{ "id": 2434496, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF YISRAEL PICKHOLTZ, Petitioner-Appellee, and SHARON PICKHOLTZ CHAMBERS, Respondent-Appellant (Continental Illinois National Bank, Party Respondent)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Pickholtz", "decision_date": "1988-12-30", "docket_number": "No. 87-3706", "first_page": "512", "last_page": "522", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 512" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550827 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3267273 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 1006", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535750 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 N.E.2d 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1577245 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/125/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 1008", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3495737 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" }, { "page": "649-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 N.E.2d 1144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3581404 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 N.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5472499 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "434-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 1096", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 769", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3148725 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 1014", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3498040 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3031137 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" }, { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0174-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1001, "char_count": 21212, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1171324744053618e-07, "percentile": 0.5725374336496066 }, "sha256": "89c2d8dea0bfe53c506cc89c7e23fccd2804609694afe0f95269f470bb358774", "simhash": "1:6aba34f7b5e655bf", "word_count": 3395 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:09.210343+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF YISRAEL PICKHOLTZ, Petitioner-Appellee, and SHARON PICKHOLTZ CHAMBERS, Respondent-Appellant (Continental Illinois National Bank, Party Respondent)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent Sharon Pickholtz Chambers (Sharon) appeals from the circuit court\u2019s denial of her amended petition to increase child support and amended post-trial motion seeking further relief, and asks this court to determine whether these denials constituted an abuse of the circuit court\u2019s discretion.\nA divorce agreement, dated July 5, 1979, between Sharon and petitioner Yisrael Pickholtz (Yisrael) was entered as a judgment on December 17, 1979, in the District Rabbinical Court in Beersheba, Israel. By agreed order entered May 4, 1981 (1981 order or order), the circuit court of Cook County enrolled and established the Beersheba judgment for the purpose of enforcing and modifying its custody and parental visitation provisions, and incorporated the following findings: (1) Sharon and Yisrael married in 1971; (2) they moved to Israel in 1973; (3) two children, Yerachmiel and Merav-Yehudit (Merav), were bom to the Pickholtzes in 1973 and 1976, respectively; and (4) the Pickholtzes divorced in 1979. Sharon and both children moved to the United States in 1980, where she remarried in 1981.\nThe 1981 order also granted Sharon full custody of the children, allowing them biannual visits with their father in Israel and permitting Yisrael to travel to the United States for the purpose of exercising additional visitation rights. In the order, the parties expressed a desire that the children \u201cbe reared in traditional Jewish values\u201d and that they \u201cattend Jewish parochial schools unless there is a bona fide reason why they should not.\u201d\nNoting that \u201cYisrael *** is a man of modest means and does not have the financial ability to pay the costs and expenses of the transportation which the visitation schedule *** will entail,\u201d the order additionally set forth the parties\u2019 financial agreement whereby: (1) Sharon would deposit $80,000 in an escrow account to remain in effect until 1994 when Merav turns 18; (2) upon expiration, the account would be liquidated and Yisrael would receive $40,000 as his sole property; (3) Sharon guaranteed that the annual net income or \u201cpayable net income\u201d on the escrowed funds would equal at least $10,000; (4) up to $11,600 of the payable net income would be used: (a) to pay for all airline tickets purchased by Yisrael and the children in furtherance of Yisrael\u2019s visitation rights; and (b) for support and maintenance of the children during the time they spent with their father in Israel and the United States; (5) any payable net income remaining would become Yisrael\u2019s \u201csole and separate property\u201d; and (6) Sharon. could claim any income earned on the escrowed funds, less the payable net income. The order also obligated Sharon to pay all escrow fees and costs relating to the escrow agreement and any cost of airline tickets not satisfied by the payable net income. Yisrael was required to pay 1,377 Israeli shekels per month for child support; any additional money needed to support the children had to be supplied by Sharon. Finally, in the event either party attempted to modify the terms of the order or petitioned to increase child support payments, the opposite party would be entitled to receive the entire escrowed funds. '\nSharon in 1984 petitioned the circuit court to declare void paragraphs 5 through 9 of the order, requiring Sharon to \u201cfund a trust essentially for the benefit of Yisrael\u201d and precluding her from seeking additional child support, and to join the escrowee, Continental Illinois National Bank, as a party defendant to the lawsuit. On May 6, 1986, the provisions of the order which made awards for child support and education expenses nonmodifiable and prescribed forfeiture of Sharon\u2019s interest in the funds should she seek modification of the order were declared void and nonbinding.\nSharon additionally filed an amended petition for increased child support, citing sections 503(g) and 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, pars. 503(g), 513), and alleging the occurrence of \u201ca substantial and material change in [the parties\u2019] circumstances creating a substantial imbalance between the needs of the minor children and the ability of the parties to pay support and warranting an increase in Yisrael\u2019s *** child support obligation,\u201d which included a decrease in the parties\u2019 ability to pay the escalating costs of the children\u2019s support and private education. Also sought was the court\u2019s protection and promotion of the children\u2019s best interests by requiring Yisrael\u2019s realistic fulfillment of his child support obligation; and therefore, money currently held in escrow should be set aside in a separate fund to annually disburse $12,000 in income and principal to pay the children\u2019s education and transportation expenses until Merav reaches 21 years of age.\nFollowing hearings, the court entered an order on September 29, 1986. Pursuant to Sharon\u2019s motions to amend the order to conform to the court\u2019s ruling, on July 9, 1987, the court vacated the September 29 order and found: (1) a substantial and material change in the parties\u2019 circumstances since the entry of the 1981 order, as economic conditions in Israel rendered the child support payments in shekels \u201cvirtually valueless\u201d; (2) Yisrael was precluded from paying increased child support to Sharon from his present employment income because of his current obligations to his second family in Israel; (3) the 1981 order was valid and binding; (4) the contractual agreements of the parties contained in the 1981 order should be preserved and adhered to; (5) the 1981 order embodies the parties\u2019 agreement that the children should receive a traditional Jewish education; (6) the escrow account held accumulated interest after payment of transportation expenses to date; and (7) except as otherwise provided in this and the May 6, 1986, order, relief requested in Sharon\u2019s petition for declaratory judgment and petition and amended petition for increased child support was denied.\nPursuant to Sharon\u2019s motion for reconsideration, the court entered yet another order on August 18, 1987, ruling that in accord with the 1981 order, the earnings available from the escrow account must finance visitation expenses for Yisrael and the children, but income in excess of that needed for airfare and related expenses must be used to meet the children\u2019s financial needs; if earnings or income from the escrow account prove insufficient, the principal of the fund will be invaded to compensate any deficiency; and as of September 1986, the fund contained $113,605.50. Yisrael will continued to pay child support as prescribed by the 1981 order and, in addition, $2,400 per year will be withdrawn from the account for child support and $3,000 per year for parochial school tuition and for the expense of sending the children to religious summer camp. The terms of this order are to remain in effect from 1982 through 1994, except that in 1992 the child support payments will be reduced to $1,800 per year, and the payments for educational and related expenses will be $2,000 per year. The court also ordered that all previous judgments, orders and agreements between the parties remain in effect except as modified by the present order, and Sharon remain responsible for payment of the escrow administrative costs and for the airfare of individuals escorting the children to and from Israel.\nBy an agreed order entered November 19, 1987, the court found no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the August 18, 1987, order. Sharon appeals.\nI\nSharon assigns as an abuse of discretion the court\u2019s denial of her amended motion to establish a trust pursuant to sections 503(g) and 513 of the IMDMA. Sharon insists the court should transfer money now in the escrow account to a separate trust to pay for the children\u2019s support, education and religious summer camp expenses, and the payments envisioned by the August 18 order are inadequate to satisfy the children\u2019s needs.\nSection 503(g) permits a court, if necessary, to set aside a portion of the jointly or separately held estates of the parties in a separate fund or trust for the support, maintenance, education and general welfare of any minor. In deciding whether to create a section 503(g) trust or fund, the circuit court must initially determine whether the fund is necessary to promote and protect the best interests of the children. (Atkinson v. Atkinson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 174, 179, 429 N.E.2d 465; In re Marriage of Bates (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 566, 571, 490 N.E.2d 1014.) Application of section 503(g) also demands evidence of a demonstrated unwillingness or inability by a parent to make direct payments of child support. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 87 Ill. 2d at 179; In re Marriage of Rockford (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 769, 782, 414 N.E.2d 1096.\nYisrael contests Sharon\u2019s entitlement to any alteration in the current child support scheme because she failed to prove the substantial change in circumstances necessary under IMDMA section 510(a) to modify the 1981 order. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 510(a); see also Harner v. Harner (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 430, 434, 434 N.E.2d 465.) Under recent decisions, however, the petitioner\u2019s burden under section 510(a) is to show a \u201csubstantial imbalance\u201d between the supporting (noncustodial) parent\u2019s capabilities and the child\u2019s needs. See In re Marriage of Boyden (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 385, 387, 517 N.E.2d 1144; Ingwerson v. Woeckener (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 647, 649, 490 N.E.2d 1008.\nIn the case sub judice, Yisrael testified he couldn\u2019t recall his 1981 income, but as to his present financial situation he averred: (1) he lives with his second wife and seven children in Israel; (2) three are Yisrael\u2019s natural children, all bom since May 1981, three are his second wife\u2019s children by a previous marriage and one is a disabled ward; (3) his wife receives $270 a month in child support; (4) he receives $180 to $200 a month from the State for care of the ward; (5) all but one of the school-age children are in parochial school; (6) he earns approximately $850 a month \u201cwhen [he works] a full month\u201d and has no other source of income; and (7) his annual income plus the support received from the State and child support received by his wife are insufficient to provide for his second family. The current exchange rate for 1,377 shekels is approximately 80 cents and since 1981, he has made no direct contributions to the support of Merav and Yerachmiel beyond the required 1,377 shekels per month. In the first year after entry of the 1981 order, he received from the escrow account payable net income approximately $5,000 over and above that needed to purchase airline tickets; some of that income was used for personal living expenses, some was spent in connection with his visits to the United States. On their visits to Israel in 1982-86, Yerachmiel and Merav stayed at Yisrael\u2019s home; when Yisrael travelled to the United States in those same years, he virtually always stayed with relatives and was never charged room and board.\nYisrael has no objections to Yerachmiel attending a religious summer camp and believes it is \u201cgood\u201d for both children to do so; he also believes that attendance at a parochial school will promote development of traditional Jewish values and it is his desire that the children continue their parochial school education while in the United States \u201cto the extent that it is possible.\u201d Money for the parochial school tuitions has not come from him. He objects to \u201cprincipal payments\u201d for the children\u2019s airfare and education coming from the escrow account and maintains it couldn\u2019t be achieved without jeopardizing \u201call of the basic intents of the original agreement.\u201d\nSharon\u2019s mother, Esther Robinson, tendered cancelled checks to substantiate her statement that she had loaned Sharon $34,939 since 1981 to pay for, inter alia, the children\u2019s clothing, education, religious summer camp expenses and escorts to Israel. Robinson asserted the payments were loans, not gifts, but lacked documentary proof.\nSharon testified that after she returned to the United States and prior to the entry of the 1981 order, she and the children lived at her parents\u2019 home, paying no bills for utilities, food or rent. In 1981, Sharon was employed as a job developer for the City Colleges of Chicago; she worked a 40-hour week and earned $14,400 per year. The position was terminated in February 1982 due to lack of funding. She sought employment elsewhere and collected unemployment benefits for six months. Unable to find work paying a salary above the minimum wage, Sharon enrolled in graduate school at Loyola University of Chicago in August 1982 and graduated with a masters degree in social work in May 1985. Sharon remarried in 1981 and had a third child in August 1985. Because she cares for her youngest child on a full-time basis, she has, since 1985, worked only four hours per week, earning a net income to date of approximately $3,300. She is employed by her mother as a clinical social worker. In 1981: (1) Sharon purchased all her children\u2019s clothing with her own money; (2) only Yerachmiel attended parochial school; (3) tuition was $850 per year; and (4) day-care expenses for Merav totalled $95 every two weeks. The parties stipulated that 1,377 shekels were worth approximately $150 in 1981.\nSharon swore that, as of the date of the trial, she purchased her children\u2019s clothing with loans from her mother, none of which she had repaid. Sharon could not recall her children\u2019s clothing expenses in 1981, but could affirm that the smaller-sized clothing worn by Merav and Yerachmiel seven years ago cost less than clothes they wear now; Yerachmiel presently requires men\u2019s-sized clothing; the preteen sizes needed to outfit Merav considerably exceed girls\u2019 clothes in price; and the quantity and frequency of clothes purchases have increased since 1981. Additional expenses presently incurred by the teenagers did not exist in 1981. She further maintained that she had financed the ordinary living expenses of her children since 1981, but would not have been able to do so without aid from her mother and current husband.\nProducing an itemized affidavit detailing monthly expenses incurred by the children, Sharon explained that Merav and Yerachmiel account for 33% or $717 of the \u201cjoint family expenses,\u201d in addition to the children\u2019s separate, monthly expenses; from these figures, Sharon established that the children\u2019s average monthly expenses total $2,324.87. This evidence distinguishes this case from Harner v. Harner (105 Ill. App. 3d at 434-35), upon which Yisrael relies. Yisrael presented no contradictory evidence.\nSharon averred it is important that she raise Merav and Yerachmiel with traditional Jewish values; they must be sent to parochial schools and participate in activities designed to promote orthodox Jewish values, such as youth groups and religiously oriented summer camps.\nThe aforementioned evidence clearly establishes a substantial imbalance between the children\u2019s expenses and their natural parents\u2019 ability to satisfy those needs. Although Yisrael stated he could not recall his 1981 income, he also testified to the formidable expansion of his family since 1981, the corresponding devaluation of the Israeli currency and his modest income. Sharon, moreover, presented evidence that the children\u2019s combined expenses currently total approximately $28,000 per year and demonstrated that due to the loss of her job and the birth of her third child, her financial and employment position suffered significantly.\nYisrael attacks Sharon\u2019s evidence of a change in Yerachmiel\u2019s and Merav\u2019s living expenses as conclusory and undocumented; however, Sharon and Esther Robinson concurred that Sharon paid her children\u2019s ordinary living expenses in 1981; Sharon can no longer pay these expenses; and Robinson produced several cancelled checks, exceeding $34,000, documenting the money Sharon used to pay for the teenagers\u2019 clothes, educational and camp expenses.\nAs to the propriety of establishing a discrete trust pursuant to section 503(g), the evidence related above illustrates Yisrael\u2019s inability to render direct child support payments to his first family; his personal income equals approximately $10,000 a year, a small sum on which to raise a family of nine, even with the monthly supplements received for the benefit of his stepchildren and ward. Sharon demonstrated, moreover, the imperative of establishing a trust to protect the children\u2019s best interests. Both parties expressed a desire in 1981 that Merav and Yerachmiel receive a private education.\nYisrael correctly observes that the court in In re Marriage of Bates (141 Ill. App. 3d 566) condoned a father\u2019s attempt to shelter his income rather than finance his children\u2019s private education. Lacking in Bates, however, was evidence of sincere religious beliefs, as are present in this case, prompting a desire for private education. Furthermore, money sought in the case at bar is accumulated interest from an escrow account funded solely by Sharon; Sharon seeks no increase in direct payments from Yisrael and concedes that any trust or fund established under section 503(g) must continue to pay all transportation and related visitation costs incurred by Yisrael and the children, until Merav achieves majority.\nYisrael argues that the clean hands doctrine bars Sharon from demanding that the court create a separate trust for the children\u2019s financial needs, citing Edwards v. Edwards (1970), 125 Ill. App. 2d 91, 96, 259 N.E.2d 820. Yisrael seeks to impose the doctrine for Sharon\u2019s alleged violations of the 1979 divorce decree and orders entered by Israeli courts pursuant to that decree; these orders are entirely unrelated to the issues raised in the present appeal. Moreover, Yisrael admits that Sharon has not \u201cdefaulted\u201d on the 1981 order. Yisrael\u2019s argument merits no further consideration. Comedy Cottage, Inc. v. Berk (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 355, 362, 495 N.E.2d 1006.\nII\nSharpn next contends the court abused its discretion in denying her relief from the responsibility of paying airfare for escorts for her children and the costs of administering the escrow account. Sharon acknowledges that the 1981 order expressly imposes the burden of these costs on her; nevertheless, she maintains that since the entry of the order these expenses have been paid with money withdrawn from the escrow account, pursuant to agreed, written orders.\nYisrael responds that Sharon waived this issue by neglecting to raise it during the proceedings below. The record, however, reveals that: (1) Sharon testified at trial regarding the children\u2019s need for an escort during their flights to and from Israel; (2) Sharon moved the court to modify these provisions on June 18, 1987; and (3) in its August 18, 1987, order, the court denied Sharon\u2019s request. Raising an issue by post-trial motion preserves the question for appellate consideration. Burgdorff v. International Business Machines Corp. (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 158, 162, 392 N.E.2d 183.\nIn Blisset v. Blisset (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 161, 167-68, 526 N.E.2d 125, the supreme court disapproved informal waivers of child support obligations, emphasizing that \u201cparents may create an enforceable agreement for modification of child support only by petitioning the court for support modification.\u201d Any de facto agreement between Sharon and Yisrael to alter child support obligations, assuming such a consensus was reached, is therefore meaningless absent court approval of the modification. On remand, the circuit court should consider whether these expenses must be included in costs compensated by a section 503(g) trust or fund.\nReversed and remanded.\nSCARIANO and EGAN, JJ., concur.\nIn 1983, Sharon stopped withdrawing the monthly support payments deposited by Yisrael in an Israeli bank because the $60 charge to telex the funds to the United States exceeded the value of the shekels themselves.\nA statute recently enacted permits courts to order the withholding of income from virtually any source where the recipient of that income fails to render timely payment of court-ordered child support. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 1107.1.) The statute demonstrates this State\u2019s policy of elevating the needs of its minors above their parents\u2019 personal pecuniary interests. A policy so plainly articulated underscores the reasonableness of and necessity for establishing the proposed trust, which is undeniably fair in its terms, and would assure the children full access to a ready and bountiful source of income without significant departure from the original intent of the escrow. See Ingwerson v. Woeckener, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 649-50.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kalcheim, Schatz & Berger, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Greenberg, Keele, Lunn & Aronberg, of Chicago (Nathan H. Lichtenstein, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF YISRAEL PICKHOLTZ, Petitioner-Appellee, and SHARON PICKHOLTZ CHAMBERS, Respondent-Appellant (Continental Illinois National Bank, Party Respondent).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 87-3706\nOpinion filed December 30, 1988.\nRehearing denied January 26, 1989.\nKalcheim, Schatz & Berger, of Chicago, for appellant.\nGreenberg, Keele, Lunn & Aronberg, of Chicago (Nathan H. Lichtenstein, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0512-01", "first_page_order": 534, "last_page_order": 544 }