{ "id": 3588765, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EUGENE PAULL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Paull", "decision_date": "1988-11-30", "docket_number": "No. 86\u20141361", "first_page": "960", "last_page": "965", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 960" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "134 N.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2715114 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/8/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 N.E.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 2d 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2474043 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 1321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3355711 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160428 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 N.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 938", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3560911 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "946" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0938-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 600, "char_count": 10546, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.201735565842673e-07, "percentile": 0.5938527690224411 }, "sha256": "2811dff4f7468f88691366cafb72a7d613b9cef5008c37ba8c534748af96de38", "simhash": "1:4e7fb73f500d8bbc", "word_count": 1725 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:43:30.106689+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EUGENE PAULL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WHITE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Eugene Pauli, charged with aggravated incest and convicted of that offense after a jury trial, appeals the conviction and the six-year prison sentence imposed thereon. He contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence items found in his home; in inadvertently suggesting to the jury that he was charged with a second count of the same offense; in allowing unfairly prejudicial cross-examination of a defense witness; and in admitting testimony which accused him of other crimes.\nThe complaining witness, the younger of defendant\u2019s two daughters, alleged that the incident occurred during an August 1983 visit at the home of defendant, who was divorced from her mother. Complainant, who was 16 years old at the time, alleged that defendant invited her to the bedroom he shared with his girlfriend, Sharon Olnhausen; that the two adults performed sexual acts upon her; and that she engaged in sexual intercourse with defendant.\nBefore trial, the defense moved to exclude two photographs and three books which were found in a search of defendant\u2019s apartment following his arrest. Sharon Olnhausen, who shared the apartment and gave police officers written consent to search the premises, testified that she had signed the consent form only after police officers told her that if she did not consent, they would get a search warrant and \u201cit would look bad\u201d for defendant. Defendant argued that the officers\u2019 remarks to Olnhausen constituted coercion which invalidated her consent. He also claimed that the photographs, which showed complainant nude, and the books, whose subject was incest, were unfairly prejudicial. The trial court ruled that the photographs and books were admissible, and defendant contends that this ruling was error.\nA trial court\u2019s decision on the voluntary nature of a consent to search will be accepted on review unless clearly unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. (People v. Howard (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 938, 946, 460 N.E.2d 432.) In our view, the mere statements that the officers would get a warrant and that \u201cit would look bad\u201d for defendant fall far short of establishing coercion or deceit and do not justify reversal of the trial court\u2019s finding that Olnhausen\u2019s consent was voluntary.\nWe are similarly disinclined to disturb the trial court\u2019s decision that the prejudicial effect of the books and photos did not outweigh their probative value. A reviewing court will not substitute its own judgment on the issue for that of the trial court unless an abuse of discretion is apparent; no such abuse appears here. See People v. Ward (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 443, 463 N.E.2d 696.\nDefendant also contends that he was prejudiced by a court error in the reading of the charges against him. At the start of jury selection, the trial court began to read an indictment to the prospective jurors:\n\u201cTHE COURT: The case before the Court is the case of the People of the State of Illinois versus Eugene Charles Pauli, wherein the defendant is charged with on August 1, 1983, with committing the offense of aggravated incest, in that he, a male person, knowing the victim involved herein as his daughter, had sexual intercourse with Teresa Pauli, a female, in violation of the statutes.\nHe is also charged with\u2014\nMR. ROSENSTRAUCH [defense attorney]: Excuse me, I believe they have changed their election.\nMR. QUIRK [prosecutor]: It was changed on the last court date, sir.\nTHE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, disregard that last statement.\u201d\nThe court then read the proper indictment, which named complainant as the victim. Teresa Pauli, defendant\u2019s older daughter, was named as the victim in a second incest indictment, which the prosecution elected not to pursue. Teresa Pauli testified for the defense in the trial which produced the instant appeal.\nIn People v. Timms (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 129, 375 N.E.2d 1321, this court addressed an allegation that a trial court\u2019s error in reading an indictment to prospective jurors warranted a new trial. In that case, the trial court initially indicated that the defendant was charged with armed robbery and attempted murder. No immediate objection was made, but after an off-record conference, the trial court told the jurors that the defendant was charged with armed robbery and that attempted murder was not to be considered. This court held: \u201cThese statements by the trial judge may have left the jury with the impression that a charge of attempt murder was also pending against the defendant. The prejudicial nature of this suggestion, although clearly inadvertent, supports our conclusion that defendant should be granted a new trial.\u201d (59 Ill. App. 3d at 137.) We believe that the conclusion reached in Timms applies with equal force to the case at bar.\nWe also find merit in defendant\u2019s argument that Teresa was improperly impeached by inflammatory and irrelevant cross-examination. On direct examination, she testified that her sister, the complainant, stayed with her, not their father, in early August 1983, and that to her knowledge, defendant and complainant did not see each other at the time the offense allegedly occurred. On cross-examination, after asking Teresa\u2019s name, her relationship to complainant, and her address, the prosecutor asked, \u201cAnd you are a stripper, aren\u2019t you?\u201d The trial court sustained the defense\u2019s objection to the question. The prosecutor asked Teresa if she had worked at a lounge, and the defense\u2019s objection was overruled. The prosecutor asked if she had worked in a theater where pornographic movies were shown, and if she had been a stripper there. When the prosecution asked Teresa if she drank, her answer was, \u201cYes, I do drink,\u201d the defense objected and attempted to add to her answer. The trial court overruled the objection and called a sidebar:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Certainly I will determine whether or not I will allow any particular questions to be asked, and I see nothing objectionable to establish the background of this witness and to show what kind of work she does, and it\u2019s appropriate and proper. I know of no cases where anybody cannot cross-examine any witness to establish what type of work she does and whether she drinks or doesn\u2019t drink.\u201d\nThe prosecutor then asked Teresa whether she had children and how old she had been when they were born. When the prosecutor asked if the children were in the custody of Teresa\u2019s aunt because they \u201cinterfere[d] with [Teresa\u2019s] job and social life,\u201d the trial court sustained the defense objection and instructed the jurors to disregard the question.\nIn People v. Gibson (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 722, 725, 272 N.E.2d 274, this court held that the prosecution may not attempt to impeach the credibility of a witness with evidence which falls short of showing unlawful and disreputable occupation and serves only to insinuate the witness\u2019 lack of good character. The court ruled that the trial court had committed reversible error in allowing defense witnesses to be cross-examined about their parenting practices, drinking habits, and participation in barroom fights. We believe that the cross-examination here, like that in Gibson, had the purpose and effect of portraying the witness as a generally immoral person. Though we reject defendant\u2019s argument that the conduct of the examination of Teresa, when compared to the examination of the plaintiff, shows prejudice by the trial court, we do agree that the court erred in allowing such cross-examination of Teresa.\nDefendant next contends that he was prejudiced by the erroneous admission of evidence of prior crimes. In opening argument, the defense claimed that complainant had been a narcotics addict in August 1983. On direct examination, the prosecutor asked complainant how she was first introduced to drugs, and she testified that she was exposed to them by her older sister and stepmother at her father\u2019s house, but that he never drank or used drugs in front of her. The prosecutor asked the following:\n\u201cQ. Were you introduced to any type of drugs when you were growing up in your visits to your father\u2019s apartment?\u201d\nA. Later on there was cocaine in the house because my dad dealt cocaine off the side of my aunt \u2019cause my Aunt Rhonda is the cocaine dealer of the family.\u201d\nThe defense objected to the evidence of other crimes and moved for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion on the grounds that the complainant\u2019s mention of defendant\u2019s drug sales was not prompted by the prosecution and that the defense had \u201copened the door\u201d to evidence of the drug sales by raising the issue of complainant\u2019s addiction in the opening statement.\nEvidence which tends to show that an accused has committed crimes or acts of misconduct which are distinct and entirely unrelated to the one for which he is being tried is both incompetent and prejudicial. (People v. Donaldson (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 510, 517, 134 N.E.2d 776.) We find no justification for the admission of such evidence in the case at bar. Defendant\u2019s alleged drug sales were not relevant to any fact properly in issue and were not made relevant by the admission of evidence that complainant had been a narcotics addict. We are unpersuaded by the State\u2019s claim that its attempt to explain complainant\u2019s road to addiction justified the testimony, especially since the objectionable answer was elicited immediately after complainant said that others had introduced her to drugs and that she had never seen defendant drink or use drugs. The evidence of other crimes served only to suggest that defendant was a criminal, a poor parent, and the appropriate person to blame for complainant\u2019s addiction. Since such suggestion is improper in a criminal trial, the evidence should not have been admitted.\nWe believe that the foregoing errors, by focusing the jury\u2019s attention on other misconduct by defendant and his daughter Teresa, deprived him of a fair trial. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and sentence entered by the circuit court of Cook County and remand the case to that court for retrial.\nReversed and remanded.\nRIZZI and FREEMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WHITE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas R. Allen, of Chicago (Mary Ellen Dienes, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Lynda A. Peters, and Rena M. David, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EUGENE PAULL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 86\u20141361\nOpinion filed November 30, 1988.\nThomas R. Allen, of Chicago (Mary Ellen Dienes, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Lynda A. Peters, and Rena M. David, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0960-01", "first_page_order": 982, "last_page_order": 987 }