{ "id": 3621864, "name": "HELEN RITTER et al., Co-Ex'rs of the Estate of Lois Buttles, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. RUSH-PRESBYTERIAN-ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Ritter v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center", "decision_date": "1988-12-07", "docket_number": "Nos. 88\u20140187, 88\u20140845 cons.", "first_page": "313", "last_page": "323", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 313" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "217 N.E.2d 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2587998 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/71/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 1291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3281233 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3497591 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3081048 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 1050", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489769 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/1050-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 871", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563202 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0871-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 N.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 945", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3582295 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/0945-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 51", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. 2d 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5805361 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/70/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.E.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 2d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1585478 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/118/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 N.Y.S.2d 820", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Misc. 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc.", "case_ids": [ 989953 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc/208/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 A.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Pa. Super. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 757321 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/197/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 F. Supp. 82", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3506444 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/549/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 A.L.R.4th 714", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ohio App. 3d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 6707571 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/9/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 N.W.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Mich. App. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2026912 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/5/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 1047", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ohio App. 3d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 6709086 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/13/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 N.W.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 Mich. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1834780 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/332/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "694 S.W.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9987732 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/694/0882-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 850", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5473034 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0850-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S. Ct. 3232", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 L. Ed. 2d 738", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "483 U.S. 1007", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 28226, 28390, 28039, 28104, 28140, 28334, 28305, 28372, 28184, 28378, 28317, 28126 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/1007-05", "/us/483/1007-08", "/us/483/1007-03", "/us/483/1007-09", "/us/483/1007-04", "/us/483/1007-06", "/us/483/1007-10", "/us/483/1007-07", "/us/483/1007-12", "/us/483/1007-01", "/us/483/1007-11", "/us/483/1007-02" ] }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 952", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3642305 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "590-93" }, { "page": "593-96" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "600-01" }, { "page": "602" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "594-95" }, { "page": "595-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0581-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1016, "char_count": 22152, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.453214519329701e-07, "percentile": 0.8042538387373164 }, "sha256": "899162ff4166d7ef450a4160888784a561d2dda7d95f8c407dd3c9f442b6b2b7", "simhash": "1:5bb57bd611540415", "word_count": 3465 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:39.846106+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HELEN RITTER et al., Co-Ex\u2019rs of the Estate of Lois Buttles, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. RUSH-PRESBYTERIAN-ST. LUKE\u2019S MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Lois Buttles, filed this action in the circuit court of Cook County for personal injuries sustained when she fell off of a transport cart, or gumee, while a patient at defendant, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke\u2019s Medical Center (Rush). After trial, a jury returned a verdict for Buttles in the amount of $332,998.15. Rush appeals an order finding it in contempt of court for violating a pretrial discovery order, the judgment for plaintiff and the denial of its post-trial motions. Cross-appellants, Helen Ritter and the Beverly Trust Company, the co-executors of Buttles\u2019 estate, Buttles having died shortly after trial, appeal the denial of a fine against Rush pursuant to the contempt finding.\nPlaintiff was admitted to Rush for treatment of a bleeding ulcer on July 7, 1986. She was 81 years old at the time. She was initially treated by her internist, Dr. Paul Winter. Because of a substantial loss of blood since July 7, Dr. David Roseman operated on plaintiff to close the ulcer on July 9. After the operation, post-operative problems kept plaintiff in intensive care until July 30. Thereafter, plaintiff was transferred out of intensive care to a general surgical floor for further post-operative recovery. On August 5, plaintiff was taken to the radiology department for C.T. scans of her abdomen. Upon her arrival at the radiology department, a C.T. technician removed her restraints, lowered the rails of her gumee and left her unattended. Plaintiff fell from the gumee while unattended, fracturing the facial bone under her left eye and bruising her face. She was found and examined by the radiology resident, Dr. Cheryl Walczak. Dr. Walczak called the surgical resident on plaintiff\u2019s floor, who also examined her. Plaintiff was examined on August 6 by Dr. Donna Bergan, a neurologist, and on August 7 by Dr. Kelvin Von Roenn, a neurosurgeon. After plaintiff suffered a seizure on August 22, she was diagnosed as suffering from a subdural hematoma. Dr. Von Roenn operated to relieve the hematoma that day. Plaintiff was transferred to Rush\u2019s rehabilitation wing on September 5. Her diagnosis upon admission to the wing was \u201csubdural hematoma.\u201d Plaintiff was discharged home on October 15.\nPlaintiff filed suit against Rush on November 14, 1986. In preparing for trial, Rush\u2019s risk manager interviewed four physicians who had treated plaintiff at Rush. They were: (1) Dr. Jo Lynn Polk, the attending physiatrist who supervised plaintiff\u2019s rehabilitation; (2) Dr. Nina Pale\u00f3logos, the neurology resident on call when plaintiff fell on August 5 and suffered the seizure on August 22; (3) Dr. Bergan, who, in addition to examining plaintiff on August 6, was consulted by Dr. Pale\u00f3logos regarding plaintiff; and (4) Dr. Antonio Yuk, a neurosurgery resident who also examined plaintiff on August 6 and who was consulted for follow-up care after her seizure. Rush disclosed these interviews to plaintiff through discovery in July 1987. Plaintiff then moved to bar any further communication between Rush and plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians, including Rush\u2019s employees. The trial court granted the motion on September 9, 1987. Thereafter, the trial court essentially denied Rush\u2019s motion to reconsider the September 9 order.\nRush sought leave to appeal the September 9 order but its application was dismissed as moot after the cause was assigned for trial on December 14. When Rush\u2019s motions to stay or continue the trial were denied, defense counsel interviewed Drs. Polk, Kluiber, Pale\u00f3logos, Bergan and Yuk to prepare for trial. Plaintiff moved for sanctions at the start of trial. The trial court found Rush in contempt, assessed attorney fees of $1,050 and costs of $164 against it and barred it from calling the five physicians as witnesses.\nIn its appeal, Rush contends, in the main, that the trial court erred in prohibiting it from communicating with and calling as witnesses in its behalf plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians since they were also Rush\u2019s staff physicians. Specifically, Rush asserts that the trial court erred in extending Petrillo v. Snytex Laboratories, Inc. (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952, cert. denied (1987), 483 U.S. 1007, 97 L. Ed. 2d 738, 107 S. Ct. 3232, to the circumstances of this case. Petrillo held that ex parte conferences between defense counsel and a plaintiff\u2019s treating physician are prohibited as against Illinois public policy because they jeopardize the sanctity of the confidential and fiducial physician-patient relationship. (Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 588.) Rush asserts that Petrillo does not apply to this case for several reasons.\nRush first asserts that application of Petrillo to the facts of this case will defeat the purpose of the physician-patient privilege by impeding the effective delivery of health care. We cannot agree. In so arguing, Rush gives too broad a compass to the \u201ccontinuing dialogue\u201d between a hospital and its medical staff which it claims such application would prohibit. The physician-patient privilege protects the confidentiality of information from a patient necessary to enable a physician to serve the patient. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 8\u2014802.) As such, we simply will not equate the communication of such information amongst a hospital\u2019s medical personnel for purposes of treating a patient with its communication by such personnel to the hospital\u2019s attorneys for purposes of defending a lawsuit brought by the patient. In short, we believe that, contrary to Rush\u2019s assertion, application of Petrillo here will encourage rather then discourage a continuing dialogue between patients and their physicians. Conversely, a holding that Petrillo does not apply would, we believe, greatly discourage unconstrained communication between a patient being treated at a hospital or clinic and the physicians actually treating him.\nWe also cannot equate communication between a hospital and its medical staff, pursuant to their legal duty under the Hospital Licensing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111\u00bd, par. 142 et seq.) to ensure the quality of the hospital\u2019s medical care, with communication of a patient\u2019s confidential information by staff physicians to a hospital\u2019s attorneys for purposes of defending a lawsuit by the patient. Similarly, we do not believe, contrary to Rush\u2019s reliance thereon, that any agency principles applicable \"to the relationship between a hospital and an. employee-physician outweigh the public policy considerations underlying the physician-patient privilege. Thus, agency principles cannot abrogate the physician-patient privilege.\nThere is another reason why we do not believe that the legal duty of Rush and its medical staff to ensure that Rush provides quality medical care warrants Rush\u2019s inclusion within the physician-patient privilege. Rush\u2019s argument in this regard ignores that this case involves only the alleged negligence of a nonphysician-employee of a hospital. As such, any justification to extend the physician-patient privilege to Rush, were plaintiff\u2019s lawsuit based on the alleged negligence or malpractice of a physician-employee, is absent here.\nWhen a patient seeks to hold a hospital vicariously liable for the negligence or malpractice of an employee-physician, exclusion of the hospital from the physician-patient privilege would, we believe, and as Rush argues, effectively prevent the hospital from defending itself by barring communication with the physician for whose conduct the hospital is allegedly liable. In contrast to such a case, Rush\u2019s exclusion from the physician-patient privilege in this case would not bar it from communicating with the employee allegedly responsible for plaintiff\u2019s injuries and thus would not bar it from defending itself from liability. That Rush only contested plaintiff\u2019s damages in this case is, we believe, insufficient justification to include Rush within the physician-patient privilege. In such circumstances, Rush is merely seeking to minimize its liability to plaintiff. It is not seeking to provide effective medical care or to defend itself from liability to a patient for improper medical care.\nMoreover, Parkson v. Central Du Page Hospital (1980), 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 435 N.E.2d 140, does not require the conclusion that the type of disclosure sought from plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians by Rush is within, rather than without, the physician-patient privilege. Parkson held that a hospital could assert the privilege to bar the discovery of the medical records of patients who, along \"with the plaintiffs, were treated at the hospital but were not parties to the plaintiffs\u2019 lawsuit. We do not believe that Parkson, which, unlike Petrillo, involved a totally inapposite fact pattern, can be extended to apply here.\nRush also asserts that it was entitled to learn confidential information given by plaintiff to her treating physicians because, by disclosing such information for the purpose of treatment by Rush through those physicians, plaintiff either evidenced an expectation that the information would not be kept from Rush or waived the physician-patient privilege. We cannot agree. In this regard, Petrillo stated:\n\u201c[W]e note that when a patient files suit, he implicitly consents to his physician releasing any of the medical information related to the mental or physical condition *** placed at issue in the lawsuit ***.\nThe patient\u2019s implicit consent, however, is obviously and necessarily limited; he consents only to the release of his medical information (relative to the lawsuit) pursuant to the methods of discovery authorized by Supreme Court Rule 201(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 201(a)). A patient certainly does not, by simply filing suit, consent to his physician discussing that patient\u2019s medical confidences with third parties outside court-authorized discovery methods, nor does he consent to his physician discussing the patient\u2019s confidences in an ex parte conference with the patient's legal adversary.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 591.\nRush next argues that, if Petrillo applies here and if plaintiff did not waive her physician-patient privilege, Petrillo should be \u201creconsidered\u201d because it violates the right of tort defendants to effectively prepare a defense and present it at trial. The physician-patient privilege is codified in section 8\u2014802 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 8\u2014802). One of the nine exceptions to the privilege allows the disclosure of information acquired from a patient \u201cin all actions *** wherein the patient\u2019s physical or mental condition is an issue.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 8\u2014802(4).) In view of that exception, Rush asserts that the Petrillo holding is unnecessary to preserve patients\u2019 confidence in their physicians because the information learned through informal interviews between defense counsel and a plaintiff\u2019s treating physician\u2019s will not remain confidential, in any event.\nWe cannot agree with Rush that the method by which a legal adversary learns a patient\u2019s otherwise confidential information from a treating physician is immaterial since, having filed suit, the patient knows the information will not remain confidential anyway. In so arguing, Rush ignores the protection afforded the confidentiality of information told a physician by formal discovery methods. It is this protection, rather than the mere fact that a patient has filed suit, which justifies the disclosure of otherwise confidential information told a physician once a patient has filed a suit putting his mental or physical condition at issue. (Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 590-93.) Otherwise stated, it is the lack of protection to the confidentiality of information told a physician when he engages in ex parte communications with his patient\u2019s legal adversary which warrants the prohibition of its disclosure through such means. As the protection afforded a patient\u2019s confidential information by formal discovery procedures is the paramount consideration, we disagree that the physician-patient privilege does not bar ex parte communications between a physician and his patient\u2019s legal adversary simply because the patient filed a lawsuit putting his mental or physical condition at issue.\nRush also attacks the Petrillo court\u2019s reliance on the fiducial nature of the physician-patient privilege (see, e.g., State ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist (Mo. App. 1985), 694 S.W.2d 882; Foshee v. Krum (1952), 332 Mich. 636, 52 N.W.2d 358; Estate of Leach v. Shapiro (1984), 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047) as also prohibiting ex parte communications between physicians and their patients\u2019 legal adversary as against public policy. (Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 593-96.) Rush asserts that the Appelquist case, as well as the States of Michigan (Gailitis v. Bassett (1966), 5 Mich. App. 382, 146 N.W.2d 708) and Ohio (Covington v. Sawyer (1983), 9 Ohio App. 3d 40, 458 N.E.2d 465), permit ex parte communications between a plaintiff\u2019s treating physician and his legal adversary, notwithstanding their recognition, as noted in Petrillo, of a fiduciary relationship between patient and physician.\nThe fact that other jurisdictions allow ex parte communications between a treating physician and his patient\u2019s legal adversary, notwithstanding their recognition of a physician\u2019s fiduciary duties to his patient, does not, alone, convince us that the Petrillo court was wrong in holding to the contrary. There is a sufficiently even split of authority on this issue (see State ex rel. Stufflebam v. Appelquist (Mo. App. 1985), 694 S.W.2d 882, 887; Annot, 50 A.L.R.4th 714 (1986)) to make the Petrillo court\u2019s conclusion not manifestly erroneous.\nMoreover, contrary to Rush\u2019s assertion, the Petrillo court did cite authority for its holding that the fiduciary relationship between a patient and physician gives the patient the right to expect that his physician will provide medical information sought by the patient\u2019s adversary only through court-authorized methods of discovery. Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 595, citing Miles v. Farrell (N.D. Ill. 1982), 549 F. Supp. 82, Alexander v. Knight (1962), 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142.\nAs Rush notes, Petrillo did recognize that a party does not have a proprietary right to any witness\u2019 testimony. However, the Petrillo court rejected this argument as a basis on which to allow ex parte interviews between defense counsel and treating physicians. (Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 600-01.) Rush makes no argument compelling us to disagree with Petrillo in this regard. Contrary to Rush\u2019s assertion, the Petrillo court did not ignore that attorneys generally have the right to interview witnesses to learn what testimony they will give. Rather, it specifically rejected that right as a basis for allowing ex parte interviews of a plaintiff\u2019s treating physician. (Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 602.) Once again, Rush makes no argument convincing us to disagree with this aspect of Petrillo.\nRush also argues that ex parte interviews save the time, expense, and delay involved in deposing usually reluctant physicians. However, Petrillo also disposed of this argument by holding that neither the time nor expense involved in deposing a treating physician \u201ccreates such hardship that it is necessary for us to carve an exception into the well-established rules of discovery.\u201d Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 597.\nWe also reject Rush\u2019s assertion that the physician-patient privilege is inapplicable to information given or statements made by plaintiff to physicians of whose name or presence she was unaware. The privilege applies \u201cwhere a physician attends a person for the purpose of giving professional aid even though the person attended is unconscious or unaware of his presence.\u201d (97 C.J.S. Witnesses \u00a7294(e) (1957), citing Jones v. Jones (1955), 208 Misc. 721, 144 N.Y.S.2d 820, 826.) If the privilege attaches even where a patient is unaware of a physician\u2019s presence, it is also immaterial to its attachment that plaintiff may not have known the names of all the doctors who attended her at Rush.\nWe also find unavailing Rush\u2019s attack upon Petrillo on the ground that the court improperly assumed that physicians would violate their ethical obligation of not revealing a patient\u2019s confidential information in ex parte interviews with defense counsel. (Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 594-95.) Contrary to Rush\u2019s implication, the Petrillo court did not solely rely on that assumption in reaching its decision. It also relied on the threat from the patient\u2019s perspective to the atmosphere of trust, loyalty and faith inherent in the physician-patient relationship posed by such interviews regardless of what might be revealed therein. (Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 595-96.) For this reason also, we find immaterial the existence of safeguards against an attorney\u2019s use of confidential and irrelevant information learned in witness interviews (see 107 Ill. 2d R. 219(c); D.R. 7\u2014102(a)(1)).\nRush next contends the trial court erred in barring evidence of plaintiff\u2019s contacts with her attorney during her stay at Rush. Rush contends this evidence revealed an alert mental condition at odds with the confused and delusional state of mind which allegedly resulted from plaintiff\u2019s fall. Specifically, Rush asserts that evidence that plaintiff had decided to sue it and that she began to consult with her attorney while undergoing rehabilitation treatment at Rush could have provided an explanation other than her mental condition for plaintiff\u2019s noncooperation with her therapists.\nWe agree with plaintiff that there was sufficient other evidence adduced by Rush of plaintiff\u2019s alert and lucid state of mind to render the evidence of plaintiff\u2019s intent to sue the hospital and of her visits with her attorney more prejudicial than probative. (See Hulsebus v. Russian (1969), 118 Ill. App. 2d 174, 180-81, 254 N.E.2d 184.) As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding that evidence.\nCross-appellants contest the denial of a fine against Rush for violating the order prohibiting it from interviewing plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians. In brief, cross-appellants contend that Rush\u2019s conduct caused Dr. Polk, who supervised plaintiff\u2019s rehabilitation, to assert that that treatment was necessitated by a \u201cdeconditioning\u201d problem rather than her fall, which she had maintained prior to her interview with defense counsel. Because plaintiff then decided not to call Dr. Polk as a witness, cross-appellants reason that Rush\u2019s conduct denied plaintiff an element of her damages, viz., the bill for rehabilitation treatment after her fall or $27,718.54.\nCross-appellants thus request a fine of $27,718.54 against Rush. That fine, they assert, would be proportionate to the gravity of Rush\u2019s violation of the discovery order (Buehler v. Whalen (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 51; Transamerica Insurance Group v. Lee (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 945, 518 N.E.2d 413; In re Estate of Soderholm (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 871, 469 N.E.2d 410) and would keep it from considering such violations in a cost-effective manner (Lee, 164 Ill. App. 3d 945, 518 N.E.2d 413; Soderholm, 127 Ill. App. 3d 871, 469 N.E.2d 410). Cross-appellants also request an additur of the $27,718.54 in damages which Rush\u2019s violation allegedly cost plaintiff.\nWe agree with cross-appellants that Rush\u2019s conduct was fundamentally more egregious than that in Petrillo inasmuch as Rush did not, unlike defense counsel in Petrillo, inform the trial court that it intended to violate the order prohibiting ex parte communication with plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians. However, neither Buehler, Soderholm nor Lee supports the imposition of the large fine requested by cross-appellants. More importantly, the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery rules and orders is within the discretion of the trial court and cannot be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. (Ralston v. Casanova (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 473 N.E.2d 444.) As a sanction for its violation of the subject order, the trial court barred Rush from calling plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians as witnesses in its case in chief and awarded plaintiff attorney fees of $1,050 and $164 in court costs. These sanctions are expressly included among those allowed under Supreme Court Rule 219(c). (107 Ill. 2d R. 219(c).) As such, we do not believe that the failure to impose a monetary fine against Rush was an abuse of discretion.\nNor do we believe that cross-appellants are entitled to the additur requested. Although it is more akin to criminal contempt, a contempt of court finding for violation of discovery rules or orders may be classified as a civil contempt. (See Anderson v. St. Mary\u2019s Hospital (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 596, 598, 428 N.E.2d 528.) In a civil contempt proceeding in Illinois, the court may imprison or fine for contempt of its orders but is without authority to recompense the aggrieved party for his damages. (In re Marriage of Wilde (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 464, 473, 490 N.E.2d 95; Melbourne Corp. v. City of Chicago (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 595, 612, 394 N.E.2d 1291; Eberle v. Greene (1966), 71 Ill. App. 2d 85, 93, 217 N.E.2d 6.) As such, we cannot award plaintiff an element of her damages as a penalty against Rush for its violation of the subject discovery order.\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment for plaintiff, the denial of defendant\u2019s post-trial motions, the finding of contempt against defendant and the denial of a fine against defendant are affirmed in their entirety.\nAffirmed.\nWHITE, P.J., and RIZZI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Arnstein, Gluck, Lehr & Milligan, of Chicago (Arthur L. Klein, John L.. Ropiequet, and C. Vincent Maloney, of counsel), for appellant.", "Fitzgerald & Gottlick, of Hinsdale (Joseph E. Fitzgerald, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HELEN RITTER et al., Co-Ex\u2019rs of the Estate of Lois Buttles, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. RUSH-PRESBYTERIAN-ST. LUKE\u2019S MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNos. 88\u20140187, 88\u20140845 cons.\nOpinion filed December 7, 1988.\nArnstein, Gluck, Lehr & Milligan, of Chicago (Arthur L. Klein, John L.. Ropiequet, and C. Vincent Maloney, of counsel), for appellant.\nFitzgerald & Gottlick, of Hinsdale (Joseph E. Fitzgerald, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0313-01", "first_page_order": 335, "last_page_order": 345 }