{
  "id": 3589694,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN J. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wilson",
  "decision_date": "1988-11-18",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN J. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE WOODWARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was charged by information \"with the offenses of residential burglary, theft of property exceeding $300 in value, and theft (firearms). (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 16 \u2014 1(a), (e)(2), (e)(3), 19 \u2014 3.) The complainant in these charges was John C. Wilson, the defendant\u2019s father.\nAfter going to trial, defendant was convicted of residential burglary, theft over $300, and theft, and sentenced to concurrent terms of four years, two years, and one year, respectively. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) he was denied his absolute right to be present at trial; (2) he was denied a fair trial when the trial court failed sua sponte to instruct the jury on an essential element of a charge; (3) the prosecutor failed to prove defendant guilty of residential burglary; and (4) his convictions for both theft over $300 and theft (firearms) cannot stand.\nAt the preliminary hearing held on May 29, 1986, defendant was advised of the charges and penalties and further advised that should he fail to appear for his trial, the trial would be held in absentia.\nOn December 30, the date his trial was to commence, defendant was not present. Defense counsel stated that a conversation with defendant\u2019s mother revealed that defendant had been staying at a friend\u2019s house but that she did not know defendant\u2019s present whereabouts. The court noted that the court reporter had related to him that she thought she had seen the defendant at the courthouse a day earlier. The prosecutor argued that the defendant had been present on October 31 when the cause was set for trial. When queried by the prosecutor if the court required further evidence, the court found that in light of defendant\u2019s experience with the judicial system and his presence at the previous hearings, the defendant knew the consequences of his absenc\u00e9. In granting the prosecution\u2019s motion for trial in absentia, the court stated that it knew \u201cof no reasonable explanation for his absence.\u201d Thereafter, voir dire was conducted, and the jury trial proceeded without defendant\u2019s presence.\nJohn C. Wilson (Wilson), the defendant\u2019s father, testified that on the day of the incident, May 25, 1986, he lived at 2248 River Road in Freeport, Illinois. Wilson stated that on the day in question, he had been vacationing in Wisconsin. Wilson related that his marriage to Joyce Wilson had been terminated by dissolution and that he had been given custody of his two sons, Jarrod and the defendant. Wilson testified that while the order of dissolution established joint custody of his sons, the order provided that the \u201c[principal residence was supposed to be with me.\u201d\nWilson testified further that approximately six months after the dissolution in July 1985, defendant decided that he was not going to live in the house with his father and under his father\u2019s rules. Wilson stated that defendant would have been able to return to the house \u201conly if he agreed to live under [my] rules.\u201d Thereafter, according to the witness, defendant went to live with his grandmother and never attempted to return.\nWilson noted that defendant had left some of his property behind, in particular, clothing and a stereo. Wilson declared that the defendant did not have authority to enter the house and that he had informed defendant several times since he left of his feelings on the matter.\nReturning from his vacation, Wilson found that his house had been ransacked. A basement window had been kicked in, and an inspection of the house revealed that many things had been taken, to wit, a video disc player, a safe, $350 in cash, jewelry, and 12 guns, which included rifles, shotguns, and pistols. Wilson opined that the items taken were well in excess of $300. Wilson testified further that he had given his son no permission to exercise control over his property.\nWilson related that on previous occasions defendant would ask permission to enter the house to pick up his personal property, and on those occasions, Wilson would permit his son to do so. Wilson claimed that if his son would have wanted to enter the house without his explicit permission, defendant would not have had the authority.\nOn cross-examination, Wilson testified that the dissolution order terminating his marriage occurred in February 1985. Wilson confirmed that according to the dissolution order, he was to furnish the basic needs of defendant, including the requirement to provide housing for him. Defendant was born on December 4, 1968, and was 16 years old at the time of the dissolution. Wilson testified further the dissolution order mandated that he was to provide \u201cthe primary place of residence\u201d for his children. Wilson related that he had understood the order to mean that he had the responsibility to support defendant and his brother. He did not seek to modify this order.\nWilson testified further that after defendant moved out in July-1985, he had helped his son secure a job in a car wash. Wilson admitted that he did not furnish defendant any support during this period. Wilson talked to his son every few weeks; he stated that he never gave his son formal notice not to come to the house. Wilson also testified that his son had sent him a letter after the incident indicating that he had acted against his father out of bitterness.\nDeputy Michael Ridgway of the Stephenson County sheriff\u2019s department testified that he investigated the incident at bar. Pursuant to this investigation, Ridgway invited defendant to come to the sheriff\u2019s office to talk about the incident at his father\u2019s place. Once at the station house, defendant was given Miranda warnings and later gave an incriminating statement; defendant was given warnings a second time and gave another incriminating statement. The police, relying on defendant\u2019s statements, recovered weapons near the scene of the incident. As to defendant\u2019s motivation, Ridgway testified that defendant had \u201cindicated both that his father did not want him living there and that he did not want to live there.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of the State\u2019s case, defense attorney\u2019s motion for directed verdict was denied. The jury found defendant guilty of all three charges.\nAt the sentencing hearing, defendant, who was present at this proceeding, was sentenced to a term of incarceration of four years on the residential burglary conviction, two years on the theft over $300 conviction, and one year on the theft (firearms) conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.\nWe initially address defendant\u2019s argument that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court failed sua sponte to instruct the jury on an essential element of the residential burglary charge. At the close of all the evidence, the prosecution tendered the following instruction:\n\u201cA person commits the offense of residential burglary when he, without authority, knowingly enters a dwelling with the intent to commit therein the offense of theft.\u201d\nDefense counsel made no objection, and the jury was given said instruction.\nDefendant initially acknowledges the general rules regarding instructions: (1) a defendant cannot claim prejudicial error in the giving of an instruction if he did not object at trial (People v. Jones (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 300), and (2) the trial court is under no obligation to give, sua sponte, jury instructions not requested by counsel. (People v. Grant (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 551.) However, defendant points out that our supreme court has found that these basic rules have been modified by the requirements of a fair trial. The court has held that the trial court \u201cbears the burden of seeing that the jury is instructed on the elements of the crime charged, on the presumption of innocence and on the question of burden of proof.\u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. Parks (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 132, 137; see also People v. Fierer (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 176.\nDefendant asserts that here the jury was not fully instructed that the residential burglary involved the \u201cdwelling place of another.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 3(a).) Instead, the instruction dealt merely with \u201ca dwelling.\u201d Defendant contends that the tendered instruction did not contain the necessary statutory language, and, therefore, it did not comport with the legislature\u2019s intent.\nMoreover, defendant argues that this error was particularly egregious because an essential thrust of his defense was that the situs of the incident was his own, court-sanctioned dwelling place. Defendant contends that with the deletion of the phrase, \u201cdwelling of another,\u201d the jury was not compelled to consider his primary defense to the charge of residential burglary.\nThe State argues that the trial court\u2019s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury that a residential burglary must occur in the dwelling place of another did not constitute reversible error. The State maintains that this argument misconstrues the defense at trial and pretrial to the charge of residential burglary. The State asserts that contrary to his appellate argument, it was not defendant\u2019s position below that he could not be tried or convicted of residential burglary because the dwelling entered by defendant was not that \u201cof another\u201d but was, in fact, defendant\u2019s own dwelling. Rather, the State contends that the defense below only addressed defendant\u2019s entering the dwelling \u201cwithout authority,\u201d a different element of the offense of residential burglary. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 3.) Thus, the State concludes that defendant\u2019s argument on this issue should be rejected.\nFurther, the State acknowledges that it is an element of residential burglary that the dwelling be that \u201cof another\u201d and that the instructions given below did not reflect such an element. Nevertheless, it asserts that the failure to instruct the jury on the element of the \u201cdwelling of another,\u201d considering the defendant\u2019s emphasis upon the element of \u201cwithout authority,\u201d amounts to harmless error. Accordingly, the State contends that defendant is not entitled to a new trial.\nIn reply, defendant asserts that, in the proceedings below, his tiefense was two-pronged, namely, that he had the authority to enter his court-ordered residence and that said residence was not the residence of another. Defendant maintains that the State makes no challenge to his citations to the record which relate to his defense that the residence in question was not a \u201cdwelling place of another.\u201d As a result, defendant contends that this element of his defense theory warranted a full and correct instruction as to all elements of residential burglary.\nWe find that the trial court bore the burden of seeing that the jury was instructed on all elements of the charge of residential burglary. (People v. Parks (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 132.) The element of \u201cthe dwelling place of another\u201d was particularly critical here, where defendant claimed that the residence at 2248 River Road, Freeport, Illinois, was his own legally sanctioned domicile. The record indicates that throughout the pretrial proceedings defendant repeatedly asserted this contention. Therefore, the court had to be fully aware that the element of the dwelling of another was critical to the defense. The fact that defendant was tried in absentia (though he was represented by counsel) and, consequently, did not put forward any defense at trial does not lessen the necessity of the trial court instructing the jury as to all elements of the charge of residential burglary.\nAccordingly, we find that the trial court committed reversible error in not instructing the jury on an essential element of the charge, i.e., that the offense must occur in the dwelling place of another. Because of our determination of this issue, we do not need to address the other arguments brought up by defendant. We reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nNASH and REINHARD, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE WOODWARD"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "G. Joseph Weller and Manuel S. Serritos, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.",
      "Charles R. Hartman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Freeport (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN J. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201487\u20140039\nOpinion filed November 18, 1988.\nG. Joseph Weller and Manuel S. Serritos, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nCharles R. Hartman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Freeport (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0358-01",
  "first_page_order": 380,
  "last_page_order": 385
}