{ "id": 2433942, "name": "TODD R. MILLS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIM EDGAR, State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Mills v. Edgar", "decision_date": "1989-02-02", "docket_number": "No. 4-88-0559", "first_page": "1054", "last_page": "1058", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 1054" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a716", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Colo. Rev. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Colo. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 4592460 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201-02" }, { "page": "314" }, { "page": "199" }, { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/181/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a742-4-1202", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Colo. Rev. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "1.5Xa" }, { "parenthetical": "1.5Xa" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a724", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Colo. Rev. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a742", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Colo. Rev. Stat.", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 487, "char_count": 10042, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.721370233370471e-08, "percentile": 0.5303036972425805 }, "sha256": "3962ac4a3d8e41c9f35258c2d4f8bc0e878b069f98eeb042c5f2641e93fb5b7e", "simhash": "1:cd4aa4df66d3c72b", "word_count": 1632 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:09.210343+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "TODD R. MILLS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIM EDGAR, State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Todd R. Mills sought review in the circuit court of Sangamon County of an administrative decision by defendant Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, denying plaintiff\u2019s petition for rescission of its previous order revoking plaintiff\u2019s driver\u2019s license. The circuit court reversed defendant\u2019s decision, finding it was contrary to law, and subsequently ordered defendant to rescind the revocation of plaintiff\u2019s driver\u2019s license. Defendant appeals from that decision. We reverse.\nThe evidence in this matter indicates that, on July 27, 1987, the circuit court of Lake County in Leadville, Colorado, entered judgment on plaintiff\u2019s plea of guilty to the offense of driving while ability impaired. (Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a742 \u2014 4\u20141202(l)(b) (1984).) Upon learning of this conviction, the defendant entered an order revoking plaintiff\u2019s Illinois driver\u2019s license pursuant to section 6 \u2014 205(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 205(d)). That section authorizes defendant to revoke the driving privileges of any person under the age of 21 who is convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95x/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.) Plaintiff petitioned defendant to rescind that order, but defendant denied his request as aforementioned.\nBy enactment of article VII of chapter 6 of the Code, Illinois entered into an agreement with various States creating a \u201cdriver license compact.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 700 et seq.) Through this compact, the licensing authority of a party State notifies the licensing authority of a home State whenever a licensee from the home State receives certain types of convictions for motor vehicle offenses in the party State. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 702.) Colorado is also a party to this compact. Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a724 \u2014 60\u2014 1101 et seq. (1988).\nFor purposes of revoking a driver\u2019s license, section 6 \u2014 703(a) of the Code mandates the licensing authority in a home State to \u201cgive the same effect to the conduct reported [by a party State] *** as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state,\u201d in regard to various criminal convictions, including those for \u201c[d]riving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 703(a)(2).) Section 6 \u2014 703(c) of the Code states:\n\u201cIf the laws of a party state do not provide for offenses or violations denominated or described in precisely the words employed in paragraph (a) of this Section, such party state shall construe the denominations and descriptions appearing in paragraph (a) hereof as being applicable to and identifying those offenses or violations of a substantially similar nature, and the laws of such party state shall contain such provision as may be necessary to ensure that full force and effect is given to this Section.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 703(c).\nWe conclude that the offense of driving while ability impaired, for which plaintiff was convicted in Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a742\u2014 4 \u2014 1202(l)(b) (1984)), results from conduct \u201csubstantially similar\u201d to conduct which would constitute driving while \u201cunder the influence of alcohol\u201d as prohibited by section 11 \u2014 501(aX2) of the Code. We reach this conclusion by a comparison of the statutory format of the two States in regard to penal provisions for persons who drive after having consumed alcoholic beverages.\nIllinois law provides for a single offense of driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. Absent exceptional aggravating circumstances not applicable here, the offense is a misdemeanor. A person commits the offense when he ingests alcohol and drives with an alcohol concentration in blood or breath of 0.10 or more- of described units (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501(a)(1)) or when he drives while \u201c[u]nder the influence of alcohol\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501(a)(2)).\nColorado law, on the other hand, recognizes three offenses involving driving after consuming alcohol: (1) driving under the influence; (2) driving while impaired; and (3) driving with excessive alcoholic content. (Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a742 \u2014 4\u20141202(l)(a), (l)(b), (1.5)(a) (1984).) All are misdemeanors. The first occurs when a person drives \u201cunder the influence of intoxicating liquor.\u201d (Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a742 \u2014 4\u2014 1202(l)(a) (1984).) The second offense occurs when a person drives \u201cwhile such person\u2019s ability to operate a vehicle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a742 \u2014 4\u2014 1202(lXb) (1984).) The final offense occurs when \u201cthe amount of alcohol in [the blood of a person driving] is 0.15 or more.\u201d Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a742-4-1202(1.5Xa) (1984).\nThe Colorado Supreme Court has concluded that the standard of proof for the offense of driving under the influence is impairment to a \u201csubstantial degree\u201d (emphasis added) (Thompson v. Colorado (1973), 181 Colo. 194, 201-02, 510 R2d 311, 314), while the standard of proof for the offense of driving while impaired is impairment to the \u201cslightest degree\u201d (emphasis added) (Thompson, 181 Colo, at 199, 510 P.2d at 313). An Illinois pattern jury instruction defines the term \u201cunder the influence of intoxicating liquor\u201d as follows: \u201cA person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor when as a result of drinking any amount of intoxicating liquor his mental and/or physical faculties are so impaired as to reduce his ability to think and act with ordinary care\u201d (Emphasis added.) Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 23.05, at 530 (2d ed. 1981).\nComparison of the two definitions indicates that one guilty of driving while impaired under Colorado law is guilty of driving under the influence in Illinois. When one\u2019s ability to perform a function is impaired, it is reduced. If the ability is only slightly impaired, it is only slightly reduced. If it is substantially impaired, it is substantially reduced. The Illinois pattern instruction appears to state that any reduction in the ability of a motorist to drive is sufficient to support a conviction. Thus, a slight impairment which leads to a slight reduction in the motorist\u2019s ability to drive is sufficient to support a conviction.\nIn both States, proof of a 0.05 or less concentration of alcohol gives rise to a conclusive presumption that the accused is not guilty of any of the offenses involved here. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.2(bXl); Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a742-4-1202(1.5Xa) (1984).) In Illinois, if the proof shows an accused drove with an alcohol content in his breath or blood of between 0.05 and 0.10, no presumption arises as to whether that person was under the influence of alcohol. On the other hand, under Colorado law a person with a 0.05 to 0.10 concentration is presumed to be guilty of driving while impaired. Thus, a person could be presumed guilty of driving while impaired in Colorado under circumstances where that person\u2019s guilt of driving under the influence would be a question for the trier of fact in Illinois. This gives some indication that the Colorado driving while impaired provision covers some conduct which would not be considered driving under the influence in Illinois. However, Illinois permits convictions of driving under the influence when the accused has a blood-alcohol content of only 0.05.\nDespite the difference between the lowest level of alcohol content at which a presumption arises, we find the minimum conduct giving rise to the offenses of the lesser Colorado offense and the driving under the influence offense in Illinois to be \u201csubstantially similar\u201d within the meaning of section 6 \u2014 703(c) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6-703(c).\nPlaintiff maintains that, if he were charged with driving under the influence in Illinois, and his impairment was no worse than that which would have merely constituted driving while impaired under Colorado law, he would likely have been placed on supervision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20141(c); compare Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a716 \u2014 7\u2014403 (1986)), no conviction would have been obtained, and he would not have lost his driving privileges. This supposition is too speculative to be of assistance in deciding the issue before us. Moreover, section 6\u2014 703 of the Code, which provides for reciprocal powers of license revocation, indicates the \u201cconduct\u201d giving rise to the offenses in the various States is the element to compare and not the penalties.\nThe defendant seeks to support the action revoking plaintiff\u2019s driver\u2019s license by evidence that a test made of plaintiff\u2019s blood immediately after the Colorado offense indicated a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.153. We need not decide whether such evidence is properly before us. The defendant is permitted to act under sections 6 \u2014 702 and 6 \u2014 703 of the Code upon the basis of a conviction in another State. As we have indicated, the comparison with Illinois law which must be made to determine whether the person\u2019s driver\u2019s license is subject to revocation is the conduct inherent in the offense for which the conviction was obtained and not conduct which might indicate the commission of a more serious offense. Defendant\u2019s case is not enhanced by this evidence.\nAs we have indicated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court which reversed the decision of defendant to revoke the plaintiff\u2019s driver\u2019s license. The decision of the defendant is affirmed.\nCircuit court reversed, Secretary of State affirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, P.J., and SPITZ, J., concur. .", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Respicio F. Vazquez and Stephen J. Rotello, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "Michael H. Vonnahmen, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TODD R. MILLS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIM EDGAR, State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-88-0559\nOpinion filed February 2, 1989.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Respicio F. Vazquez and Stephen J. Rotello, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nMichael H. Vonnahmen, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1054-01", "first_page_order": 1076, "last_page_order": 1080 }