{
  "id": 3620367,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALFREDO AGUSTO PRESIDA, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Presida",
  "decision_date": "1988-12-15",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:39.846106+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALFREDO AGUSTO PRESIDA, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE SPITZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Alfredo Agusto Presida was charged by indictment in the circuit court of Champaign County with the offense of residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 19\u20143). Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the charged offense and was thereafter sentenced to a term of 10 years\u2019 incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant now appeals from the sentence imposed.\nFor the reasons stated below, we affirm.\nDefendant\u2019s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court improperly considered his juvenile record in sentencing. Relying upon our decision in People v. Chumbley (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 72, 435 N.E.2d 811, defendant argues that the sentencing court could not consider his juvenile record because he was never adjudicated a delinquent. The record reveals that the defendant, as a juvenile, had been placed on 12 months\u2019 supervision, but no finding of delinquency was entered.\nDefendant\u2019s assertion is incorrect. Section 2\u20149(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (Act), in effect at the time of our decision in Chumbley, provided as follows:\n\u201c(2) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Section, whenever anyone who has been adjudicated to be a delinquent minor described in Section 2\u20142 is convicted of a crime in any court, the court in which the conviction has been entered may, in passing upon an application for probation or in determining the sentence to be imposed, examine the records of disposition or evidence which were made in proceedings under this Act.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 702-9(2).)\nApplying section 2\u20149(2) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 702\u20149(2)) in Chumbley, we held that juvenile proceedings which do not result in findings of delinquency should not be considered by any court in sentencing hearings arising out of subsequent criminal convictions. (Chumbley, 106 Ill. App. 3d 72, 435 N.E.2d 811.) Accordingly, we concluded that the sentencing court in Chumbley erred in considering the defendant\u2019s juvenile record where he had not been adjudicated a delinquent, but had merely been placed on supervision.\nBoth parties involved in the instant appeal have overlooked the fact that the legislature amended the Act, subsequent to our decision in Chumbley. Pursuant to Public Acts 82\u2014973 and 85\u2014601 (1982 Ill. Laws 2414, 2419-21; 1987 Ill. Laws 2578, 2586), the admissibility of juvenile records, formerly governed by section 2\u20149, is now controlled by section 1\u201410(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, which provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c(1) Evidence and adjudications in proceedings under this Act shall be admissible:\n* * *\n(b) in criminal proceedings when the court is to determine the amount of bail, fitness of the defendant or in sentencing under the Unified Code of Corrections.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 801-10(1)(b).\nRecently, the court in People v. Gromm (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 236, 517 N.E.2d 721, interpreted this provision in relation to an issue identical to the one before us in the instant appeal. In Gromm, the defendant, as a juvenile, had been placed on supervision for possession of cannabis and had been adjudicated a minor in need of supervision as the result of a battery charge. Citing to Chumbley, the defendant claimed that the sentencing court erred in considering his juvenile record because he was never adjudicated a delinquent. The court rejected this contention for the reasons stated above, and concluded that under the amended provisions of the Act, the sentencing court could properly consider the defendant\u2019s juvenile record. In reaching its conclusion, the Gromm court stated:\n\u201cThe plain and ordinary meaning of the language of section 2\u201410(1)(b) [now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 801\u201410(1)(b)] clearly shows the legislature\u2019s intent to allow a court sentencing a defendant under the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1001\u20141\u20141 et seq.), to consider any prior juvenile adjudication, not only a finding of delinquency.\u201d (Gromm, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 239, 517 N.E.2d at 723.)\nWe agree with this interpretation and therefore conclude that the sentencing court in this case did not err in considering the defendant\u2019s juvenile record. A reading of section 1\u20148 together with section 1\u201410 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, pars. 801\u20148, 801\u201410) supports our conclusion. Section 1\u20148 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides that judges, prosecutors, and probation officers may inspect and copy a minor\u2019s juvenile records \u201c[w]hen a minor becomes 17 years of age or older, and is the subject of criminal proceedings, including a hearing to determine the amount of bail, a pre-trial investigation, a pre-sentence investigation, a fitness hearing, or proceedings on an application for probation.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 801\u20148(d).\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County is affirmed. Defendant\u2019s motion to supplement the record on appeal, which was taken with the case, is allowed.\nAffirmed.\nLUND and KNECHT, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE SPITZ"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel D. Yuhas and Jane Raley, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.",
      "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Rebecca L. White, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALFREDO AGUSTO PRESIDA, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201488\u20140217\nOpinion filed December 15, 1988.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Jane Raley, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Rebecca L. White, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0123-01",
  "first_page_order": 145,
  "last_page_order": 148
}