{ "id": 3620959, "name": "THE SERVICEMASTER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARY THOMPSON HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Servicemaster Co. v. Mary Thompson Hospital", "decision_date": "1988-12-29", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201488\u20140486", "first_page": "885", "last_page": "895", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 885" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173343 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 2d 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5213172 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/26/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3395120 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" }, { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/316/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ill. App. 3d 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5344970 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/20/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5278501 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/51/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 2d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2471602 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 751", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 5655313 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/329/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 Ill. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3423184 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/240/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5147096 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/317/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2716244 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "441" }, { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/8/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 Ill. App. 2d 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5149614 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/8/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2423880 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/321/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590329 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3438541 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" }, { "page": "554" }, { "page": "551" }, { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524192 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5813305 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3544127 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3614578 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543345 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" }, { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472375 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429312 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0153-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 916, "char_count": 22276, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.082501193053712e-07, "percentile": 0.5628490309666703 }, "sha256": "71a961176198c80dafea468035e26744f39091bc7462bb2dc5b06002b3246083", "simhash": "1:ef9b7de3f902b6f1", "word_count": 3627 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:06:39.846106+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE SERVICEMASTER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARY THOMPSON HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Mary Thompson Hospital (the hospital), brings this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306 (107 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(1)(iv)) from an order of the circuit court of Du Page County denying its motion to transfer venue from Du Page County to Cook County. The hospital contended Du Page County was a forum non conveniens and that no part of the transaction out of which the cause of action arose occurred in Du Page County.\nPlaintiff, the ServiceMaster Company, in the business of supplying contract management services, filed a four-count complaint in Du Page County against the hospital for breach of contracts for its management of the hospital\u2019s housekeeping services, plant operations and maintenance, food service, and materials. At the transfer hearing, the hospital reserved its right to assert the ground of forum non conveniens at a later time, and the cause proceeded solely on the issue of transactional venue. Based on its review of the contracts and various affidavits submitted, the court found that \u201csome of the transaction occurred in Du Page County\u201d and denied the hospital\u2019s motion for transfer of venue.\nThe issue presented on this appeal is whether the court erred in finding that some part of the transaction out of which the cause of action arose occurred in Du Page County.\nThe parties entered into four management services agreements during the period June 1984 to June 1987. All four contracts required biweekly payments to ServiceMaster. It is undisputed that Service-Master\u2019s principal place of business is in Downers Grove, Du Page County, Illinois. The hospital\u2019s principal place of business at all relevant times herein was at 140 N. Ashland Avenue in Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, and it was not engaged in business in Du Page County. It is also undisputed, and this court may judicially notice (May Department Stores Co. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 473 (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 153; First State Bank v. Leffelman (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 362), that the hospital, an incorporated voluntary nonprofit hospital primarily serving indigents, was granted permission by the Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board on July 7, 1988, to cease all operations and close its facility on Ashland Avenue. According to its brief, the hospital is otherwise still in business and operating various facilities.\nServiceMaster filed its complaint in December 1987 upon the hospital\u2019s failure to make the payments specified in the agreements. The hospital\u2019s motion for change of venue, treated by the court as a motion to transfer venue, contended, inter alia, that no part of the transaction giving rise to the cause of action arose in Du Page County. The motion was supported by the affidavit of the hospital\u2019s chief operating officer, Steven G. Orcutt. Inter alia, Orcutt stated that the agreements were negotiated at the hospital with various officials of the ServiceMaster Corporation; that the agreements were required to be and were performed exclusively at the hospital and at no other location; and that any functions performed by ServiceMaster at any location other than the hospital relating to any of the agreements was merely preliminary to the performance of the agreements and did not constitute actual performance of any functions required by the agreements.\nServiceMaster\u2019s response alleged, inter alia, that it substantially performed its duties under the contracts at its home office in Du Page County; substantial contacts between itself and the hospital took place in Du Page County and the contracts themselves were executed by it in Du Page County. The response incorporated therein ServiceMaster\u2019s supporting memorandum of law and affidavits. It was stated in the affidavit of Ed Schmal, ServiceMaster\u2019s controller for health care operations, that he was familiar with the manner in which service contracts such as the ones between ServiceMaster and Mary Thompson Hospital are performed pursuant to normal practice and procedure at ServiceMaster; that to the best of his knowledge and belief, the Mary Thompson Hospital service contracts were performed consistently with the normal practice and procedure of ServiceMaster; financial record keeping, including review meetings records and education training records, occurs in the Du Page County offices of ServiceMaster; that record keeping relative to the issuance of the payroll to persons performing specific service functions is handled at the Du Page County office; that supplies necessary for the housekeeping contract are ordered out of the Du Page County office; that processing and payment of all procurements of food and related supplies from outside vendors occurs at the Du Page County offices bv ServiceMaster\u2019s accounts payable department; and that the processing of payroll and food service procurement involves a substantial amount of work at the Du Page County offices. The affidavits of ServiceMaster\u2019s president of central management services, Kenneth W. Creasman, and ServiceDirection\u2019s president, Patrick E. Gallagher, set forth the fact that their respective signing and execution of the contracts occurred in the offices of the ServiceMaster Company located in Downers Grove.\nThe hospital\u2019s reply memorandum was supported by three affidavits. It was stated in the affidavit of Steven Orcutt that he was in part responsible for negotiation of the agreements between the hospital and ServiceMaster; that all negotiations required took place at the hospital between the affiant, other hospital personnel, and Service-Master personal sales representative Clarence Smith; and that so far as in Orcutt\u2019s personal knowledge, the contracts between ServiceMaster and the hospital were all performed exclusively at the hospital. In her affidavit, Ivette Estrada, president and chief executive officer of the hospital, stated, inter alia, that ServiceMaster, through its sales representative Clarence Smith, solicited the opportunity to provide the various contractual services later agreed upon by calling upon her and other hospital administrative persons exclusively at the hospital; that after deliberation, the hospital informed Smith that it was interested in proceeding with the agreements; that Smith delivered each of the agreements, fully signed and sealed by ServiceMaster, to the hospital; and that the agreements were then signed by the affiant and other hospital administrative officials and given to Smith when he personally visited the hospital.\nIt was stated in the affidavit of Jeffrey Ellis that he was responsible for the financial affairs of the hospital; that it is his duty to see to the issuance of and delivery of checks to vendors for services performed and supplies provided; that he is familiar with the hospital\u2019s practices and procedures for the payment of money to ServiceMaster under the agreements at issue; that no standard system or procedure was established for the delivery of checks to ServiceMaster for services under the agreements; that initially, early on during the terms of the agreements, payments were mailed to ServiceMaster in Du Page County; that thereafter, at the request of the ServiceMaster Company, checks were handed by the affiant to ServiceMaster employees at the hospital.\nVenue is properly fixed in the county of residence of any defendant joined in good faith or in the county in which the transaction or some part hereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014101.) When a defendant moves to transfer venue, it is the defendant\u2019s burden to prove that the plaintiff\u2019s selection of venue was improper. (Weaver v. Midwest Towing, Inc. (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 279, 285; Wilson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co. (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 533, 538-39; but see Peterson v. Monsanto Co. (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 508, 512-13.) \u201c[T]he defendant must set out specific facts, not conclusions, and show a clear right to the relief asked for. [Citations.] Any doubts arising from the inadequacy of the record will be resolved against the defendant. [Citation.]\u201d Weaver, 116 Ill. 2d at 285.\n\u201cThe Illinois venue statute is designed to insure that the action will be brought either in a location convenient to the defendant, by providing for venue in the county of residence, or convenient to potential witnesses, by allowing for venue where the cause of action arose. [Citation.]\u201d (Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 321, 328; Mauro v. Peterson (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 466.) Venue may properly lie in more than one jurisdiction (Frey Corp. v. Gilldorn Mortgage Midwest, Inc. (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 548, 554), and where witnesses to \u201csome part\u201d of the transaction will be convenienced by the plaintiff\u2019s choice of one of two or more available jurisdictions, it should not be disturbed (Frey, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 554).\nThe hospital\u2019s initial contention is that the term \u201ctransaction\u201d used in section 2\u2014101 of the Civil Practice Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014101(2)) should be narrowly construed to relate only to the immediate facts out of which the cause of action arose \u2014 that is, venue should lie where the actual breach arose \u2014 and, therefore, the facts pleaded by ServiceMaster (e.g., how the agreements were negotiated and signed, where they were performed, communications between the parties relating to them) are \u201cgenerally irrelevant.\u201d It cites Hanna v. Breese Trenton Mining Co. (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 657, La Ham v. Sterling Canning Co. (1943), 321 Ill. App. 32, and Bagarozy v. Memghini (1955), 8 Ill. App. 2d 285, in support of its \u201cnarrow\u201d construction argument.\nIts reliance on those cases for its general proposition is misplaced, however. In People ex rel. Carpentier v. Lange (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 437, 441, it was stated:\n\u201cBased upon the several broad meanings given to the term \u2018transaction\u2019 in VanMeter v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620, and upon the observation in Walters v. City of Ottawa, 240 Ill. 259, that a cause of action \u2018includes every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to entitle him to succeed, \u2014 every fact that the defendant would have a right to traverse,\u2019 the italicized phrase [\u201cor in which the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose\u201d] has been interpreted to mean that, for purposes of venue, the places where the transaction, or a part thereof, occurred out of which the cause of action arose include those where any significant negotiations were carried on between the parties, where an agreement was signed, the place where it was, or was supposed to be performed, or where matters occurred that plaintiff has the burden of proving. See: La Ham v. Sterling Canning Co., 321 Ill. App. 32; Heldt v. Watts, 329 Ill. App. 408; Schmelzle v. Transportation Investment Corp., 341 Ill. App. 639; Keystone Steel and Wire Co. v. Price Iron and Steel Co., 345 Ill. App. 305; Winn v. Vogel, 345 Ill. App. 425; Christopher v. West, 345 Ill. App. 515; 1954 LF 557.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\n(See also Wier v. Ketterer (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 751, 752; Frey Corp. v. Gilldorn Mortgage Midwest, Inc. (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 548, 551; Hanna v. Breese Trenton Mining Co. (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 657, 660.) In light of the above, the hospital\u2019s suggested narrow interpretation is without merit.\nThe hospital further contends that even if the \u201ctransaction\u201d here is construed broadly as referring to the entire course of dealing between the parties, the facts cited by ServiceMaster are insufficient to establish venue in Du Page County. Specifically, the hospital asserts venue in Du Page County is not conferred simply because some work incidental to work required under the agreements was performed there by ServiceMaster, or the agreements were signed there by ServiceMaster, or some payments to ServiceMaster were paid there. We disagree.\nServiceMaster\u2019s complaint alleged that \u201csubstantial management services under [each of the agreements] were performed by [it] at its principal place of business located in Du Page County, Illinois.\u201d The work performed by ServiceMaster in Du Page County in connection with the agreements was further set forth in the affidavit of Ed Schmai. In arguing at the transfer hearing that the agreements were performed at the hospital in Cook County, the hospital stated that it was \u201cnot concerned so much about where ServiceMaster might have done the preliminaries necessary,\u201d thus acknowledging there was \u201cnecessary\u201d preliminary work performed by ServiceMaster in Du Page County. None of the affidavits filed by the hospital in support of its motion for transfer of venue set forth specific facts to controvert Schm\u00e1l\u2019s affidavit, and although the hospital now describes Schmal\u2019s affidavit as \u201cdefective\u201d on the ground it is general and not specific, it made no objection on this ground at the transfer hearing.\nThe hospital cites American Oil Co. v. Mason (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 259, in support of its argument the services performed by Service-Master in Du Page County were merely incidental to the transaction between them. In American Oil, however, venue in Cook County, the home office of the plaintiff, was found to be improper where the transaction, the signing of a dealer installment note, took place between the defendants, Frank Mason and three sureties on the note and the plaintiff\u2019s representative, Richard Fomell. The note was signed by Mason in Ogle County, and the gas station owned by plaintiff which Mason was to operate was in Ogle County. All defendants resided in De Kalb County and plaintiff\u2019s representative, Fomell, was \u201cof De Kalb, Illinois.\u201d (133 Ill. App. 2d 259.) The trial court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s motion to transfer venue to either De Kalb or Ogle County was reversed on appeal; the court found the billings, payments and deliveries routed through plaintiff\u2019s Chicago offices or warehouses were clearly incidental to the transaction between Fornell and the defendants out of which the cause of action arose. Plaintiff here is not a third party, however, as in American Oil, and the activities allegedly performed by ServiceMaster in Du Page County were not merely \u201cincidental\u201d to the transaction out of which the cause of action arose but were integral to it. As ServiceMaster notes, the plaintiff in a breach of contract action must prove that it performed the services for which payment is due (see Nation Oil Co. v. R.C. Davoust Co. (1964), 51 Ill. App. 2d 225), and the term \u201ctransaction\u201d includes every fact which is an integral part of a cause of action. (Carpentier, 8 Ill. 2d at 441; see also Kenilworth Insurance Co. v. McDongal (1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 615, 617.) Accordingly, the hospital has not met its burden of proving that venue in Du Page County could not be based on the fact that part of the work required by the agreements was performed by ServiceMaster in Du Page County.\nServiceMaster\u2019s complaint further alleged that each of the contracts \u201cwas accepted and substantially negotiated within Du Page County.\u201d According to the affidavits of Steven Orcutt and Ivette Estrada on behalf of the hospital, it appears negotiation of the contracts took place at the hospital in Cook County. However, it is also clear from Estrada\u2019s affidavit and those of ServiceMaster\u2019s Kenneth Creasman and Patrick Gallagher that the contracts were signed at Service-Master headquarters in Du Page County and then delivered to and signed by the hospital in Cook County.\nAs ServiceMaster argues, it is well settled that the place where a contract is signed and executed is the proper forum for litigation concerning a breach of that contract. (Consolidated Gasoline Co. v. Lexow (1942), 316 Ill. App. 257; Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Price Iron & Steel Co. (1952), 345 Ill. App. 305; see also Standard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kinsolving (1960), 26 Ill. App. 2d 180.) In Lexow, plaintiffs brought a suit in St. Clair County against the defendants which arose out of violation of a certain lease agreement entered into between them which pertained to the sale of oil and gasoline. The defendants were all residents of Madison County and filed a motion to dismiss on the basis venue in St. Clair County was not proper. Defendants\u2019 motion was granted but was reversed on appeal in light of plaintiffs\u2019 allegation, which was uncontradicted by the defendants, that the lease was made and executed partly in St. Clair County. The court reasoned:\n\u201cConceivably, the lease in question could have been made and executed partly in one county and partly in another. If one party to the lease signed in Madison county and another party thereto signed in St. Clair county, certainly the transaction would occur partly in one and partly in the other. Contrary to the contention of the [defendants], it would not depend upon who signed last, nor where the instrument was delivered.\u201d Lexow, 316 Ill. App. at 260.\nLexow was followed in Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Price Iron & Steel Co. (1952), 345 Ill. App. 305. There, the plaintiff filed suit in Peoria County against the defendant, a Chicago-based corporation, for breach of contract due to its failure to furnish scrap steel as required by the contract. The contract was prepared and signed by the plaintiff in Peoria County and forwarded to the defendant in Cook County. The defendant signed it and returned it to the plaintiff. The defendant moved to dismiss the suit or transfer it to Cook County, where its office was located. The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss or to transfer the case. Following judgment against it in a bench trial, the defendant appealed. ,\nOn appeal, the court affirmed the trial court\u2019s overruling of the defendant's motion to transfer the cause to Cook County. Relying on Lexow, the court stated:\n\u201cWe agree with the law as stated in this case that it makes no difference which party signed first, or where it was delivered. It shows that part of the transaction took place in Peoria county, and the other part in Cook county.\u201d Keystone, 345 Ill. App. at 309.\nWe find unpersuasive the hospital\u2019s attempt to distinguish the instant cause on the basis the \u201coffer and acceptance\u201d here both occurred at the hospital. The hospital contends ServiceMaster\u2019s delivery of the agreements \u201csigned and sealed\u201d to the hospital constituted, the offer, and its signing of the agreements, also at the hospital, constituted the acceptance whereby a valid contract was formed. Clearly, principles of offer and acceptance were not dispositive in Lexow and Keystone for purposes of determining venue. Each court found \u201cit would not depend upon who signed last [or \u201cfirst\u201d (Keystone, 345 Ill. App. at 309)], nor where the instrument was delivered.\u201d Lexow, 316 Ill. App. at 260.\nWe conclude venue here was proper in Du Page County, where it is undisputed the contract was signed by ServiceMaster in Du Page County.\nThe hospital further contends venue in Du Page County was not proper because the biweekly payments required by the contract were being made to ServiceMaster\u2019s agent at the hospital in Cook County at the time the breach occurred.\nThis contention is based on the hospital\u2019s incorrect premise that the transactional venue phrase in section 2\u2014101 of the Civil Practice Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014101) should be narrowly construed to encompass only the situs of the breach. That phrase has been broadly interpreted to mean not only where an agreement \u201cwas supposed to be performed\u201d but also \u201cwhere it was.\u201d (Carpentier, 8 Ill. 2d at 441.) The fact payments were routinely being made to ServiceMaster\u2019s agent at the hospital in Cook County at the time the hospital allegedly breached its contract does not negative the prior connection with Du Page County where payments \u201cearly on\u201d during the terms of the agreements were mailed to and received by ServiceMaster in Du Page county.\nThe hospital\u2019s final contention is that the court\u2019s finding that venue here was proper in Du Page County offends the legislative purpose of the venue statute, which is to ensure the convenience of the defendant or witnesses. (Mauro v. Peterson (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 466.) The hospital asserts it would be \u201cgreatly inconvenienced by being required to proceed with the trial of the case in Du Page County.\u201d It bases this assertion on the affidavit of Steven Orcutt in which affiant states the burden of having employees of the hospital called upon to testify or provide depositions will be \u201ccorrespondingly greater\u201d if they are required to travel to Du Page County, thus reducing the hospital\u2019s efficiency and ability to provide high-quality care for the minimum possible amount and causing it to incur \u201cgreat additional expense.\u201d\nWithout even considering how the subsequent closing of the hospital would affect this argument, Orcutt\u2019s affidavit was offered in support of the hospital\u2019s motion to transfer venue which asserted forum non conviens as an alternate ground. That ground was reserved by the hospital below, however, and is not relevant here. The purpose of the venue statute may be said to have been served where \u201c[w]itnesses to \u2018some part\u2019 of the transaction will be convenienced by plaintiff\u2019s choice *** of one of two or more available jurisdictions.\u201d (See Frey, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 554.) Moreover, this court is aware that Du Page and Cook Counties border each other, and that the City of Wheaton, the county seat of Du Page County, is located a distance of only about 25 miles from the City of Chicago. As such, no inconvenience to parties or witnesses serious enough to defeat the plaintiff\u2019s choice of forum here may be said to exist. See Meyers v. Bridgeport Machines Division of Textron, Inc. (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 112, 120-21.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page county is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nNASH and INGLIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Norman P. Jeddeloh, of Siegan, Barbakoff, Gomberg & Gordon, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Thomas H. Ryerson, James T. Ferrini, Kevin J. Young, and Richard C. Clark, all of Clausen, Miller, Gorman, Caffrey & Witous, P.C., of Chicago (Edward M. Kay, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE SERVICEMASTER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARY THOMPSON HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201488\u20140486\nOpinion filed December 29, 1988.\nNorman P. Jeddeloh, of Siegan, Barbakoff, Gomberg & Gordon, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nThomas H. Ryerson, James T. Ferrini, Kevin J. Young, and Richard C. Clark, all of Clausen, Miller, Gorman, Caffrey & Witous, P.C., of Chicago (Edward M. Kay, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0885-01", "first_page_order": 907, "last_page_order": 917 }