{ "id": 2431105, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LLOYD ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rogers", "decision_date": "1989-01-13", "docket_number": "No. 2-87-0826", "first_page": "650", "last_page": "661", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 650" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3636697 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 1074", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3536185 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1083-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/1074-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3046232 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405554 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3605574 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160428 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2969592 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" }, { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2613321 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "92" }, { "page": "92-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 3d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2837660 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141932 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809479 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" }, { "page": "282", "parenthetical": "statement was admissible to explain the words of the defendant's public admission, \"Yes\"; statement gave meaning to the defendant's otherwise incomprehensible statement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545016 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" }, { "page": "393-95", "parenthetical": "statements made after crime which did not attempt to conceal crime are not admissible under the coconspirator's exception" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 U.S. 387", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203799 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394-96" }, { "page": "398-99" }, { "page": "1126-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/475/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787607 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" }, { "page": "606" }, { "page": "2537" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "606" }, { "page": "2538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3229029 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3123281 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312-14" }, { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115107 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0176-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 955, "char_count": 24520, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.844367769120929e-08, "percentile": 0.4173009700565554 }, "sha256": "a536ee130d8b4584e991af7e75aa9cde545588b9e7c6abe28842d7c9e41a67d8", "simhash": "1:982f2574834bf1c7", "word_count": 4124 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:09.210343+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LLOYD ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE INGLIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was found guilty of attempted murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 8-4). The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and sentenced defendant to 20 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant contends on appeal he was denied a fair trial because the trial court admitted evidence of a subsequent shooting at the victim\u2019s house and that he was denied a fair trial because of the State\u2019s closing argument. We affirm.\nThe victim, Michael Jones, was shot at on February 18, 1987, while driving his car. Jones testified that at approximately 7:30 p.m. on February 18, 1987, he drove his father\u2019s yellow Cadillac to O\u2019Donnell\u2019s store in Rockford with his friend, Clottie George, where he saw Keith Dainty in his beige car. In Dainty\u2019s car were Michael Glass, his brother Wayne (a/k/a Daniel) Glass, and an individual he later identified as defendant.\nJones testified that after he left O\u2019Donnell\u2019s, he drove his friend home. Later, at approximately 8:15 or 8:30 p.m. as he drove around a local \u201cdead man\u2019s curve,\u201d he saw Dainty\u2019s car approaching head-on, then turn around and follow him. As he turned left onto Preston Street, he slowed down to a stop. Dainty first pulled ahead of him on the driver\u2019s side and blew his horn for Jones to get out, which Jones declined to do. Dainty then pulled up beside Jones\u2019 car. According to Jones, Dainty was th\u00e9 driver, Wayne Glass was in the front seat on the passenger side, Michael Glass was behind the driver, and defendant was behind Wayne Glass. Jones was positive that he had seen the person who eventually shot at him earlier that night with Dainty at O\u2019Donnell\u2019s. Jones wears glasses but was not wearing them on the night in question. Jones testified that from approximately three feet away, defendant fired a shot with a long .22 or .32 caliber revolver which shattered his rear driver\u2019s side window. Jones ducked. Next, Jones\u2019 front passenger side window was shot out as Dainty\u2019s car pulled up besides Jones. Jones could not see who fired the second shot. Jones drove off after the second shot at a high rate of speed down Preston Street, and Dainty\u2019s car followed. According to Jones, he was heading for his mother\u2019s house, where he lived at the time. However, because he was being closely followed, he went around the block. Eventually, he arrived home at about 9 p.m. or before.\nTwo days later, Jones identified defendant from a photo array as the shooter.\nKeith Dainty testified next for the State in accordance with an agreement reached with the State. That agreement provided that charges of attempted murder and reckless conduct would be dropped in the instant case, probation would be revoked in another matter, and defendant would be sentenced to six months\u2019 work release for the revocation of probation. Dainty testified that he drove to O\u2019Donnell\u2019s on the night in question with Wayne Glass, Michael Glass, and Frank (Pete) Jefferson. Dainty stated that defendant was not with them at this time. Dainty also testified that he did not see defendant that night at O\u2019Donnell\u2019s. Dainty did state that he saw Jones at the store.\nDainty stated that he, the two Glass brothers, and Jefferson drove back to the house of Dainty\u2019s girlfriend\u2019s aunt, Juicy Glass. Defendant was among those present. Later that evening, Dainty was driving his car, in which Michael Glass sat in the front passenger seat and Wayne Glass, defendant, and Jefferson sat in the rear.\nWhen they saw Jones driving down a hill into \u201cDead Man\u2019s curve,\u201d defendant told Dainty to follow Jones, which Dainty did. Jones pulled over, and defendant told Dainty to pull his car next to Jones. Dainty complied and was approximately 15 feet from Jones\u2019 car. Dainty stated that he saw Michael Glass roll down his front passenger window while defendant pulled a gun and started shooting at Jones. Dainty saw Jones lie down in his car while defendant kept shooting. Dainty then started to drive away. Defendant asked Dainty why he drove away and stated \u201cnow we got to kill him.\u201d Defendant instructed Dainty to follow Jones, and, again, Dainty complied. Defendant kept shooting, using a long .22 caliber automatic pistol, as they followed Jones for approximately four blocks. Jefferson was screaming and lying down on the rear car floor.\nJefferson also testified for the State. Jefferson stated that one of the Glass brothers was in the front passenger side of Dainty\u2019s car and defendant, himself, and the other Glass brother were in the rear.\nAs Dainty was driving back to Juicy\u2019s house, Jefferson heard someone say, \u201c[T]here he is,\u201d and Dainty tried to flag down a man driving a yellow Cadillac flashing his car lights. This man, subsequently identified as Jones, pulled his car over, as did Dainty. Jefferson heard someone say, \u201c[D]uck, he might shoot,\u201d so Jefferson ducked and remained on the floor. Jefferson said defendant fired five or six rounds at the yellow Cadillac from a distance of approximately 5 to 10 feet away. Jefferson said Jones drove away, and Dainty pursued him for approximately four blocks. Jefferson was not charged with any crime in connection with this offense. Jefferson later identified defendant as the shooter from a photo array.\nNeither of the Glass brothers testified.\nThe State further produced evidence that at approximately 9:30 p.m. on the same night, bullets were fired through the front closed house window where Jones lived with his parents, brother, and sister. Neither Jones nor his car was present then, but Jones\u2019 father and sister were. No one was injured. Police later retrieved two bullets from the interior of the house, and there was testimony that they were .22 caliber. Jones\u2019 sister stated that she heard a loud car muffler at the time of this shooting.\nDainty also testified regarding the subsequent shooting. He claimed he saw defendant and Wayne Glass later that night at approximately midnight at the house of Jones\u2019 wife (who did not reside with her husband). Dainty testified that Glass said, in defendant\u2019s presence, that Glass and defendant had just \u201cshot up the house of Michael Jones\u2019 mother.\u201d Dainty added that defendant then warned Dainty not to \u201ctell,\u201d or else \u201csomething bad will happen.\u201d\nDefendant presented an alibi defense. Defendant stated that at approximately 6 p.m. on the night in question, he was at his apartment alone. He went upstairs and talked to his neighbor Dean Bell about his house being broken into. Bell and defendant then went down to defendant\u2019s apartment, where they fixed a broken window in defendant\u2019s apartment. They finished repairing the window between 6:50 and 6:55 p.m. After they fixed the window, Bell and defendant sat and talked for a while. According to defendant, Bell stayed at his apartment for about two hours. Bell left at about 7:30 or 8:30. Defendant stated that he left his apartment at about 8:45. He then went to the house of Juicy Glass. Present at Juicy Glass\u2019 were Juicy Glass, Carol Glass, and \u201cseveral other girls with some kids.\u201d According to defendant, he arrived at Juicy Glass\u2019 at about 8:50 or 8:55 p.m. According to defendant, Michael Glass, Keith Dainty, and Jefferson arrived 15 to 20 minutes later. About 5 to 10 minutes later, defendant left with Wayne Glass. Defendant and Glass then went back to defendant\u2019s apartment for approximately five minutes. Defendant then drove Glass to Glass\u2019s house where defendant dropped Glass off at approximately 10 p.m. Defendant then went to a friend\u2019s house, where he arrived at approximately 10:10 p.m. He stayed there for approximately one hour, after which he went home. Defendant stated that he never reported the break-in of his apartment to the police.\nDean Bell testified that he did not specifically remember February 18 nor did he remember the exact date that defendant\u2019s apartment was broken into. He did, however, remember that defendant\u2019s apartment was broken into. Bell stated that about 5:15, 5:20, about the time the sun was getting ready to set, defendant asked him if he knew anything about defendant\u2019s window being broken. Bell stated they then got a piece of glass and put it in the window, which took about 45 minutes. He then talked to defendant for about two hours afterward. According to Bell, he left defendant at about 8 p.m, 8:30, or 9 p.m.\nThe jury returned a guilty verdict on attempted murder, and the trial court entered a judgment on the verdict. The court later sentenced defendant to 20 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nDefendant initially contends that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to offer evidence of the subsequent shooting at the victim\u2019s mother\u2019s house. Defendant specifically contends that it was error to allow this testimony because there was no showing that defendant committed the subsequent crime. This argument relies on defendant\u2019s next contention that the trial court improperly allowed testimony by Dainty that Wayne Glass stated that he and defendant had \u201cjust shot up Michael Jones [sic] mom\u2019s house.\u201d\nWe agree with defendant that absent Dainty\u2019s testimony, evidence of the subsequent crime would have been inadmissible. However, we disagree with defendant\u2019s contention that Dainty\u2019s testimony was inadmissible and therefore find that evidence of the subsequent crime was admissible.\nOur supreme court has held that evidence of a subsequent crime is admissible to prove the intent of the defendant at the time of the crime charged. (People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 176, 186; see also People v. Bartall (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 294, 312-14.) However, before another crime is admitted, it must be shown that the crime has a threshold similarity to the crime charged (Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d at 310) and it must also be shown that the defendant actually committed the other crime or participated in its commission (People v. Gugliotta (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 362, 365).\nIn the instant case, Dainty testified that Glass stated that he and defendant had shot up Jones\u2019 mother\u2019s house and that defendant had warned Dainty not to tell anyone. There was also evidence that there was a loud muffler noise at the time of the shooting and that defendant drove a car with a loud muffler and evidence that both crimes were committed with a .22 caliber weapon. Absent Dainty\u2019s testimony, we would find that the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant committed the subsequent crime. We therefore move on to address defendant\u2019s contention that Dainty\u2019s testimony regarding the subsequent crime was inadmissible. Specifically, defendant contends that Dainty\u2019s testimony constituted hearsay which violated his sixth amendment right of confrontation. In response, the State initially contends that defendant\u2019s argument is waived because defendant only objected to the testimony on hearsay grounds. In the alternative, the State argues that the statement was admissible because it did not violate the confrontation clause, it was the statement of a coconspirator, and it contained an admission by defendant.\nAt the outset we note that the State\u2019s contention of waiver is entirely erroneous. The record clearly reveals that counsel for defendant objected to the testimony on both hearsay and the right to confrontation. The record also reveals that these same objections were again raised in defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. We also note that a reply brief, had one been filed, could have effectively set the record straight on this point. It is unfortunate that when so many reply briefs are no more than a rehash of the appellant\u2019s original brief, a reply brief was not filed where it could have served a purpose. Since the issue has not been waived, we proceed to the merits of the case.\nThe confrontation clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation and the right of cross-examination. (Ohio v. Roberts (1980), 448 U.S. 56, 63, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 606, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2537.) However, competing interests may warrant dispensing with the confrontation at trial. (448 U.S. at 64, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 606, 100 S. Ct. at 2538.) In United States v. Inadi (1986), 475 U.S. 387, 394-96, 89 L. Ed. 2d 390, 398-99, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27, the Court found that the confrontation clause did not prohibit a coconspirator\u2019s statement made in furtherance of the conspiracy from being admitted against a defendant. Thus, if, as the State argues, Glass\u2019s statement fell within the coconspirator\u2019s exception to the hearsay rule it would violate neither the hearsay rule nor the confrontation clause.\nHowever, we find that in the instant case the statement of Glass does not fall within the coconspirator\u2019s exception. In order for the exception to apply, the statement must be made in furtherance of the conspiracy. (See People v. Parmly (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 386, 393.) In the instant case, Glass stated, \u201c[T]hey just shot up Miche\u00e1l Jones [sic] mom\u2019s house.\u201d It thus did not further the conspiracy in any way and, rather than covering it up, the statement, in fact, exposed the crime. We therefore find that Glass\u2019 statement, standing alone, was inadmissible as hearsay and as a violation of the confrontation clause. See 117 Ill. 2d at 393-95 (statements made after crime which did not attempt to conceal crime are not admissible under the coconspirator\u2019s exception).\nNevertheless, we find that defendant\u2019s statement was an admission and therefore admissible. Extrajudicial admissions made by a defendant are not excludable as hearsay. (People v. Simpson (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 276, 282.) An admission is a statement from which guilt may be inferred, when taken in connection with other facts, but from which guilt does not necessarily follow. (People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 22, 57.) In the instant case, we find that defendant\u2019s statement was an admission from which guilt could be inferred. Moreover, because defendant\u2019s statement was admissible, we find that Glass\u2019 statement was admissible to provide the context in which defendant\u2019s statement was made. See Simpson, 68 Ill. 2d at 282 (statement was admissible to explain the words of the defendant\u2019s public admission, \u201cYes\u201d; statement gave meaning to the defendant\u2019s otherwise incomprehensible statement).\nWe next address defendant\u2019s contention that the subsequent shooting should have been excluded because it did not evince an intent to kill on the part of defendant. Defendant argues that the evidence showed that the victim was not home at the time of the subsequent shooting and that the victim\u2019s car was also absent. Defendant argues that, at most, the evidence showed that defendant shot at a house not known to be occupied by the victim or any other person. Defendant also argues that evidence of the subsequent crime does not have any probative value concerning his earlier mental state. In support of his position, defendant cites People v. Henry (1971), 3 Ill. App. 3d 235, People v. McChristian (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 87, and People v. Trinkle (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 730.\nIn Henry, the court found that the evidence did not support a finding of attempted murder. (Henry, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 239.) There, the evidence showed that the defendant, who was an ex-marine with an expert rating in marksmanship, fired a hand gun as an unmarked police car approached. (3 Ill. App. 3d at 239.) The court found that the evidence was not clear as to whether the defendant actually shot at the police car, and the court was of the opinion that it was unlikely that the defendant would have missed the car had he aimed at it. (3 Ill. App. 3d at 239.) Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction.\nIn McChristian, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit the murder of five named individuals. (McChristian, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 89.) The defendant was also separately charged with attempted murder of each individual. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the attempt charges but guilty on the conspiracy charge. (18 Ill. App. 3d at 89.) On review, the appellate court reversed the finding of guilty on the conspiracy charge. In so doing, the court noted that the verdicts of the jury were logically inconsistent. (18 Ill. App. 3d at 92.) The court found that the jury\u2019s verdicts on the attempted murders tended to negate the overt act of shooting, which by its verdicts of acquittal the jury must have found the defendant did not commit with intent to murder. (18 Ill. App. 3d at 92-93.) The court therefore reversed the conspiracy conviction.\nIn Trinkle, the court found that the indictment for attempted murder was insufficient because it did not contain the specific intent element. (Trinkle, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 734.) The court also questioned the sufficiency of the evidence, noting that the defendant fired at the door of a building (a bar) not knowing that a patron was standing behind it. The court also noted that previous statements by the defendant evinced an intent against property not against a person. 40 Ill. App. 3d at 734.\nWe find that the above cases are all distinguishable from the issue in the present case. Those cases dealt with the sufficiency of evidence to prove the crime charged. In the instant case, the issue before us is whether the subsequent crime was sufficiently relevant to be admitted into evidence. The decision of the trial court in this regard will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Ward (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455-56; People v. Jurczak (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 206, 214.) The evidence indicates that defendant shot at Jones\u2019 house at a time when it could reasonably be expected that Jones was home. Thus, at the very least, evidence of the subsequent shooting showed malice toward Jones which could be probative of defendant\u2019s intent at the time of the shooting which was charged. (See People v. Manzella (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 187, 197 (evidence of other crimes went to the issues of malice and criminal intent).) Consequently, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.\nFinally, we address defendant\u2019s contention that the closing argument by the State deprived him of a fair trial. Defendant contends that he was prejudiced in that the State argued facts which were not in evidence in that the State claimed that innocent people, maybe children, were jeopardized, that there was good lighting, and that Dainty denied using cocaine; that the State made emotional appeals, asking the jury to put itself in the place of Jones; that the State disparaged the State\u2019s burden of proof when it told the jury not to give defendant a \u201cfree pass\u201d just because the State had the burden of proof; that the State vouched for the credibility of witnesses in that it stated that Dainty entered into a plea agreement to get at the truth and that Jefferson was not charged with the offense, the result of which was also to insinuate that since defendant was charged he was guilty; and that the State argued that defendant\u2019s admission of a prior burglary was disingenuous.\nThe State responds that all but three of these arguments have been waived. We agree. In order to preserve an issue on appeal the issue must have been raised at trial and in a post-trial motion. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186.) In the instant case, defendant did not object to the State\u2019s argument that Dainty\u2019s plea agreement was an effort to get at the truth; that Jefferson was not charged and that he was therefore believable; that Dainty denied trying to buy cocaine from Michael Jones; or to the argument that defendant\u2019s admission of his prior burglary conviction was disingenuous. We therefore consider these issues waived. We also find that defendant waived his argument that the State improperly argued that the jury should put itself in Jones\u2019 place. Although there was an objection to this argument, the basis for the objection was different at trial than the one now asserted on appeal. The purpose of requiring an objection at trial is to allow the trial court to correct errors as they occur. (See People v. Jackson (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 350, 359.) Counsel is therefore required to inform the court of the basis for objections. Thus, when an objection is not specified, it is waived. (People v. Cowper (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1083-84.) Since the basis now being argued was not raised at trial, we consider it waived. We will now consider defendant\u2019s remaining contentions.\nDefendant claims that he was prejudiced when the State argued that innocent people, maybe children, were jeopardized, and that there was good lighting. Defendant contends that neither of these arguments was supported by the record.\nWe agree that it is improper to argue facts which are not in the record. (See People v. White (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 262, 280.) However, we find that neither of the State\u2019s arguments violated this rule. In beginning its argument, the State said:\n\u201cThere are two ways, at least two ways in which a jury can approach an analysis of this case. A jury could think or say, for example, that the people involved in this shooting are not choir boys \u2014 not even the victim \u2014 and that this doesn\u2019t really concern or affect us very much, because bullets don\u2019t fly around our neighborhoods like this. That nobody got hurt, and so all things considered, the case is not really that important to us, so let\u2019s refer to a judgment of not guilty and be gone.\nOn the other hand, a jury could approach its deliberations in this frame of mind, this is a serious incident, innocent people, maybe children, were jeopardized who lived near Tay and Preston \u2014 .\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe evidence in the instant case showed that the shooting occurred in a residential neighborhood at approximately 8:30 at night. It could thus be inferred that \u201cinnocent people, maybe children,\u201d could have been jeopardized by the shooting. We therefore find that there was evidence in the record upon which the State\u2019s argument was based.\nWith regard to the lighting, the State argued:\n\u201cThe equalizer light was on to provide some light in that car. It provided some light in that car to assist in an identification. And to confirm these shots, in my judgment. That wasn\u2019t the only light in that area. There is a street light. If you look, for example, in People\u2019s Exhibit No. 5, there is a street light over the intersection, on the northwest comer of the intersection.\u201d\nWe find that this was proper argument Since the exhibit referred to by the State did in fact show a streetlight.\nFinally, defendant contends that the State denigrated its burden of proof. We disagree. The argument to which defendant refers is as follows:\n\u201cOne of the very last things Mr. Wilt said to you in his closing argument is this, something to the effect of, if you believe the defense witnesses, the defendant and Dean Bell, then of course you would find the defendant not guilty. And he said then, on the other hand, if you disbelieve the defense witnesses, it doesn\u2019t necessarily mean you find him guilty, you still have to believe the State\u2019s witnesses before you can find him guilty.\nAs you think about that, think about what he is arguing to you in here, and that is, this free pass theory or rationale I talked about in my opening argument.\nThe burden is the State\u2019s. And it is. And if you don\u2019t believe the defense witnesses, don\u2019t think about it, just kind of shove it out of your mind, they have the burden, because we are not going to think about it, we don\u2019t believe the defendant or his witnesses, it doesn\u2019t enter into the equation. Don\u2019t buy that free pass argument.\u201d\nWe do not find this argument altered the State\u2019s burden of proof, especially when taken in context with the rest of the State\u2019s argument. The State recognized both that it had the burden of proof and that that burden was beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the statement complained of appears to do no more than direct the jury that it should consider defendant\u2019s testimony along with all other testimony.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nUNVERZAGT, P.J., and DUNN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE INGLIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Daniel D. Yuhas and Judith L. Libby, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, both of Springfield, for appellant.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LLOYD ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-87-0826\nOpinion filed January 13, 1989.\nG. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Daniel D. Yuhas and Judith L. Libby, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, both of Springfield, for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0650-01", "first_page_order": 672, "last_page_order": 683 }