{ "id": 2433195, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS W. BOND, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bond", "decision_date": "1989-01-26", "docket_number": "No. 4-88-0433", "first_page": "1020", "last_page": "1025", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 1020" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "404 U.S. 189", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171662 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/404/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 1285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1297" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563980 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 N.E.2d 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3483104 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427582 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 1285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1288" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3464478 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 N.E.2d 1027", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3632956 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515833 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0502-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 590, "char_count": 11339, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9705224030956718e-07, "percentile": 0.739250242002526 }, "sha256": "1727d2b3d6dce1acd0e8caec1a7124a38df56151d1d36d78c9c460f71060094b", "simhash": "1:72a716ccf47f3a26", "word_count": 1901 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:09.210343+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS W. BOND, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn March 24, 1988, following a jury trial in the circuit court of Macon County, defendant Dennis W. Bond was convicted of the offenses of armed violence, unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and unlawful use of firearms by a felon. The court vacated the conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance and sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of eight years\u2019 imprisonment on the armed violence conviction, five years\u2019 imprisonment on the possession with intent to deliver conviction, and four years\u2019 imprisonment on the unlawful use of a weapon conviction.\nOn appeal, defendant maintains (1) he was not properly convicted of armed violence, because the State failed to prove a gun, found underneath cushions in a sofa in defendant\u2019s apartment, was \u201con or about\u201d defendant\u2019s person; (2) the unlawful use of firearms charge should have been severed from the other charges at trial, despite defendant\u2019s failure to request a severance; and (3) the trial court erred, after finding defendant was indigent, in seizing part of his bond money to pay for the expense of a transcript. We affirm in part and reverse in part.\nAt trial, Sam Baum testified (1) he was a detective with the Macon County sheriff\u2019s department; (2) on December 22, 1987, he obtained and executed a search warrant at defendant\u2019s apartment; (3) when he and other officers arrived at the apartment, after knocking and announcing their presence, they heard noises from inside; (4) when no one answered the door, they then broke the door down and found a \u201chide-a-bed\u201d sofa blocking the door; (5) they found defendant and another male inside the apartment; (6) a search of the apartment revealed a quantity of cocaine and various drug-related items, which were seized; (7) a loaded handgun, which was also seized, was found underneath a sofa cushion where defendant was sitting; (8) defendant admitted residing in the apartment and admitted ownership of the gun and the cocaine; and (9) defendant admitted he was attempting to flush some of the cocaine down the toilet when the officers arrived. Deputy Jerry Dawson and Detective Gilbert Veach also testified and substantially corroborated Baum\u2019s testimony.\nDefendant testified in his own behalf and admitted that on December 22, 1987, he was in possession of the cocaine and the handgun which police found in his apartment. He noted, however, that the gun was not in plain view, and he had never intended to use it. He also admitted that he had a felony conviction in 1984. A certified copy of defendant\u2019s 1984 conviction was admitted into evidence by the State.\nDefendant argues the State failed to prove he was armed with a dangerous weapon for purposes of the armed violence statute, because the gun was found in defendant\u2019s apartment, underneath the cushions of a sofa, and not \u201con or about\u201d defendant\u2019s person. Defendant notes that he admitted he was in the bathroom trying to dispose of the cocaine in the toilet at the time the police announced their arrival, and he was later sitting on the floor when the police ordered him to sit on the sofa where the gun was eventually found. He maintains, that since he had no intention of using the gun, his conviction of this offense results from the police officers\u2019 virtually placing the gun in his control.\nThe armed violence statute provides that a person commits the offense when, \u201cwhile armed with a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony defined by Illinois Law.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 33A \u2014 2.) For purposes of this statute, a person is considered \u201carmed with a dangerous weapon *** when he carries on or about his person or is otherwise armed\u201d with,' for example, a pistol or revolver. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 33A \u2014 1(a).\nDefendant argues the purpose of the statute is to punish those who create an added risk of potential violence by carrying a weapon at the time they commit a crime. He maintains that here, where the gun was located underneath the cushions of a sofa, the risk contemplated by the armed violence statute does not exist.\nIn People v. Alejos (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 502, 455 N.E.2d 48, the court recognized, however, that the mere presence of a weapon and not its actual use was sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute. The court noted the \u201cpresence of a weapon enhances the danger that any felony that is committed will have deadly consequences should the victim offer resistance.\u201d (Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d at 508, 455 N.E.2d at 50.) The court further noted that the statute was designed to not only punish the criminal, but also to deter the conduct of carrying a weapon while committing a felony.\nAlthough here the gun was not physically in defendant\u2019s hands or in actual contact with his \u201cperson,\u201d it was immediately accessible, as was the gun in People v. Lenoir (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 260, 465 N.E.2d 1027. There, the defendant was found alone, lying on a bed, watching television. A gun was found on the bed, near where the defendant was lying. The court found the circumstances supported the inferences that the defendant was in possession and control of the items on the bed, including the gun, and that he knew what was there.\nThe case of People v. King (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 363, 507 N.E.2d 1285, cited by defendant, is factually distinguishable. There, the defendant met police officers at the door wearing only a blanket. The police subsequently discovered an unloaded gun on a table in a bedroom. On appeal, the court reversed the conviction for armed violence, noting the statute suggests \u201cknowledge or control, including immediate access to the weapon\u201d is required. (King, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 369, 507 N.E.2d at 1288.) The mere physical existence of a weapon is not within the meaning of the statute.\nHere, the evidence indicated defendant was sitting on the sofa, and the loaded gun was found underneath the sofa cushions. Although defendant argues he was ordered to sit on the sofa by the police, he presented no evidence to support that theory at trial. Moreover, even if such evidence had been presented, it would not negate the knowledge, control, and accessibility defendant had of the weapon while he was sitting on top of it. The gun was clearly within defendant\u2019s reach and constituted the kind of danger contemplated by the armed violence statute. The evidence supported defendant\u2019s conviction on that charge.\nDefendant next argues the unlawful use of firearms charge should have been severed from the other charges, because the trial on the firearms charge necessarily involved disclosure to the jury of defendant\u2019s prior theft conviction. Defendant, who appeared pro se at trial, acknowledges he did not request that the unlawful use of firearms charge be severed from the other charges. He maintains, however, that had such a request been made, he would have been entitled to a severance. People v. Edwards (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 134, 345 N.E.2d 496.\nWe agree that under the authority of Edwards, had defendant requested a severance, the court would have been required to grant his request. However, a defendant appearing pro se must comply with the rules of procedure required of attorneys, and a court will not apply a more lenient standard to pro se litigants. (Harvey v. Carponelli (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 448, 451, 453 N.E.2d 820, 823.) Defendant did not request a severance and did not allege this error in his post-trial motion. As a result, this contention has been waived. (People v. Washington (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 365, 381, 468 N.E.2d 1285, 1297.) Moreover, even if the issue had been properly raised, we conclude defendant was not prejudiced. He admitted in statements to the police and during his testimony at trial that he possessed the cocaine and the gun. The evidence against him was overwhelming, and the fact of a previous felony would not have had a substantial effect on the jury\u2019s decision.\nFinally, defendant maintains the trial court erred, when, after finding defendant was indigent, it seized part of his bond as payment for the transcript.\nHere, prior to trial, the trial court determined defendant was indigent and appointed the public defender to represent him. Defendant\u2019s affidavit of assets and liabilities revealed the source of his $1,000 bond money was \u201cborrowed cash.\u201d Following defendant\u2019s trial and convictions, the court ordered that a transcript of the trial and a transcript of the hearing on waiver of counsel be prepared and furnished to the attorney appointed to represent the defendant for purposes of preparing a post-trial motion and sentencing. The court subsequently ordered the costs of the two transcripts, totalling $264.60, be paid out of the money deposited for defendant\u2019s bond. The transcript of the trial was prepared a second time after the State Appellate Defender was appointed as counsel on appeal, and the court ordered the court reporter be paid $206.70 out of defendant\u2019s bond money. Finally, the court ordered that $119.60 be taken out of defendant\u2019s bond money to pay for a transcript of the post-trial and sentencing hearing.\nDefendant argues he was entitled to the transcript free of charge under Supreme Court Rule 607(b). That rule provides, inter alia, that a defendant found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment may petition the court for a report of the proceedings at his trial, and if the judge finds the defendant is \u201cwithout financial means\u201d with which to obtain the report of proceedings, it will be provided \u201cwithout charge.\u201d 107 Ill. 2d R. 607(b).\nThe committee comments to that rule indicate paragraph (b) was amended to conform to the requirements set out in Mayer v. City of Chicago (1971), 404 U.S. 189, 30 L. Ed. 2d 372, 92 S. Ct. 410. In Mayer, the Court held that a defendant convicted of an ordinance violation, punishable by fine only, is entitled, if indigent, to receive a free transcript of the proceedings at trial. (Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 378, 92 S. Ct. at 415.) The comments conclude that, as presently worded, paragraph (b) provides that a defendant found guilty of an offense and sentenced to any of the sentences provided for in the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1001 \u2014 1\u20141 et seq.) may proceed under the rule. 107 Ill. 2d R. 607(b), Committee Comments, at 553-54.\nThus, the trial court improperly assessed the costs of the transcripts against defendant.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgments of conviction and sentences entered in the circuit court of Macon County. We reverse the trial court\u2019s order to pay the costs of the transcript from defendant\u2019s bond and remand to that court with instructions to refund to the defendant the sum of $590.90.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nLUND and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Jane Raley, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Larry R. Fichter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur \u2022 (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Michael Blazicek, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS W. BOND, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-88-0433\nOpinion filed January 26, 1989.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Jane Raley, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nLarry R. Fichter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur \u2022 (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Michael Blazicek, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1020-01", "first_page_order": 1042, "last_page_order": 1047 }