{ "id": 3588750, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. RICHARD M. DALEY, State's Attorney of Cook County, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DATACOM SYSTEMS CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees (Datacom Systems Corporation, Third-Party Plaintiff; The Department of Registration and Education et al., Third-Party Defendants-Appellants)", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Sytems Corp.", "decision_date": "1988-11-10", "docket_number": "Nos. 87\u20140674, 87\u20140677 cons.", "first_page": "697", "last_page": "714", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 697" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "57 N.E.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "388 Ill. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2501707 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/388/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3398385 ], "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 N.E. 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 Ill. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2418933 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/290/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.E. 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 Ill. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5280129 ], "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/358/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5437214 ], "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 N.E.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5456424 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 F.2d 874", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2191414 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/411/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 1024", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3438922 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3271060 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "663 F. Supp. 651", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7398677 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/663/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455758 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3177929 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3603776 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 P.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10447237 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/609/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "928" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3011515 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 1012", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1015" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083629 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" }, { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5304654 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/120/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 N.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1905, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2863374 ], "year": 1905, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 N.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2580262 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/74/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 N.E .2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2533892 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/102/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 N.E. 934", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ill. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2408172 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/274/0637-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1262, "char_count": 41207, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0827045086819808e-07, "percentile": 0.5629088800157847 }, "sha256": "fe319d8cf2d86982255fc26847454c50de217bebbe640a3bc56046a3ed1eb4cb", "simhash": "1:ffa220d412f797f2", "word_count": 6535 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:43:30.106689+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. RICHARD M. DALEY, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DATACOM SYSTEMS CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees (Datacom Systems Corporation, Third-Party Plaintiff; The Department of Registration and Education et al., Third-Party Defendants-Appellants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, Illinois (the State\u2019s Attorney), brought an action on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois against the City of Chicago (the City) and Datacom Systems Corporation (Datacom). The complaint challenged certain aspects of the City\u2019s parking ticket collection program, whereby the City contracted with Datacom to aid in the City\u2019s efforts to collect fines allegedly due the City for individuals\u2019 asserted violations of the City\u2019s parking ordinances. The pleading alleged facts purporting to show that Datacom\u2019s actions with respect to the City\u2019s program violated the Illinois Collection Agency Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111, par. 2001 et seq.), the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer. Fraud Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121 1/2, par. 261 et seq.) and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121 1/2, par. 311 et seq.). The complaint also alleged facts purporting to demonstrate in quo warranto that the actions of the City and Datacom with respect to the program exceeded their corporate authorities. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 18\u2014101 et seq.) The trial court dismissed the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint against Datacom and the. City for failure to state claims for which relief could be granted (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014615(a)), and the State\u2019s Attorney appeals.\nOn the same day that the State\u2019s Attorney filed its complaint against Datacom and the City, the Illinois Department of Registration and Education (DRE) initiated an administrative action to suspend or revoke Datacom\u2019s debt collection agency license, charging Datacom with violations of the Illinois Collection Agency Act. Thereafter, in the lawsuit commenced by the State\u2019s Attorney, Datacom was granted leave to file a third-party action against the DRE in which Datacom requested a declaratory judgment that Datacom\u2019s activities under the City\u2019s program were not governed by the Collection Agency Act and a temporary and permanent injunction to bar the DRE\u2019s administrative action against Datacom. The DRE filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. The trial court denied the DRE\u2019s motion to dismiss, entered a declaratory judgment that Datacom\u2019s activities do not fall within the scope of the Collection Agency Act, and permanently enjoined the DRE from any administrative action to suspend or revoke Datacom\u2019s debt collection agency license. The DRE appeals.\nWe hold that: (1) Datacom\u2019s activities pursuant to its contract with the City amount to the sale of debt collection services governed by the Illinois Collection Agency Act; (2) Datacom\u2019s provision of debt collection services pursuant to its contract with the City is governed by the Consumer Fraud Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act; (3) Datacom\u2019s debt collection activities as an independent contractor for the City do not fall within the acts\u2019 exemptions for actions of public officials; (4) the factual allegations of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint are sufficient to state claims that the notices sent by Datacom were misleading and thereby violated the acts; and (5) the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint is sufficient to state claims against Datacom and the City in quo warranto.\nWe recognize that the City\u2019s contract with Datacom to collect allegedly delinquent municipal parking ticket fines was instituted pursuant to lengthy study, and that the City\u2019s program was adopted to achieve the laudatory and important goals of collecting needed municipal revenues and improving perceived deficiencies in the City\u2019s parking ticket collection system. The City\u2019s power to employ agents or independent contractors to assist in its collection program is not challenged in this appeal. At issue in this case is, simply, the applicability of the Illinois Collection Agency Act, the Consumer Fraud Act, and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act to Datacom\u2019s activities pursuant to its contract with the City. We conclude that these acts do apply to Datacom\u2019s actions and that the City cannot enter into a contract with an independent contractor collection agency to collect municipal parking ticket fines, which are \u201cdebts\u201d under the Illinois Collection Agency Act, and by said contract authorize the independent contractor collection agency\u2019s violations of the Collection Agency Act, the Consumer Fraud Act, and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Our determination that the acts are applicable does not negate the validity of a debt collection program, agreed to by a municipality and its agents or independent contractors, which is not violative of those acts.\nBased upon our determinations, we find that the trial court should not have dismissed the Cook County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint for failure to state claims for which relief could be granted and should have dismissed Datacom\u2019s third-party complaint against the DRE. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.\nBackground\nThe State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint states the following with regard to the City\u2019s contract with Datacom to recover fines allegedly due from persons with outstanding parking tickets. When a person has allegedly violated the City\u2019s parking ordinance, the police department of the City serves the individual with a citation that is placed or tied on his motor vehicle. This citation states, inter alia, \u201cNotice \u2014 this is a complaint for a parking violation.\u201d The issuance of this notice initiates a court case in the circuit court of Cook County against the owner of the vehicle corresponding to the number of the license plate listed on the citation. The citation contains a schedule of statutory minimum fines for various parking offenses, which the person can pay by mail if he chooses to plead guilty to the alleged ordinance violation.\nIf the ticket holder does not either plead guilty, and pay the scheduled fine, or appear in court to contest the citation, notices setting a second court date are sent to the ticket holder by the clerk of the circuit court. If the ticket holder does not pay the scheduled fine or attend the second court hearing, he is listed by the clerk of the circuit court as being delinquent in paying the fine. According to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint, \u201c[n]o judgment has ever been entered by a Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County against persons who neither appear in court to contest the alleged parking violation nor plead guilty to the violation and paid the scheduled fine.\u201d\nOn January 30, 1985, Datacom and the City executed a contract pursuant to which Datacom agreed, according to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint, to \u201cperform all services necessary to attempt to effect collection of delinquent parking ticket fines where parking tickets were issued by the *** City prior to September 30, 1984. Under said contract *** Datacom would retain a percentage which ranges from 20% to 42% of monies collected.\u201d\nAccording to the terms of the contract, Datacom agreed to \u201cundertake through ethical and lawful means to effect collections of the delinquent parking tickets.\u201d To do so, Datacom agreed to mail notices to delinquent ticket holders. The City reserved the right to approve the text of all notices and information sent by Datacom. The contract provided that Datacom was an independent contractor in the performance of its duties and was not an agent of or joint venturer with the City. Under the contract, Datacom agreed to comply with all applicable provisions of Federal, State and city ordinances, with specific reference to license requirements and debt collection activities. Thereafter Datacom applied for and was issued a debt collection agency license by the DRE.\nBetween May 1985 and January 1986, Datacom sent notices to Illinois residents who allegedly were delinquent in paying parking fines to the City. These notices instructed the recipients to pay the \u201ctotal amount due\u201d stated therein. This total amount included a sum listed under \u201cfines and penalties\u201d plus an additional amount listed under the heading \u201ccourt costs\u201d or \u201cmailing fees.\u201d The amount of the \u201cfines and penalties\u201d listed in the notices was higher than the fines listed on the recipient\u2019s original parking citations; these initial citations also had stated no amount due for \u201ccourt costs\u201d or \u201cmailing fees.\u201d Neither the City nor Datacom filed a motion in the circuit court to amend the City\u2019s traffic complaint to request increased fees; no trial court entered an order increasing the requested payment; and no court entered a judgment which would permit the recovery of \u201ccourt costs\u201d or \u201cmailing fees.\u201d\nThe notices sent by Datacom carried the seal of the City, listed as return addressee the City\u2019s department of revenue, and directed inquiries to an address and telephone number that appeared to be the City\u2019s department of revenue. However, inquiries so channelled were actually received and handled by Datacom, and fines paid were actually received by Datacom. Also, although the notices directed that checks or money orders be made payable to the clerk of the circuit court, payments were deposited by Datacom in its accounts in the Seaway National Bank. Datacom\u2019s deposits of monies in the bank continued until approximately July 1, 1985; the funds were not remitted to the office of the clerk of the circuit court until mid-July 1985. Neither the Cook County circuit court clerk, nor any judge of Cook County circuit court, authorized Datacom to deposit these payments in Datacom\u2019s accounts with the bank, or any other accounts not authorized by the Clerk.\nAccording to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint, Datacom\u2019s notices were also forwarded to persons who had previously paid their parking fines, individuals who had not violated any City parking ordinance, and persons whose citations had been dismissed by court order.\nOn February 26, 1986, the State\u2019s Attorney filed a four-count complaint against Datacom and the City. Count I alleged that Data-com violated certain provisions of the Consumer Fraud Act, including, inter alia, numerous violations of the Collection Agency Act. In count II of the complaint, the State\u2019s Attorney alleged that Datacom\u2019s activities with respect to the City\u2019s parking ticket collection program violated various provisions of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. In counts III and IV of the complaint, the State\u2019s Attorney alleged that the activities of the City and Datacom exceeded their corporate authorities. The complaint requested various forms of declaratory and equitable relief, including suspension or revocation of Datacom\u2019s debt collection agency license, as well as fines for violations of the several acts upon which the State\u2019s Attorney relied.\nThe City and Datacom filed a motion to dismiss the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint in its entirety for failure to state claims for which relief could be granted. Datacom also filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the DRE to bar the DRE from proceeding on its administrative complaint against Datacom. The trial court allowed Datacom\u2019s motion to file the third-party complaint, to which the DRE filed a motion to dismiss. Following a hearing wherein the parties argued their respective positions, the trial court entered an order that dismissed the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint against Datacom and the City. The court also entered a permanent injunction against the DRE barring its administrative proceeding to suspend or revoke Datacom\u2019s debt collection agency license. The State\u2019s Attorney and the DRE appeal.\nOpinion \u2022\nI\nThe State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint alleges that Datacom\u2019s actions in connection with its collection efforts for the City violate the Illinois Collection Agency Act and also constitute unfair practices under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Datacom\u2019s motion to dismiss responds that its activities are not subject to the provisions of the Illinois Collection Agency Act. Datacom argues that its actions are not subject to the provisions of the Collection Agency Act both with respect to the sufficiency of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint and also in support of its own third-party action against the DRE. We disagree and hold that Datacom\u2019s activities under its City contract are governed by the Illinois Collection Agency Act.\nDatacom argues that its activities are not governed by the Illinois Collection Agency Act because its contract with the City only obligates it to provide data processing or clerical services rather than debt collection services. The Illinois Collection Agency Act states that a \u201ccorporation acts as a collection agency when *** it *** [ejngages in the business of collection for others of any account, bill or other indebtedness.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111, par. 2006(a).) The State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint alleges and the terms of Datacom\u2019s contract with the City plainly provide, that Datacom would, for a percentage fee, \u201cundertake through ethical and lawful means to effect collections of the delinquent parking tickets.\u201d The contract further states that Datacom agreed to comply with all applicable provisions of Federal, State and city laws, including those regarding license requirements and debt collection activities. In light of Datacom\u2019s agreement that it would \u201ceffect collection of the delinquent parking tickets\u201d for a fee, and that it would comply with applicable laws pertaining to debt collection activities, we conclude that the allegations in the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint are sufficient to establish, for the purpose of overcoming Datacom\u2019s motion to dismiss, that Datacom\u2019s activities amount to debt collection rather than simply data processing.\nDatacom also asserts that its activities are exempted from the Illinois Collection Agency Act (Act) because that act expressly states that it does not apply to actions of \u201c[p]ublic officers and judicial officers acting under order of a court.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111, par. 2005(4).) Datacom argues that the City\u2019s collection of delinquent parking ticket fines constitutes the conduct of an exempted public officer; because the City\u2019s collection of these municipal fines is exempted from the Act, Datacom\u2019s activities, which are to be performed \u201cat the direction of and to the satisfaction of the City\u201d pursuant to its contract with the City, are also exempt.\nHowever, the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint alleges, and Datacom\u2019s contract with the City explicitly provides, that Datacom\u2019s actions are those of an independent contractor for the City and that Datacom is not acting as an agent of or joint venturer with the City. The State\u2019s Attorney argues that because Datacom agreed to act as an independent contractor for the City, Datacom\u2019s actions pursuant to its contract with the City do not fall, as a matter of law, within the Collection Agency Act\u2019s exemption for acts of \u201cpublic officers.\u201d Datacom does not dispute the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s argument that as an independent contractor Datacom cannot benefit from the public officer exemption of the Act. In light of these circumstances, we find Data-com\u2019s reliance upon the Act\u2019s public officer exemption insufficient ground to affirm the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint. Whether Datacom is in fact an agent of the City, or an independent contractor, and the legal significance of said status under the Act may be determined upon evidentiary proof and legal argument upon remand.\nDatacom further argues that the provisions of the Collection Agency Act are not applicable to its activities because municipal parking ticket fines are not \u201cdebts\u201d under the Act. According to the terms of the Act, a collection agency is \u201cany person, association, partnership or corporation who, for compensation, either contingent or otherwise, or for other valuable consideration, offers services to collect an alleged debt.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111, par. 2004.) It states that a \u201cperson, association, partnership or corporation acts as a collection agency when he or it *** [ejngages in the business of collection for others of any account, bill or other indebtedness.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. Ill, par. 2006(a).) Although the term \u201cdebt\u201d is not defined in the Act, the Illinois legislature has recently indicated in the Hlinois Vehicle Code that a \u201cfinal determination of parking violation liability *** [assessing] any unpaid fine or penalty will constitute a debt due and owing the municipality.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11 \u2014 208.3(b)(5)(i); see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11 \u2014 208.3(b)(5)(ii) (notice of final determination shall indicate that unpaid fine is \u201cdebt due and owing the municipality\u201d).) Because the Illinois Vehicle Code explicitly recognizes a municipal parking fine as a \u201cdebt,\u201d and the Illinois Collection Agency Act applies to the business of collecting \u201can alleged debt,\u201d we believe the Illinois legislature intended the term \u201calleged debt\u201d under the Illinois Collection Agency Act to include the allegedly delinquent parking ticket fines which Datacom has agreed to attempt to collect in the instant case.\nDatacom cites to various cases for the general proposition that a municipal fine is not a \u201cdebt\u201d under Illinois law. (People v. Dummer (1916), 274 Ill. 637, 113 N.E. 934; City of Chicago v. Thomas (1968), 102 Ill. App. 2d 143, 243 N.E .2d 572; Village of Park Forest v. Bragg (1966), 74 Ill. App. 2d 87, 220 N.E.2d 61, rev\u2019d (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 225, 230 N.E.2d 868; Flynn v. City of Springfield (1905), 120 Ill. App. 266.) In view of the Illinois legislature\u2019s specific recognition of a municipal parking ticket fine as a \u201cdebt due and owing the municipality,\u201d the decisions to which Datacom refers are not applicable to the case at bar.\nBecause Datacom\u2019s third-party complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the City\u2019s municipal parking ticket fines are not \u201cdebts\u201d under the Collection Agency Act, we consider the propriety of Datacom\u2019s third-party complaint at this juncture. In this regard we address the DRE\u2019s arguments that the trial court should have dismissed Datacom\u2019s third-party complaint. Section 2 \u2014 406(b) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) permits a defendant, by third-party complaint, to \u201cbring in as a defendant a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him or her for all or part of the plaintiff\u2019s claim against him or her.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 406(b).) The DRE does not question whether Datacom\u2019s third-party declaratory judgment action against it was permissible pursuant to section 2 \u2014 406(b) of the Code, and we therefore do not reach the issue. We note that the trial court\u2019s inclusion of the third-party claim would have been appropriate under section 2 \u2014 1006 of the Code, which allows a defendant to file a separate claim against a nonparty and seek consolidation of the two causes \u201cas an aid to convenience, whenever it can be done without prejudice to a substantial right.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1006.) We find no reversible error in the trial court\u2019s discretionary decision to permit Datacom\u2019s filing of the third-party claim, since such procedure adhered in substance to the requirements of section 2 \u2014 1006 of the Code.\nHowever, we further find that the trial court should have dismissed Datacom\u2019s third-party complaint on its merits. The DRE argues for the first time on appeal that Datacom\u2019s third-party complaint should have been dismissed because the City\u2019s allegedly delinquent parking ticket fines are \u201cdebts\u201d under the Collection Agency Act. Although the DRE\u2019s argument could be deemed waived upon review because it was not raised before the trial court, we note that the DRE\u2019s contention is solely a question of law and has been fully briefed and argued by Datacom, DRE, and the State\u2019s Attorney in this appeal. In light of these circumstances, we elect to consider the merits of the DRE\u2019s argument that Datacom\u2019s third-party complaint should have been dismissed because the municipal parking ticket fines are debts under the Collection Agency Act.\nAs discussed above, we determine that the municipal parking ticket fines are debts under the Collection Agency Act. Because Data-com\u2019s third-party complaint sought a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction on the sole premise that the parking ticket fines are not debts under the Collection Agency Act, and we have concluded that said fines are debts under that Act, we find that the trial court erred when it permanently enjoined administrative proceedings by the DRE against Datacom. We also hold that the trial court should have dismissed Datacom\u2019s third-party complaint against the DRE.\nII\nCount I of the complaint charged Datacom with violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. Datacom contends that its actions do not violate the Consumer Fraud Act because that act regulates only activities in \u201ctrade or commerce\u201d to protect \u201cconsumers.\u201d The Consumer Fraud Act defines the terms \u201ctrade\u201d and \u201ccommerce\u201d to include the \u201csale *** of any services *** directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121 1/2, par. 261(f).) The phrase \u201ctrade or commerce\u201d is to be given a liberal construction so that the broad purposes of the Consumer Fraud Act might be achieved. (See, e.g., Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, International (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 279, 284, 430 N.E.2d 1012; People ex rel. Fahner v. Hedrich (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 83, 88, 438 N.E.2d 924.) Cases from other jurisdictions have held that the provision of debt collection services constitutes the \u201csale\u201d of a \u201cservice\u201d affecting \u201ctrade or commerce\u201d governed by consumer fraud regulations. See, e.g., State v. O\u2019Neill Investigations, Inc. (Ala. 1980), 609 P.2d 520; see generally Note, The Illinois Collection Agency Act, 1975 U. Ill. L.F. 441, 455-57.\nDatacom does not address or challenge the general proposition that the provision of debt collection services is a \u201cservice\u201d affecting \u201ctrade or commerce\u201d that is governed by the Consumer Fraud Act. Rather, Datacom argues that its mailing of notices to delinquent parking ticket holders is not the typical consumer transaction which the Consumer Fraud Act seeks to regulate. Thus Datacom\u2019s argument draws a distinction between the collection of consumer debts (such as debts arising from the purchase of goods for household use) and the collection of debts owed to a local government (such as fines arising from violations of municipal ordinances). Based upon this distinction between the collection of consumer debts and debts of a local government, Datacom asserts that only the collection of consumer debts falls within the purview of the Consumer Fraud Act. Datacom maintains that the collection of municipal debts, such as the collection of allegedly delinquent parking ticket fines at issue in the case at bar, is not governed by the Consumer Fraud Act.\nIn our view, Datacom\u2019s argument draws an invalid distinction between various types of debts. The Consumer Fraud Act\u2019s definition of \u201ctrade or commerce\u201d does not differentiate between consumer debts and other classifications of debts for purposes of the Consumer Fraud Act\u2019s applicability. The appropriate inquiry is, simply, whether the City has purchased debt collection services from Datacom, and whether Datacom\u2019s provision of these services \u201cdirectly or indirectly affect[s] the people of this State.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121 1/2, par. 261(f).) Datacom\u2019s debt collection activities for the. City, similar to debt collection services for any creditor from whom a consumer has purchased an item for household use, amount to the sale of a service that, as alleged in the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint, \u201cdirectly or indirectly affects the people of this State.\u201d For these reasons we conclude that Datacom\u2019s debt collection activities are part of \u201ctrade or commerce\u201d governed by the Consumer Fraud Act.\nIn count II of the complaint, the State\u2019s Attorney charged Datacom with violations of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Datacom argues that its actions are not governed by the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act because that act is limited to deceptive conduct in connection with the sale of goods or services, and grants an injured competitor standing to sue a party who offers or misrepresents as his goods those of the injured competitor. Datacom\u2019s position represents an overly restrictive interpretation of that act. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act accords the right to injunctive relief to \u201c[a] person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121 1/2, par. 313.) Deceptive trade practices include, for example, \u201ccausing] likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services,\u201d or \u201cthe affiliation, connection or association with or certification by another,\u201d or \u201cany other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121 1/2, pars. 312(2), 312(3), 312(12).) In the case at bar, the State\u2019s Attorney alleges that recipients of Datacom\u2019s notices have been misled by Datacom\u2019s misrepresentations in the performance of its debt collection services for the City. We disagree with Datacom\u2019s position that these recipients are not \u201cpersons likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice\u201d adopted by Datacom. (See Duncavage v. Allen (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 88, 101-02, 497 N.E.2d 433, appeal denied (1987), 113 Ill. 2d 573.) As a result we find Datacom\u2019s argument insufficient ground to warrant dismissal of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s claim under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.\nTo support its position that its activities for the City do not constitute \u201ctrade or commerce\u201d under the Consumer Fraud Act and Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Datacom relies upon Chirikos v. Yellow Cab Co. (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 569, 410 N.E.2d 61, and Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634. Both cases are distinguishable.\nIn Chirikos, plaintiff argued that taxicab companies licensed by the City of Chicago violated the Consumer Fraud Act when the companies allegedly submitted misleading and erroneous information to the city in order to obtain city adoption of an ordinance authorizing a taxicab fare increase. In affirming the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the claim, the appellate court reasoned that the taxicab companies\u2019 \u201cdeception was [not] practiced in connection with trade or commerce\u201d because inter alia \u201cthere was no representation and no dealing whatsoever between plaintiff and [the taxicab companies]. No representations or misrepresentations at the time plaintiff entered a taxicab or paid his fare are alleged in the amended complaint.\u201d (87 Ill. App. 3d at 578, 410 N.E.2d at 67-68.) In contrast to Chirikos, the case at bar is founded on alleged misrepresentations made by Data-com to recipients of the notices regarding allegedly delinquent parking ticket fines. Chirikos is therefore inapplicable to the instant case.\nThe case of Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School is also distinguishable. In that decision, plaintiff alleged that a medical school violated the Consumer Fraud Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act because the school used nonacademic criteria to reject plaintiff\u2019s application for admission. The supreme court determined that the trial court properly found that pleading insufficient to state claims for which relief could be granted. To support this conclusion, the supreme court simply observed that the Consumer Fraud Act was inapplicable because plaintiff was not a \u201cconsumer\u201d who had purchased merchandise and that the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act did not apply since it \u201cis limited to goods or services [and therefore] is not relevant.\u201d 69 Ill. 2d at 328, 371 N.E.2d at 638.\n\u201cHowever, the issue before the court [in Steinberg] was the right of a private person to sue under the Act, not the right of the [State\u2019s Attorney] to investigate or the scope of the Act\u2019s regulation. The court held that the Act did not provide a remedy for persons in Steinberg\u2019s position, because he, as an applicant, was not a \u2018consumer\u2019 \u2014 that is, he was not a purchaser of educational services.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) (Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, International (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 279, 285, 430 N.E.2d 1012, 1015.) \u201cThus, it appears that while the definition of consumer as set out in [the Act] may be pertinent for determining whether a plaintiff has standing, it is not a question of importance in a case, like the present case, which has been brought by the Attorney General\u2019s [or State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s] Office. [Citations.]\u201d (People ex rel. Fahner v. Hedrich (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 83, 88, 438 N.E.2d 924, 928.) Steinberg is therefore not controlling in the case at bar.\nDatacom also contends that its activities are covered by the exemptions of the Consumer Fraud Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The Consumer Fraud Act provides that it is inapplicable to \u201c[a]ctions or transactions specifically authorized by laws administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this State.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121 1/2, par. 270b(1).) The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act similarly exempts \u201cconduct in compliance with the orders or rules of or a statute administered by a Federal, state or local governmental agency.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 121V2, par. 314(1).\nTo support its position, Datacom again cites to Chirikos v. Yellow Cab Co. (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 569, 410 N.E.2d 61. The Chirikos decision is distinguishable from the instant case. In Chirikos, the Consumer Fraud Act\u2019s exemption was held to apply because public officers in the discharge of their lawful authorities had acted in reliance upon misrepresentations made by private parties.\nIn the case at bar, however, the debt collection activities of which the State\u2019s Attorney complains are not alleged to have been undertaken by the City in reliance upon misrepresentations made by Data-com. Rather, the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint alleges that Datacom has made misrepresentations to recipients of Datacom\u2019s notices. The State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s pleading further alleges that Datacom has made these misrepresentations in Datacom\u2019s capacity as an independent contractor providing debt collection services to the City, and Datacom has made no argument to the effect that an independent contractor debt collection agency may benefit from the exemptions stated in the acts upon which Datacom relies. Under these circumstances, we find Datacom\u2019s citation to the public official exemptions of the Consumer Fraud Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act inadequate basis to affirm the- trial court\u2019s dismissal of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint. See Richardson v. Baker (S.D.N.Y. 1987), 663 F. Supp. 651; cf. Sherman v. Field Clinic (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 21, 392 N.E.2d 154; Note, The Illinois Collection Agency Act, 1975 U. Ill. L.F. 441, 447 n.34.\nWe further determine that the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint is sufficient to state a claim that Datacom\u2019s notices employ deception, fraud, false pretense, misrepresentation, or the concealment of a material fact to those persons who received Datacom\u2019s notices and therefore may violate the Consumer Fraud Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. (See People ex rel. Hartigan v. Stianos (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 575, 581, 475 N.E.2d 1024 (collection of excessive sales tax held unfair and deceptive); Floersheim v. Federal Trade Comm\u2019n (9th Cir. 1969), 411 F.2d 874, 878 (misleading address to indicate debt collection notices derived from government source held unfair and deceptive); see also State v. O\u2019Neill Investigations, Inc. (Ala. 1980), 609 P.2d 520, 534; Richardson v. Baker (S.D.N.Y. 1987), 663 F. Supp. 651 (improper debt collection activities violate consumer fraud regulations).) Because the issue is not briefed by the parties herein, we need not and do not address the question of whether a violation of the Collection Agency Act is a per se violation of the consumer Fraud Act. See Note, The Illinois Collection Agency Act, 1975 U. Ill. L.F. 441.\nWith respect to whether the notices are misleading under the acts, Datacom urges that this court should follow the rulings of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Horn v. City of Chicago (7th Cir. September 21, 1988), Nos. 87-1174, 87-1175, 87-1209, 87-1936, and the circuit court of Cook County in Stelzik v. City of Chicago (January 21, 1986), No. 85 \u2014 CH\u20147631 (memorandum opinion). However, \u201c[t]he central question in [these actions was] whether plaintiffs were afforded the pre-deprivation process required by the United States Constitution.\u201d (Horn, slip op. at 8.) Because both of these decisions pertained to whether the demand notices provided sufficient notice to satisfy procedural due process, they are not apposite to the instant cause.\nWe note that Datacom contends on appeal that the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice because the State\u2019s Attorney is laboring under a conflict of interest. (See generally Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 14, par. 6; Environmental Protection Agency v. Pollution Control Board (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 394, 372 N.E.2d 50; People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149; People ex rel. Courtney v. Ashton (1934), 358 Ill. 146, 192 N.E. 820; People ex rel. Livers v. Hanson (1919), 290 Ill. 370, 125 N.E. 268; 1975 Ill. Att\u2019y Gen. Op. 143.) In this regard Datacom asserts that the State\u2019s Attorney has adopted inconsistent positions in two other lawsuits. (Horn v. City of Chicago (N.D. Ill. December 29, 1986), No. 85 \u2014 C\u20146838 (amended memorandum opinion), rev\u2019d (7th Cir. September 21, 1988), Nos. 87-1174, 87-1175, 87-1209, 87-1936; Stelzik v. City of Chicago (January 21, 1986), No. 85 \u2014 CH\u20147631 (memorandum opinion).) Datacom argues that on this basis, the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to dismiss should be affirmed.\nHowever, Datacom did not raise this contention in its motion to dismiss the complaint, nor did Datacom present a motion to disqualify the State\u2019s Attorney on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest. Since the trial court made no ruling either with respect to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s disqualification, or on whether the State\u2019s Attorney is laboring under a conflict of interest, the question is not properly presented for review, and we do not consider the issue here. Also, in none of the cases cited by Datacom was a State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s conflict of interest deemed sufficient basis to dismiss the cause with prejudice, as was done by the trial court in the case at bar. Consequently, we find Datacom\u2019s argument in this regard an inadequate basis to affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling in the instant case.\nIII\nThe State\u2019s Attorney argues that the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the quo warranto actions was also improper. Specifically, the State\u2019s Attorney maintains that certain acts of Datacom and the City are in excess of their authorities. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 18\u2014101 et seq.; People ex rel. Carey v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc. (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 61, 369 N.E.2d 94.) In People ex rel. Ray v. Lewiston Community High School (1944), 388 Ill. 78, 57 N.E.2d 486, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:\n\u201cA complaint in quo warranto is not, in the strict sense, a pleading. Following the function of the ancient writ, the complaint is the voice of sovereignty calling upon the defendant to answer by what authority he acts. The plaintiff is not required to either allege or prove any facts. *** The burden is on the defendant [to disclaim or justify]. If he attempts to justify; he must allege and prove facts which justify his acts. *** The defendant, not the plaintiff, must, by his answer, tender the issues on which the rights claimed by him are to be litigated.\u201d 388 Ill. at 86-87.\nApplying the Lewiston principles to the instant case, we hold that the trial court improperly dismissed the quo warranto actions. The State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint sufficiently and properly questions the authorities of the City and Dataeom to: (1) issue demand notices that improperly imposed extrajudicially increased fines; (2) permit Dataeom to \u201cmasquerade\u201d as the City by utilizing the City seal and insignia on the demand notices; and (3) appropriate funds sent pursuant to the demand notices by negotiating checks made payable to the clerk of the circuit court and depositing those sums in Datacom\u2019s account at the Seaway National Bank.\nThe City and Dataeom argue that Datacom\u2019s activities pursuant to its contract to collect allegedly delinquent parking ticket fines were undertaken on behalf of the City. Thus the City and Dataeom contend that under the City\u2019s broad, home rule municipal powers, the City (through Dataeom) could demand higher fines before seeking them in court as long as those demands do not exceed the maximum allowed by ordinance. On the basis of this home rule municipal power, the City and Dataeom also maintain that the City has the authority to contract with a private company to enforce the City\u2019s regulatory traffic and parking powers and that its contract with Dataeom simply delegates to Dataeom the administrative and ministerial functions of parking ticket enforcement and collection. Therefore, the City and Dataeom assert, Dataeom was simply providing data processing or clerical services to the City in the City\u2019s efforts to collect delinquent parking ticket fines.\nHowever, the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint alleges that Dataeom and the City agreed that Dataeom would act as independent contractor to provide all services necessary to effect collection of delinquent parking tickets and that Dataeom would comply with applicable laws regarding debt collection services. Neither the City nor Dataeom has provided any legal basis for a home rule municipality to accord to an independent contractor, which is acting as a debt collection agency, the powers to demand extrajudicially increased amounts of fines, to use the City seal and insignia, and to negotiate and deposit checks made payable to the clerk of the circuit court. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111, pars. 2012 (general category of violations of Collection Agency Act), 2014 (threat of criminal prosecution), 2023 (enforcement of nonexistent right), 2024 (failure to disclose collection agency name), 2026 (unauthorized use of governmental badge or insignia), 2029, 2030 (unauthorized collection of fines or fees), 2032 (unauthorized collection of interest or other charges).\nThe City\u2019s home rule powers do not justify the City\u2019s demand for a greater amount than that stated in the parking citation, since the Chicago Municipal Code affords such power only to a judge of the circuit court. (See Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7\u00a71 \u2014 14, 27 \u2014 363 (1987).) Moreover, neither the City nor Datacom has offered any specific legal foundation to justify the negotiation of checks made payable to the clerk or the deposit of these funds into Datacom\u2019s account at Seaway National Bank. As a result, we find the trial court improperly dismissed the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s quo warranto claims.\nFor the reasons stated, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s complaint for failure to state claims for which relief could be granted and in permanently enjoining the DRE\u2019s administrative proceeding against Datacom. We also determine that the trial court should have dismissed Datacom\u2019s third-party complaint against the DRE. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.\nReversed and remanded.\nJIGANTI, P.J., and LINN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Glenn Carr and Caroline O. Shoenberger, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, and Patricia Rosen and Bret Rappaport, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants Department of Registration and Education and Gary L. Clayton.", "Judson H. Miner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Lynn K. Mitchell, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee City of Chicago.", "Baker & McKenzie, of Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, Thomas F. Bridgman, and William Lynch Schaller, of counsel), for appellee Datacom Systems Corporation.", "Thomas W. Kelty and Michael J. Luke, both of Pfeifer & Kelty, P.C., of Springfield, for amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. RICHARD M. DALEY, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DATACOM SYSTEMS CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees (Datacom Systems Corporation, Third-Party Plaintiff; The Department of Registration and Education et al., Third-Party Defendants-Appellants).\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNos. 87\u20140674, 87\u20140677 cons.\nOpinion filed November 10, 1988.\nRehearing denied December 15, 1988.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Glenn Carr and Caroline O. Shoenberger, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, and Patricia Rosen and Bret Rappaport, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants Department of Registration and Education and Gary L. Clayton.\nJudson H. Miner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Lynn K. Mitchell, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee City of Chicago.\nBaker & McKenzie, of Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, Thomas F. Bridgman, and William Lynch Schaller, of counsel), for appellee Datacom Systems Corporation.\nThomas W. Kelty and Michael J. Luke, both of Pfeifer & Kelty, P.C., of Springfield, for amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0697-01", "first_page_order": 719, "last_page_order": 736 }