{ "id": 3620773, "name": "COUNTY OF COOK, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Michael Fajdich, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "County of Cook v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1988-11-02", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201487\u20142906WC", "first_page": "264", "last_page": "275", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 264" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "477 N.E.2d 1364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 895", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3530202 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 N.E.2d 1247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3541471 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3123349 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3607256 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 N.E.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2895475 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 N.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2862989 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3648715 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070847 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937342 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 N.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5476196 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0331-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 951, "char_count": 24101, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8706460647379758e-07, "percentile": 0.7262255444236324 }, "sha256": "cf280361fdc4dabcd49f70e0a62e366b0cfa777116c6c0cef00a4e2858b24dbf", "simhash": "1:fcf528c393c02091", "word_count": 3911 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:39.846106+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "COUNTY OF COOK, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Michael Fajdich, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LEWIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nClaimant, Michael Fajdich, filed an application for adjustment of claim under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) for injuries received in an accident on January 5, 1983. The accident occurred while claimant was a passenger in his employer\u2019s truck returning from his day\u2019s tasks to the employer\u2019s garage. At the hearing before the arbitrator on September 29, 1983, claimant contended that his accident occurred while in the course of his employment, which claim the respondent, Cook County Highway Department, disputed. After hearing testimony and considering the exhibits received into evidence, the arbitrator, in her order of October 10, 1983, determined that claimant\u2019s injuries were incurred in the course of his employment and awarded claimant temporary total disability payments for-10% weeks, benefits for permanent partial loss of 20% of the use of his right arm (47 weeks) and benefits for serious and permanent disfigurement of the face (10 weeks). The arbitrator further ordered the respondent to pay $1,732.80 for claimant\u2019s necessary medical expenses. The Industrial Commission affirmed the arbitrator\u2019s decision, and on review, the circuit court confirmed the Industrial Commission\u2019s order. The respondent appeals.\nOn appeal, respondent raises two primary issues: First, that claimant\u2019s injuries did not arise out of the course of his employment as claimant was intoxicated at the time of the accident, and second, that the arbitrator\u2019s award of temporary total disability and for permanent partial disability were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Before considering these issues, a statement of the facts is necessary.\nAt the hearing before the arbitrator, claimant testified that he was hired as a truck driver and a laborer by the respondent on October 12, 1982. On January 5, 1983, claimant worked the 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. shift. He reported to work slightly before 7 a.m. and was assigned the task of placing gravel on the soft shoulder along the road. On that date, he worked with Sandy Simmons, who was assigned as driver of the county truck.\nClaimant worked at his required tasks until approximately noon that day, whereupon he and Simmons picked up a sandwich and \u00e1 six-pack of Old Style beer for lunch. Because they were required to stay with their vehicle, they ate their lunch in the cab of the truck. According to claimant\u2019s testimony, he drank two cans of beer with his lunch, Simmons drank two cans of beer at lunch, and two full cans of beer remained. Claimant resumed his tasks after lunch.\nSometime after 2 p.m. that afternoon, claimant and Simmons had finished their work for the day and were returning to the county\u2019s garage. As they came onto a ramp to get onto 1-55, another vehicle cut in front of their truck, causing it to swerve off the ramp and into a ditch. The truck overturned, and claimant lost consciousness. He regained consciousness at the hospital.\nClaimant was taken by ambulance to La Grange Community Memorial General Hospital, where he was treated for his injuries. As a result of the accident, claimant had lacerations above his right eye and on his right cheek, a small laceration under his tongue, an abrasion over his right clavicle, and a broken right clavicle. The hospital records revealed that claimant had an acetone odor (ethanol) on his breath. It was noted that claimant had slurred speech and moderate disorientation. The emergency room doctor applied a clavicle strap (shoulder harness) and cleaned and sutured the- lacerations. X rays and blood tests were taken. The results of the blood test revealed that claimant had an ethanol blood level of 0.25. Claimant was released for work by his doctor on March 21, 1983. At the time of the hearing before the arbitrator, claimant was on suspension from his employment.\nClaimant testified that on the evening prior to the accident, he watched television and drank 10 to 12 cans of beer, a long-standing daily habit of his for the past 20 years. Claimant stated that he had felt no ill-effects the next morning from his previous night\u2019s drinking. Claimant denied consuming any alcohol prior to lunch on the day of the accident.\nClaimant\u2019s wife, Carmen Fajdich, testified that she had been married to the claimant for 22 years. She corroborated claimant\u2019s testimony that he habitually consumed 6 to 12 cans of beer each day for the past 20 years.\nVernon Volke, an assistant chief engineer for the Cook County Highway Department, testified that he went to the scene of claimant\u2019s accident on January 5, 1983, at approximately 4:30 p.m. He inspected the scene of the accident and took photographs of the area. Inside the cab of the truck he observed approximately a half dozen Old Style beer cans, two of which were unopened. According to Volke, two of the cans of beer were 16 ounce cans and the other cans were 12 ounces. Volke was unable to state with certainty whether the beer cans inside the cab were from claimant and Simmons or whether the cans were debris picked up by them. However, he stated that the picking up of debris was not claimant\u2019s assigned task for that day.\nAccording to Volke, the written rules and regulations of the Highway Department prohibited its employees from drinking alcoholic beverages during working hours. He testified that claimant was given four or five different sets of policies and procedures, and at the end of each policy and procedure was an affidavit that the employee was to sign. The affidavit stated that the employee has read the policies and procedures, that the employee understands the policies and that he will abide by those policies. He said that claimant had signed such an affidavit, but he did not produce that document at the hearing. He admitted that it was not the custom and habit of the county to send an employee out on a work assignment if the employee was drunk.\nVolke\u2019s testimony established that at the onset of each working day, every vehicle was assigned a driver. Although a specific driver was designated for each vehicle, anyone assigned to the work detail was permitted to drive the truck. He corroborated claimant\u2019s testimony that Simmons was the assigned driver to the truck the day of claimant\u2019s accident.\nUpon being questioned by the arbitrator, Volke did not recall the suspension of any employee for drinking a beer at lunchtime in the six months prior to the accident. He also admitted that the rules may be \u201cbent,\u201d and that there was no regular monitoring of employees at the end of their shifts to determine if an employee had been drinking during work hours.\nDr. Gerald Atlas, the director of medical services for the Cook County commission, testified that he was familiar with the general effects of alcohol consumption in the human body. He stated that there are great physiological variances, but that a laboratory reading of 0.15 usually indicates that a person is unmistakably drunk and a laboratory reading of 0.30 indicates that a person is stuporous. According to his testimony, at a 0.25 alcohol level, a person has a marked disturbance of coordination to such a degree that it would be almost impossible for that person to do any refined acts. He explained that \u201crefined acts\u201d are acts requiring point-specific judgment, body reaction, eye-to-hand relationship, and coordinative reaction. However, at the 0.25 level, it was possible that a person could stand and could shovel gravel, as these are \u201ccord functions,\u201d i.e., a function that can be performed without thinking of how to do it, a conditioned reaction.\nDr. Atlas testified that there would not be any residual alcohol in the blood from beers consumed the night before at 12 midnight by 2 p.m. the next day, with the exception that someone who has cirrhosis of the liver may retain alcohol in the blood. He further stated that studies have shown that some persons who have been drinkers all of their lives accumulate substantial levels of alcohol in their blood and exhibit few or little signs of inebriation. He also admitted that medication can create a high ethanol reading in a laboratory blood test.\nAfter hearing the testimony and considering documentary evidence, the arbitrator concluded that claimant\u2019s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment as respondent failed to show that claimant was unable to perform his assigned tasks. The arbitrator determined that it was not shown that claimant left the course of his employment when he violated the respondent\u2019s rules forbidding the drinking of alcoholic beverages during working hours as respondent did not prove that its rules were strictly enforced. The arbitrator\u2019s decision was affirmed by the Industrial Commission and confirmed by the circuit court.\nInitially, respondent contends that claimant\u2019s injuries were not compensable as his injuries did not arise out of his employment. In support of this argument,' respondent asserts claimant\u2019s intoxication as a defense to compensation.\nIn order for an injury to be compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, it must both \u201carise out of\u201d and be sustained while \u201cin the course of\u201d employment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.2; Eagle Discount Supermarket v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 331, 412 N.E.2d 492.) \u201cArising out of the employment\u201d means that the injury must have had its origins in some risk incidental to the employment, while \u201cin the course of employment\u201d refers to the time, place and circumstances of the injury. (Eagle Discount Supermarket, 82 Ill. 2d 331, 338, 412 N.E.2d 492, 496.) Intoxication, in itself, is insufficient to defeat recovery under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. (M & M Parking Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 252, 302 N.E.2d 265.) For a claimant\u2019s injury to be noncompensable because of intoxication, it must be shown that the employee was so intoxicated that the court can say that his injury arose out of his drunken condi: tion and not out of his employment. (District 141, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 544, 404 N.E.2d 787; Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 524, 513 N.E.2d 555.) Further, even if an employee\u2019s intoxicated condition is a contributing cause of his injury, if the employee is not incapacitated from following his occupation, his recovery of compensation will not be defeated. District 141, International Association of Machinists, 79 Ill. 2d 544, 404 N.E.2d 787.\nRespondent\u2019s defense of intoxication was based primarily on claimant\u2019s blood-alcohol level of 0.25. Respondent claimed that since there is a legal presumption of intoxication when a person has a 0.10 blood-alcohol level under the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014501.2(b)(3)) and since claimant\u2019s blood-alcohol level was in excess of the statutory level, that claimant\u2019s intoxication should defeat recovery. Respondent also argued that the doctor\u2019s testimony established that a person having a blood-alcohol level \u00f3f 0.25 would have marked disturbance of coordination, blurred vision, and a great disturbance of depth perception and, therefore, with these physical impairments, it was impossible for claimant to perform his required tasks.\nInitially, we note that respondent\u2019s argument that claimant was legally intoxicated under the Illinois Vehicle Code is not relevant. The standard to be applied for an intoxication defense, as was noted previously, is whether a claimant is so intoxicated that he cannot perform his occupational tasks. Respondent urges this court to change this standard and to apply the standard of the Illinois Vehicle Code for showing a person to be legally intoxicated. Respondent claims that the current standard for the intoxication defense places an impossible burden on the respondent to prove an employee intoxicated without objective criteria such as blood-alcohol levels but respondent cites no authority nor gives examples of why the current standard is so onerous. Therefore, we find no reason to change the current standard of proof of an intoxication defense.\nFurther, the evidence did not show that claimant was unable to perform his required tasks. Claimant testified that after he drank his two cans of beer at lunchtime, he returned to his task of placing stone on the shoulder of the roadway. Respondent presented no evidence to contradict claimant\u2019s testimony. The doctor\u2019s testimony established that a person could perform the tasks required of claimant even when intoxicated as this type of activity is a \u201ccord function,\u201d i.e., a conditioned reaction. While respondent argues that the doctor\u2019s testimony asserted that a person having a blood-alcohol level of 0.25 would have a marked disturbance of coordination, blurred vision, and a great disturbance of depth perception, no evidence was presented that claimant displayed any of these physical characteristics. Dr. Atlas did not examine the claimant at the time of the accident and none of the questions addressed to him were specific as to claimant\u2019s condition on that date, but were only of a hypothetical nature. Thus the doctor\u2019s testimony did not conflict with claimant\u2019s testimony that he could perform his duties. Accordingly, although claimant may have been intoxicated at the time of the accident, his intoxication did not defeat his claim for compensation.\nRespondent also claims that even though claimant was not driving at the time of the accident, he was entitled to drive the county truck but his condition rendered him incapable of this and therefore claimant was incapable of performing his required duties. This argument is speculative at best. Although respondent argues that claimant was legally drunk and unable to drive the truck, the evidence clearly showed that it was not the claimant who was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.\nIn conjunction with respondent\u2019s intoxication defense, respondent also contends that claimant violated its rules and regulations when he consumed alcohol during working hours; therefore, his accident did not arise out of his employment. Because claimant violated this rule, claimant was not following his employer\u2019s instructions and claimant\u2019s accident was outside the scope of his employment.\nWhether claimant\u2019s violation of his employer\u2019s rules and regulations made his injury noncompensable was a question of fact for the Industrial Commission and its decision will not be set aside unless its determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Northwestern Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 441, 232 N.E.2d 293.) Further, an employee may be entitled to compensation even though he may have violated a rule of his employer, especially where that rule was unenforced. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 38 Ill. 2d 441, 232 N.E.2d 293.\nThe Industrial Commission found that respondent failed to prove that the rules prohibiting drinking alcoholic beverages during working hours were strictly enforced by the respondent. This finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Volke\u2019s testimony established that there had been no suspensions of employees in the six months prior to claimant\u2019s accident for an employee drinking during working hours. Volke\u2019s testimony also established that the rules of the county had been \u201cbent\u201d upon occasion. Volke also testified that respondent had no method for regularly checking its employees at the end of a day to determine if an employee had been drinking during working hours. Thus it was a reasonable inference from this evidence that the respondent did not strictly enforce its rule.\nIt is also important to note that it was not proven that claimant\u2019s injury was causally connected to the claimant\u2019s violation of respondent\u2019s rules. The violation of respondent\u2019s no-drinking rule occurred during lunchtime. Claimant\u2019s accident occurred sometime after 2 p.m. and after he had returned to his course of employment. Checker Taxi Cab Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 4, 256 N.E.2d 828.\nRespondent\u2019s last contention that claimant\u2019s injury did not arise out of the course of his employment is that the respondent\u2019s line of questioning regarding the condition of the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident was erroneously disallowed by the arbitrator as irrelevant. Respondent argues that this line of questioning \u201cmight\u201d have established that claimant and the driver were on a \u201cfrolic\u201d and thus claimant\u2019s injury did not arise out of his employment. Again, this argument is speculative and not supported by any case authority. Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (113 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)) provides that an appellant\u2019s brief must cite to relevant authority to support an argument advanced upon appeal. Respondent\u2019s failure to cite authority in support of its argument fails to comply with Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) and will not merit consideration upon appeal. Britt v. Federal Land Bank Association (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 605, 505 N.E.2d 387.\nNevertheless, regardless of whether claimant and the driver had been on a \u201cfrolic\u201d at an earlier time, as was noted earlier, the evidence supported the determination that claimant had returned to the course of his employment and that his injury had occurred after he had done so. If, arguendo, there was any deviation earlier from his employment, this deviation would not defeat his claim. (Checker Taxi Cab Co., 45 Ill. 2d 4, 256 N.E.2d 828.) The arbitrator was also correct in that the condition of the driver was not relevant to whether claimant was injured in the course of his employment.\nRespondent\u2019s last contention is that the Industrial Commission\u2019s award for permanent partial loss of 20% use of claimant\u2019s right arm and for 10% weeks of temporary total disability payments was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent claims that the medical evidence presented failed to establish any functional loss of claimant\u2019s right arm; therefore, the arbitrator\u2019s allowing a 20% loss cannot stand.\nIt is the primary responsibility of the Industrial Commission to determine the nature and the extent of a claimant\u2019s injury, and the Industrial Commission\u2019s findings will not be set aside upon review unless those findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Wallace v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 33, 455 N.E.2d 92.) It is the claimant who has the burden of proving his claim by a preponderance of credible evidence. (Wallace, 98 Ill. 2d 33, 455 N.E.2d 92.) When the Industrial Commission has made a determination, it is presumed that it considered proper and competent evidence. (English v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 682, 502 N.E.2d 1247.) Resolving disputes in the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences and conclusions from that evidence is the responsibility of the Industrial Commission, and given its expertise in the area of workers' compensation, its findings on the disability of a claimant should be given substantial deference. English v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 151 Ill. App. 3d 682, 502 N.E.2d 1247.\nThe Industrial Commission\u2019s decision finding claimant was entitled to an award for the permanent partial loss of 20% of the use of his right arm and for temporary total disability payments for t06h weeks was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The arbitrator found that the claimant\u2019s subjective complaints were supported by Dr. Hirshfield\u2019s medical report and by the medical records from La Grange Community Memorial General Hospital.\nClaimant testified that he had a chipped bone in his right elbow. Claimant stated that when he arises in the morning and gets dressed, his right elbow causes him pain. When he raises his right arm to comb his hair or to shave, his right shoulder hurts. He stated that he applied a heating pad every night.\nDr. Hirshfield\u2019s letter of June 8, 1983, stated that he examined the claimant on June 2, 1983. The doctor\u2019s letter noted that claimant had been in a truck accident and that he had \u201ccut his eye above and below, cut his nose and forehead, chipped a bone in his right elbow and injured his left elbow and fractured his right collarbone.\u201d He stated that claimant\u2019s treatment for these injuries included the taking of X rays, suturing of the lacerations, and receiving a tetanus shot and a shoulder harness for his right arm. He noted that claimant\u2019s personal physician gave him some pain pills, aspirated fluid from his right elbow and injected medication into the right elbow.\nDr. Hirshfield\u2019s examination revealed that claimant\u2019s right arm measured one-quarter inch more than his left arm, that claimant\u2019s right and left elbows measured the same and that the \u201cmotility\u201d of both arms and both elbows was intact. The X rays of the right collarbone showed that there had been a fracture mid-clavicle which had a \u201ccalus formation.\u201d The X rays of the right elbow revealed that \u201c[tjhere is an area of increased bony density [in the] proximal portion of the ulna which may be consistent with trauma.\u201d\nRespondent introduced a letter from Dr. Sid John Shafer into evidence at the hearing before the arbitrator. This letter explained that he had examined claimant on July 22, 1983. He found that claimant had a normal range of painless motion of both shoulders. He noted a thickening of the right clavicle \u201cat the junction of the middle and outer third.\u201d He determined the motions of claimant\u2019s right and left elbows to be identical and that there was no evidence of tenderness; swelling or deformity of the elbows. He stated that \u201cthere is a normal range of painless motion of both wrists and fingers and there is no evidence of tenderness, swelling or deformity of the above mentioned joints.\u201d He took X rays of claimant\u2019s shoulders and clavicles. The X rays revealed a healed fracture of the right clavicle and failed to reveal any evidence of abnormality of the shoulders.\nThe medical evidence corroborated claimant\u2019s subjective complaints regarding his right elbow. Claimant testified that his right arm hurt and that his right elbow had a chipped bone in it. The X rays of his right elbow revealed that there was a density in that area. Dr. Hirshfield\u2019s report stated that claimant\u2019s right elbow had been chipped. Respondent\u2019s medical report of Dr. Shafer corresponded with Dr. Hirshfield\u2019s report; however, Dr. Shafer did not X-ray claimant\u2019s elbows but only his shoulders and clavicle areas. Claimant proved his claim by a preponderance of credible evidence.\nRespondent argues that claimant should only have been given temporary total disability from the date of the accident to February 17, 1983, as on that date Dr. Demange\u2019s records (claimant\u2019s treating physician) revealed that claimant\u2019s clavicle was healed and nontender. Dr. Demange\u2019s records also stated on that date that claimant was able to return to work on March 21, 1983. To prove temporary total disability, a claimant must show that he did not work and that he was unable to work. (Rambert v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 895, 477 N.E.2d 1364.) Here the claimant proved that he was unable to work when he introduced Dr. Demange\u2019s medical records. The evidence provided a reasonable basis for the Industrial Commission to infer that he was unable to work until March 21, 1983, and its award of temporary total disability payments was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Cook County, confirming the decision of the Industrial Commission, is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nBARRY, P.J., and McNAMARA, WOODWARD, and McCullough, jj., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LEWIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Helen Haynes, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellant.", "Joseph A. Vitell, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "COUNTY OF COOK, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Michael Fajdich, Appellee).\nFirst District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 1\u201487\u20142906WC\nOpinion filed November 2, 1988.\nRehearing denied January 5, 1989.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Helen Haynes, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellant.\nJoseph A. Vitell, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0264-01", "first_page_order": 286, "last_page_order": 297 }