{ "id": 3621696, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DINO CONNOR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Connor", "decision_date": "1988-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 85\u201420", "first_page": "532", "last_page": "540", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 532" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3227708 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 N.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 U.S. 844", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6355104, 6353346, 6352195, 6353541, 6354822, 6353190, 6352841, 6354601, 6353929, 6354412, 6352652, 6353006, 6353743, 6354160, 6352434 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/464/0844-15", "/us/464/0844-07", "/us/464/0844-01", "/us/464/0844-08", "/us/464/0844-14", "/us/464/0844-06", "/us/464/0844-04", "/us/464/0844-13", "/us/464/0844-10", "/us/464/0844-12", "/us/464/0844-03", "/us/464/0844-05", "/us/464/0844-09", "/us/464/0844-11", "/us/464/0844-02" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115107 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5661667 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0803-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463440 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2897868 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971950 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0448-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 805, "char_count": 16009, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0209510388325381e-07, "percentile": 0.5452321737676599 }, "sha256": "85bf29fda958d87ea0d42de4102c7c94fffd3665e713294f912053c817deff1f", "simhash": "1:a218b894fdeda9a4", "word_count": 2691 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:39.846106+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DINO CONNOR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Dino Connor was charged with armed robbery, armed violence and unlawful restraint. A jury found him guilty of armed robbery, and the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 17 years. Defendant appeals, contending that he was denied a fair trial as the result of the trial judge\u2019s hostility toward defense counsel, the introduction of other crimes evidence, and the ineffective assistance of counsel. He also contends that the sentences of defendant and a codefendant were disproportionate. (Daniel Clay; who is not involved in this appeal, was found guilty of the same offense and was sentenced to a term of six years.) \u25a0\nOn October 31, 1982, at about 9:20 p.m., 76-year-old Elmar Runguls was walking near his home when two men accosted him and demanded his money. One man stood in front of Runguls, holding a gun to his head. The other man, later identified as defendant, stood at Runguls\u2019 side and went through his pockets. The men took Runguls\u2019 wallet, which contained $10 and identification, and ran away.\nRunguls returned home and telephoned the police with a description, which was broadcast on the police radio. About 20 minutes later, Runguls identified defendant and Clay in a squad car at his home, and later identified them in a lineup. Runguls testified that the gun recovered from defendant looked like the one used in the robbery.\nOfficer Michael Keas testified that at about 9:55 p.m. he and his partner saw Clay running, with his arm raised, toward two women in a car stopped at a red light. Clay saw the officers, dropped his arm, and began running the other way. Defendant was standing near a building, and defendant started moving in the same direction as Clay, but they did not speak to each other. Both men were stopped by the officers. Keas found a loaded gun in defendant\u2019s waistband. The officers brought the two men to Runguls\u2019 home, and Runguls identified them.\nIt was stipulated that defendant was admitted to bond on November 6, 1982, failed to appear in court on December 6, 1982, and had a bond forfeiture warrant issued for his arrest.\nTondaleo Clinton, defendant\u2019s mother, offered alibi testimony for defendant. She stated that defendant was at home with her on October 31 from 8 p.m. until about 10 p.m.\nDuring a sidebar, defense counsel asked to use John Johnson, who was listed as a character witness, as an alibi witness. On the day of trial, counsel had learned that defendant was with Johnson while he repaired a thermostat in defendant\u2019s home. The court denied the request and limited Johnson\u2019s testimony to character evidence. Johnson, defendant\u2019s landlord, testified that defendant was a peaceful, law-abiding person. Gamita Woolfolk testified similarly.\nDefendant testified that he was at his mother\u2019s home until 9:40 or 9:45 p.m., when he left for his grandmother\u2019s home. After leaving, he saw a friend, Marshon Stewart, who offered to sell defendant a gun. Defendant took the gun and agreed to pay Stewart the $40 later. While standing at a bus stop several blocks from his home, defendant and Clay were detained by several police officers. Defendant knew Clay from high school, but they had not spoken to each other near the bus stop.\nIn August 1982, defendant had been accepted by the Marine Corps. Defendant\u2019s full name is Dino E. Clinton Connor. Because he had previously enlisted under the name of Dino Clinton in August 1982, he used the name Connor when he was arrested in October 1982, \u201cto avoid any mix-ups with this here and the government.\u201d When he bought the gun from Stewart on October 31, defendant knew he would be leaving for boot camp in about a week. Defendant had stated in his August 1982 application that he had never been arrested, charged, detained in prison or involved in a court action. He had not taken the final oath when he was charged with these crimes on November 1, 1982. On November 8, 1982, defendant reexecuted the end of the 41-page Marine Corps application as part of his taking the oath required to enter active service. The re-signing included some language indicating it was a reaffirmation of the original application answers.\nDefendant was in jail until November 6, 1982, when he was released on bond. Defendant informed someone at the Marine Corps local office of his arrest and was told \u201cDon\u2019t worry about it.\u201d He assumed the government would \u201ctake care of it.\u201d Defendant immediately left Illinois for boot camp in San Diego. He testified that he did not appear in court in December because he was in California. After serving in Lebanon, defendant returned to Chicago in November 1983, when he was rearrested for the Runguls robbery.\nAnna Cotto testified in rebuttal for the State that between 8:45 p.m. and 9 p.m. on October 31, 1982, she heard a man choking in the gangway outside her window. She opened the window and saw two men robbing her 65-year-old landlord, Edward Hoeltz. One man, whom she later identified as defendant, choked Hoeltz with a necktie while a second man went through his pockets. The man she identified as defendant looked about 17 or 18 years old and wore a maroon jacket and blue jeans. She yelled for them to stop, and defendant looked up at her for about five seconds, standing in the light of the gangway. Cotto did not give the police a description of the men. Several hours later, Cotto identified defendant in a lineup. She could not identify the second man. Cotto testified that she knew Johnnie Flowers and believed he lived in the building next to her apartment, and that defendant lived in the same building.\nFlowers testified for defendant in surrebuttal that Flowers and \u201cSmokey\u201d robbed Hoeltz. A woman in a second-floor window yelled down to stop. Flowers was in a lineup on November 29, 1982, but Hoeltz did not identify him.\nIn November 1983, Flowers entered into a plea agreement and was convicted of six or seven robberies. He was not sure whether the Hoeltz case had been dismissed as part of the plea agreement. Flowers had seen defendant in the neighborhood, but did not know his name.\nThe defense rested.\nThe following morning, defense counsel informed the court that when he drove Flowers home the previous day, counsel discovered Smokey\u2019s full name was Kenneth Shenaurlt. Counsel asked to reopen proofs to call Shenaurlt. He made an offer of proof that if Shenaurlt were allowed to testify, he would state that he committed and pled guilty to the Hoeltz robbery. The trial court questioned Shenaurlt outside the presence of the jury. The court and a public defender explained to Shenaurlt that if he had not previously been charged with the crime, he could now be charged. Shenaurlt insisted, \u201cBut I was charged.\u201d\nShenaurlt told the court that he and Flowers robbed Hoeltz. Shenaurlt said that he pled guilty to the Hoeltz robbery and that he was in fact guilty of the offense.\nShenaurlt did not remember if Hoeltz identified him in a lineup, but he stated that Hoeltz was at the preliminary hearing. Shenaurlt pled guilty to four robberies and received a sentence of four years in prison. He had been released one month before testifying. Defense counsel had contacted him the previous day. Hoeltz did not know Flowers\u2019 real name.\nAfter Shenaurlt was dismissed, the State listed four cases to which Shenaurlt had pled guilty, and none involved a victim named Hoeltz. The trial court decided that Shenaurlt would not be allowed to testify in front of the jury because it found Shenaurlt\u2019s testimony to be \u201csuspect.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s principal issue on appeal is that he was denied his right to a fair trial by the erroneous introduction of evidence of two other crimes. Defendant points to evidence of the intended \u201csmash and grab\u201d by codefendant Clay and to Cotto\u2019s testimony of the Hoeltz robbery, introduced to rebut defendant\u2019s alibi.\nOrdinarily, evidence of separate offenses unconnected with the crime for which a defendant is on trial is incompetent. (People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 448, 343 N.E.2d 489; People v. Harris (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 395, 263 N.E.2d 35.) It infers that because a man has committed other crimes he is more likely to have committed the current crime. People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 325, 362 N.E.2d 288.\nEvidence of other crimes may be admitted, however, if e.g., it tends to show motive, intent, knowledge, plan, design or identification (People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 448, 343 N.E.2d 489; People v. Young (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 803, 455 N.E.2d 845), or if it tends to disprove an alibi (People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 325, 362 N.E.2d 288; People v. Harris (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 395, 263 N.E.2d 35; People v. Kimbrough (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 481, 485 N.E.2d 1292). Here, Cotto\u2019s testimony that she saw defendant robbing Hoeltz at 8:45 or 9 p.m. was introduced to rebut defendant\u2019s testimony that he was with his mother until 9:45 p.m. and to rebut Clinton\u2019s testimony that her son was home from 8 p.m. until 10 p.m. (See People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 325, 362 N.E.2d 288.) Moreover, that evidence, showing that within an hour defendant was involved in another armed robbery with the same companion, in which other similarities were also present, was admissible for a purpose other than to show defendant\u2019s propensity to commit crime and was therefore admissible. See People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821, cert. denied (1983), 464 U.S. 844, 78 L. Ed. 2d 136, 104 S. Ct. 145.\nSimilarly, the other crimes evidence relating to the smash and grab incident was admissible only for the purpose of showing the circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s arrest. (See People v. Martin (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 196, 459 N.E.2d 279.) The admission of other crimes evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821; People v. Lieberman (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 949, 438 N.E.2d 516.) In exercising its discretion, the trial court must balance the probative value of the evidence to establish the purpose for which it is offered against the prejudicial effect of such evidence on defendant. (People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 22, 473 N.E.2d 840, cert. denied (1985), 471 U.S. 1131, 86 L. Ed. 2d 283, 105 S. Ct. 2666; People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821.) In this case, we find no abuse of discretion.\nDefendant also contends that the hostility of the trial judge toward defense counsel denied defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial.\nThe trial court must carefully avoid any remarks that indicate a prejudice toward either side in order to protect defendant\u2019s right to a fair and impartial trial by jury in a criminal case. (People v. Bartall (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 294, 456 N.E.2d 59.) It is not within the judge\u2019s province to convey his opinions, by word or by deed, on such matters as the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be afforded their testimony. Jurors are \u201cever watchful of the attitude of the judge, and any disclosure of disbelief or hostility on his part is very apt to influence them in arriving at their verdict.\u201d (People v. Santucci (1962) , 24 Ill. 2d 93, 98, 180 N.E.2d 491; see also People v. Sprinkle (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 398, 189 N.E.2d 295; People v. Heidorn (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 933, 449 N.E.2d 568.) A verdict will not be disturbed unless the judge\u2019s remarks constituted a material factor in the conviction or unless prejudice to the defendant appears to be their probable result. (People v. Heidorn (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 933, 449 N.E.2d 568; People v. Parker (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 597, 352 N.E.2d 394.) In the present case, we find that the record reveals any improper conduct of the trial judge towards defense counsel did not constitute a material factor in defendant\u2019s conviction.\nSeveral times the court admonished defense counsel regarding his physical movements in the courtroom. At one point, the court excused a witness and announced, \u201cCall your next witness.\u201d Defense counsel stepped out of the courtroom to get his next witness from the hallway. In counsel\u2019s absence and in front of the jury, the judge stated, \u201cI don\u2019t know where he is going.\u201d The prosecutor replied, \u201cTo get his witness.\u201d The judge answered, \u201cHe wasn\u2019t excused.\u201d When counsel returned, the trial judge admonished him.\nIn another incident, defense counsel attempted to show defendant an exhibit, and the court admonished him:\n\u201cDEFENSE COUNSEL: Showing you what has been marked as People\u2019s\u2014\nTHE COURT: Are you seeking permission to approach the witness?\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes.\nTHE COURT: I will appreciate it if you ask that and conduct yourself accordingly.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: May I approach the witness, your Honor?\nTHE COURT: Yes.\u201d\nThese two minor incidents can hardly have suggested to the jury that defense counsel attempted to present the case in an improper manner. Other comments made by the court and quoted at length by defendant were all made outside the presence of the jury, and thus we find no evidence that they materially influenced the conviction.\nDefendant also contends he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel committed errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment and that the errors were prejudicial to his defense. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246.) Defendant argues that his attorney failed to interview certain witnesses. We find nothing in the record indicating counsel failed to interview Woolfolk or Flowers, both of whom testified for defendant at trial. Counsel did interview Johnson before trial and either did not learn of his alleged alibi testimony at that time, or accurately observed that it conflicted with the alibi offered by defendant\u2019s mother. Furthermore, counsel\u2019s failure to file a motion in limine or objection directed toward Cotto\u2019s rebuttal testimony would have been pointless where that testimony was properly admitted. People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 325, 362 N.E.2d 288.\nWe conclude that these, along with the several examples of counsel\u2019s failure to make an objection, fail to show counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment or that counsel\u2019s errors were in fact prejudicial to the defense.\nFinally, defendant contends that the imposition of a 17-year prison term on defendant was an abuse of discretion. We agree. Codefendant Daniel Clay received a six-year sentence. A disparate sentence may be supported by a more serious criminal record or greater participation in the offense. (People v. Martin (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 238, 401 N.E.2d 13.) Defendant had no adult criminal record, while Clay did have a record. Their participation was not disproportionate. Defendant took the victim\u2019s wallet and searched his pockets while Clay held a gun pointed at the victim\u2019s head. Neither entered into a plea agreement. Thus, the relevant factors here do not justify the disparate sentences. We recognize that the court could consider defendant\u2019s bond forfeiture, but we find that, in view of Clay\u2019s sentence, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a 17-year sentence on defendant.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed, the sentence is vacated, and the cause is remanded for a new sentencing hearing.\nJudgment affirmed; sentence vacated and cause remanded.\nWHITE, P.J., and FREEMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Chester Slaughter and Freddrenna M. Lyle, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth T. McCurry and Anthony J. Carballo, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DINO CONNOR, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 85\u201420\nOpinion filed December 21, 1988.\nChester Slaughter and Freddrenna M. Lyle, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth T. McCurry and Anthony J. Carballo, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0532-01", "first_page_order": 554, "last_page_order": 562 }