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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3648164 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3647422 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3514544 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" }, { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 N.E.2d 1073", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3617632 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46-48" }, { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179745 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092137 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" }, { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 25", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6196869 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 U.S. 687", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6193489 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/457/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 590", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9639 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" }, { "page": "706" }, { "page": "444" }, { "page": "706-07" }, { "page": "1612" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 200", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531819 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" }, { "page": "832" }, { "page": "2254" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "835-36" }, { "page": "2256" }, { "page": "218-19" }, { "page": "840" }, { "page": "2260" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 U.S. 643", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1785580 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/367/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 U.S. 365", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6208511 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379-80" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/477/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "856 F.2d 1011", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10535112 ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/856/1011-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545221 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 387", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11959535 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 429", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6218763 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" }, { "page": "1902" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "1905" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 L. Ed. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1494770 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311-12" }, { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/488/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 573", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777746 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "weight": 11, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { "page": "10" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "8" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "13-14" } ], "opinion_index": 2 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 3698, "char_count": 224853, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0853994129725609e-07, "percentile": 0.7596077995280806 }, "sha256": "32c482eb9d3d410ed3d765613c8ad4d1c3e72551fbde550ef342a7f2437bc1d4", "simhash": "1:ae48b6acf74a9df0", "word_count": 38231 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:22:52.001106+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES GREEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURRAY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a bench trial, defendant Charles Green was found guilty of four counts of murder, aggravated arson, residential burglary, home invasion, armed robbery, and four counts of armed violence. He was sentenced to natural life imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) he was improperly tried and sentenced as an adult; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest; (3) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the admission of evidence indicating that persons other than he committed the offenses for which he was charged. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.\nOn January 12, 1985, police officer Joe Deases, in responding to a fire call, discovered the burned bodies of Raynard Rule, Lauren Rule, and Yvonne Brooks in a second-floor apartment located at 458 North Hamlin Avenue in Chicago. The victims had been gagged and their hands tied behind their backs, Raynard Rule had been stabbed, and Lauren Rule and Yvonne Brooks had been shot. Deases also found Kim Brooks outside of the apartment building. She told Deases that one of her assailants attempted to shoot her, the bullet missed her and she had managed to free herself and escape from the apartment after her assailants left. Brooks, who was severely burned, was rushed to a hospital for treatment, but subsequently died on February 16.\nThe events leading up to the deaths of the victims, according to defendant\u2019s grand jury testimony, consisted of the following. On January 12, at approximately noon, defendant, who was 16 years old at the time, met Derrick House in a \u201cgame room\u201d at 750 North Lawn-dale in Chicago. Upon leaving the game room, defendant and House met Teddy Bobo. House and Bobo asked defendant if he would get Raynard Rule, whom defendant had known for three years, to open the burglar bars which were in front of the door to his apartment on the pretext that he wanted to buy some drugs. House gave defendant $25, defendant went to Rule\u2019s apartment, went up to the door by himself and knocked, Rule answered and asked defendant what he wanted, defendant said he wanted to buy a bag of cocaine and told Rule he had $25 to pay for some, Rule opened the burglar bars, defendant stepped into the apartment, and immediately thereafter House and Bobo ran in after him. House grabbed Rule and put a pistol to his head and said something about money to him. House then took Rule to the kitchen while Bobo went into another room where three girls were sleeping on two mattresses. Bobo woke the girls up and tied them up with a brown extension cord. At that time defendant heard Rule yelling \u201cNo, no\u201d in the kitchen. House came out of the kitchen shortly thereafter and went into the room where Bobo and the girls were. After talking with Bobo and the girls, House left the room, went back to the kitchen, and took Rule to a back bedroom, supporting him as they went. House then again went to the room where Bobo and the girls were, the girls \u201cstarted to panicking [sic\\\u201d because they smelled smoke, which was coming from the back bedroom, and House told the girls not to worry about the smoke because the extension cord binding them was loose enough for them to free themselves and to get out of the apartment before it \u201cstarted flaming.\u201d Immediately thereafter House shot one of the girls, Bobo shot another, and House shot the third girl. Kerosene was poured over the girls and ignited by Bobo. Defendant, who had been standing inside the doorway of the apartment throughout this time, then ran out and went to the game room on Lawndale. He subsequently met House in the game room and House told him he had stabbed Rule.\nFollowing a police investigation, defendant was implicated in the Rule murders, taken to a police station on February 5, taken before a grand jury on February 6, subsequently charged with the crimes set forth above, found guilty after a bench trial, and sentenced to natural life imprisonment. This appeal followed.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try and sentence him as an adult. We find defendant\u2019s argument without merit. Section 2 \u2014 7(6)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act (the Act) provides as follows:\n\u201cThe definition of delinquent minor under Section 2 \u2014 2 of this Act shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 years of age and who is charged with murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, armed robbery when the armed robbery was committed with a firearm, or violation of the provisions of subsection 24 \u2014 l(a)(12) of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended. These charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted pursuant to the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 702\u2014 7(6)(a).\nHere, defendant was 16 years old at the time he was charged with the murders of the victims, as well as the other offenses arising out of the same incident. Defendant argues, however, that since he was convicted on a theory of accountability and did not directly participate in the crimes, section 2 \u2014 7(6)(a) is inapplicable, i.e., he in fact did not actually commit any of the crimes enumerated in section 2 \u2014 7(6Xa), triggering application of that section.\nIt is well settled that the accountability statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 5 \u2014 1, 5 \u2014 2) makes both parties guilty as principals; the statute admits of no degrees. (People v. Clark (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 420, 494 N.E.2d 551, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 1, 518 N.E.2d 138.) Furthermore, the language of section 2 \u2014 7(6Xa) provides for automatic trial of a defendant as an adult who is charged with the offenses enumerated in that section and who is at least 15 years of age at the time he allegedly commits those offenses. Therefore, whether a defendant is charged with those offenses on an accountability theory or otherwise is irrelevant; the fact remains that he is charged with the pertinent offenses, triggering application of section 2 \u2014 7(6Xa).\nWe also reject defendant\u2019s similar argument with respect to the trial court\u2019s sentencing him as an adult. The pertinent section of the Act provides as follows:\n\u201cIf after trial or plea the minor is only convicted of an offense not covered by paragraph (a) of subsection (6) of this Section, such conviction shall not invalidate the verdict or the prosecution of the minor under the criminal laws of this State, however the court must thereafter proceed pursuant to Sections 4 \u2014 7 or 4 \u2014 8. In all other circumstances, in sentencing the court shall have available any or all dispositions prescribed for that offense pursuant to Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections and Article 5 of the Juvenile Court Act.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 702\u2014 7(6Xc).)\nDefendant again argues that he was not convicted of an offense covered by section 2 \u2014 7(6Xa), i.e., he insists that his convictions on an accountability theory are convictions for qualitatively different offenses. As indicated above, defendant, under an accountability theory, is deemed to be as guilty as a principal in committing the offenses charged and whether or not he directly participated in the crimes is irrelevant. Defendant was convicted of the offenses of murder and armed robbery, among others, and thus subject to sentencing under the Unified Code of Corrections.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest, contending that his warrantless \u201carrest\u201d was made without probable cause during an illegal entry of his home on February 5, his arrest and detention violated his fourth amendment rights and the Juvenile Court Act, and his testimony before the grand jury \u201cshould be deemed tainted and unable to provide probable cause for his arrest\u201d on February 6 when he was officially charged by the police.\nAt the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest, Detective John Summerville testified that pursuant to his investigation of the deaths of Raynard and Lauren Rule and Yvonne and Kim Brooks, he spoke to James Davis on February 3. Davis told Summerville that on January 11 he saw Rule and House get into an argument and fistfight over money; Rule \u201cgot the better of House\u201d in front of a crowd which included House\u2019s girl friend. On January 12 at 11 a.m., he saw defendant and House at the Lawndale game room at which time they said they were going to \u201cpeep\u201d or look for Rule, and later that evening he saw defendant, House and a boy named Virgil, who all had handguns and were smoking \u201chappy sticks\u201d (marijuana laced with PCP), and heard House say, \u201cWe got them, we got them, we just burnt Raynard.\u201d Summerville further stated that he subsequently identified Virgil as defendant\u2019s cousin, Virgil Bridges. Bridges later told Summerville that he had met defendant on January 12 at 7:30 p.m. and asked defendant what he \u201chad done wrong,\u201d to which defendant responded that he had \u201cgone up to Raynard\u2019s dope house with someone else and got Raynard to open the burglar gates\u201d and, after the gates were opened, \u201cthings happened that were not suppose [sic] to happen,\u201d and that he also later overheard a conversation between defendant and House at the game room about opening burglar gates. Bridges subsequently gave Summerville defendant\u2019s address.\nSummerville further testified, as did his partner Detective James Clemmons, that on February 5, at approximately 1 p.m., they went to defendant\u2019s apartment. They knocked on the door of the apartment, a young woman answered, they identified themselves as police officers and asked to speak to defendant, and they were allowed entry into the apartment. Summerville asked the male occupants in the room to identify themselves, defendant produced an ID, and Summerville asked defendant if he would come to the police station and answer some questions. Defendant stated that he wanted to get dressed first and telephone his mother. Summerville told both defendant and his mother that defendant did not have to go to the station, and defendant accompanied the police to the station house. No force was used to gain entry to the apartment, neither officer displayed his weapon, they were in the apartment for approximately 15 minutes, they did not search the apartment, defendant was not handcuffed when he left the apartment with them, and no other occupants of the apartment were taken to the police station. At the station, defendant was not handcuffed, searched, fingerprinted or booked on any charge.\nDefendant, in recounting the events of February 5, testified that three policemen, with their guns out, arrived at his apartment just as his sister was leaving, they rushed into the open door of the apartment, and they began searching the apartment. Defendant asked a police officer if he had a warrant and was told to shut up. He further stated that the police remained in the apartment for V-fe hours, he was taken from the apartment to the police station in handcuffs, as were his brother and cousin, the police told him he was under arrest, and he was photographed at the station house.\nGloria Thompson, defendant\u2019s sister, testified differently only to the extent that she telephoned her mother, one police officer had his gun out, one officer searched the apartment while the other two spoke to defendant\u2019s brother and cousin, the police officers never threatened anyone while they were in the apartment, and the officers only remained in the apartment for 20 to 30 minutes. Terry Green, defendant\u2019s brother, and Willie Thomas, defendant\u2019s cousin, similarly testified on these points.\nViola Green, defendant\u2019s mother, testified that on February 5 she received a telephone call from her daughter Gloria Thompson. Thompson said police were at her house \u201cgetting\u201d defendant, Terry Green and Willie Thomas and searching the house. She went to the police station and spoke to Sergeant John Regan at 1:30 p.m., asked to see defendant, and Regan refused her request. She stayed at the station for approximately 45 minutes longer, then left.\nWith respect to the time of defendant\u2019s arrest, Detective James Clemmons acknowledged that an arrest report, with his name on it but which he did not prepare, indicated February 5 at 1 p.m. as defendant\u2019s time of arrest. Detective Michael Miller testified that he saw defendant at the police station on February 5, he was not under arrest, restricted or charged with any crime, and he formally arrested defendant on February 6 after defendant testified before the Cook County grand jury. Miller also acknowledged on cross-examination that an arrest report with his name on it indicated defendant\u2019s time of arrest at 1 p.m. on February 5. Assistant State\u2019s Attorney John O\u2019Donnell testified that on February 6 no charges had been lodged against defendant prior to his testimony before the grand jury. On cross-examination, however, O\u2019Donnell acknowledged preparing a \u201cForm 101\u201d prior to defendant\u2019s appearance before the grand jury, which indicated February 5 as defendant\u2019s date of arrest.\nThe trial court subsequently found that defendant\u2019s arrest occurred at 1 p.m. on February 5, that probable cause for his arrest existed at that time, and that the police had consent to enter his apartment. Accordingly, the court denied defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest.\nIt is well settled that probable cause to arrest an individual exists where, when viewed objectively, the situation confronting the arresting officer, as well as the facts known to him, are such as would cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the individual to be arrested had committed a crime, bearing in mind that probabilities are involved, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Holloway (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 290, 475 N.E.2d 915.) A reviewing court will not disturb a finding of probable cause to arrest unless it is manifestly erroneous. (People v. Philson (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 513, 389 N.E.2d 1223.) A warrantless arrest based on probable cause may be made in an individual\u2019s home if the police have consent to enter. People v. Williams (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 384, 470 N.E.2d 1140.\nHere, defendant merely asserts but does not argue with specificity that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him. Instead, his probable cause argument appears to be premised on his contention that his arrest was illegal because he did not give the police his consent to enter his home.\nOn the other hand, the State argues that probable cause existed based on information obtained from James Davis and Virgil Bridges, defendant's cousin. James Davis told the police he saw defendant and House at the game room and heard them say they were going to look for Rule and, later that evening while defendant, House and Virgil Bridges were together, he heard House say, \u201cWe got them, we got them, we just burnt Raynard.\u201d Davis also stated that all three men had handguns at the game room and began smoking \u201chappy sticks.\u201d Virgil Bridges, defendant\u2019s cousin, corroborated much of Davis\u2019 statement to the police. Bridges told Detective Summerville that defendant told him he had \u201cgone up to Raynard\u2019s dope house with someone else and got Raynard to open the burglar gates\u201d and \u201cthings happened that were not suppose [sic] to happen.\u201d We find the obvious inference to be drawn from this information by any reasonable person is that defendant and House had participated in the shootings and fire at Rule\u2019s apartment on January 12. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court\u2019s finding of probable cause to arrest defendant was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nWe also reject defendant\u2019s argument that the police entered his apartment without his consent. Although the testimony of the police and defendant\u2019s witnesses contradict each other, it was within the province of the court to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts therein. (People v. Washington (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 109, 465 N.E.2d 666.) Based on the record before us, we cannot say that its determination was erroneous. While Detectives Summerville and Clemmons similarly testified that they knocked on the door, did not have their guns drawn, did not use force in entering defendant\u2019s apartment, and defendant consented to their entry, there were discrepancies in the testimony of defendant\u2019s witnesses with respect to the number of police in and out of the apartment, the number of officers who had their guns drawn, the amount of time the police remained in the apartment, and who was handcuffed to whom. Apparently the trial court determined the two police officers were more credible than defendant and his witnesses. Since the court was in a better position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, we see no reason to disturb its determination that the police entered defendant\u2019s apartment with consent.\nDefendant next argues that his arrest on February 5 and his alleged subsequent 27-hour detention at the police station violated his rights under the fourth amendment and the Juvenile Court Act. He first contends that he was illegally restrained at the police station for 27 hours under \u201cunknown circumstances\u201d prior to being charged, was not represented by counsel during that time and was \u201ccut off\u201d from his family. Accordingly, he asserts that a statement made by him after 10 hours \u201cin custody\u201d and his testimony before the grand jury 17 hours later were the products of physical and psychological coercion.\nIt is well settled that an arrest involves three elements: intention of the officer, understanding of the arrestee, and restraint of the person. (People v. Fulton (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 915, 386 N.E.2d 605.) The test of an arrestee\u2019s understanding is whether an innocent, reasonable man would have thought himself under arrest. People v. Wipfler (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 158, 368 N.E.2d 870.\nHere, notwithstanding the fact that the time of defendant\u2019s arrest is disputed, the record is clear that he was not handcuffed, fingerprinted, or charged while at the police station until after his testimony before the grand jury on February 6. Detective Miller testified that defendant was \u201cin custody\u201d but that meant merely that \u201che was in the police presence in a police facility.\u201d Miller further testified that he and Summerville told defendant he was free to leave but that defendant stayed overnight at the station in the interview room. John Regan testified that defendant was \u201cin custody\u201d but that meant only that he was in the area of the station.\nOn the other hand, defendant only asserted he was photographed but does not cite to the record evidence in support thereof. Defendant also does not argue in his brief or cite to the record evidence supporting his contention that he was not free to leave the station house, i.e., he failed to account for his whereabouts during the 27 hours or allege any specific conduct by the police barring his freedom to leave. Defendant also only states that his mother asked to see him when she initially came to the station at 1:30 p.m. on February 5 and her request was denied; defendant does not allege that his mother asked to see him again and that her request was denied over the alleged 27-hour period of illegal detention.\nIt is well settled that an appellant is responsible for providing a record which shows the errors claimed; where the record is incomplete, or is silent, a reviewing court will invoke the presumption that the trial court ruled or acted correctly. (People v. Hamilton (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 276, 381 N.E.2d 74.) Defendant clearly has failed to support his claim that he was illegally restrained.\nWe further observe that defendant was familiar enough with police procedure to ask the police if they had a warrant to enter his apartment. He further testified that at the police station he was neither searched nor fingerprinted. Defendant also had previous involvement with police procedure given the fact that a delinquency petition was filed against him stemming from an alleged battery. Defendant was interrogated on February 5 for a total of approximately three hours during which time he was in and out of the interview room. The unrebutted testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses indicates that defendant left the interview room to use the washroom facilities and to get something to eat. Defendant never complained of being mistreated and in fact stated before the grand jury that he had been treated well by the police; no threats or promises were made by the police.\nBased on the evidence presented, therefore, we cannot say that defendant should have reasonably believed he was under arrest and not free to leave the station.\nDefendant also argues that his arrest violated the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act because the police failed to contact his mother and to promptly take him before the court as a juvenile in custody. We first observe that even if the police did not talk directly to defendant\u2019s mother by telephone, Mrs. Green testified that shortly after the police entered defendant\u2019s apartment her daughter spoke to her at that time and told her the police were \u201cgetting\u201d defendant. Secondly, we note that section 3 \u2014 2(2) of the Act, which defendant relies on as requiring notification of the parents of juveniles, does not apply to defendant\u2019s situation. The pertinent part of that section provides:\n\u201cA law enforcement officer who takes a minor into custody without a warrant under Section 3 \u2014 1 shall, if the minor is not released, immediately make a reasonable attempt to notify the parent or other person legally responsible for the minor\u2019s care, *** that the minor has been taken into custody and where the minor is being held; and the law enforcement officer shall without unnecessary delay take the minor to the nearest juvenile police officer designated for such purposes in the county of venue or shall surrender the minor to a juvenile police officer in the city or village where the offense is alleged to have been committed.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 703-2(2).)\nSection 3 \u2014 1, referred to above, applies to minors who are believed to be delinquent or who have escaped from any court-ordered commitment or who are sick or injured in a public place. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 703 \u2014 1.) Moreover, based on our above discussion, we have determined that defendant was not taken into custody, but rather went to the police station on his own volition to answer questions. In addition, defendant was taken to the station based on his suspected involvement in four murders and therefore was subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts, not the juvenile courts. See People v. Visnack (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 113, 481 N.E.2d 744.\nDefendant\u2019s last argument on this issue is that no probable cause existed to arrest him on February 6 because his statements to Assistant State\u2019s Attorney O\u2019Donnell and before the grand jury on that day were not made voluntarily. In support thereof, defendant repeats his argument that he was physically and psychologically coerced into making the statements as a result of his 27-hour detention during which he was isolated from his family and the court.\nBecause we have determined that probable cause existed to arrest defendant on February 5, we need only address the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s statements on February 6. \u201cThe test of whether a confession was admissible at trial is whether the [State] met its burden of showing that the statement was made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether defendant\u2019s will was overcome when he made the statement.\u201d (People v. Stachelek (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 391, 401, 495 N.E.2d 984.) In making this determination, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, including the existence of any threats, promises, or physical coercion, the length and intensity of the interrogation, and the age, intelligence, experience, and physical condition of the defendant. The court\u2019s determination will not be disturbed on review unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Stachelek, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 401.\nHere, defendant stated in his grand jury testimony that he was given Miranda warnings on February 5 and that they were repeated again at the grand jury hearing, he admitted neither the police nor the State\u2019s Attorney made any threats or promises to him and never hit or did anything to scare him, and that the police treated him well throughout the time he was at the station house. We further observe that defendant never complained about being mistreated. There is no evidence that defendant was subjected to lengthy periods of interrogation or that he was denied sleep, food or access to a washroom. Nor was any affirmative evidence presented showing that coercion was used to get defendant to appear before the grand jury. Additionally, various police officers and assistant State\u2019s Attorneys testified that defendant\u2019s movement was not restricted and that he was treated well throughout his stay at the police station. In considering the totality of the circumstances, therefore, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant\u2019s statements on February 6 were voluntary was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIn light of the foregoing, we hold that the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest.\nDefendant next argues that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on accountability, nor was his guilt established beyond a reasonable doubt because his grand jury testimony was contradicted by other evidence. He first contends that no evidence was presented that he encouraged House or Bobo by word, gesture or deed to commit any of the specific offenses for which he was subsequently held accountable, there was no evidence that House and Bobo revealed their true intent to him, and he did not actually participate in any of the specific offenses and therefore cannot be held accountable.\nA person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when, \u201c[ejither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 5 \u2014 2.) Evidence that a defendant voluntarily attaches himself to a group bent on illegal acts which are dangerous or homicidal in character, or which will probably or necessarily require the use of force and violence that could result in the taking of life unlawfully, makes him criminally liable for any wrongdoings committed by the other members of the group in furtherance of the common purpose, or as a natural or probable consequence thereof, even though he did not actively participate in the overt act itself. (People v. Gutierrez (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 774, 483 N.E.2d 944.) Proof of a common purpose need not be supported by words of agreement but can be drawn from circumstances surrounding the commission of an act by a group. People v. St. Pierre (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 644, 324 N.E.2d 226.\nHere, the common purpose of defendant, House and Bobo was to illegally enter Rule\u2019s apartment while he was at home to force him to turn over money he otherwise refused to pay to House. This unauthorized entry with the intended use of some force (home invasion) is the offense which is the basis of finding defendant accountable for the other offenses committed in furtherance of the purpose for the unauthorized entry. Defendant\u2019s role in the home invasion was integral to its success and clearly he intended to promote or facilitate the commission of that offense by pretending to buy cocaine from Rule so that House and Bobo could gain entry into the apartment they could otherwise not lawfully enter. Obviously defendant knew a conflict existed between Rule and House, based on the necessity of using him to get Rule to open the protective burglar gates, and that that conflict could result in the use of force against Rule.\nWe further observe that in determining whether accountability has been established, the trier of fact may consider factors such as defendant\u2019s presence without disapproving or opposing the commission of the crime, a continued close affiliation with the codefendants after the commission of the crime, the defendant\u2019s failure to report the incident or confide in anyone about it (People v. Watson (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 315, 436 N.E.2d 7), and the defendant\u2019s flight from the scene (People v. Washington (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 365, 468 N.E.2d 1285).\nIn the instant case, defendant initially made a statement that he remained in the hallway near the front door rather than in the apartment while the subsequent crimes were being committed. This statement was contradicted by his testimony before the grand jury that he had originally lied and in fact had been in the apartment near the entryway. On appeal, he also contends that he was prevented from fleeing the scene because the burglar gates had been locked again and he knew of no other exit. At the same time, however, defendant recited in his various statements that he was close enough to the events to hear the argument over money with Rule and his codefendants\u2019 later questioning of the three girls concerning money and where \u201cdope\u201d might be hidden. He also was able to observe Bobo enter the bedroom where the girls were sleeping and see him tieing them up with a brown extension cord. Later, when there was evidence of smoke in the apartment, defendant heard Bobo tell the girls not to panic because the extension cord binding them was loose enough for them to free themselves and get out of the apartment. Defendant further saw House and Bobo shoot the girls, pour kerosene over them, and ignite the kerosene. Accordingly, we find it incredible, as apparently did the trial court, to believe that defendant could have described these events had he been positioned in the hallway outside the apartment. Logically then, having been in the apartment, the burglar gates could not have been locked when he fled the scene, notwithstanding the fact that they were locked when the fire department arrived and had to be tom away from the wall.\nWe also observe that at no time did defendant attempt to disapprove or oppose the actions of House and Bobo; he remained to view all of the crimes and only then did he flee to the Lawndale game room where he met House and discussed details of the crime with him and smoked \u201chappy sticks.\u201d Defendant did not contact the police and he later initially denied his participation in the occurrence. In the absence of any evidence that defendant detached himself from the criminal enterprise (see People v. Rybka (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 394, 158 N.E.2d 17), defendant was accountable for the conduct of House and Bobo after his initial action in getting Rule to open the burglar gates.\nWe similarly reject defendant\u2019s argument that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because of conflicts between his grand jury testimony and other evidence. In support of this contention, defendant again argues he remained in the hallway during the occurrence. He also appears to argue that the burglar gates were locked so he therefore could not have been in the apartment. He further contends that a conflict existed based on Kim Brooks' statement that she only saw two men in the apartment, thereby strengthening his argument that he did not enter the apartment.\nWhere inconsistencies and conflicts exist in the evidence, the trier of fact has the responsibility of weighing the credibility of the witnesses and resolving these conflicts and inconsistencies. (People v. Torres (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 931, 427 N.E.2d 329.) We find, as apparently did the trial court, that any number of reasons could explain why Brooks only saw two men. For example, defendant could have been out of her line of vision or she only focused on House and Bobo, with whom she was in direct contact. Similarly, the burglar gates could have been locked by any one of the defendants upon leaving the apartment. On the other hand, we do not find the State\u2019s evidence improbable, unconvincing, or contrary to human experience. (See People v. Scott (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 607, 439 N.E.2d 130.) In light of the foregoing, therefore, we cannot say that the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt.\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the trial court erred in refusing the admission of evidence as hearsay that the offenses were committed by other persons. Specifically, he contends that the testimony of Sterling Buchanon implicated another party and his alleged accomplice as the perpetrators of the.crimes and the court improperly excluded certain statements made by Kim Brooks at the hospital which supported this theory.\nIn Illinois, the general rule is that an extra-judicial declaration not under oath by the declarant that he, and not the defendant on trial, committed a crime is inadmissible as hearsay notwithstanding the declaration is against the declarant\u2019s penal interest. An exception to this rule exists where the statement is supported by sufficient indicia of trustworthiness. (People v. Bowel (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 58, 488 N.E.2d 995.) The trustworthiness of such a declaration can be determined by consideration of whether the statement was spontaneous and occurred shortly after the crime, the statement was corroborated by other evidence, the statement was self-incriminating and a declaration against penal interest, and there was an adequate opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant. (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 93 S. Ct. 1038.) The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. People v. Bowel (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 58, 488 N.E.2d 995.\nAt trial, defendant made an offer of proof that Sterling Buchanon would testify to certain statements made by his brother, Jeffrey Hagans, also known as \u201cBodine.\u201d Buchanon stated that on January 16,- 1985, he was with Bodine and some friends and asked Bodine if he knew anything about the \u201cHamlin crimes,\u201d and Bodine responded \u201c[T]he less you know the better off you is\u201d; that he overheard Charlie Hill, a friend of Bodine\u2019s, tell Bodine that he \u201c[BJetter get rid of the clothes because [he] throwed that shit everywhere. It got on me, on my pant, my shoes, everything\u201d; that he saw Bodine burn a \u201croll of clothes\u201d; that Hill told Bodine that \u201cYou should have called the nigger back upstairs, cause he could put us in the building\u201d; that in response to Buchanon\u2019s statement to Bodine that Hill had too much influence over him and the Hamlin crimes did not \u201cmake any sense,\u201d Bodine responded that \u201cit just didn\u2019t go the way we planned\u201d; that at a later time Buchanon showed Bodine a photograph of his brother-in-law\u2019s girlfriend, who Buchanon learned was one of the victims and Bodine said she was \u201cone of the bitches with Raynard\u201d and that \u201cthat bitch shouldn\u2019t have been up there\u201d; and that at another time Buchanon overheard a conversation between Bodine and Hill in which Hill remarked to Bodine that \u201cYou know that bitch is still alive,\u201d to which Bodine responded, \u201cDon\u2019t worry about it, she in a coma\u201d and told Hill to \u201ckeep tabs on the broad,\u201d and Hill responded that \u201cshe the only one can identify us\u201d and \u201cif worse come to worse, we will go up in the hospital and get her.\u201d The trial court refused admission of these statements as hearsay.\nDefendant also contends that Kim Brooks\u2019 statements to Detective Thomas Blomstrand approximately two hours after being taken to the hospital corroborates Buchanon\u2019s proffered testimony, i.e., she identified Bodine as one of the two men responsible for the incident at the Rule apartment and described the other offender as being approximately 5 feet 7 inches (allegedly Hill). The court refused admission of Blomstrand\u2019s testimony as to these statements as not falling under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule.\nWe agree with the trial court that Buchanon\u2019s and Blomstrand\u2019s testimony was inadmissible as hearsay. Neither Bodine nor Brooks was available for cross-examination; both died prior to trial. Although Buchanon\u2019s testimony would have been against his penal interest, presumably because in making his statement in court he admitted smoking marijuana and stripping a stolen car, the very fact that he was smoking marijuana and \u201cgetting high\u201d when he initially overheard Bodine\u2019s and Hill\u2019s alleged references to the Rule murders casts doubt on their trustworthiness. We further observe that nothing in Bodine\u2019s alleged statements to Buchanon contained any specifics about the crime and no direct admission by Bodine that he in fact committed the offenses. The only corroborating evidence was Donald Grigsby\u2019s testimony that he saw Bodine and another man who was 5 feet 7 inches on the stairs of the apartment building on the date of the crimes, but that is not proof that Bodine was the perpetrator of the crimes. On the other hand, defendant confessed to his participation in the incident in accurate detail before the grand jury, and House subsequently corroborated his testimony in the same detail. In addition, James Davis and Virgil Bridges both implicated defendant as a participant in the incident. Buchanon\u2019s offered testimony thus was not only uncorroborated but it lacked trustworthiness because of its sheer implausibility in light of defendant\u2019s and House\u2019s confessions.\nSimilarly, we reject defendant\u2019s contention that Kim Brooks\u2019 statements to Detective Blomstrand were admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. At 6:15 p.m. on the date of the Rule incident, Detective Joe Deases spoke with Kim Brooks prior to her being taken to the hospital. Her version of the events leading up to the crimes corresponded with defendant\u2019s and House\u2019s subsequent accounts, but she did not identify her assailants at that time. After arriving at the hospital, Detective Blomstrand spoke with Brooks at approximately 8:30 p.m. During her interview with him, she stated that one of the assailants was 5 feet 7 inches and she referred to another offender as \u201cBo\u201d or \u201cBoo.\u201d Blomstrand later acknowledged that he had written the name Bodine at least once in his report but that in fact Brooks had not named one of the assailants as Bodine; Blomstrand apparently had become aware of the name of Bodine during his investigation.\nIn order for a statement to be admissible as a spontaneous declaration, there must be (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement, (2) absence of time to fabricate, and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. (People v. Sanchez (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 488, 434 N.E.2d 395.) The spontaneous declaration exception \u201cis based upon the experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or, at least, as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker\u2019s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts.\u201d People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175, 180-81, 174 N.E.2d 804, quoting 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence \u00a71747 (3d ed. 1940).\nHere, Brooks\u2019 statements to Blomstrand were made at least two hours after being taken to the hospital. At that time she was alert, responsive and speaking without trouble, unlike her condition when she first spoke to Detective Deases and related the events leading up to that time but did not name anyone as her assailants. At the least, Brooks had time at the hospital to reflect on who her assailants were. We further observe that even assuming Brooks\u2019 hospital statements had been admitted, she clearly referred to one assailant as \u201cBo\u201d or \u201cBoo,\u201d but specifically not \u201cBodine,\u201d and could have been referring to Teddy Bobo. In addition, her statements corroborated defendant\u2019s confession in all other respects. With respect to her description of one of the offenders being 5 feet 7 inches, this point would have carried little weight in light of defendant\u2019s and House\u2019s confessions as discussed above. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the hearsay statements of Buchanon and Blomstrand.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURRAY" }, { "text": "LORENZ, P.J.,\nconcurs.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "LORENZ, P.J.," }, { "text": "JUSTICE PINCHAM,\ndissenting:\nI\nI dissent. For police officers, without a warrant, to enter a home and arrest an American citizen, particularly a 16-year-old boy in the absence of his parents, without probable cause as the State was compelled to urge in the trial court, or with probable cause as the State is compelled to inconsistently and diametrically urge on appeal before this court, take the juvenile from his home and voluntarily or involuntarily detain him incommunicado in a police station for over 27 hours, refuse the juvenile\u2019s mother\u2019s request to see the child, take the juvenile before a grand jury, where and without counsel on his behalf, the prosecutor extracts an incriminating statement from him, on which that grand jury indicts him and which is the only evidentiary basis for his murder convictions, constitute flagrantly egregious violations of the juvenile citizen\u2019s cherished, revered and basic Federal and State constitutional rights to (1) due process of law, (2) to be secure in his person and home against unreasonable search and seizure, (3) to the assistance of counsel, (4) not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, and (5) against self-incrimination, notwithstanding the egregiousness of the offenses with which the defendant was charged, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.\nThe record on appeal reflects that the People of the State of Hlinois were represented at a 4 p.m., February 6, 1985, meeting, called \u201cto discuss the fact whether Mr. Green was in fact a witness or a participant in the murders that occurred in that apartment,\u201d by at least four lawyers of considerable talent and experience, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys Dennis Demback, Timothy Quinn, Tom Brennan and John O\u2019Donnell, who had, in addition, the majesty and power and authority of a grand jury literally at their collective elbow. Arrayed against all this talent and power was one uncounseled, unadvised 16-year-old boy who had spent 27 continuous hours in police custody and who had been denied the request during that time to see his mother. The fact that this young lad had been denied access to his family obviously preyed upon the defendant\u2019s mind at the grand jury because he testified at the grand jury that the night before he had given a statement to an assistant State\u2019s Attorney and a court reporter in the police station and that that statement contained lies. After being questioned about this prior statement before the grand jury the following then occurred:\n\u201cQ. (by Assistant State\u2019s Attorney O\u2019Donnell at the grand jury) And now you\u2019re telling the truth today?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Why are you telling the truth today?\nA. Because I want to be with my family.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThis answer, that he was telling the truth at the grand jury \u201cbecause I want to be with my family\u201d (emphasis added) from a 16-year-old boy, under these circumstances, is a prima facie indication that his. testimony had been coerced. Something happened while the defendant was in police custody which caused him to change his story with respect to the homicides, and it obviously related to his deprivation from his family. From the totality of the hereinafter mentioned facts and circumstances, the later set forth testimony of Assistant State\u2019s Attorney John O\u2019Donnell regarding why he took the defendant before the grand jury and the defendant\u2019s answer before the grand jury, \u201cbecause I want to be with my family,\u201d (emphasis added) it is quite apparent to me that the defendant was of the frame of mind that because of and upon the conclusion of his grand jury testimony he would be allowed to return home to his family.\nHis answer troubled at least one grand juror, who asked the defendant:\n\u201cA JUROR: He made a statement that he want [sic] to be with his family. Will you explain what he meant by what he want [sic] to be with his family or how is this working?\nMR. O\u2019DONNELL: Charles, did you tell me that the reason you\u2019re telling the truth is because you wanted to protect your family?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Is that the reason why you\u2019re telling the truth today?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Have I made any promises to you?\nA. No.\nQ. Have I made any threats to you?\nA. No.\nA JUROR: How did you find Charles?\nMR. O\u2019DONNELL: I couldn\u2019t tell you that.\nA JUROR: He just came?\nMR. O\u2019DONNELL: There was a police investigation. Charles was picked up as a result of that police investigation.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThus, when the juror asked about the defendant wanting \u201cto be with his family\u201d Assistant State\u2019s Attorney O\u2019Donnell diverted the trajectory of the grand juror\u2019s question by suggesting that the defendant \u201cwanted to protect\u201d his family. (Emphasis added.) The defendant\u2019s desire \u201cto be with his family,\u201d the words of the defendant and the grand juror, and \u201cto protect his family,\u201d (the words of Assistant State\u2019s Attorney O\u2019Donnell), which are not the same thing. (Emphasis added.)\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney O\u2019Donnell\u2019s zeal before the grand jury to immediately extricate himself from any possible accusation of skullduggery is glaringly apparent. Promptly after the grand juror asked him to explain what the defendant meant when he said that he had testified before the grand jury because he wanted to he with his family, and O\u2019Donnell\u2019s successfiil sidetracking and redirecting the defendant\u2019s statement and the grand juror\u2019s inquiry about it, O\u2019Donnell hastily asked the defendant, \u201cHave / made any promise to you?\u201d and, \u201cHave I made any threats to you?\u201d (Emphasis added.) I find it extremely significant that this experienced astute prosecutor did not likewise ask this minor defendant if any other prosecutor or law enforcement officer had made any promises to him or had threatened him, in order to also eliminate any possible charges of chicanery against them.\nIt is indeed noteworthy that, according to the grand jury testimony of the defendant Charles Green, he was simply the decoy who persuaded Raynard Rule to open the burglar gates to enable Derrick House and Teddy Bobo to gain entrance into the apartment, where House and Bobo actually committed the four atrocious murders, in which the defendant Charles Green did not actually or actively participate. Thus, at best, defendant Charles Green was merely an accessory and only accountable for the murders, while House and Bobo were the principal offenders, and all three were charged in the indictment with the murders. Yet, the record reflects, Teddy Bobo was not prosecuted for the murders because, on motion of the State, the trial court nol-prossed the indictment against him, whereas, in a bench trial severed from the trial of the defendant Charles Green, Derrick House was found guilty of the murders and sentenced to death. Derrick House\u2019s sentence being death, his appeal was directly to and is now pending before the supreme court of Illinois. From the entire record before us on appeal, it could be argued with a great degree of persuasion that the law enforcement officers\u2019 interactions with the defendant, Charles Green, were initially designed to coerce him into being a witness against Derrick House and Teddy Bobo, and when that failed, for reasons which do not appear, the law enforcement officers then prosecuted the defendant for the crimes and used his illegally obtained grand jury testimony as the evidence to convict, him.\nIt is clearly borne out by Assistant State\u2019s Attorney John O\u2019Donnell\u2019s testimony on the hearing of the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his grand jury testimony:\n\u201cQ. (By defense counsel) Prior to Mr. Green testifying in front of the Grand Jury, you had spoken with him, had you not?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. And you talked with him about everything he in fact testified to in front of the Grand Jury; is that correct?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. He told you nothing new in front of the Grand Jury; is that correct?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. What did he tell you new in front of the Grand Jury?\nA. He didn\u2019t tell me anything new in front of the Grand Jury.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe final proof, if any were needed, that this scheme was deliberate and purposeful came from Assistant State\u2019s Attorney O\u2019Donnell\u2019s testimony later at the trial when the denouement of the stratagem was revealed:\n\u201cQ. Now, why did you put Mr. Green in front of the Grand Jury after you interviewed him?\nA. There were two reasons. One was I was waiting for a youth officer at that time \u2014 well, that is not a reason but I was waiting for a youth officer. The youth officer was late and the time was late. It was time that the Grand Jury was leaving. I put him in the Grand Jury because we believed \u2014 ive were going to discuss the fact whether Mr. Green was in fact a witness or a participant in the murders that occurred in that apartment.\nQ. Is it not a fact, Mr. O\u2019Donnell, that you wanted to commit Mr. Green\u2019s testimony to writing in front of a charging authority, the Grand Jury?\nA. I wanted his statement to in effect be in writing since he had given, a prior inconsistent statement the night before.\nQ. You could have brought a court reporter in to do that, couldn\u2019t you?\nA. I could have brought in a court reporter, yes.\n* * *\nQ. Mr. O\u2019Donnell, these events that you have testified to here today took place approximately 11 months ago, is that correct?\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nQ. How many cases have you been responsible for handling in those 11 months?\nA. I have been responsible for quite a few cases.\nQ. Hundreds?\nA. Well, it depends what you mean responsible for, whether you mean responsible for trial or responsibility for putting someone before the Grand Jury.\nQ. How many investigations, indictments, informations, complaints, charges or the like have you handled in the last 11 months?\nA. I have probably been responsible for hundreds of cases for trial or motions. This probably was one of the only cases that I in fact put a defendant in before the Grand Jury.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nI am impelled to briefly comment, first, upon the horrible state of the record on appeal, filed in this court, and, second, upon the grossly inadequate and incompetent performance of defendant\u2019s counsel.\nAccording to the common law record, there was testimony heard on the motion to quash arrest and to suppress evidence on January 7, 8 and 10, 1986, and on January 13, 1986, the court denied the motions. On January 17, 1986, the defendant\u2019s bench trial commenced. Testimony was heard thereafter on January 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 1986; closing argument was heard on January 31, 1986, and on February 4, 1986, the trial court found the defendant guilty. The record on appeal does not contain any report of proceedings at all for January 27. The report of proceedings for January 31, 1986, is physically inserted between the reports of proceedings for April 1, 1986, and February 4, 1986. As to the January 21, 23, 24 and 29 trial dates, the report of proceedings contains only partial or \u201cexcerpted\u201d trial proceedings and, naturally, there is no way of knowing the relative importance or unimportance of the missing trial proceedings. In addition, the report of proceedings (\u201cexcerpted\u201d or otherwise) is bound in nonsequential misorder. For example, Volume I begins with the report of proceedings for May 7, 1986, followed by January 7, 1986, and next, followed by January 17, 1986. One must refer to the \u201cSupplemental Record,\u201d another volume (Volume III), for the intervening report of proceedings for January 8, 9, 10, and 13 (excerpted only), and then back to Volume I for the report of proceedings for January 21 (excerpts only), January 22, 23 (excerpts only), January 24 (excerpts only), and January 28, 1986. One then proceeds to Volume II for the proceedings of January 29, 1986, and returns to the \u201cSupplemental Record\u201d (Volume III) for the February 4, 1986, guilty findings of the trial court, only to find that the same appears inserted into Volume III after the sentencing proceeding on April 1, 1986. In addition, the record on appeal nowhere contains the defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and to suppress evidence, the very matter upon which the defendant places primary reliance in his brief for reversal in this court. Likewise missing are most of the exhibits admitted into evidence on the hearing of the motion to suppress and considered by the trial court in ruling thereon.\nNow, certainly none of the insufficiency of the record on appeal is attributable to the defendant personally, a teenager in the penitentiary and who is compelled to exclusively rely upon appointed counsel on appeal. The majority points out (179 Ill. App. 3d 12) that it is the responsibility of appellant\u2019s counsel to provide the court with a complete and orderly record on appeal so that we may accurately discharge our obligations to the parties and to the public. True. But this should rightly create an obligation on this court, not serve as an excuse for this court to affirm a conviction. It is our duty to see to it that the obligations of the appellant\u2019s counsel are properly fulfilled. We are required in this case to render a decision which determines the remainder of the entire life of the defendant, and we are asked by defendant\u2019s own counsel to make this serious and awesome determination on the basis of partial transcripts, excerpted proceedings, and missing documents. In my judgment, this constitutes dereliction of duty and incompetence by defendant\u2019s counsel in its grossest and rawest form.\nIn addition, the brief filed on behalf of defendant is, in my judgment, woefully inadequate and disorganized. For instance, the brief cites very little pertinent testimony, abandons the Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371, issue specifically relied upon by the defendant below, fails to point out the utter confusion and contradictions of the trial court\u2019s findings and conclusions at the motion to quash and suppress hearing, and pays but scant heed to the propriety of the State\u2019s eliciting self-incriminating testimony from an uncounseled juvenile arrestee before the same grand jury which subsequently indicted him, and the State\u2019s introduction of that same testimony at the defendant\u2019s trial to convict him. In addition, nearly one-third of defendant\u2019s 52-page brief (pages 2 through 17), purports to quote defendant\u2019s testimony before the grand jury on February 6, 1985. However, the transcript of the defendant\u2019s testimony before the grand jury which was introduced into evidence at the trial as People\u2019s exhibit No. 27 is not a part of the record on appeal. This court therefore has no way of determining whether the quotation in the defendant\u2019s brief is accurate or complete. Except for the two short paragraphs preceding the defendant\u2019s supposed grand jury testimony, and one short paragraph following it, the defendant\u2019s supposed grand jury testimony constitutes the entire \u201cStatement of Facts\u201d in the defendant\u2019s brief. Moreover, and at least equally important, the defendant filed no reply brief in this court and thus totally abstained from thereby bringing to this court\u2019s attention the misrepresentations of certain motion to suppress testimony set forth and relied upon by the State in its brief, as well as the impropriety of the State\u2019s urging a position in this court exactly contrary to that which the State urged in the trial court.\nIt is now well established that a defendant on direct appeal has a sixth amendment constitutional guarantee to competent counsel on appeal. (Penson v. Ohio (1988), 488 U.S. _, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300, 109 S. Ct. 346; McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconson, District 1 (1988), 486 U.S. 429, 100 L. Ed. 2d 440, 108 S. Ct. 1895; Evitts v. Lucey (1985), 469 U.S. 387, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 105 S. Ct. 830.) It is also now well established that an appellate court has an independent constitutional obligation to examine the record on appeal for completeness and a criminal defendant\u2019s brief for competence of counsel on appeal. (Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. _, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300, 109 S. Ct. 346.) This court has been repeatedly admonished \u2014 see, e.g., People v. White (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 194, 228; United States ex rel. Thomas v. O\u2019Leary (7th Cir. 1988), 856 F.2d 1011 \u2014 that a decision by this court adverse to a criminal defendant without a brief having been filed on behalf of such defendant violates the defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to counsel. Surely no different rule prevails where the defendant\u2019s counsel files an inadequate brief. No longer is a court of review permitted to sweep a defense counsel\u2019s defective representations under the rug with a rationalization: \u201cIt is well settled that an appellant is responsible for providing a record which shows the errors claimed; where the record is incomplete, or is silent, a reviewing court will invoke the presumption that the trial court ruled or acted correctly.\u201d (179 Ill. App. 3d at 12.) The sixth \u2022 amendment makes no distinction between appointed and retained counsel. In McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1 (1988), 486 U.S. 429, 100 L. Ed. 2d 440, 108 S. Ct. 1895, Justice Stevens recently stated for the court:\n\u201cEvery advocate has essentially the same professional responsibility whether he or she accepted a retainer from a paying client or an appointment from a court. The appellate lawyer must master the trial record, thoroughly research the law, and exercise judgment in identifying the arguments that may be advanced on appeal. In preparing and evaluating the case, and in advising the client as to the prospects for success, counsel must consistently serve the client\u2019s interest to the best of his or her ability.\u201d 486 U.S. at_, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 453,108 S. Ct. at 1902.\n\u201cThe attorney must still provide his or her client precisely the services that an affluent defendant could obtain from paid counsel \u2014 a thorough review of the record and a discussion of the strongest arguments revealed by that review. In searching for the strongest arguments available, the attorney must be zealous and must resolve all doubts and ambiguous legal questions in favor of his or her client.\u201d 486 U.S. at_, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 457,108 S. Ct. at 1905.\nNo citizen should be imprisoned for life simply because his appointed counsel was incompetent, either at trial or on appeal, or at both. When the State of Elinois appoints counsel for an indigent it warrantees that the counsel possesses certain minimum standards. These minimum standards should include at least the following: That counsel file in the court of review (1) a complete, accurate and sequential report of proceedings; (2) a complete and accurate original or copy of all relevant motions filed in the trial court; (3) a statement of all issues litigated in the trial court and not raised on appeal, together with a short statement explaining why these issues have not been raised on appeal; and (4) a brief filed in accordance with the supreme court rules. Only then will a conscientious court of review be able to assure itself that the defendant\u2019s sixth amendment guarantee to competent representation and the fourteenth amendment guarantees to due process of law and the equal protection of the laws, as well as the corresponding State constitutional guarantees, have been fully enforced as to the humblest citizen convicted of even the most heinous crimes. As Mr. Justice Brennan recently explained for the Court in Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986), 477 U.S. 365, 379-80, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305, 322,106 S. Ct. 2574, 2585-86:\n\u201cWhile we have recognized that the \u2018 \u201cpremise of our adversary system of criminal justice *** that partisan advocacy *** will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free\u201d \u2019 [citations] underlies and gives meaning to the right to effective assistance [citation], we have never intimated that the right to counsel is conditioned upon actual innocence. The constitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the innocent and the guilty alike. Consequently, we decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination of actual guilt.\u201d\nAt a minimum, in the case at bar, this court should appoint new appellate counsel for the defendant and order that he or she furnish to this court a complete, sequential, and accurate record on appeal and the new counsel should be further directed to file new briefs. The Supreme Court has just this term in Penson v. Ohio (1988), 488 U.S. _, _, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300, 311-12, 109 S. Ct. 346, 352, cautioned, in words directly applicable to this cause:\n\u201cThe need for forceful advocacy does not come to an abrupt halt as the legal proceeding moves from the trial to appellate stage. Both stages of the prosecution, although perhaps involving unique legal skills, require careful advocacy to ensure that rights are not foregone and that substantial legal and factual arguments are not inadvertently passed over. ***\nBy proceeding to decide the merits of petitioner\u2019s appeal without appointing new counsel to represent him, the Ohio Court of Appeals deprived both the petitioner and itself of the benefit of an adversary examination and presentation of the issues.\u201d\nHowever, because the majority in the case at bar has ostensibly elected to proceed to the merits despite the incompleteness of the record on appeal and an inadequate defendant\u2019s brief, I, too, by that compulsion, reach the merits, but dissent; and in doing so, I touch upon some issues inadequately addressed by defendant\u2019s own counsel.\nII\nThe events which unfolded in the court below present a highly unusual set of circumstances. Though I will review the testimony at the motion to quash and suppress in detail, a brief introductory overview of that testimony will be helpful in understanding the issues. The undisputed testimony below reveals that on January 12, 1985, the bodies of three deceased persons, Raynard Rule, Lauren Rule, and Yvonne Brooks, were found in a smoldering apartment at 458 North Hamlin, Chicago. The victims had been gagged and their hands were tied behind their backs. Raynard Rule had been stabbed and the two women had been shot. A fourth victim, Kim Brooks, subsequently died of bums from the fire connected with the same incident. Three weeks later, on February 5, 1985, during the daylight hours at least two Chicago police detectives, John Sommerville and James Clemmons, entered the defendant\u2019s home located at 846 North Hamlin, Chicago. The detectives had no warrant to enter the home or to arrest anyone. Present in the defendant\u2019s home were the defendant\u2019s sister, Gloria Thompson, Gloria\u2019s baby, and three teenage boys, Willie Thomas, Terry Green, and the defendant, Charles Green, age 16. There may have been one or two additional family members present, but no adult and neither parent of the defendant was present. The detectives took the defendant from his home to the police station, where he was repeatedly questioned by different officers and an assistant State\u2019s Attorney. Sometime during the evening of February 5, 1985, the defendant\u2019s mother, Viola Green, went to the station and asked to see her son but her request was denied. Her minor son was kept in the police station all night and most of the next day, February 6, 1985. On the afternoon of February 6, 1985, the defendant was driven by police officers to the Cook County criminal court building at 26th and California, in Chicago, and at about 4 p.m. he was taken before the Cook County grand jury, where he was questioned by Assistant State\u2019s Attorney John O\u2019Donnell. Assistant State\u2019s Attorney O\u2019Donnell advised the defendant of his Miranda rights before the grand jury; the defendant acknowledged them and subsequently gave self-incriminating answers to questions put to him by Assistant State\u2019s Attorney O\u2019Donnell. The same grand jury subsequently indicted the defendant for the murders.\nPrior to trial, the defendant moved to quash his arrest and to suppress his grand jury testimony, and the trial court took extensive testimony on those motions. Thereafter, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney argued to the trial court that the defendant\u2019s grand jury testimony was admissible at trial because the defendant had not been placed under arrest or in custody until after he had given his grand jury self-incriminating testimony. That is to say, the State argued that the defendant had voluntarily left his home on February 5, 1985, with Detectives Sommerville and Clemmons, that he had voluntarily stayed in the police station the remainder of that day, and all the night of February 5, 1985, that the defendant also voluntarily stayed all the next day, February 6, 1985, in the police station, and that the defendant had voluntarily testified before the grand jury. Conversely, the defense argued that the defendant\u2019s arrest occurred in his home on February 5, 1985, and was constitutionally invalid on two grounds: (1) because it was without probable cause; and (2) because of the officer\u2019s warrantless entry into the defendant\u2019s home. Thus, in the trial court, the State and the defendant both AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE DEFENDANT ON FEBRUARY 5, 1985. Despite the vociferous urgings of both sides that at the time the detectives went to the defendant\u2019s home and took the defendant from his home to the police station, whether under arrest or by consent, there was no probable cause to arrest him, the trial judge nevertheless found that the detectives had probable cause to arrest the defendant and denied the motion to quash the defendant\u2019s arrest and to suppress evidence on that ground.\nThe defendant waived his right to trial by jury and the cause proceeded to a bench trial, during which the defendant\u2019s grand jury testimony was admitted as evidence against him. The trial court convicted the defendant of the murders and sentenced him to an imprisonment term of natural life. On defendant\u2019s appeal to this court, the State has dramatically reversed its original trial court position and now conversely argues, for the first time, that (1) the defendant was arrested in his home and (2) that there was probable cause for the defendant\u2019s arrest.\nI am mindful that the defendant has been convicted of extremely brutal and hideous crimes. On the other hand, the defendant is a 16-year-old boy sentenced to life imprisonment on evidence clearly insufficient to convict him for for his own uncounseled testimony, before the same grand jury which indicted him, elicited from him after he had been in continuous police custody over 27 hours. Because I firmly believe that the applicable relevant and binding constitutional and statutory provisions, and the case law interpreting them, demand the legal determinations that (1) the defendant\u2019s arrest was not supported by probable cause and (2) the defendant\u2019s uncounseled statements before the grand jury which indicted him were the product of the defendant\u2019s illegal arrest and were in derogation of his guarantees under the fourth, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as well as various statutory provisions, I dissent.\nThe underlying facts of this case are not complicated and should have been utilized by this court as a basis for the application of legal principles to those facts, as in the ordinary modus opercmdi for courts of review. Instead, the majority has rendered a decision which is disparate from the trial testimony, at variance with soipe of the trial court\u2019s specific findings and rulings, and even inconsistent within itself. For instance, the majority says (179 Ill. App. 3d at 10) that the defendant was legally arrested in his home and taken to the police station, but later (179 Ill. App. 3d at 13), the majority conversely states: \u201c[W]e cannot say that defendant should have reasonably believed he was under arrest and not free to leave the station.\u201d Query: If it wasn\u2019t reasonable for the defendant to believe he was under arrest, why then was it reasonable for the trial court to find that he was?\nThe internal inconsistencies in the majority opinion have resulted, in part, from at least the following reasons: (1) the trial court\u2019s confusion as to what the testimony had shown; (2) the refusal of the trial court, when requested, to make clear and concise findings of fact; (3) the diametrically contrary positions of the State in the trial court vis-a-vis its position in this court on the issue of probable cause; (4) the misrepresentations in Detective Summerville\u2019s testimony in the State\u2019s brief; (5) the failure of defendant\u2019s appointed appellate counsel, who was also the defendant\u2019s appointed trial counsel, to provide this court with a full and complete record on appeal; (6) the failure of defendant\u2019s appellate counsel to thoroughly and clearly advocate the defendant\u2019s cause in the defendant\u2019s brief in this court; (7) the failure of the trial court to determine all the issues apparently presented to it in the defendant\u2019s motion to quash and suppress; and (8) a determination by the majority to affirm this defendant\u2019s conviction no matter how inconsistent the reasoning employed to reach that result. For all of these reasons, it is necessary to an accurate appraisal of the facts and a correct application of the law that a thorough rendition of the testimony on the motion to quash the defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress evidence be set forth.\nIn reviewing this evidence it should be noted that the prosecuting attorneys were uniquely contending before the trial court that there was no probable cause for the defendant\u2019s arrest, that the officers did not arrest the defendant in his home on February 5, 1985, that the defendant was not under arrest but voluntarily accompanied the officers to the police station, where he voluntarily remained for 27 hours, to enable the prosecutors to urge that the defendant\u2019s subsequent uncounseled incriminating grand jury statement was unconstitutionally admissible as trial evidence against the defendant. It should also be noted in reviewing the motion to quash and suppress testimony and evidence that the defendant also contended that there was no probable cause for his arrest, but, the defendant conversely contended that the officers arrested him in his home for the quadru- ' pie murders, transported him to the police station where he was held in custody incommunicado for 27 hours, after which, without counsel he was taken and gave an incriminating statement before the grand jury, in violation of his constitutional rights to be secure in his person and home against unreasonable search and seizure, against self-incrimination and the compulsion of being a witness against himself, to counsel and to due process of law.\nTHE TESTIMONY ON THE MOTIONS TO QUASH AND SUPPRESS\nCHARLES GREEN \u2014 Direct Examination\nHe is the Defendant. On February 5, 1985, in the morning hours he was at his home at 846 North Hamlin babysitting his niece LaToya Miller. Present was his brother, Terry Green, his cousin, Willie Thomas, and his sister, Gloria Thompson. At about 11:30 a.m. Gloria was about to take the baby to the doctor, and when she walked to the door and opened it, the police rushed in.\nHe was standing beside his sister when three policemen came in with their guns drawn. The police started walking around and searching the apartment and they had no warrant. The police remained in the apartment for about a half an hour, and when he asked the police if they had a warrant they told him to \u201cshut up.\u201d\nThe police told him that \u201cthey had to take me in\u201d and he left the apartment with the police. He did not leave voluntarily. Prior to leaving the apartment the police handcuffed him, took him outside to the police car, placed him in the police car, and took him to the station.\nAt the station they took him into a room but did not take the handcuffs off; he remained in the room for four or five hours. No policeman ever told him he could go home.\nCross-Examination\nTerry Green is 19, Willie Thomas is 18. Gloria was 20, and her baby was 1. No other relative was in the apartment. When the police came in he was in the front room. When the police came in they did not identify themselves as policemen. The front door to the apartment was not damaged by the police. He did not know the names of the three policemen who came into the apartment. The first one that walked through the door pointed his weapon at his face.\nHe did not tell the police his name was Charles Green or that he went by the nickname of Little Charles. He did not show any identification to the police in the apartment.\nIn addition to handcuffing him, they also handcuffed his brother and his cousin, and the police took Terry Green and Willie Thomas to the police station too. They did not take Gloria. His hands were handcuffed behind him and all three were taken in the same police car. The police told him he was trader arrest but did not tell him what he was under arrest for.\nHe was not allowed to make a telephone call before he left the apartment and he did not call his mother before he left the apartment. He asked the police if they had a warrant.\nAfter he was taken to the police station he was handcuffed to the wall for the entire time he was in the police station. He did not see his brother Terry Green or his cousin Willie Thomas while he was at the police station.\nGLORIA ANNE THOMPSON \u2014 Direct Examination\nOn February 5, 1985, she lived at 846 North Hamlin and she is the sister of the defendant Charles Green. On February 5, 1985, at about 11 a.m. she was going to take her baby to the doctor. Present in the home were Charles, Terry, Willie Thomas, and her small sister Glendora.\nAs she got the baby dressed to go to the doctor and went to the door to open it \u201csome police officers was [sic] at the door.\u201d She did not hear the officers knock and when she opened the door the officers came in without her telling them they could come in. There were three of them and one had his gun out. She asked the officers if they had a search warrant and they \u201ctold me to shut up whenever I asked them something.\u201d\nTwo officers were \u201cjust looking around\u201d and the one with the blond hair went into the back room and was \u201cin the drawers, just throwing clothes all over the place, and I asked him did he have a search warrant, and he said he didn\u2019t need no search warrant.\u201d\nShe told the officer that she was going upstairs to get her uncle so they could talk to her uncle and tell him what they wanted, and as she was leaving the doorway the officer \u201ccame behind me, and he stopped me at the front door and searched me (by) putpng] his hands on me, around my waist, and down my legs and searched me.\u201d She then went upstairs and knocked on her uncle\u2019s door but he wasn\u2019t there, and then she went downstairs to her aunt\u2019s house and brought her upstairs.\nWhen Gloria came back upstairs all three police officers were still in the apartment, and two of them were talking to her brother and her cousin. They stayed in the apartment about 20 to 30 minutes.\nDuring the time the police were in the apartment she called her mother\u2019s job and spoke to her mother. No one else spoke to her mother. When she was talking to her mother, the police officer kept saying \u201cyou are lying, you are lying,\u201d and she tried to give the officer the phone but he never accepted the phone to talk to her mother.\nThe police officers then left the apartment with Charles, Terry, and Willie, and prior to leaving they handcuffed them. The police officers said they were taking them to the station. They showed her no search warrant or arrest warrant.\nCross-Examination\nShe heard no knock at the door before she opened it. All three police officers came in at one time. She saw additional police officers outside the apartment. One officer had his gun out and it was pointed in front of him; the officers did not identify themselves as police officers or show any identification.\nThe police were in the apartment for 20 to 30 minutes. Charles Green did not speak to his mother on the phone when she called their mother and she spoke to her mother for about two or three minutes.\nCharles Green, Terry Green and Willie Thomas were handcuffed together not separately. Her brother the defendant is not known as Little Charles, and he has never been known by that name.\nIt was then stipulated between the parties that the defendant made certain statements after he was taken to the police station which the Police intended to introduce as evidence against the defendant on his trial. The defendant then rested on the motion to quash the defendant\u2019s arrest and suppress evidence, and the People called the following witnesses.\nJOHN SUMMERVILLE \u2014 Direct Examination\nHe is a detective assigned to Area 4, Violent Crimes. On January 12, 1985, he became involved in the investigation of a quadruple homicide which occurred at 458 North Hamlin Avenue. Pursuant to that investigation, on February 3, 1985, he spoke to James Davis first at his home and later at Area 4. Present was Detective Capesius.\nJames Davis told him that on January 11 he was at a game-room at 750 North Lawndale. While at the gameroom he saw Raynard Rule and Derrick House engage in a verbal argument outside the gameroom about money. The argument \u201cescalated\u201d into a fistfight with Raynard Rule getting the better of Derrick House. The fight took place in front of several people, including Derrick House\u2019s girl friend.\nThe following day, January 12, at 11 a.m. James Davis said that he was in the same gameroom with a man named Ghost. While at the gameroom, Derrick House and Charles Green came in and told Ghost they were going to \u201cpeep\u201d Raynard, which Davis explained meant that they were going to look for him.\nDavis then left the gameroom, returning about 12:30 where he remained until Derrick House returned with Charles Green about 6 p.m. At that time Ghost was present, a boy named Virgil was also present, and Derrick made the remark, \u201cWe got them, we got them, we just burnt, we got them, we just burnt Raynard.\u201d\nDavis also said that they went into the back room of the same gameroom, where Derrick House removed a .45 silver-colored handgun from his waist. Charles Green had a blue-steel handgun but Davis did not know what caliber. Davis also stated that Virgil had a .38 caliber handgun. Davis said that they began to make small talk and then began smoking \u201chappy sticks,\u201d which are marijuana dipped in PCP. Davis said he believed that Little Charles and Virgil were related, that they were cousins.\nAfter his conversation with James Davis, Detective Summerville went to Orr High School, where \u201cwe identified Virgil as Virgil Bridges.\u201d Summerville then spoke to Virgil Bridges on February 5, first at his home and then later at Area 4 at about 10:30 to 11 in the morning. Present was Detective Capesius.\nBridges told them that Little Charles was his cousin, that his name was Charles Green, and he gave them Charles Green\u2019s address.\nVirgil Bridges told them that on January 12 at 7:30 p.m. he took a bus to the neighborhood of Chicago and Hamlin where he met Charles Green on the sidewalk and Charles told him that he had done something wrong. Virgil said that he asked Charles what he \u201cdid wrong\u201d and Charles stated that he had gone up to Raynard\u2019s dope house with someone else and got Raynard to open the burglar gates. After the gates were open, things happened that were not supposed to happen.\nAfter this conversation, Virgil went to the gameroom and overheard a conversation between Charles and Derrick House about opening the burglar gates. Virgil Bridges gave the address of Charles Green as 846 North Hamlin.\nDetective Summerville went there on February 5, 1985, at 1 p.m. At that time he did not know what Charles Green looked like. He was accompanied by Detective James Clemmons, and no other policemen were at the address.\nWhen he got to the second floor of the building he knocked and a woman answered. He and Clemmons identified themselves as Chicago police officers and asked if Charles Green lived at the apartment, and she said yes. Then, \u201cwe asked if we could speak with him, and we were allowed into the apartment.\u201d No force was used to gain entrance. Neither detective displayed his handgun.\nHe saw Charles Green in the apartment and asked who he was and Charles Green identified himself. Charles Green then got some school identification with his picture on it and showed it to him. He told Charles Green that the police wanted to ask him some questions, and asked him \u201cif he would come with us.\u201d Charles Green said that he wanted to call his mother first, and that he would have to get dressed, and he was allowed to get dressed and speak to his mother over the telephone for a couple of minutes. He was not handcuffed at that time.\nSummerville gave Charles Green \u201ca ride to the police station.\u201d Charles Green was not handcuffed in the police car and the other occupants of the apartment were not taken to the police station. No handcuffs were placed on any other occupant of the apartment. The rooms of the apartment were not searched by either detective, nor was Charles Green searched while in the apartment. Summerville was in the apartment \u201cmaybe 15 minutes.\u201d\nCharles Green was taken to Area 4, 3151 W. Harrison, to the second floor to an interview room. He was not handcuffed nor was he fingerprinted, nor was he \u201cbooked,\u201d nor was he searched.\nThe conversation with James Davis had occurred on Sunday, February 3, 1985, and present was Detective Capesius. At that time James Davis told them that he would rather not talk in front of his mother, but that he had information regarding the multiple homicides which were then being investigated.\nCross-Examination\nWhen he had the conversation with James Davis, James Davis had an injury to his leg from a gunshot wound. James Davis referred to Charles Green as Little Charles but he didn\u2019t know Charles\u2019 last name. He gave a description but he did not remember it. The description was important at the time but \u201cI don\u2019t remember (it) at this moment.\u201d\nJames Davis\u2019 statement was not reduced to writing nor was Davis asked to \u201cattest to, sign, affirm, or otherwise affix his signature to the statement as to (my) version of what it was.\u201d He did not make any notes of his conversation with Davis. He did not remember if Detective Capesius made any notes of their conversation with Davis. The reason why Davis\u2019 statement was not reduced to writing and given to Davis to review and sign was because \u201cit is not necessary. We don\u2019t \u2014 it is something you don\u2019t have to do.\u201d\nHe did not tell Davis that if he cooperated with his investigation that he could possibly help Davis with regard to any criminal matters that Davis had at that time; nor did he have any knowledge that Davis had any pending criminal matters at that time.\nDavis gave his statement at approximately 12 p.m. on February 3, 1985, and it took about a half an hour. Then he drove Davis back home. He did not prepare any reports regarding the interview of James Davis, but he did review a report of the interview of James Davis after it was typed by Detective Capesius.\nHe went to Orr High School on Monday February 4 \u201cprobably in the morning.\u201d He did not recall the name of the person he spoke to at Orr High School, but that person was an assistant principal. It was a male person, and he told them that \u201cVirgil is probably Virgil Bridges.\u201d\nHe first met Virgil Bridges on the morning of February 5, at 10 or 11 a.m. He met him at his home but he did not remember his address. He went there with Detective Capesius, and \u201che asked him if he would come with us to Area 4,\u201d and Bridges responded \u201csure.\u201d At Area 4 he interviewed Bridges in the presence of Detective Capesius. The interview took about a half an hour, and \u201cseveral hours after that we went to Charles Green\u2019s house.\u201d Virgil Bridges was free to go home at that time. However, Bridges remained at Area 4 \u201cprobably a couple of hours.\u201d\nHe was not present on February 5, 1985, at 7:10 p.m. when Bridges gave a statement. Bridges did give a statement prior to 7:10 p.m. February 5, 1985, about 10 a.m. He did not see Bridges sign any statement but after he left Bridges at 11 a.m. he next saw him when he brought him into the room with Charles Green between 1:30 and 2 p.m., when Bridges was in the interview room he was not handcuffed, and neither he nor Detective Capesius struck him.\nIt was after he took the statement from Virgil Bridges that he went to 846 North Hamlin on February 5, 1985. James Davis did not know Charles\u2019 last name at the time he went to the home of Charles Green. Davis never identified any photographs of Charles Green as being \u201cLittle Charles.\u201d He asked Virgil Bridges for a description of Charles Green, but he did not write that description down.\nHe had seen an arrest report of Charles Green, and recognized Defendant Green\u2019s Exhibit No. 2 for identification as that arrest report. The arrest report contains the date of arrest in box 32 as February 5, 1985, and it contains the time as 1300 hours, which is 1 p.m. He did not know who prepared the arrest report. Detective Miller did not go to 846 North Hamlin on February 5, 1985, but his name was listed on the arrest report because \u201che would be the one who did arrest Charles Green.\u201d\nWhen he arrived at the building he and Officer Clemmons walked up to the second floor and knocked on the door. The door was opened by a female, and \u201cthey were all near the door *** everybody was sitting in the dining room.\u201d He and Clemmons identified themselves as being police officers and asked the female if Charles Green lived at the apartment.\nIn the apartment was Charles Green, two other males, two women, and some small children. He asked who was Charles Green and when someone responded he asked for identification from all subjects \u201cso we could know who was Charles Green.\u201d\nAll three persons produced identification and he identified Charles.\n\u201cQ. What did you say to him?\nA. We asked him if he would come to Area 4.\nQ. What did he respond?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Did you tell him why you wanted him to go to Area 4?\nA. I believe we told him it was for an investigation.\nQ. Did you tell him he didn\u2019t have to go to Area 4?\nA. Yes, sir, he knew that.\nQ. When did you tell Mr. Green that he didn\u2019t have to go with you to Area 4?\nA. When I was talking on the telephone.\nQ. Did you tell him or did you tell the person that you were talking to on the telephone?\nA. I told them both. They were standing right next to me.\nQ. Were you talking to both people at the same time?\nA. At that point, yes, sir.\nQ. Who did you speak with on the telephone?\nA. His mother.\nQ. How do you know it was his mother?\nA. She told me she was his mother.\nQ. Do you know her name?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. What did you tell her on the phone?\nA. I told her we wanted to talk to Charles. We had some questions we wanted to ask him regarding an investigation, that he was not under arrest.\nQ. Did you tell her anything else?\nA. Where he would be, Area 4.\nQ. Did you tell her anything else?\nA. I don\u2019t think so.\u201d\nHe took Charles Green to the police station rather than interview him at home because it is hard to interview somebody about a quadruple murder in the presence of five or six friends. The two other male individuals in the apartment were not taken to Area 4 Violent Crimes. He did not know their names nor would he recognize them.\n\u201cQ. Now, when you went to Charles Green\u2019s flat, he was a suspect, was he not?\nA. No, sir. He had only been told that Charles Green had \u2018knowledge\u2019 of the murders, and \u2018that he had did something wrong, that he had got Raynard to open the gates.\u2019 \u201d\nHe did not have Charles Green\u2019s fingerprints and palm prints taken when he arrived at Area 4 to compare with those prints that were found on a gas can at 458 North Hamlin on January 12, 1985. He interviewed Charles Green within minutes of arriving at Area 4.\nExamination by the court:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Officer, when did you arrest Charles Green for these murders?\nA. He was placed under arrest after he came back from the Grand Jury.\u201d\nRedirect Examination\nDetective Miller arrested Charles Green after he came back from the grand jury.\nJAMES CLEMMONS \u2014 Direct Examination\nHe is a detective assigned to Area 4. On February 5, 1985, he accompanied Detective Summerville to 846 North Hamlin at 1 p.m. They went to the second floor, knocked on the door; the door was opened by a young adult. They identified themselves as Chicago police officers and requested to speak to Charles Green. They were admitted into the apartment. \u201cThere were a number of subjects sitting at the table.\u201d They asked the three male subjects if they would identify themselves and said they had come to speak with Charles Green. Charles Green identified himself, and they \u201casked him if he would come into Area 4 for an interview.\u201d They were in the apartment \u201cno more than 15 minutes.\u201d\nCharles Green was transported to the police station and he was the only person taken to the police station. When Charles Green was taken to the police station \u201che was not handcuffed or in any way restrained.\u201d\nCharles Green had a conversation on the phone with his mother before they left the apartment. The person that opened the door to the detectives was a female.\nCross-Examination\nDefendant\u2019s exhibit No. 2 \u201cappears to be a copy of an arrest report for Charles Green.\u201d He did not know who prepared it, but his name was one of the names in box 56 on the report. Box 32 of the arrest report states the arrest to have occurred on February 5, 1985, at 1 p.m. That was the time that he (and Summerville) first went to the apartment of Charles Green. Box 5 of the arrest report has the address of the defendant\u2019s arrest as being 846 North Hamlin, Apartment 2. The arrest report shows that the I.R. number for Mr. Green is contained in box 20 and is stated to be 731781. Detective Clemmons said \u201cprobably the booking officer placed it there.\u201d\nExamination by the court:\n\u201cQ. Officer, did you advise this defendant at any time that he was under arrest?\nA. No, sir I did not.\nQ. Did anyone in your presence at anytime advise this defendant that he was under arrest?\nA. No, sir.\u201d\nMICHAEL MILLER \u2014 Direct Examination\nHe was assigned to Area 4, Violent Crimes. He was involved in an investigation of a multiple homicide which occurred on January 12, 1985, at 5:45 p.m. at 458 North Hamlin Avenue, Chicago. The victims were Raynard Rule, Lauren Rule, Yvonne Brooks, and Kim Brooks. The manner of death of Raynard Rule was stabbing, and the manner of death of Lauren Rule and Yvonne Brooks was gunshot wound. The condition of Kim Brooks on February 5, 1985, was that she was dying. He was aware that two .45 caliber spent shell casings had been recovered from 459 North Hamlin prior to February 5, 1985, and that there had been some burglary gates at that apartment on January 12,1985.\nOn February 5, 1985, he spoke with Charles Green in an interview room at Area 4. He first saw him at 1:30 p.m. and spoke with him in the presence of Detective Summerville.\n\u201cQ. Now, at the time you spoke with Charles Green, was he under arrest for anything?\nA. No, he was not.\nQ. Was he or was he not handcuffed, at that time?\nA. He was not.\nQ. Was his freedom of movement restricted at any manner at that time?\nA. No.\nQ. Do you know whether or not any charges had been lodged against him at that time?\nA. To my knowledge he was not charged with anything.\u201d\nHe spoke to Charles Green again at 2 p.m. the same day, and at that time no charges had been lodged against him. Neither he nor Detective Summerville informed the defendant that he was under arrest for anything at that time. At no time was defendant handcuffed on February 5, 1985, and at no time was the defendant\u2019s freedom of movement restricted in any manner on February 5,1985.\n\u201cQ. If Charles Green wanted to go home on February 5, 1985, would you have let him go home?\nA. Yes.\u201d\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney George Ellison came to the police station on February 5, 1985, and interviewed the defendant. After that interview no charges were filed. On February 6, 1985, he took Charles Green to the Cook County grand jury.\n\u201cQ. Was he under arrest at that time?\nA. No, he was not.\nQ. Was his freedom of movement restricted in any manner at that time?\nA. No, it was not.\u201d\nThe defendant was not handcuffed when he was brought to 26th and California and testified before the grand jury. He arrested Charles Green on February 6, 1985, after he had testified before the grand jury \u201csome time in the afternoon hours of the 6th of February.\u201d\nCross-Examination\nDefendant\u2019s exhibit No. 3 is a copy of the arrest report for Charles Green. Box 22 states that the time of arrest occurred at 1 p.m., February 5, 1985. His name was contained in box 55 as an arresting officer. Box 41 has the person notified as Sergeant J. Regan, Area 4, Violent Crimes, 1315 hours. That would be 15 minutes after the time of arrest. Sergeant J. Regan was his supervisor on February 5, 1985. Defendant\u2019s exhibit No. 3 is a supplemental report bearing his signature which he signed some time in the evening hours of February 6, 1985, and it was approved on the morning of February 7, 1985. He assisted in the preparation of that report. Page 2 of that report states that \u201cbased on information received House and Green were taken into custody on 5 \u2014 5\u201485 [sic].\u201d He, Detective Michael Miller prepared the report.\n\u201cQ. Mr. Green was in custody on February 5, 1985; is that correct?\nA. In a manner of speaking.\nQ. Yes or no, was he in custody?\nA. Yes, he was.\u201d\nRedirect Examination\n\u201cQ. Detective Miller what do you mean when you say in a manner of speaking he was in custody on February 5, 1985, referring to Charles Green?\nA. He was in the police presence in a police facility.\nQ. Was his freedom of movement restrained in any manner on February 5,1985?\nA. No. Charles Green was not handcuffed, nor arrested for anything nor were charges lodged against him, nor was he processed in any manner on February 5,1985.\u201d\nRe-Cross-Examination\n\u201cQ. Does custody mean free to leave you.\nA. Yes.\u201d\nExamination by the court:\n\u201cQ. How long were you in the defendant\u2019s presence [February 5,1985]?\nA. Three hours, more or less.\nQ. Was this continuous presence of the defendant?\nA. In and out of the room, yes, sir.\nQ. What time of day was this?\nA. Approximately 2:00 p.m., that afternoon until 5, 5:30.\nQ. After you got through at 5:30 did the defendant go home?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. How old was the defendant on that date?\nA. Sixteen.\nQ. Was he told that he could go home?\nA. Yes.\nQ. After you had gotten through?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. What about in the beginning?\nA. He was always told he had freedom to leave any time he wished.\nQ. Did you tell him that?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Who else told him that?\nA. Detective Summerville.\nQ. Did he finally leave the premises?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. When you got through what happened to him?\nA. He stayed in the facilities over night.\nQ. Whereabouts?\nA. In the interview room in Area 4 Violent Crimes.\nQ. Did he ever leave that interview room?\nA. Yes, the washroom and to eat, to my knowledge.\nQ. Did he ever leave the facility?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. Next day he was then taken to the Grand Jury?\nA. He was.\u201d\nJOHN O\u2019DONNELL \u2014 Direct Examination\nHe was an assistant State\u2019s Attorney on February 6, 1985. On that day he was assigned to the felony preliminary hearing division, Branch 66 of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office. The grand jury was a part of that unit. He saw Charles Green and he spoke to him on that date on the fourth floor at 26th and California (the criminal court building) at approximately 4 to 5 p.m. Members of the grand jury were present at that time. People\u2019s exhibit no. 1 is a 22-page transcript of the testimony given by Mr. Green before the Cook County grand jury on February 6, 1985. Before the testimony of Charles Green he made a statement to the members of the grand jury. People\u2019s exhibit No. 1 is a true and accurate transcript of the questions asked and the responses given by Charles Green. It also reflects the statement which he made to the grand jury.\nBefore Charles Green testified at the grand jury no charges had been placed against him. Criminal charges were placed against Charles Green after his (O\u2019Donnell\u2019s) discussions -with Quinn, Dernbach and Detective Miller, which was after Charles Green had testified before the grand jury. Prior to Charles Green testifying before the grand jury he was in the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office.\nPeople\u2019s exhibit No. 1 states that prior to the questions and answers concerning the homicides given before the Cook County grand jury the following proceedings occurred at the grand jury:\n\u201cCharles Green having been first duly sworn was asked and testified as follows:\nExamination By Mr. O\u2019Donnell\nQ. Charles, you have been previously sworn in?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Will you tell the ladies and gentlemen your name?\nA. Charles Green.\nQ. How old are you?\nA. Sixteen.\nQ. Charles, you gave a court reported statement last night to another State\u2019s Attorney, is that correct?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And at that time that State\u2019s Attorney read you your rights; is that correct?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And you told that State\u2019s Attorney that you understood your rights; is that correct?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Now I\u2019m going to read your rights again to you. Do you understand you have a right to remain silent?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Do you understand anything you say can be used against you in a court of law?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Do you understand you have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being \u25a0questioned?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Do you understand that if you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish one?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Understanding these rights, do you wish to talk to me now?\nA. Yes.\u201d\nThe witness then read on the suppression hearings the transcript of the proceedings before the grand jury.\nCross-Examination\nPrior to Charles Green testifying before the grand jury, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney O\u2019Donnell had spoken with the defendant, at which time the defendant told him everything which he later testified to before the grand jury. Charles Green did not tell him or state anything new before the grand jury.\nO\u2019Donnell had also been provided with a prior court-reported statement and some police reports prior to the defendant\u2019s appearance before the grand jury. Defendant Green\u2019s exhibit No. 6 is the court-reported statement which he reviewed prior to interviewing the defendant. Exhibit No. 6 contains the same matters that defendant testified to in front of the grand jury. Defendant\u2019s exhibit No. 6 was taken on February 5, 1985, at 11:10 p.m. by Assistant State\u2019s Attorney George Ellison. Prior to going before the grand jury with the defendant he prepared a \u201cJohn Doe Form 101.\u201d This is a form that \u201cwe present to the Foreman of the Grand Jury anytime we present any witness or any witnesses to the Grand Jury.\u201d The purpose of a form 101 is to inform the foreman of the purpose of going before the grand jury, either seeking an indictment or providing a witness for information. Green\u2019s exhibit No. 4 appears to be a form 101. It is a form that is used by the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, and Green\u2019s exhibit No. 4 contains the names of Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys Dernbach, Brennan and Quinn. Green\u2019s exhibit No. 4 has the name of the defendant, his age, and the date of his arrest to be February 5,1985.\nThe State rested on the hearing of the defendant\u2019s motions to quash his arrest and suppress evidence.\nOn rebuttal, the defendant called as witnesses Terry Green, the defendant\u2019s brother; Tanya Green, the defendant\u2019s sister; and Willie Thomas, the defendant\u2019s cousin, whose testimony was substantially the same as the foregoing testimony in chief of the defendant\u2019s sister, Gloria Ann Thompson. The defendant then called Virgil Bridges as a rebuttal witness and he testified.\nVIRGIL BRIDGES \u2014 Direct Examination\nHe lived at 620 S. Lawndale with his mother, sister and brother. On the morning of February 5, 1985, the police officers came to his house about 9 a.m., and \u201cthey told me they were going to take me up to Orr High School.\u201d\nThe officers took him to the police station at Kedzie and Harrison and not to Orr High School. At the station the officers held him in a room on the second floor and handcuffed him to a ring on the wall. He remained there from approximately 9 a.m. until 7 p.m.\nAbout three hours after he had arrived at the police station, he had a conversation with Officer Miller. \u201cHe asked me did I know a Little Charles and I told him no, I didn\u2019t. Then he said that I was lying and then he slapped me and I said I wasn\u2019t lying. And they he hit me in my chest, and then he hit me in my ribs, and then he tried to kick me in my privates, but I moved. So then he said you are lying again, and then they left out.\u201d\nAt no time during the first interview did he tell the officer that he knew a Little Charles, that he had had a conversation with Charles Green or Little Charles on January 12, 1985. He did not tell the officers that Charles Green had told him that he (Green) had done something wrong. At no time during the first three hours of the interview did he tell the officers that Charles Green had told him that Green had gone to Raynard\u2019s house with someone else and had gotten Raynard to open the gates for him; nor that Charles Green had told him \u201cwhat happened up there wasn\u2019t supposed to go that way.\u201d He did not tell the officers that he was at the gameroom and heard Charles Green and Derrick House talking about the burglary bars at Raynard\u2019s house.\nDuring the time he was held, one of the officers slapped him, and Officer Miller came in and put a brown bag over his head, and then he made a statement at around 7:10 p.m. An assistant State\u2019s Attorney came in and he signed the statement and they told him he was free to go. Defendant\u2019s exhibit No. 1 contains his signature on page 1 and page 2, and it is the statement that he gave on February 5, 1985, at 7:10 p.m.\nCross-Examination\nHe is 17 years of age. He does not have a street name and neither does the defendant. He was not handcuffed in the car, or until he arrived at the police station at Harrison and Kedzie and put into the interview room. At that time, they handcuffed him to a ring in the room, and he stayed there from about 9:10 a.m. until 7:10 p.m., at which time he signed the statement and they let him go. While he was in the room, Officer Miller and Officer Summerville came in and closed the door and talked to him for about three hours.\nOfficer Miller slapped him at least 50 times and hit him on both sides of the face. Detective Summerville also hit him in the stomach with his fist five or six times, and \u201che had a serious look on his face.\u201d Officer Miller put a Jewel\u2019s bag over his head and squeezed it so that he could not breathe. He screamed and he kicked but he couldn\u2019t see because of the bag on his head. Then Officer Miller took the bag off and said \u201cbetter tell us what we want to know.\u201d Officer Miller said that he wanted to know whether he (Virgil Bridges) knew a Little Charles, but he told him he did not know a Little Charles. Charles Green is his cousin. They also tried to kick him \u201cin my privacy.\u201d Officer Miller kicked him once in the groin and attempted to kick him again but he moved. He then made a false statement to the police about his cousin, Charles Green.\nWhen the State\u2019s Attorney came and he asked him how he was, and \u201cI told him I was doing alright.\u201d He told the State\u2019s Attorney that he had seen the defendant on Chicago Avenue, and at that time he didn\u2019t say what had happened, but he had gotten them to open the bars. He told the State\u2019s Attorney that he saw Charles Green on January 12, 1985, at 7 to 7:30 p.m. at Chicago and Hamlin, and that he had told him that he (the defendant) \u201cdid something wrong.\u201d He told the State\u2019s Attorney that Charles Green told him that he and someone else had gone to Raynard Rule\u2019s place and he had gotten Raynard to open the gates for them. This was what the police had told him to tell the State\u2019s Attorney. He also told the State\u2019s Attorney that Green had told him \u201cthat wasn\u2019t suppose to go that way.\u201d The police had told him to tell that to the State\u2019s Attorney. The police also told him to tell the State\u2019s Attorney that Green talked to Derrick House and that he said that Green had opened the bars.\nThe police did not tell him to tell the State\u2019s Attorney that Green had shot anyone, or stabbed anyone in the house, or that he had tied up any of the women or set any of the women on fire. He said what he told the State\u2019s Attorney was in the statement but \u201call of it is untrue. I hadn\u2019t even seen Green.\u201d\nRedirect Examination\nNothing in the statement says that Little Charles was Charles Green, my cousin.\nGEVENA DUNCAN BRIDGES, a defense rebuttal witness \u2014 Direct Examination\nShe lives at 620 South Lawndale. On February 5, 1985, the police came to her house at about 9 a.m. She asked one of the officers \u201cwhat was wrong and he told me it was nothing to be concerned about; that an incident had happened at Orr High School, and that my son had been implicated in the incident and they wanted to take him over to clear his name. And he said it wouldn\u2019t take long; that it was nothing to worry about and they would bring him back.\u201d\nHer son left with the officers and she next saw him about 8 or 9 p.m. that evening when he came home. At that time his face was slightly swollen, and he said, \u201cMa, I didn\u2019t go nowhere near Orr High School. They took me straight to Kedzie and Harrison police station.\u201d Her son further told her that he had been handcuffed and beaten and that a plastic bag had been placed over his head.\nCross-Examination\nWhen her son came home his cheeks and his jaws were slightly swollen. \u201cOne side of his face was bigger than the other side.\u201d It was immediately noticeable. She did not see any blood, nor take her son to the hospital, nor seek medical treatment. \u201cI asked him if he wanted to go to the doctor, he said no.\u201d Her son had told her that he had been kicked also. He told her that he had signed a statement at the police station. She made no complaint to the police department about how the police had treated her son. Neither did she contact the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, or the United State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, or any law enforcement officer about how her son had been treated. Neither did she go to the police station that day.\nRedirect Examination\nShe tried to get in touch with Russ Ewing (Chicago Channel 7 television news reporter) about her son, who had been slapped and kicked by the police officers.\nVIOLA GREEN \u2014 Direct Examination\nShe is the mother of the defendant, Charles Green. On February 5, 1985, she received a telephone call from Gloria Thompson, her daughter. Gloria \u201ctold me that some policemen was at my house and they were getting my son, Charles Green and Terry Green and my nephew, Willie Thomas, and that they were searching the house.\u201d She never talked to a policeman when Gloria called her.\nAfter she received the phone call she went back to her machine where she worked, got her purse, punched out, and left for the police station at Harrison and Kedzie. When she arrived there she spoke to Sergeant Regan.\n\u201cQ. Did Sergeant Regan ever tell you that your son was free to leave?\nA. No.\nQ. Did Sergeant Regan let you see your son at the police station?\nA. No.\u201d\nCross-Examination\n\u201cQ. Did you ask to see your son?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Did you see him anywhere?\nA. No.\u201d\nShe remained at the police station for about 45 minutes or an hour, and then she left the station and went home.\nThe trial court ordered that Sergeant Regan be called as a witness.\nThe defendant sought to introduce as defendant\u2019s exhibit No. 7 a transcript of the testimony of James Davis which was presented in another proceeding in behalf of one Derrick House, on the hearing of House\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. The State objected, contending that \u201conly the relevant questions and answers be considered by the Court.\u201d The defendant agreed that \u201conly those portions which the court already previously deemed appropriate and admissible into evidence\u201d would be considered by the trial court. The trial court stated, \u201cI have to read only the relevant portions of this transcript as it also applies to the facts produced in this case, and they are offered for the purpose of contradiction or rebuttal.\u201d\nTranscript of James Davis\u2019 Testimony (testifying on behalf of Derrick House\u2019s motion to suppress evidence in another proceeding)\nDirect Examination\nHe lives at 852 North Kolin. On February 3 or 4, 1985, he had been shot in the leg and was at his home recovering from the wound. He was arrested at his home by Detective Foley and taken to Area 4. While at Area 4 the officers took him to a little room where six or seven officers were present. At that time he thought he had cases pending against him. The officers kept him there about three hours.\nThe detectives gave information to him which concerned an incident that occurred on January 12, 1985, with respect to a fire at 458 North Hamlin.\nHe did not tell the police that the previous evening Derrick House and Raynard Rule had gotten into an argument in front of a gameroom at 750 North Lawndale. He said he did not \u201ceven know Raynard Rule.\u201d He denied telling the police that Little Charles displayed a revolver, or that Ghost produced a .41 Magnum bluesteel revolver, or that Virgil displayed a .38 bluesteel revolver, or that Derrick House displayed a silver-colored .45 automatic pistol that evening about 6 p.m. He also denied saying that the four individuals placed their guns on the couch and smoked \u201chappy sticks.\u201d\nCross-Examination\nHe did not see Derrick House on January 12, 1985. He did not tell the police that Derrick House and Little Charles were involved in the murders, but the police told him that they were. He did not tell the police that on January 11, 1985, at 7 p.m., Derrick House approached Raynard Rule in front of the gameroom and that he had heard an argument between Derrick House and Raynard Rule. He denied telling the police that he had seen a fight between Rule and House with Raynard getting the best of House. He did not tell the police that on January 12, 1985, at 11 p.m. he was in the gameroom with Ghost when Derrick House and Little Charles came in and he overheard Derrick House say \u201cwe are going to peep Raynard.\u201d He did not tell the police that he saw Derrick House and Little Charles leave the gameroom together and return about 12:30 p.m. He did not tell the police that Derrick House and Little Charles returned to the gameroom about 6 p.m. and that he overheard Derrick House say \u201c[W]e got them, we burned them.\u201d He did not see Derrick House with any guns that day. He was presently in the penitentiary for an armed robbery, residential burglary, attempted burglary, and UUW (unlawful use of weapons). Before that time he was in the House of Corrections convicted of burglary, which conviction occurred on April 9, 1985.\nThe following witnesses were called in surrebuttal by the People.\nJOHN REGAN \u2014 Direct Examination\nHe was the second watch commander in Area 4, Violent Crimes. On February 5, 1985, he was involved in the investigation of the homicides which occurred on January 12, 1985, at 458 North Hamlin. He did not recognize the arrest slip for Charles Green, defendant\u2019s exhibit No. 2. He knew that on February 5, 1985, Charles Green had been brought into the Area.\n\u201cQ. My question to you, Sergeant Regan, is were you ever informed on February 5, 1985 that Charles Green was in custody?\nA. I knew that he was in the Area.\nQ. Was he in custody when he was in the Area?\nA. No, sir, he was not.\u201d\nDefendant Green\u2019s exhibit No. 3, consisting of four pages, contained his signature. He reviewed it, he then testified:\n\u201cQ. Were you informed via those documents that on February 5,1985, that Charles Green was in custody?\nA. Yes, sir. I have to correct myself.\u201d\nGEORGE ELLISON \u2014 Direct Examination\nHe was a State\u2019s Attorney assigned as a felony trial assistant. On February 5, 1985, about 7:10 that evening, he spoke to Virgil Bridges. He did not observe any bruises on Virgil Bridges\u2019 face. He spoke to him alone and he asked him if he had been treated well by the police and Bridges replied that he had.\nMICHAEL MILLER \u2014 Direct Examination\nOn February 5, 1985, he spoke to Virgil Bridges at Area 4 in the interview room. Neither he nor Detective Summerville slapped, hit, kicked or placed a plastic bag over Virgil Bridges\u2019 head or squeezed the throat of Virgil Bridges or tried to suffocate him.\nIll\nThe State\u2019s assertion in the trial court, unlike in this court, that there was no probable cause for the defendant\u2019s arrest was absolutely correct.\nDetectives John Summerville and James Clemmons were shown to have taken the defendant from his home at 1 p.m. on February 5, 1985. Of these two, only Detective Summerville testified to the alleged reasons the detectives went to the defendant\u2019s home. Because Summerville\u2019s rendition of the alleged information he received from James Davis is essential to.a finding of probable cause, it is necessary to examine Detective Summerville\u2019s testimony in some detail in order to determine exactly what information Detective Summerville had allegedly received from James Davis when he and Detective Clemmons went to the defendant\u2019s home. On direct examination, Detective Summerville testified as follows with regard to his conversation with James Davis.\n\u201cQ. Detective Summerville, just relate what the content of the conversation was that you had with James Davis at the' police station?\nA. James Davis told me that on the 11th of January he had occasion to be at the gameroom at 750 North Lawndale. While at that gameroom he saw Raynard Rule and Derrick House in a verbal argument outside the gameroom.\nQ. What was that argument about; did James Davis tell you?\nA. Yes, he said it was about money.\nQ. What else did he tell you?\nA. The argument soon escalated into a fist fight wherein Raynard Rule got the better of Derrick House in that fight. The fight took place in front of several people, including Derrick House\u2019s girlfriend. The following day, the 12th of January, at approximately 11:00 in the morning, James Davis was at the same gameroom with a man he identified as Ghost. While at the gameroom Derrick House and [defendant] Charles Green came in and told Ghost that they were going to peep Raynard. Davis explained that meant they were going to look for Raynard. Davis then left the gameroom, returned about 12:30 where he remained until Derrick House returned along with [defendant] Charles Green at about 6:00 p.m. At that time, Ghost was present, a boy named Virgil was also present, and Derrick House made the remark, \u2018we got them, we got them, we just burnt, we got them, we just burnt Raynard.\u2019\nQ. What else did James Davis tell you?\nA. Davis went on to say they went into the back room of the gameroom where Derrick House removed a .45 silver colored handgun from his waist. [Defendant] Charles Green had a blue steel handgun. He didn\u2019t know what caliber. He also stated that Virgil had a .38 caliber handgun. They began to make small talk, and then began smoking happy sticks, which is marijuana dipped in PGP.\nThe State\u2019s brief in this court virtually tracks Detective Summerville\u2019s aforesaid direct examination testimony from the report of proceedings as the statement of facts of the case. The State\u2019s brief states:\n\u201cPursuant to his investigation, Detective Summerville interviewed James Davis on February 3, 1985. James Davis told Detective Summerville that on January 11, 1985, he saw Raynard Rule and Derrick House get in an argument outside of a gameroom located at 750 North Lawndale. This argument over money escalated into a fist fight wherein Raynard Rule \u2018got the better of\u2019 Derrick House in front of several people including House\u2019s girlfriend. James Davis also told Detective Summerville that on January 12, 1985 at 11:00 a.m. he saw defendant and Derrick House come into the gameroom and tell a friend they were going to \u2018peep\u2019 or look for Raynard Rule. At 6:00 p.m. on January 12, Derrick House and defendant returned to the gameroom and saw a boy named Virgil; and Derrick House remarked, \u2018we got them, we got them, we just burnt Raynard.\u2019 Detective Summerville also testified that James Davis saw House, defendant and Virgil with handguns at the gameroom and they began smoking \u2018happy sticks\u2019 which is marijuana dipped in PCP.\u201d\nAnd, in a final and conclusive transposition, Detective Summer-ville\u2019s aforesaid controverted motion to suppress direct examination (and the above-quoted portion of the State\u2019s brief) has been copied virtually verbatim into the majority opinion as fact (179 Ill. App. 3d at 8) as follows:\n\u201cAt the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest, Detective John Summerville testified that pursuant to his investigation of the deaths of Raynard and Lauren Rule and Yvonne and Kim Brooks, he spoke to James Davis on February 3. Davis told Summerville that on January 11 he saw Rule and House get into an argument and fistfight over money; Rule \u2018got the better of House\u2019 in front of a crowd which included House\u2019s girlfriend. On January 12 at 11 a.m., he saw defendant and House at the Lawndale game room at which time they said they were going to \u2018peep\u2019 or look for Rule, and later that evening he saw defendant, House and a boy named Virgil, who all had handguns and were smoking \u2018happy sticks\u2019 (marijuana laced with POP), and heard House say, \u2018We got them, we got them, we just burnt Raynard.\u2019 \u201d\nNow, in my judgment, Detective Summerville\u2019s rendition of what James Davis (not shown to have been previously reliable) allegedly told him would certainly constitute a reason for further investigation, but it would not constitute probable cause to arrest the defendant for murder. But an extended discussion on this point, however, is unnecessary because Detective Summerville\u2019s above-quoted testimony was shown to be a lie, or at least a deliberate misrepresentation (if there is a difference between the two). On cross-examination, Detective Summerville testified:\n\u201cQ. Now, did James Davis ever give you the name Charles Green?\nA. James Davis referred to Charles Green as Little Charles.\nQ. He did?\nA. Little Charles.\nQ. He gave you the name of Little Charles, did he not?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Did he tell you that he knew that Little Charles was Charles Green?\nA. He didn\u2019t know Charles\u2019 last name.\nQ. Did he give you a description of Little Charles?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. And what was that description?\nA. I don\u2019t remember now.\nQ. Was the description of Little Charles important to your investigation, Detective Summerville?\nA. At that time, yes, sir.\nQ. But you did not take it down or write it down or include it in any report or remember it, is that correct?\nA. I did remember it, yes, sir.\nQ. What did you remember about the description?\nA. I don\u2019t remember at this moment.\nQ. You took a statement from James Davis, is that correct?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. You interviewed James Davis, is that correct?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Did you ever ask that the statement, the interview, be reduced to writing?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. Did you ever ask that Mr. Davis attest to, sign, affirm, or otherwise affix his signature to the statement as your version of what it was?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. Did you ever show him what you had written down or any notes or memorandum or the like that you took with regards to that statement?\nA. Any notes that were taken were taken in his presence.\nQ. Did you take any notes with regard to his statement?\nA. I didn\u2019t, no sir.\nQ. Was anyone else present when you took the statement from Mr. Davis?\nA. Detective Capesius.\nQ. Did you observe Detective Capesius make any notes while he was interviewing or while you were interviewing Mr. Davis?\nA. I don\u2019t remember, sir.\nQ. Is there any reason why you didn\u2019t reduce the statement to writing and give it to Mr. Davis to review and sign?\nA. It is not necessary.\nQ. Why is it not necessary?\nA. It is not necessary. We don\u2019t \u2014 it is something you don\u2019t have to do.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThus, on cross-examination \u2014 and in direct contradiction to his misrepresentations on direct examination \u2014 Detective Summerville admitted that the person to whom James Davis allegedly referred as being with Derrick House, possessing the handguns, having the conversations, smoking \u201chappy sticks,\u201d etc. was not Charles Green, as he had stated on his direct examination, but one Little Charles, and that he hadn\u2019t bothered to write down Davis\u2019 description of Little Charles. Nor could he remember it. If Davis\u2019 alleged description fit Charles Green as he appeared seated in the courtroom, or as he appeared when Detective Summerville went to the defendant\u2019s home on February 5, 1985, certainly Detective Summerville would have said so. Moreover, no testimony was offered that Davis ever identified the defendant, or a picture of the defendant, as being the Little Charles about whom Davis allegedly spoke. In fact, not one witness in court identified the defendant as ever having used the sobriquet \u201cLittle Charles.\u201d Over and above Detective Summerville\u2019s attempt to mislead the court by falsely testifying that Davis had said \u201cCharles Green\u201d was with Derrick House in the gameroom after the killings, had a handgun etc., there is simply no nexus between the Little Charles allegedly referred to by Davis and the defendant in court.\nAssuming that the Summerville-Davis conversation did take place, the cross-examination of Detective Summerville demonstrated that Davis did not know Little Charles\u2019 last name and did not identify the defendant, or the defendant\u2019s picture, as the \u201cLittle Charles\u201d to whom he referred. Since Detective Summerville did not himself testify that the defendant\u2019s physique was similar or identical to the description of Little Charles provided to him by James Davis, it is not even debatable that probable cause to arrest the defendant was nonexistent.\nThe State and the majority\u2019s reliance upon James Davis\u2019 communication to Detective Summerville for probable cause is ill founded simply because, as it was established, James Davis did not know the defendant, James Davis did not know Little Charles\u2019 last name, and James Davis did not in any manner identify the defendant as Little Charles. Undoubtedly the trial assistant State\u2019s Attorneys recognized this immutable conclusion because they conceded on the motion to suppress hearing that the detectives did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant when they went to his home on February 5,1985.\nA mere cursory reading of the record on appeal clearly reveals that on February 5, 1985, the police \u201cpicked up\u201d the defendant at his home on the speculation and hope that he might give them some information which would further their investigation into the brutal January 12, 1985, homicides. The police held the defendant at the police station incommunicado from his family, all night and all the next day \u2014 over 27 hours. Late on the afternoon of February 6, 1985, an assistant State\u2019s Attorney took the 16-year-old defendant before the grand jury (the propriety of which I discuss in part V, infra), obtained from him an incriminating statement under oath and then formally charged the defendant with murder. Indeed, on the hearing of the defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress, this is precisely what the State argued to the trial court had occurred, except the State there fallaciously contended that the defendant went voluntarily to the police station. The trial court, however, found differently, that the defendant was under arrest when he was taken by the police to the police station at 1 p.m. on February 5,1985.\nFurthermore, the trial court made findings of fact in which he demonstrated his obfuscation as to what the testimony had been on the motion to suppress evidence, and upon which he relied, mistakenly, in finding probable cause to arrest the defendant, contrary to the State\u2019s urging that the defendant was arrested without probable cause. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate the trial court\u2019s confusion.\nIn mistakenly recounting the facts on the motion to suppress, the trial court incorrectly stated that Detective Summerville testified that Virgil Bridges told him:\n\u201cOn January 12th, he took a bus with defendant Charles Green and that Charles Green had told him that he had done wrong. He said that he had \u2014 that is Charles Green \u2014 had gone to Raynard Rule\u2019s dope house and that things had happened that were not suppose to have happened, and Charles had told him about Charles opening the burglar gates of Raynard Rule\u2019s apartment. A written statement to the above effect was made by the defendant preceded by an oral statement prior to the time of its being reduced to writing.\u201d\nThe record does not contain any such testimony of any written statement by the defendant \u201cpreceded by an oral statement prior to the time of its being reduced to writing.\u201d Even if such statement had existed it could not have been relied on by the trial court to establish probable cause for the defendant\u2019s arrest for the simple reason that the \u201cfruits\u201d of an arrest cannot be used to justify the arrest.\nThe trial court further mistakenly stated:\n\u201cCharles Green told this court that he (Detective Miller) struck him 50 times in the face, both sides took in the stomach, 5 or 6 times in the stomach. He was kicked in his privates and they put a Jewel\u2019s bag over his head in such a manner that he could hardly breathe. In this manner the statement was forced from him and the detectives told him what to say. This statement was made, that it, the statement later made to an Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, but that the testimony here was that the defendant made no complaint about any mistreatment at that time.\u201d\nThere simply was no testimony from the defendant which is remotely similar to the aforesaid quoted portion of the trial court\u2019s \u201cfinding.\u201d It is quite apparent that the trial court derived this confusion from the identical testimony of the witness, Virgil Bridges.\nThe trial court likewise incorrectly recapitulated the motion to quash and suppress evidence:\n\u201cSummerville also related that the, that he told the defendant that he had opened the gates and knew something about the crime, and subsequently that night there were statements made, one at or about 11:10 p.m., which was proceeded by, to 11:20 to an assistant State\u2019s Attorney. That statement by Charles Green was of an inculpatory nature insofar as his presence on the scene, that is the time that was involved. In that statement he indicated that he, once he heard the shot, he ran down the stairs and then back to the gameroom. There were other statements made. The character of those statements, I assume that previous statements, oral statements, were parallel to the statements made, at least there was one made parallel to that statement made at that point.\u201d\nDetective Summerville gave no such testimony. There was no testimony or other evidence of what the defendant said in any oral or written statements. The only testimony or evidence of anything the defendant stated while he was at the police station or at the criminal courts building is the defendant\u2019s testimony before the grand jury on February 6, 1985. More importantly, such post-arrest statements by the defendant could not have been properly considered by the trial court at all in determining on the motion to quash and arrest whether there was probable cause for the defendant\u2019s arrest.\nThe trial court also stated fallaciously in its \u201cfindings\u201d that before Detective Summerville and Detective Clemmons went to the defendant\u2019s home at 1 p.m. on February 5, 1985, \u201cthey knew how these victims came to there [sic] deaths and it was by criminal activity. They didn\u2019t know then of the burglar bars, bars across the front.\u201d Again, there was no such testimony from Detective Summer-ville or Detective Clemmons as to whether they did or did not know about burglar bars across the front of Raynard Rule\u2019s home. Here, again, the trial court is apparently using some statement of the defendant, to support its finding of probable cause arid, as I have said, the law does not permit but indeed prohibits such bootstrapping.\nFinally, the trial court stated, \u201cAt this point the court will find, notwithstanding the background of criminal activity of the defendant James Davis [James Davis was never a defendant in this case] the detectives had a right to rely on the statements of James Davis, at least to corroborate the details related, notwithstanding the fact that he recanted his testimony under oath.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Again, the trial court was confused as to what the evidence had been. No witness testified that James Davis\u2019 alleged communications and information \u201ccorroborate^] the details related.\u201d\nAt no place in the record, however, did the trial court display his utter obfuscation and bewilderment with what the evidence had been on the motion to quash and suppress than when the trial court made the following statement:\n\u201cFifthly, that James Davis told the detectives, that is one or the other of those detectives or perhaps both, that he didn\u2019t know the last name of Little Charles but that Little Charles and Virgil were related and went to Orr High School. Now a signed statement to this effect was given by James House [sic], arid in the hearing before this court, that statement was repudiated on the basis, number 1, that he didn\u2019t make the statement to the police officers. He denied anything about the details of the signed statement, that he admitted that he had known Derrick House for two years but that Derrick House is not his friend, and that police officers told him what to say.\u201d\nThe following testimony of Detective Summerville, however, on the motion to quash and suppress evidence had been precisely to the opposite effect with regard to \u201ca written\u201d statement by James Davis:\n\u201cQ. You took a statement from James Davis, is that correct?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. You interviewed Mr. Davis, is that correct?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Did you ever ask that the statement, interview be reduced to writing?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. Did you ever ask that Mr. Davis attest to, sign, affirm, or otherwise affix his signature to the statement as your version of it was?\nA. Did I ever ask him to do that?\nQ. Yes.\nA. No, sir.\nQ. Did you ever show him what you had written down or any notes or memorandum or the like that you took with regards to that statement?\nA. Any notes that were taken were taken in his presence.\nQ. Did you take any notes with regard to his statement?\nA. I didn\u2019t, no, sir.\nQ. Was anyone else present when you took the statement from Mr. Davis?\nA. Detective Capesius.\nQ. Did you observe Detective Capesius make any notes while he was interviewing or while you were interviewing Mr. Davis?\nA. I don\u2019t remember, sir.\nQ. Is there any reason why you didn\u2019t reduce this statement to writing and give it to Mr. Davis to review and sign?\nA. It is not necessary.\nQ. Why is it not necessary?\nA. . It is not necessary. We don\u2019t \u2014 it is something you don\u2019t have to do.\u201d\nAfter the trial court had rendered its finding that probable cause existed for the arrest of the defendant, that the defendant was arrested in his home on February 5, 1985, at 1 p.m., and that the defendant\u2019s subsequent grand jury testimony would be admissible on the trial, the defense attorney requested the trial court to make certain findings of fact in accordance with section 114 \u2014 12(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, 38, par. 114 \u2014 12(e)). That section provides: \u201cThe order or judgment granting or denying the motion shall state the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the order or judgment is based.\u201d\nThe defense attorney pointed out to the trial court that James Davis had made no written statement, signed or otherwise. The trial court\u2019s answer to this was, \u201cI'm not aware of that. Where is your transcript. Does anyone have a transcript? The trial court perhaps did not get all its notes down.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The court, in apparent disbelief, said to the assistant State\u2019s Attorney, \u201cNo written statement? Is this correct?\u201d (Emphasis added.) To which the assistant State\u2019s Attorney stated, \u201cI believe so. I believe when the court made its ruling it might have confused the written statement of Virgil Bridges. Virgil Bridges, he made a written statement.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The trial court then compromisingly concluded: \u201cI will have to vacate these findings at least tentatively until I have them, until it stands together.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nNext, the defense attorney asked for factual findings with respect to the trial court\u2019s finding that James Davis gave a physical description of Charles Green, because the State had produced no evidence of such physical description, nor any other evidence that Charles Green fit the physical description given by James Davis. The defense attorney stated: \u201cThere was no evidence to that and I\u2019m asking for a finding as to that fact.\u201d The trial court\u2019s response was, \u201cWas there testimony to this event, this fact?\u201d (Emphasis added.) The trial court then went on to state \u201cIf I have mis-quoted, if I have relied on things that are not true, I\u2019ll have to vacate it.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe trial court appeared helpless in its predicament: \u201cWas there a written \u2014 was James Davis, was he asked to sign any written statement, yes or no? Who can answer that? Did the testimony show that James Davis was asked to sign a written statement? You\u2019re going to have to give me some help on this.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Finally, the trial court appeared to have been confused about what its own findings were: \u201cIn my findings just now made did I indicate that there was a written statement?\u201d (Emphasis added.) At last, the trial court abandoned any pretense of attempting to be accurate, and after realizing that no transcript of the testimony on the motion to quash and suppress was then available, allowed its obfuscated \u201cfindings\u201d to stand: \u201cI can take care of that because there\u2019s no testimony upon which I can review as to what the actual description of James Daws \u2014 strike that \u2014 of Little Charles was *** there\u2019s no testimony here. I think \u2014 I don\u2019t know. I\u2019ll have to make these findings because I think the transcript would show that. \u201d (Emphasis added.) Thus, though both the prosecution and defense attorneys agreed that the trial court had erroneously \u201cfound\u201d that James Davis had made a written statement, the trial court nonetheless permitted this erroneous finding to stand simply because no one had an available transcript to contradict it.\nI recognize, of course, the rule that a court of review may reverse a trial court\u2019s finding on a motion to suppress only if those findings are \u201cmanifestly erroneous\u201d or \u201cclearly erroneous.\u201d (People v. White (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 194, 209.) Even if the trial court had been clear and concise in its findings, and even if those findings had been supported by the evidence, I still would not be persuaded that the \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d standard should be applied in the unique circumstances present here, that is, where both the prosecutor and the defense attorney agree and argue, before, during and after the suppression hearing that probable cause did not exist to arrest the defendant, and contrary, to the agreement and argument of the attorneys, the trial court made its own contrary findings that there was probable cause for the defendant\u2019s arrest. My research has not disclosed a similar situation in Illinois jurisprudence. But assuming without conceding that the \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d standard is the proper one, I am fully persuaded that, as the parties agreed below, there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant, and that, in any event, the trial court was so obviously confused by the evidence on the motion to suppress that it cannot be fairly said what testimony the trial court credited and what it discredited. The suppression hearing testimony can be read but it cannot be determined from this record what the trial court thought it had been, and it is highly unlikely, with all due deference, that the testimony was at all clear in the trial court\u2019s mind.\nI am constrained to point out that it is quite unique in the case at bar that, and my research reveals no other case in which, every purported conversation, on which the arresting officers allegedly relied to establish probable cause to arrest the defendant, was denied, under oath, in open court by each person to whom the officers attributed the conversations.\nThe arrest of this defendant was illegal, without probable cause, and his arrest should have been quashed and his statements should have been suppressed. The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: \u201cThe right of the people to be secure in their persons *** against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.\u201d (U.S. Const., amend. IV.) This amendment is applicable to the States through the fourteenth amendment. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684.) In Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248, the police were investigating a murder, and one of the investigating officers ordered other detectives to \u201cpick up\u201d the defendant and \u201cbring him in.\u201d The defendant was taken into custody, not told that he was under arrest, and driven to police headquarters and questioned. Thereafter he was given his constitutional warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, waived those rights, eventually incriminated himself, and the defendant\u2019s statements were used against him at his trial. The State of New York, like in the trial court here in the State of Illinois, contended that the seizure did not amount to an arrest, and therefore was permissible because the police reasonably believed that the defendant possessed \u201cintimate knowledge about a serious and unresolved crime.\u201d (Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 207, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 832, 99 S. Ct. at 2254.) In holding that the detention of Dunaway could not be distinguished from an arrest, the Supreme Court used language pertinent to the case at bar:\n\u201c[T]he detention of petitioner was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest. Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found. Instead, he was taken from a neighbor\u2019s home to a police car, transported to a police station, and placed in an interrogation room.\u201d 442 U.S. at 212, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 835-36, 99 S. Ct. at 2256.\nRelying upon Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254, the Court once again disapproved of arrests for \u201cinvestigatory\u201d purposes on less than probable cause. The Supreme Court refused to permit introduction of Dunaway\u2019s self-incriminatory statements, stating:\n\u201cThe situation in this case is virtually a replica of the situation in Brown. Petitioner was also admittedly seized without probable cause in the hope that something might turn up, and confessed without any intervening event of significance. *** To admit petitioner\u2019s confession in such a case would allow \u2018law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity, safe in the knowledge that they could wash their hands in the \u201cprocedural safeguards\u201d of the Fifth.\u2019 \u201d 442 U.S. at 218-19, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 840, 99 S. Ct. at 2260.\nSee also Alabama v. Taylor (1982), 457 U.S. 687, 73 L. Ed. 2d 314, 102 S. Ct. 2664; Lanier v. South Carolina (1985), 474 U.S. 25, 88 L. Ed. 2d 23,106 S. Ct. 297.\nIn People v. Townes (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 32, police officers investigating a rape visited the defendant at his home at approximately 9 a.m. on the day following the incident. The defendant was told that the officers wished to speak with him at the police station, and when the defendant asked the reason, the officers informed him that they were investigating an entry into an apartment and an assault on a woman. The defendant was given the choice of accompanying the officers in the police car or driving his own car to the station, and the defendant elected to ride with the policemen. At the station the defendant was questioned on several occasions and ultimately made statements admitted against him at his trial. As in the case at bar, \u201c[t]he State concede[d] that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant at the time they visited his residence. However, [the State] argued that a finding of probable cause is unnecessary because defendant was never \u2018seized\u2019 within the meaning of the fourth amendment.\u201d (91 Ill. 2d at 38.) Our supreme court rejected the State\u2019s argument, and, relying upon Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248, stated that the defendant\u2019s statements were inadmissible: \u201cSimilarly, in the instant case, the defendant\u2019s detention resembled a traditional arrest, and the circumstances indicate that a reasonable person would not have believed he was free to leave. As previously noted, defendant was not questioned briefly at his residence.\u201d 91 Ill. 2d at 37.\nPeople v. Franklin (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 328, bears more than a facial similarity to the case at bar. Franklin was a bench trial for murder. The defendant in Franklin met the police on the street and accompanied them to the police station. He was allowed to go home, but when he failed to appear the next day for his scheduled polygraph examination police detectives went to his residence and \u201casked or ordered the defendant to stay at the station overnight *** and he spent the remainder of the night in an interview room.\u201d (115 Ill. 2d at 331.) Subsequently the defendant made self-incriminatory statements which he moved to suppress at the trial. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the defendant had stayed voluntarily overnight at the police station and had voluntarily confessed. Despite testimony from the police officers that the defendant was not a suspect in the murder at the time he was taken to the station, our supreme court noted, \u201cThe apparent purpose of the defendant\u2019s arrest and detention was to enable the police to conduct an expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up, a practice that the Supreme Court has condmened.\u201d 115 Ill. 2d at 335.\nTwo recent appellate court cases should be mentioned, especially since one, People v. Ealy (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 557, 497 N.E.2d 101, was written by the author of the instant majority opinion, Justice Murray, and the other, People v. Holveck (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 38, 524 N.E.2d 1073, was authored by the other member of the majority in the case at bar, Justice Lorenz. In People v. Ealy, the defendant was convicted of murder. Investigating the murder, the police arrived at the defendant\u2019s home without a warrant and asked to speak to the defendant. The defendant\u2019s mother invited the officers in and sent her younger son to get the defendant, who was outside in the playground area of the building. When the defendant arrived, the detectives asked him if he would come to the station with them. Both detectives testified that they did not tell the defendant that he had to go with them, and the defendant never indicated he did not want to go with them. The officers testified that the defendant was not handcuffed, that they did not pull their guns on him, and he was taken in a squad car to Area 4 and placed in an interview room on the second floor. The officers testified they did not give the defendant his Miranda warnings at that time. When the defendant\u2019s mother came to the station to inquire about her son, the officers testified they told her about inconsistencies between the defendant\u2019s and her account of the defendant\u2019s whereabouts on the day of the murder. Contrary to the defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s testimony, they then asked the defendant\u2019s mother if she would speak to the defendant about her story and she agreed. Contrary to the defendant\u2019s testimony, however, the officers further testified that when they asked the defendant if he would speak with his mother he refused to do so. Later, the defendant confessed, and the trial court denied the motion to suppress the confession. On appeal the defendant argued that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him at the time they took him from his residence, and therefore, his confession and other incriminating evidence which were the fruits of his illegal arrest should be suppressed. As noted, Justice Murray wrote the opinion for a unanimous court in People v. Ealy, in which he therein stated:\n\u201cAn arrest occurs when the police detain a person in a manner such that a reasonable, innocent person in the same situation would not consider himself free to go. [Citation.] All evidence directly traceable to an arrest made without probable cause must be suppressed where there are no intervening events to break the connection between a defendant\u2019s illegal detention and the evidence obtained as a result therefrom. [Citation.]\nHere, the State concedes that no probable cause to arrest defendant existed at the time he was taken from his residence, but argues defendant was not \u2018seized\u2019 at that time so as to require probable cause. Instead, the State argues that defendant was not considered under arrest until 4 a.m., at which time probable cause existed, and that defendant\u2019s consent to the searches and his confession were voluntarily made. * * *\n* * *\nWe find that the circumstances in the present case are more analogous to those in People v. Townes (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 32 ***.\u201d People v. Ealy, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 564-65.\nMr. Justice Murray went on in People v. Ealy to analyze and compare People v. Townes and Dunaway v. New York, and then concluded:\n\u201cWe believe the circumstances in the instant case present far more compelling reasons than Townes for requiring reversal of the trial court\u2019s judgment. Here, in addition to the obvious similarities of this case and Townes, the police continuously interrogated the defendant eight times during an 18-hour period \u2014 three interrogation sessions more and six hours longer than the interrogation of the defendant in Townes.\u201d 146 Ill. App. 3d at 565.\nIn People v. Holvek (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 38, 524 N.E.2d 1073, an opinion written by Mr. Justice Lorenz, the defendant was convicted of deviate sexual assault and unlawful restraint. The police stopped the defendant as he was driving his car and asked him if he would go with them to the police station to answer some questions, and the defendant responded \u201csure.\u201d He drove his own car to the police station. The police officer\u2019s testimony was that he \u201cinvited\u201d the defendant to come to the station and the defendant agreed. The officer testified that the defendant was free to leave after being stopped, that the officer had not drawn his weapon, handcuffed the defendant, or searched the defendant. At the trial level, the State advanced the theory that the defendant had consented to go to the station and to be questioned, and, in fact, offered to stipulate that the initial stop of the defendant was not based upon probable cause. The trial court found the defendant had consented to go to the police station for questioning, noted that normal arrest activities such as booking and searching the defendant had not taken place prior to his making the incriminating statements, and, accordingly, denied the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the statements which he had made at the station. In Holvek, which is factually very similar to the cause at bar, Mr. Justice Lorenz speaking for a unanimous court said:\n\u201cThe issue before us is whether the trial court correctly found that defendant was not arrested prior to making the first incriminating statement, but instead voluntarily consented to accompany police to the police station and submit to questioning. *** It is also well established that where there are significant indicia of coercion, a court will not find controlling the fact that a defendant was merely asked if he would accompany the police [citations] or that he was not told that he was under arrest or made to undergo booking procedures [citation]. ***\n*** [W]e find that clearly a reasonable innocent man confronted with this situation would have believed that he was not free to leave at the time that the police began their questioning.\nThis finding is reinforced by the apparent purposefulness of the police conduct. The State has conceded that the officers had no probable cause to arrest the defendant when he was stopped. Officer Buschbacher admitted that defendant was committing no crime and he had no basis for arresting the defendant.\u201d 171 Ill. App. 3d at 46-48.\nMr. Justice Lorenz concluded that \u201cthe seizure of the defendant appears to have been investigatory in nature, calculated to elicit information from him.\u201d (171 Ill. App. 3d at 49.) Therefore, ruled the Holvek court, the cases cited, together with Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254, mandated that the trial court erred in failing to quash the defendant\u2019s arrest and to suppress the statements elicited from him dining his interrogation following that arrest. It must be noted that the defendant in Holveck, unlike the defendant in the case at bar, was an adult. These authorities, and a myriad of others, such as People v. Cole (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 172, 522 N.E.2d 635, People v. McGhee (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 232, 507 N.E.2d 33, People v. Haymer (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 760, 403 N.E.2d 781, and People v. McMahon (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 137, 403 N.E.2d 781, compel but one conclusion: The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States will not countenance the interruption and interference with the liberty of a citizen, in the absence of a warrant or probable cause, \u201cto elicit information,\u201d or \u201cfor investigation,\u201d or for any other synonymous euphenism.\nIV\nOn the hearing of the defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress his uncounseled grand jury statement, the trial assistant State\u2019s Attorneys were confronted with an oxymoronic, diabolical dilemma. If the defendant was arrested for the quadruple murders by the officers at the defendant\u2019s home and was under arrest therefor while he was at the police station and when he was summoned without counsel and gave his incriminating statement before the grand jury, the only evidence available to the prosecution to convict the defendant, the defendant\u2019s incriminating grand jury statement, was inadmissible against the defendant at trial because it was obtained in violation of the defendant\u2019s constitutional rights to counsel, not to be a witness against himself and not to be compelled to incriminate himself. Conversely, the trial assistant State\u2019s Attorney apparently theorized that if the defendant was not arrested in his home by the officers, was not under arrest but was voluntarily in the police station and voluntarily appeared without counsel, although only 16 years of age, and gave his incriminating statement before the grand jury, the defendant\u2019s volunteered, incriminating grand jury statement would be therefore admissible against the defendant at his trial for the murders. The trial court bifurcated both contentions and applied segments from each. It held that the defendant was arrested at his home but his incriminating grand jury testimony nevertheless was admissible. The majority in this court adopts both contentions, without the bifurcation.\nIt is of little wonder that the trial assistant State\u2019s Attorneys contended in the trial court that there was no probable cause for Charles Green\u2019s arrest. They recognized the deficiency in their proof on this issue. The assistant State\u2019s Attorneys admitted there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant and proceeded to argue an entirely different theory from the one advanced by the appellate assistant State\u2019s Attorney in this court on behalf of the State. In the trial court, the State argued the various alleged inconsistencies between the defendant\u2019s witnesses\u2019 testimony and the assistant State\u2019s Attorney concluded: \u201cThe People\u2019s evidence has shown that when Charles Green was taken to the station it was for the purpose of conducting an investigation ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) As to the arrest report statement that the defendant was arrested at 1300 hours, February 5, 1985, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney argued that this was \u201cjust a mistake in the paperwork.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The assistant State\u2019s Attorney argued further that the accepted test of whether the defendant 'believed that he was under arrest when he left the apartment was \u201cwhat [a] reasonable man innocent of any crime would have thought had he been in the defendant\u2019s shoes,\u201d and then the assistant State\u2019s Attorney proceeded to argue that a reasonable person \u201cin the defendant\u2019s shoes\u201d would not believe he was under arrest. (Emphasis added.) He further argued that any belief by the defendant that he was under arrest would have been an unreasonable belief. Then the assistant State\u2019s Attorney concluded, \u201cI suggest, therefore, that the defendant was not under arrest when he was taken to the police station. *** The second component of the arrest concerns the intent of the police officers. It was not the intent of the police officers, that is Detective Summerville nor Detective Clemmons, to arrest Charles Green in the apartment.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The trial assistant State\u2019s Attorney continued to argue throughout \u2022 his presentation that the defendant was not arrested, but had merely been asked \u201cto come down to the police station to aid in an investigation,\u201d and that under the circumstances shown by the evidence to exist:\n\u201c[T]o hold that this amounted to an arrest would be to hold that virtually any stationhouse interrogation is necessarily so custodial as to indicate that the person questioned has been placed under arrest. This would mean that the police could not request the presence of anyone even for non-custodial questioning unless and until they had probable cause. And I suggest to the court that there is no such reason to restrict the investigatory function to the police. *** When was the defendant arrested? I suggest to the court he was arrested and placed in custody after he testified at the Grand Jury *** the court has learned about the statement made by the defendant Charles Green that he gave before members of the Grand Jury and I suggest that that statement, along with all the other evidence that the police had at that time has provided the probable cause to arrest this defendant Charles Green. \u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThus, nothing could be clearer than that the State\u2019s position at the trial level was that the police did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant when they went to the defendant\u2019s home at 1 p.m., February 5, 1985; the officer did not arrest the defendant at that time, but merely requested the defendant\u2019s assistance in their homicide investigation. Indeed, the trial court alluded to this in its findings when it denied the motion to quash and suppress as follows: \u201cThe State\u2019s position appears to be that the defendant was not arrested until after he was taken before the Grand Jury on February 6, 1985 ***.\u201d\nIt is impossible to reconcile the State\u2019s position in the trial court with its brief in this court wherein, after recounting Detective Summerville\u2019s misrepresentations as to what James Davis allegedly told him about the defendant (see part III, supra) the People proclaim in this court:\n\u201cGiven the fact the reasonableness of the police officer\u2019s conduct in making an arrest must be judged on the basis of their responsibility to prevent crime and apprehend criminals, the police in this case would have been remiss if they did not take the defendant into custody and question him concerning his involvement in the murders.\u2019\u2019 (Emphasis added.)\nAs I have shown from the mouths of the trial assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, the theory of the State at the trial level was that the entry to the defendant\u2019s home was peaceful and consensual; the defendant was not arrested in his home but merely invited to come to the police station to aid in a homicide investigation; voluntarily remained with the authorities for 27 hours; and then testified voluntarily before the grand jury, after which he was promptly arrested. Preposterous as was the State\u2019s theory at trial, at least it had the merit of being based on its view of the testimony of its own witnesses and possessed a degree of consistency. But on appeal, the State has taken a 180 degree turn contending that the officers not only arrested the defendant at his home on February 5, 1985, but the officers would have been \u201cremiss\u201d if they had done the precise things they testified they did do, i.e., not arrest the defendant, allow him to go home if he wished, etc. What can explain this total oxymoronic dichotomy?\nThe explanation for the State\u2019s contention in the trial court that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Charles Green in his home on February 5, 1985, undoubtedly was based upon two factors: (1) the trial assistant State\u2019s Attorneys recognized that the cross-examination of Detective Summerville had so undercut his misrepresentations on direct examination that the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys had no confidence in urging that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant, and they therefore sought to preserve the admissibility of the defendant\u2019s subsequent grand jury statement by contending that it could not be the \u201cfruit\u201d of the defendant\u2019s illegal arrest because the defendant had not been arrested at all, instead he was merely a cooperating citizen voluntarily providing the police with information; and (2) the trial assistant State\u2019s Attorneys recognized that incriminating statements made by an arrested person without counsel before a grand jury are not admissible on his trial (see part V, infra), whereas such statements are admissible if made by a witness not under arrest. Thus it was mandatory, from the State\u2019s point of view, to establish that the defendant was not \u201cin custody\u201d when he testified before the grand jury.\nThe trial court was so singularly unimpressed with the State\u2019s argument that he took perhaps the unprecedented step (my research discloses no similar case), of \u201cfinding\u201d that there was probable cause for the arrest of the defendant on February 5, 1985, at 1 p.m., despite the urging of both the prosecutors and the defense attorney that there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant. A pertinent question, then, is whether the State may be permitted to contend and concede in the trial court that there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant, and that the defendant was not arrested at all, and then conversely contend and urge in the court of review the exact opposite \u2014 that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant and indeed the officers did so in defendant\u2019s home on February 5, 1985, and that they were fully justified in doing so; indeed, would have been \u201cremiss\u201d if they had not done so.\nI consider the State\u2019s retroverse brief and argument in this court not only degrading to the integrity of the profession by its reliance upon Detective Summerville\u2019s misrepresentations concerning probable cause, but insulting to the intelligence of the members of this court as well. Every witness for the State who was asked, including an assistant state\u2019s attorney (John O\u2019Donnell), unambiguously testified that the defendant was not restrained or deprived of his freedom until after he testified before the grand jury on the late afternoon of February 6, 1985, and that at all times until then the defendant remained free to go home if he wished. Yet, in this court the State\u2019s brief tells us that if the authorities had done precisely what they swore they did do they would have been \u201cremiss\u201d in their duties. This is more than capricious inconsistency. Implicit in an acceptance of the State\u2019s present argument in this court is the inescapable conclusion that the State\u2019s witnesses committed perjury when they swore the defendant was not arrested on February 5, 1985, was not restrained in any manner, and was at all times free to leave the police station and go home if he wished. The only testimony in the entire record on the motion to suppress which supports the proposition that the defendant was arrested at 1 p.m. on February 5, 1985, in his home (the State\u2019s present argument) came from the defendant and his witnesses \u2014 the very testimony which the assistant State\u2019s Attorney below went to such great lengths in his argument to discredit and urged the trial court to reject. In other words, to uphold the State\u2019s position in this court we would be required to credit only the defense witnesses and to discredit all the State\u2019s witnesses. But the State\u2019s dilemmatical predicament is of its own making, and I find it disingenuous.\nThe answer to the foregoing question, whether the State may contend and concede in the trial court that there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant and that the defendant was not arrested at all, and then conversely contend and urge in this court of review the exact opposite \u2014 that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant and indeed the officers did so in the defendant\u2019s home on February 5, 1985 \u2014 is clearly \u201cNo,\u201d and for several reasons, the major one of which is that it would be obnoxiously unfair to a defendant. The defendant below concentrated his efforts on attempting to convince the trial court that he was arrested without probable cause in his home at 1 p.m. on February 5, 1985, as he and his witnesses so testified and as the arrest report \u2014 the one relevant document which is in the record on appeal \u2014 so states. Because of the State\u2019s concession that the detectives lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant, the defense made little or no effort to cross-examine Detective Summerville or Detective Clemmons in this area, or to call witnesses to establish the lack of the very element which the State had already conceded was indeed absent. It must be remembered in this regard that once the defendant offered evidence that he was arrested in his home without a warrant at a time when he was violating no law the burden was on the State to prove the lawfulness of the arrest. (People v. Nash (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 172, 177, 397 N.E.2d 480, 484; People v. Boston (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 107, 111, 391 N.E.2d 503, 506; People v. Talley (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 506, 340 N.E.2d 167.) As Justice Lorenz said in People v. Watson (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 492, 499, 495 N.E.2d 1153, 1158: \u201cOnce a defendant establishes the illegality of the arrest and its connection with the alleged fruit, the prosecution has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the challenged statement was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.\u201d Certainly the State should not be permitted to sustain its burden of proving the lawfulness of the defendant\u2019s arrest by arguing in the trial court that there was and had been no arrest. Our supreme court has commented many times on this fundamental concept that it is basically unfair to a defendant for the State to raise an issue for the first time on appeal. In People v. Holloway (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 78, 91-92, for example, our supreme court said:\n\u201cWe turn next to the question of whether the State has waived its right to challenge the standing of defendant Moore. The State made no objection when counsel for defendant Moore orally joined in defendant Holloway\u2019s motion to suppress. Also, the State filed a motion to reconsider the court\u2019s ruling on the motion to suppress. Again, neither in the motion nor on its oral argument did the State raise the question of Moore\u2019s standing. Issues not raised in the trial court are generally considered waived on appeal. (People v. Knight (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 291, 300[, 388 N.E.2d 414].) The principle of waiver applies to the State as well as the defendant in a criminal case. (People v. McAdrian (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 250, 254[, 287 N.E.2d 688].) Had the State made a timely objection, defendant Moore may have been able to satisfy the court that he did, in fact, possess an interest in the premises sufficient to give him standing to object to the warrantless entry. As noted in McAdrian, one of the basic considerations supporting the rule preventing a party from raising issues for the first time on appeal is that \u2018[t]he failure to urge a particular theory before the trial court will often cause the opposing party to refrain from presenting available pertinent rebuttal evidence\u2019 which could have a bearing on the disposition of the question. (People v. McAdrian (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 250, 254[, 287 N.E.2d 688]. See also People v. McCullum (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 306, 316[, 362 N.E.2d 307].) Consequently, we hold that the State has waived its right to challenge the standing of defendant Moore.\u201d\nHolloway thus stands for the proposition that the State may not fail to object to the defendant\u2019s lack of standing to bring a motion to suppress, and then, on appeal, take the diametrically opposite position that the defendant lacked standing. This rule is applicable whether the State is the appellant from the granting of the motion to suppress, as in People v. Weber (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 631, 424 N.E.2d 874, or the defendant is the appellant from a denial of a motion to suppress, as in People v. Chianakas (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 496, 448 N.E.2d 620. A case directly on point is People v. Franklin (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 328 (cited supra in another connection in part III). In Franklin, the defendant was scheduled to appear for a polygraph examination, and when he failed to keep his appointment, the police took the defendant to the murder victim\u2019s apartment, and then either asked or ordered the defendant to stay overnight at the station. The defendant spent the night in an interview room at the station and the next day was given the polygraph examination, was told that he failed it, and subjected to further questioning, whereupon he eventually confessed. On the defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and to suppress his statements, the trial court concluded that the defendant had voluntarily stayed over night at the station and denied the motion to suppress. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress but on a different ground: That the defendant had in fact been arrested, that the arrest was not supported by probable cause, but that the defendant\u2019s statements were nevertheless admissible because the statements were \u201csufficiently distinct from [the] illegal arrest to be free from the initial taint\u201d of the illegal arrest. (115 Ill. 2d at 332.) After the defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal was granted by the Illinois Supreme Court, the State adopted several new theories: (a) That the polygraph examination had worked an attenuation of the taint of the illegal arrest, as the appellate court had held; (b) that the police misconduct in detaining the defendant for the purpose of conducting an expedition for evidence was not flagrantly abusive; (c) that the period of time between the defendant\u2019s arrest and his confession was not so lengthy that it aggravated the detention, nor so brief that it prevented the dissipation of the initial taint; and (d) that, in fact, the arrest of the defendant had been supported by probable cause. Thus, in Franklin, as in the case at bar, the State took one position in the trial court \u2014 that there had been no arrest of the defendant at all \u2014 and another position on appeal \u2014 that there had been an arrest of the defendant and that that arrest was supported by probable cause. The supreme court rejected the State\u2019s bid to flip-flop in Franklin:\n\u201cThe general rule that a prevailing party may raise, in support of a judgment, any reason appearing in the record does not apply when the new theory is inconsistent with the position adopted below or the party has acquiesced in contrary findings. [Citations.] We believe that in this case the State\u2019s probable-cause argument comes too late, for it directly conflicts with the State\u2019s theory at the pretrial hearing. The police officers testified that the defendant was not a suspect in the murder case until sometime on June 14 and that he did not commit any crimes in their presence on June 13. Furthermore, the defendant did not have an opportunity to develop a factual record in opposition to the new theory.\u201d 115 Ill. 2d at 336.\nIn People v. Wetherbe (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 654, 462 N.E.2d 1, the defendant was stopped while driving his car, the car was searched, and stolen equipment found. The State sought to justify the seizure on the ground that the police officers were conducting a lawful inventory of the items in the car. The trial court concluded the inventory procedure was in fact an investigatory search and sustained the motion to suppress evidence. On appeal, the State changed its theory and sought to justify the seizure as being incident to a valid arrest. Omitting citations, the court held,\n\u201cIf the search had been made on the basis of probable cause, Guzlas [the police officer] would have been able to search the entire vehicle, including the trunk [citations], even after Guzlas had taken custody of the car [citations] and regardless of the validity of defendant\u2019s arrest. [Citation.] However, as the State did not claim at trial that the search was based on probable cause, this ground has been waived as a basis for justifying the search.\u201d 122 Ill. App. 3d at 656.\nThus the State may not change its position on appeal when to do so would deprive the defendant of a fair opportunity to develop a factual record in order to challenge the new belated State contention, or when the State\u2019s position on appeal is inconsistent with its position at \"the trial level.\nThe majority, like the State, seeks, to employ a common metaphor, \u201cto have its cake and eat it too.\u201d Just as the State argued to the trial court that there was no probable cause to arrest defendant, and subsequently to this court that there was probable cause to arrest him, the majority opinion engages in the same convoluted rationale. The trial court found that the defendant had been arrested on February 5, 1985, at 1 p.m. in his own home. Thus much is acknowledged by the majority opinion. In order to sustain the trial court\u2019s finding, the majority of this court holds as follows:\n\u201c[W]e hold that the trial court\u2019s finding of probable cause to arrest defendant was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d 179 Ill. App. 3d at 11.\nBut then the majority reaches a contrary conclusion when discussing the applicability of the Juvenile Court Act to this case. Section 703 \u2014 2(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 703 \u2014 2(2)) provides:\n\u201cA law enforcement officer who takes a minor into custody without a warrant *** shall, if the minor is not released, immediately make a reasonable attempt to notify the parent or other person legally responsible for the minor\u2019s care or the person with whom the minor resides that the minor has been taken into custody and where the minor is being held; and the law enforcement officer shall without unnecessary delay take the minor to the nearest juvenile police officer designated for such purposes in the county of venue or shall surrender the minor to a juvenile police officer in the city or village where the offense is alleged to have been committed.\u201d\nWhile noncompliance with this section has been held not to automatically render a juvenile\u2019s confession inadmissible (In re Stiff (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 971, 978, 336 N.E.2d 619, 625), the failure to comply with this section is an important consideration in determining whether a juvenile defendant\u2019s statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. See, for example, People v. Cole (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 172, 179, 522 N.E.2d 635, 639, People v. McGhee (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 232, 236, 507 N.E.2d 33, 35, People v. Travis (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 671, 677, 462 N.E.2d 654, 658-59, and In re S.D.S. (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1012, 431 N.E.2d 759, 762, in which the court stated:\n\u201cOne of the most telling factors in the instant case is the age of the accused: he was a juvenile, 16 years old. We have noted on another occasion that our courts must be especially cautious in cases involving juveniles because the coerciveness of a situation is thereby enhanced. (People v. Travis (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 671, 676, 462 N.E.2d 654; see also Haley v. Ohio (1948), 332 U.S. 596, 599, 92 L. Ed. 224, 228, 68 S. Ct. 302, 303-04.) In response to the potential for abrogating the rights of juveniles, our legislature has enacted the Juvenile Court Act, which provides that when a juvenile is taken into custody, his parent or guardian and a youth officer should be immediately notified. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, cha. 37, par. 703\u2014 2.) In this case, the police violated the Act by failing even to attempt to notify Cole\u2019s mother, and notified a youth officer only after he had been in custody for several hours.\u201d Cole, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 179.\nThe undisputed testimony in the trial court established that the police denied the defendant\u2019s mother permission to see her son while he was in the station on the evening of February 5, 1985, a clear violation of the statute. So, in order to circumvent section 703 \u2014 2, and the case authorities applying it, I am utterly amazed to read (179 Ill. App. 3d at 13) in the majority opinion, that the same defendant who the majority just held (179 Ill. App. 3d at 11) was lawfully arrested in his home was not really arrested at all. But,\n\u201c[W]e have determined that defendant was not taken into custody, but rather went to the police station of his own volition to answer questions.\u201d 179 Ill. App. 3d at 13.\nThus, we are told by the majority that in determining the defendant\u2019s fourth amendment claims, the defendant was lawfully arrested in his home, but for the purpose of determining the applicability of section 703 \u2014 2, the defendant was not arrested at all! This is not possible, I submit. Either the defendant was under arrest when he was taken from his home, or he was not under arrest when he was taken from his home. If the defendant was under arrest when he was taken from his home, then certain questions must be answered, such as, whether there existed probable cause for his arrest; whether section 702 \u2014 3 was violated, and if so, the effect thereof; whether the State may take an arrestee before the grand jury and secure self-incriminatory statements, etc. (On this latter, see part V, infra.) If the defendant was not under arrest when he was taken from his home, and he went \u201cof his own volition\u201d to the police station, then other questions must be answered, such as whether the trial judge\u2019s finding that defendant was arrested in his home was \u201cmanifestly erroneous,\u201d and the effect of Detective Summerville\u2019s aforementioned misrepresentations. But I submit the defendant could not have been placed under arrest in his home, and not arrested in his home; the defendant did not go to the station under arrest, and also \u201cof his own volition.\u201d One or the other. But not both. The terms \u201carrest\u201d and \u201cvolition\u201d are irreconcilable terms characterized by contradictory and incompatible elements. No oxymoronic or imbrogliocal phraseology can turn hot into cold, day into night, fire into water or custody into freedom.\nV\nThe majority recognizes that an additional issue exists with respect to the defendant\u2019s appearance and testimony before the grand jury which indicted him. Here again the majority opinion demonstrates its internal inconsistency. Having just ruled that the defendant was not under arrest, but went to the station of his own \u201cvolition\u201d (179 Ill. App. 3d at 13), in order to avoid the consequences of section 703 \u2014 2, and the misconduct of the police in refusing Viola Green access to her son on the evening of February 5, 1985, the majority thereafter reverses itself once again and holds that the defendant was under arrest, stating:\n\u201cDefendant\u2019s last argument on this issue is that no probable cause existed to arrest him on February 6 because his statements to Assistant State\u2019s Attorney O\u2019Donnell and before the grand jury on that day were not made voluntarily. ***\nBecause we have determined that probable cause existed to arrest defendant on February 5, we need only address the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s statements on February 6.\u201d 179 Ill. App. 3d at 13-14.\nNo reasonable person, in my judgment, would deny, on the state of this record, that the defendant\u2019s liberty of movement was restricted, he was not free to leave, he was \u201cin custody\u201d when he left his home of February 5, 1985, at 1 p.m., and for the 27 hours in the police station thereafter, as that term has been defined by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612: \u201cBy custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.\u201d The trial court found that from the moment the defendant left his home he was under arrest. But the issue which the majority totally ignores is whether it is legally permissible to hold a person under arrest, particularly a juvenile, before a grand jury, and, without counsel, obtain incriminating statements, procure an indictment from the same grand jury, and then use those same statements to convict him at trial. I have not been able to locate, after extensive research, one single authority approving such outrageous prosecutorial misconduct which clearly violates both the fifth amendment guarantee against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel. A case from our own supreme court, and, of course, binding upon us, flatly and vehemently rejects such a procedure, and, as I have said, I can find no case which approves it.\nThe fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States guarantees that \u201c[n]o person *** shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\u201d (U.S. Const., amend. V.) Artiele I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution provides that \u201c[n]o person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself.\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a710.) In People v. Boone (1894), 148 Ill. 440, 36 N.E. 99, the defendant was indicted for murder. Prior to trial the defendant moved to quash the indictment \u201cbased on the fact that the defendant was taken from the jail and before the grand jury which found the indictment, and sworn as a witness, and examined as to the homicide.\u201d (148 Ill. at 446.) The supreme court of Illinois held:\n\u201cThe assignment of error first alleged is in overruling defendant\u2019s motion to quash the indictment, which was based on the fact that defendant was taken from the jail and examined as a witness before the grand jury that found the indictment against him, and was compelled to testify before said grand jury regarding his guilt or innocence. That motion is supported by the affidavit of the defendant. The grand jury constitutes a part of the court, and their official acts in finding true bills or ignoring bills are borne on the records of the court, and witnesses sworn before that body are sworn in open court, though not necessarily in the presence of the judge. [Citation.] By section 10 of article 2 of the constitution of the State of Illinois it is declared: \u2018No person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to give evidence against himself.\u2019 When the disqualification of a defendant in a criminal case as a witness in his own case was removed by section 426 of the Criminal Code of Illinois, it was expressly provided \u2018that a defendant in any criminal case or proceeding shall only at his own request be deemed a competent witness, and his neglect to testify shall not create any presumption against him, nor shall the court permit any reference or comment to be made to or upon such neglect.\u2019 [Now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 155 \u2014 1.] The provision of the statute and the positive inhibition of the constitution alike preclude the right of the grand jury, or any court, to call upon the defendant, and, in the first place, make him a witness, and require him to give evidence against himself. It is of the highest degree of interest, and most important, to preserve that peculiar excellence of the common law system which has never allowed a proceeding to establish guilt to be inquisitorial. The affidavits in the record show that the defendant was taken from the jail where he was held in custody, and taken before the grand jury, where he was examined touching the very matter on which that grand jury found an indictment against him and on which he was placed on trial. A right of the highest character was violated, a privilege sacredly guaranteed by the constitution was disregarded, and a dangerous innovation in the uniform practice in this State made. A danger so great, if it once became a rule of law, that one ignorant of his rights, and, it may be, also of his danger, unattended by counsel and unprotected by a court, could be called before a grand jury and interrogated, and, as he may believe, compelled to answer charges made against him on a subject matter of investigation then before that body, in which his interest is vital, that we will not stop to inquire into the question as to whether the indictment was found on that testimony alone, nor whether that testimony influenced the finding where, as here, the defendant is in custody charged with a crime, and whilst so in custody is taken from the jail to be examined about that subject matter. It is sufficient that so important a right was violated and such a proceeding had where an indictment was found under such circumstances.\nBut were that otherwise, it does not appear that any other evidence was heard before that grand jury on which this indictment was found. We do not hold that where one is before the grand jury as a witness, and at that time is not charged with crime, and may incidentally be interrogated about a matter, to which he makes answer, and an indictment afterwards is found against him, would require the indictment to be quashed; nor do we hold that every case where one is before the grand jury as a witness, and interrogated about a matter for which he may afterward be indicted, would be, of itself, sufficient cause to quash the indictment. But in this case it does not appear that the grand jury examined any other witnesses, nor does it appear the indictment was not found on the evidence of the defendant alone. No affidavits are filed by the State\u2019s attorney on that question, and where, as here, the defendant charged with crime is taken from the jail and before the grand jury, and interrogated about the matter with which he is charged with crime, such an error must be held fatal to the indictment. It was error to overrule the motion to quash the indictment.\u201d 148 Ill. at 448-50.\nCases such as United States v. Washington (1977), 431 U.S. 181, 52 L. Ed. 2d 238, 97 S. Ct. 1814, and In re J.H. (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 718, 518 N.E.2d 249, are not applicable to the instant cause for several reasons. In neither Washington nor In re J.H. was the defendant under arrest when taken before the grand jury. Furthermore, in In re J.H., after noting that the defendant was not under arrest at the time he was taken before the grand jury, the court also noted, \u201cWhile such allegations of fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment violations may be an appropriate basis upon which to grant a motion to suppress evidence, we do not believe that they constitute sufficient justification for dismissal of the grand jury indictment in the present case.\u201d (164 Ill. App. 3d at 724.) Here, of course, the defendant\u2019s motion was based upon the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments, and it was a motion to suppress evidence of statements, not a motion to quash the indictment. Also, in In re J.H., there was additional evidence presented to the grand jury which returned that indictment.\nThe sixth amendment guarantees that \u201cIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.\u201d (U.S. Const., amend. VI.) If the arrest of the defendant in his home was not supported by adequate probable cause, as I believe it was not, then the defendant\u2019s grand jury testimony should have been suppressed as a product of a fourth amendment violation, his illegal arrest. If, on the other hand, defendant\u2019s arrest was supported by probable cause, as the trial judge so held, then section 703 \u2014 2 mandates the procedures which must take place in the case of this juvenile.\nThere simply is no statute or other authority which permits an arrested juvenile to be taken before a grand jury and interrogated. Interrogation before a grand jury is altogether distinguishable from interrogation in a police station, even assuming that the police and assistant State\u2019s Attorneys may violate section 703 \u2014 2 with impunity. The long history of the grand jury, extending back more than 900 years, and the rights of witnesses before grand juries trace their evolution from the Magna Charta, and has been exhaustively recounted in many volumes. (See e.g. 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law (2d ed. 1923.) In Illinois, special protections involving the right to counsel which attach to the appearance of potential defendants, and even to mere grand jury witnesses, are set forth in sections 112 \u2014 4 and 112 \u2014 4.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 112 \u2014 4, 112\u2014 4.1). Those sections provide:\n\u201cAny person subpoenaed who is already charged with an offense or against whom the State\u2019s Attorney is seeking a Bill of Indictment shall have the right to be accompanied by counsel who shall advise him of his rights during the proceedings but may not participate in any other way. Before any testimony is given by such a person, he shall be informed that he has the right to refuse to answer any question that will tend to incriminate him, that anything he says may be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to be accompanied and advised of his rights by counsel, and that he will have counsel appointed for him if he cannot afford one.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 112 \u2014 4.\nSection 112 \u2014 4.1 provides:\n\u201cAny person appearing before the grand jury shall have the right to be accompanied by counsel who shall advise him of his rights but shall not participate in any other way.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 112-4.1.\nEven if People v. Boone, involving the guarantee against self-incrimination were not on the books, the sixth amendment right to counsel would, independently of the fifth amendment, prohibit compelling an arrestee (and most particularly a 16 year old, to whom we owe special care because juveniles could be \u201ceasy victim[s] of the law\u201d (Haley v. Ohio (1948), 332 U.S. 596, 599, 92 L. Ed. 224, 228, 68 S. Ct. 302, 303-04)), to appear before the grand jury without counsel to advise them. The sixth amendment and the above Illinois statutes require that when an unrepresented involuntary \u201ctarget witness\u201d is compelled to appear before the grand jury that \u201ctarget witness\u201d is confronted with a \u201ccritical stage\u201d of the proceedings against him; it is an occasion when legal advice is most critically needed. The proceeding in which the arrestee appears before the grand jury has clearly moved from the investigatory to the accusatory stage, and thus the \u201ctarget witness\u201d is confronted with a \u201ccritical stage\u201d of a criminal prosecution such that he cannot intelligently waive his right to the assistance of counsel except in the presence of counsel.\nThe Supreme Court of the United States for many years rejected various opportunities to determine whether the sixth amendment operates independently of the fifth amendment so as to require, of its own force, the suppression of evidence secured in violation of the right to counsel. (See, for example Moran v. Burbine (1986), 475 U.S. 412, 428 n.2, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410, 425 n.2, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1145 n.2; Brewer v. Williams (1977), 430 U.S. 387, 405-06, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 441, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1243.) In Michigan v. Jackson (1986), 475 U.S. 625, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631, 106 S. Ct. 1404, the Supreme Court held that where the defendants had been arraigned, and requested counsel, but were interrogated by the police before they were able to consult with counsel, their statements were inadmissible as being the product of the violation of their sixth amendment right to counsel. The Supreme Court emphasized that that defendants\u2019 right to counsel operated independently of the fifth amendment guarantee against self-incrimination, but again refrained from clarifying the precise parameters of each guarantee:\n\u201cThe State also argues that the Michigan Supreme Court\u2019s finding of a valid Fifth Amendment waiver should require the finding of a valid Sixth Amendment waiver. The relationship between the validity of waivers for Fifth and Sixth Amendment purposes has been the subject of considerable attention in the courts, [citation] and the commentaries [citation]. In view of our holding that the Edwards rule applies to the Sixth Amendment and that the Sixth Amendment requires the suppression of the postarraignment statements, we need not decide either the validity of the Fifth Amendment waiver in this case *** or the general relationship between Fifth and Sixth Amendment waivers.\u201d 475 U.S. at 635 n.10, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 642 n.10, 106 S. Ct. at 1411 n.10.\nIn the recent case of Patterson v. Illinois (1988), 487 U.S. _, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389, the defendant, after indictment, was given Miranda warnings, waived his rights thereunder and, in the absence of counsel, made incriminating statements to a police officer in the police station where he was being held preparatory to being transferred to the Cook County jail. The justices divided 5 to 4 on the issue of whether such post-indictment questioning violated the sixth amendment right to counsel independently of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, the majority holding that \u201cit is our view that whatever warnings suffice for Miranda\u2019s purposes will also be sufficient in the context of postindictment questioning.\u201d (487 U.S. at_, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 276, 108 S. Ct. at 2398.) But all nine justices agreed on one proposition:\n\u201c[Bjecause the Sixth Amendment\u2019s protection of the attorney-client relationship \u2014 \u2018the right to rely on counsel as a \u201cmedium\u201d between [the accused] and the State\u2019 \u2014 extends beyond Miranda\u2019s protection of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel [citation], there -will be cases where a waiver which would be valid under Miranda wall not suffice for Sixth Amendment purposes.\u201d 487 U.S. at _ n.9, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275 n.9, 108 S. Ct. at 2397 n.9.\nThe test approved by the Patterson majority as to whether the sixth amendment operates independently of the fifth amendment was lifted from United States v. Ash (1973), 413 U.S. 300, 313, 37 L. Ed. 2d 619, 628, 93 S. Ct. 2568, 2575, and is whether the procedure is one at which \u201cthe accused requirefs] aid in coping with his legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary.\u201d Thus, under the present state of the law, if counsel would only serve to guard against self-incriminatory statements by his client a Miranda warning is sufficient to waive the right to counsel. But if counsel is necessary to aid the client in \u201ccoping with legal problems or assistance in meeting the adversary,\u201d then a Miranda waiver is not sufficient to waive counsel. Under the Patterson v. Illinois test, clearly Charles Green was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel, which operated independently of his fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself, when he was arrested and -without counsel taken before the Cook County grand jury. Clearly, at the moment he entered the grand jury room he required \u201c \u2018aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary.\u2019 \u201d As such, the Miranda warnings which preceded his grand jury self-incriminatory testimony were insufficient to waive his right to counsel at the grand jury.\nActually, there is nothing new in this concept. In United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 226-27, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1157, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1932, the court pronounced:\n\u201c[I]n addition to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel\u2019s absence might derogate from the accused\u2019s right to a fair trial. ***\n*** It calls upon us to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant\u2019s rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.\u201d\nThere is in reality no substantial difference between this case and United States v. Doss (6th Cir. 1977), 563 E2d 265, where a defendant who had already been secretly indicted by the grand jury was called before the grand jury, given his Miranda warnings, and subsequently made incriminatory answers to questions put to him by the prosecutor, and which were used against him at his trial. Indeed, it might be argued that the conduct employed in Doss is somewhat less reprehensible because in Doss (1) the defendant\u2019s grand jury admissions were not used by the same grand jury to indict him (he had already been secretly indicted); and (2) Doss was not under arrest when he appeared. The court held the sixth amendment had been violated:\n\u201cWhere a substantial purpose of calling an indicted defendant before a grand jury is to question him secretly and without counsel present without his being informed of the nature and cause of the accusation about a crime for which he stands already indicted, the proceeding is an abuse of process which violates both the right to counsel provision of the Sixth Amendment and due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.\u201d 563 F.2d at 286.\nVI\nThere is a final point to be considered. The police officers in this case, who took this 16-year-old defendant from his home on February 5, 1985, at 1 p.m., to the police station either under arrest, as the trial judge found, or voluntarily, as the assistant State\u2019s Attorney argued at trial, or both under arrest and voluntarily, as the majority herein has ruled, did not give the defendant his Miranda warnings either at his home or while he was being held at the station. No witness, including Assistant State\u2019s Attorney George Ellison, who said he took a statement from the defendant on the evening of February 5, 1985, at the police station, testified that the defendant was given his Miranda warnings by anyone until Assistant State\u2019s Attorney John O\u2019Donnell and the defendant confronted each other on the late afternoon of February 6, 1985, at the criminal courts building, some 27 hours after the defendant was taken from his home. The record on appeal reflects that the defendant made several statements to police detectives and at least one to Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Ellison (to the latter, a written signed court reported statement) on February 5, 1985, in the police station, but those statements and their contents are not contained or reflected in the record.\nOne of the serious questions which frightfully disturbs me in this case is whether the police and State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office may take a juvenile from his home, hold him at least 27 hours incommunicado from his family, deliberately not advise the defendant of his Miranda constitutional guarantees, interrogate him, take \u201cun-Mirandized\u201d statements from him, then take him before a grand jury where he is advised of his Miranda rights and asked to repeat his previous \u201cun-Mirandized\u201d statements, and then use those grand jury statements against the defendant at his trial. If this procedure were permitted as an exception to the Miranda strictures, such an exception would figuratively swallow the rule. But that is exactly what the record shows was done in this case. And the State witnesses went to preposterous lengths in their testimony to \u201cjustify\u201d their failure to give Miranda admonitions to this defendant. For instance, Detective Miller testified as a State witness on direct examination that when the defendant was in the police station he was not handcuffed, his \u201cfreedom of movement\u201d was not restricted in any manner, no charges were lodged against him, and that if he had wanted to go home he would have been allowed to do so. This was of course, offered to show that the defendant was not \u201cin custody\u201d and thus no Miranda warnings were required.\n\u201cQ. Detective Miller, the entire time that Charles Green was at the police station on February 5, 1985 was he handcuffed?\nA. No.\nQ. Was his freedom of movement restricted in any manner on February 5, 1985?\nA. No.\nQ. If Charles Green wanted to go home on February 5, 1985, would you have let him go home?\nA. Yes.\nQ. On February 5, 1985 are you aware that an Assistant State\u2019s Attorney by the name of George Ellison came to the police station?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And are you aware that he interviewed the defendant Charles Green?\nA. Yes, I am.\nQ. Are you aware that after Assistant State\u2019s Attorney George Ellison spoke to Charles Green, are you aware whether or not any charges were filed by the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office?\nA. No charges were filed.\u201d\nOn cross-examination the defense attorney showed Detective Miller a copy of an arrest report bearing his own signature and he was asked:\n\u201cQ. Directing your attention to Box 22, does that state a date and time of arrest?\nA. Yes, it does.\nQ. What is the date and time of arrest?\nA. This states its the 5th of February, 1985 at 1300 hours which is 1 o\u2019clock in the afternoon.\n* * *\nQ. Do you know whose responsibility it was to prepare the arrest report?\nA. It could have been any of our responsibility. Primarily mine.\u201d\nDetective Miller was then shown a two-page supplemental report which stated that the defendant was taken \u201cinto custody\u201d on February 5, 1985. Detective Miller then testified:\n\u201cQ. Did you prepare that report?\nA. Yes.\nQ. You prepared that portion of it?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Mr. Green was in custody on February 5, 1985; is that correct?\nA. In a manner of speaking.\nQ. Yes or no, was he in custody?\nA. Yes he was.\u201d\nOne might have thought that Detective Miller would have been unable to extricate himself from the strictures of his own reports, but he was equal to the task, and in doing so proved himself a master contortionist of the English language:\n\u201cQ. Detective Miller what do you mean when you say in a manner of speaking he was in custody on February 5, 1985 referring to Charles Green?\nA. He was in the police presence in a police facility. \u201d\nUnquestionably no decision in the entire history of the United States Supreme Court, at least in the constitutional-criminal sphere, is as well known as Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706-07, 86 S. Ct. 1602,1612, which holds:\n\u201c[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. *** Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.\u201d\nI am of course aware of the United States Supreme Court decision in Oregon v. Elstad (1985), 470 U.S. 298, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222, 105 S. Ct. 1285. In Elstad, the police were investigating a burglary and went to the defendant\u2019s home. In the living room of the home, with defendant\u2019s mother in the kitchen, the officer asked the defendant, without first giving the defendant his Miranda warnings, whether the defendant knew a person by the name of Gross. When the defendant stated that he had heard that there was a robbery at the Gross house, the officer told the defendant that he felt the defendant was involved in the robbery, and the defendant stated \u201cYes I was there.\u201d (470 U.S. at 301, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 227, 105 S. Ct. at 1289.) The defendant was then transported to the police station, advised of his Miranda rights, and subsequently gave a full confession. Under these facts the Supreme Court held that the failure to give the defendant Miranda warnings in the defendant\u2019s home did not taint the subsequent confession made after the defendant was advised pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. I believe the Elstad holding to be inapplicable to the present cause for two reasons. First, it is obvious to me that the defendant\u2019s statements on February 5 and 6, 1985, in the police station prior to his appearance before the grand jury \u2014 again, the record does not reflect what those statements were \u2014 were involuntary. The defendant was 16 years old, in strange, unfamiliar surroundings, questioned at length by adult (police and assistant State\u2019s Attorney) strangers about brutal homicides, not advised of any constitutional guarantees, his mother denied the right to see him, not provided with counsel, juvenile officer, or taken before a court. The Supreme Court has held that the lack of Miranda warnings is \u201ca significant factor\u201d in determining the voluntariness of a confession. (Davis v. North Carolina (1966), 384 U.S. 737, 740, 16 L. Ed. 2d 895, 898, 86 S. Ct. 1761, 1764.) The following language from the recent unanimous holding of the United States Supreme Court in Crane v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 683, 687-89, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636, 643-44, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2145-46, is directly applicable:\n\u201cIt is by now well established that \u2018certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation, or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u2019 Miller v. Fenton (1985), 474 U.S. 104, 109, 88 L. Ed. 2d 405, 410,106 S. Ct. 445, 449. ***\n* * *\n*** [T]he circumstances surrounding the taking of a confession can be highly relevant to two separate inquiries, one legal and one factual. The manner in which a statement was extracted is, of course, relevant to the purely legal question of its voluntariness ***. [Citation.] But the physical and psychological environment that yielded the confession can also be of substantial relevance to the ultimate factual issue of the defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence.\u201d\nIt must also be kept in mind that the burden of proving that a confession was voluntary is on the State. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 114 \u2014 11(d).) Even if Detective Miller\u2019s testimony were to be credited that he told the defendant that he was free to leave, if Miller had told the defendant this, he would, of necessity be stigmatized as \u201cremiss\u201d in his duties, according to the State\u2019s brief filed in this court. This case at bar\n\u201cpresents a clear picture of an officer attempting to turn a custodial interrogation into a noncustodial one by repeating a litany that the defendant was free to leave. It is apparent that even one of defendant\u2019s mentality would have felt the opposite; he knew that he had made an oral confession; it belies all human experience to say that in that posture the authorities would lose interest in the case. Miranda warnings should have been given. The purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct are apparent. People v. Smith (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 438, 414 N.E.2d 1281, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 179, 442 N.E.2d 1325.\u201d People v. Berry (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1046, 463 N.E.2d 1044,1048.\nTwo recent cases have distinguished Elstad on this basis. In In re T.S. (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 344, 502 N.E.2d 761, the defendant, a 15 year old, made an oral confession without benefit of Miranda warnings. Later, the statement was typed, defendant was warned of his Miranda guarantees, and he signed the statement. The written statement which was given immediately after the unwarned oral statement was a \u201cmere reiteration\u201d of the oral statement. As in the case at bar, the defendant was taken to a police station alone in a squad car; he was not accompanied by his parents or an attorney during the interrogation at the police station; although he was initially informed he was free to go, he testified that he did not really believe that this was true. In distinguishing Oregon v. Elstad, the court in In re T.S. held:\n\u201cThere are several significant distinctions between Elstad and the case at bar. First, in Elstad, the respondent\u2019s warned confession was preceded by an unwarned yet volunteered remark. Here, however, defendant\u2019s warned written confession was preceded by an unwarned oral confession. Further, the written confession here was, by the detective\u2019s own admission, a \u2018mere reiteration\u2019 of the previous oral confession. Second, Elstad involved a \u2018simple failure to administer Miranda warnings, unaccompanied by \u201cany actual coercion\u201d or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect\u2019s ability to exercise his free will.\u2019 In the present case, however, there is a considerable amount of unrefuted evidence which would suggest coercion and intimidation. Third, unlike in Elstad, respondent\u2019s written statement here immediately followed his full, detailed oral statement. From an examination of the \u2018surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct\u2019 with respect to both of respondent\u2019s statements, we conclude that the manner of interrogation was coercive. (Oregon v. Elstad (1984), 470 U.S. 298, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222, 105 S. Ct. 1285.) Further, due to the coercion and improper tactics used in obtaining an unwarned oral statement, the administration of Miranda warnings immediately prior to the written statement did not cure the condition that rendered the oral statement inadmissible.\u201d 151 Ill. App. 3d at 353.\nIn People v. Hagar (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 370, 513 N.E.2d 628, the defendant, 17 years old, was questioned by DCFS investigators. The DCFS investigator testified that under Department policy and State law he, as a DCFS investigator, was not required to give Miranda warnings to an arrestee. The defendant\u2019s statement to the DCFS investigator was made in a custodial environment at the DCFS Office, not at the defendant\u2019s home. After giving both an oral and written statement to the DCFS investigators, the defendant was then questioned by sheriff\u2019s investigators who did give the defendant Miranda warnings. After a 45-minute interview the defendant made a statement of his guilt to the Sheriff investigators. The Hagar court held that the second statement to the sheriff\u2019s investigators, though preceded by Miranda warnings, was inadmissible, distinguishing Oregon v. Elstad on the ground that the unwarned previous statement to the DCFS investigators was not voluntary.\nI cannot accept the proposition that the Elstad holding may be converted into a license to induce an arrestee to make incriminating statements. Unlike Elstad, the failure to administer Miranda warnings here was a deliberate authoritative scheme calculated to permit the police and State\u2019s Attorney to interrogate a juvenile who was purposely kept ignorant of his constitutional guarantees. Then, once having obtained incriminating statements, the defendant was advised of his Miranda warnings, and repeated those incriminating answers before the grand jury which subsequently indicted him.\nIt is thus revealed that, to use another well-worn metaphor, the State played \u201ccat and mouse\u201d with the constitutional guarantees of this unrepresented boy right up to the end. Oregon v. Elstad clearly stands for the proposition that the mere inadvertent failure of the police to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights does not forever contaminate defendant\u2019s statements after he has been given the appropriate warnings. However, the correct rule to be applied in the case of deliberate police deception was that announced more recently in Maine v. Moulton (1985), 474 U.S. 159, 176, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 496, 106 S. Ct. 477, 487, where the court said:\n\u201cThus, the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever \u2014 by luck or happenstance \u2014 the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached. [Citation.] However, knowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a breach of the State\u2019s obligation not to circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity. Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused\u2019s right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIf this deceptive practice gained approbation from the courts the desiccation of Miranda v. Arizona would be complete. I have simply seen no authority which remotely approves such contradictory and diabolical stratagems.\nVII\nConclusion\nIn sum, there simply is no authority from any jurisdiction of which I am aware which permits the police to arrest a 16-year-old boy in his home, take him to the police station, deny his mother permission to speak to him, purposely keep him in ignorance of his constitutional guarantees to counsel, silence and against self-incrimination, hold him for 27 hours, not take him before a juvenile police officer or a court as the State statutes require, but instead, take him before a grand jury, and without benefit of counsel, elicit self-incriminatory statements from him which constitute not only the evidence upon which the same grand jury indicted him, but also constitutes the only evidence which convicted him at trial. The procedure shown by this record to have been employed by representatives of the State of Illinois sworn to uphold the Constitution and the statutes of the State of Illinois flagrantly and abusively violated Charles Green\u2019s constitutional and statutory rights.\nHorrible, despicable atrocities were inflicted upon the victims in the case at bar. Horrible, despicable atrocities were likewise inflicted upon the constitutional rights of this defendant. But the former never justifies the latter. The majority opinion fully sets forth the former. I have similarly endeavored herein to reveal the latter, in part, because I am firmly convinced that a sure protection of constitutional freedoms is an adequate exposure of their violations. Accordingly, I vigorously dissent from the affirmance of the defendant\u2019s convictions.\nADDENDUM TO ORIGINAL DISSENTING OPINION ON DENIAL OF DEFENDANT\u2019S PETITION FOR REHEARING.\nIf there existed a molecule of doubt that the assessment in my dissenting opinion of appointed counsel\u2019s performance as grossly deficient was perhaps too harsh, counsel\u2019s \u201cPetition for Rehearing\u201d has obliterated every iota of uncertainty. I went to considerable length in my dissenting opinion to point out that the record on appeal was incomplete and in considerable disorder. I had hoped, even expected, that defendant\u2019s appointed counsel would have made a conscientious attempt to rectify this situation. Instead, defendant\u2019s appointed counsel has done nothing.\nAdditionally, defendant\u2019s counsel\u2019s \u201cPetition for Rehearing\u201d fails to discuss or even mention the inconsistent positions taken by the State in the trial court and in this court on the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Nor does it discuss the confusing and incoherent \u201cfindings\u201d of the trial court in denying the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. The petition for rehearing does not discuss the impropriety of the trial judge\u2019s consideration and reliance upon the testimony of James Davis, given in a totally different trial court proceeding to which this defendant was not a party or even present, in denying the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nMost egregious of all is the failure of the defendant\u2019s appointed counsel to even mention in the defendant\u2019s petition for rehearing the gross impropriety of the assistant State\u2019s Attorneys taking this unrepresented youth before a grand jury, extracting thereat a self-inculpatory statement from him; adroitly sidetracking a grand juror\u2019s questioning of the defendant; and then prosecuting the defendant on an indictment returned by the same grand jury and using the defendant\u2019s unconstitutionally procured grand jury testimony to convict him. Perhaps appointed counsel\u2019s failure to cite Boone v. The People (1894), 148 Ill. 440, 36 N.E. 99, in his original brief is explainable by and attributable to the longevity of Boone. No subsequent State\u2019s Attorney (as far as I am able to determine) has since the advent of Boone attempted such despicable tactics and, therefore, perhaps counsel\u2019s research failed to uncover Boone. But appointed counsel\u2019s failure to discuss Boone and its applicability in defendant\u2019s petition for rehearing, now that counsel has been made aware of Boone by my dissent, is so grossly derelict that I can only conclude that justice and due process demand that different counsel be appointed and defendant given an opportunity to fairly litigate the issues in his case with the benefit of and by competent representation.\nI stress again that involved in this cause is a minor, of limited education, unsophisticated in legal matters, and ignorant of his constitutional and statutory rights. When I read appointed counsel\u2019s lead brief and compared it to what the record on appeal revealed, my original belief was that counsel either did not know or did not care about the legal issues involved in this defendant\u2019s highly unusual appeal. But after reading his petition for rehearing, it has become obvious to me that the alternatives have been narrowed to the latter.\nAlso egregious is the petition for rehearing\u2019s failure to rely on, argue, discuss or even mention the State\u2019s inconsistent positions in the trial court that: (1) the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant; and (2) the defendant was not under arrest (a) when the officer took him from his home on February 5, 1985, (b) during the defendant\u2019s 27-hour, incommunicado overnight stay at the police station, (c) during which his mother was refused permission to see him, and (d) when he was thereafter taken before the grand jury, with the State\u2019s contrary positions, taken for the first time, before this court of review, that: (1) the officers did have probable cause for the defendant\u2019s arrest; (2) the officers did arrest the defendant in his home on February 5, 1985; and (3) that the defendant was thereafter under arrest. The majority in the case at bar is conspicuously silent on and makes absolutely no mention of these legally impermissible inconsistencies by the State. Thus, the majority has not only inconspicuously, but improperly, allowed the State to change horses in the middle of the stream between the trial court and the appellate court upon learning that the horse it was riding could not carry it to the desired affirmance shore, but additionally, the majority has also, but just as improperly and equally as inconspicuously, allowed the State to mount an inconsistent and different horse and ride in an inconsistent and different stream, in an inconsistent and different direction to an inconsistent and different affirmance shore.\nI am constrained to point out the recent decision of this court in People v. Walker (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 743, 532 N.E.2d 447. Walker filed a motion to suppress evidence which was denied by the trial court. In his motion to suppress, Walker urged that his warrantless arrest in his home was illegal. On his appeal the State, for the first time, urged that the officer\u2019s entry into Walker\u2019s home was with the consent of Walker\u2019s mother. Serendipitously, the Walker appeal was heard by the identical panel of justices who heard the instant appeal. Moreover, the same justice authored both the majority opinions in Walker and in the instant appeal, and the same justice concurred in both. I have dissented in both. In Walker, the majority wrote:\n\u201cIt appears that the State raised the question of a consensual arrest for the first time on appeal. A prevailing party may raise, in support of a judgment, any reason appearing in the record [citation], although this rule does not apply when the new theory is inconsistent with the position adopted below or the party has acquiesced in contrary findings. [Citation.] The record in the court below disclosed that the initial hearing revolved around probable cause to arrest rather than the consensual nature of the entry. The State did not argue in the trial court a theory inconsistent with its position in this court. Therefore, we find no basis in the record to reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress even though the consent issue was first argued on appeal.\u201d 177 Ill. App. 3d at 746, 532 N.E.2d at 448-49. (Emphasis added.)\nI dissented in Walker and asserted, inter alia, that the State should not be permitted to rely upon a ground on appeal, i.e., consent, different from the ground upon which it relied in the trial court, i.e., probable cause, to validate a warrantless arrest. As I read the majority\u2019s decision in Walker, the rule announced therein is that the State may assert a different theory on appeal when \u201c[t]he State did not argue in the trial court a theory inconsistent with its position in this court,\" and provided the \u201cnew [appeal] theory is [not] in consistent with the position adopted below.\u201d (177 Ill. App. 3d at 746, 532 N.E.2d at 448.) Yet, in the instant cause the positions urged by the State on appeal are not merely \u201cinconsistent\u201d \u2014 they are antagonistic and diametrically opposite, by 180 degrees, to the positions urged by the State in the trial court. As stated, in the instant cause the State asserted in the trial court that the officers did not have probable cause for the defendant\u2019s arrest and that the defendant was not arrested in his home, at the police station, or at all; whereas on appeal the State conversely urges, for the first time, that the officers had probable cause for the defendant\u2019s arrest and that the officers arrested the defendant in his home.\nThe majority opinion in Walker and the majority opinion in the instant cause cannot be reconciled. Even a precise reader will fastidiously peruse the majority opinion in the instant cause in vain to discern that the State urged on appeal a new theory \u201cinconsistent with the position adopted below,\u201d to avoid the majority\u2019s Walker ruling, as quoted above. The majority in the instant case says absolutely nothing on this issue. At least in Walker the majority faced the State\u2019s double-dealing, made a decision and rendered its ruling. However, here, where the facts incontestably establish that the State has violated the majority\u2019s Walker ruling, the same majority is completely silent.\nWith all due deference, this is unfair and misguiding not only to the defendant, but to the entire bench and bar. Trial judges as well as litigators look to published appellate court opinions not only as the law in the particular cases, but also as guideposts and touchstones for future cases and controversies. While reasonable men and women may disagree on the limits of stare decisis, certainly stare decisis does have some rule to play in our judicial system. Surely some fidelity to consistency is owed. The majority opinions in Green and Walker are irreconcilable. Certainly if this court is going to create such a drastic legal change of such gigantic proportions between Green and Walker, i.e., permit the State to \u201csandbag\u201d a defendant by switching adverse theories between the trial and appellate courts in order to affirm a conviction, this court ought to say so forthrightly and in no uncertain terms.\nI would grant the petition for rehearing and appoint other counsel to represent the defendant.\nAs noted above, James Davis, testifying on Derrick House\u2019s motion to suppress, denied telling Detective Summerville the matters attributed to him by Summerville. But neither the defendant nor his attorney was present for Davis\u2019 testimony, and the defendant did not call Davis as a witness on his motion to suppress in order to contradict Summerville. The defendant\u2019s attorney did, however, proffer a transcript of Davis\u2019 testimony to the court, the \u201cpertinent\u201d parts of which the court said he considered, a questionable practice to say the least, given that Davis\u2019 live testimony was available to the defendant with the defendant\u2019s own attorney being able to guide the examination of Davis into appropriate and germane areas. In addition, a court of review has no way to determining which portion(s) of the transcript the trial court considered \u201cpertinent\u201d, the relative weight he gave to the \u201cpertinent\u201d portion(s), etc.\nFor adults, the proper procedure is delineated in section 109 \u2014 1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 109-1).\nMany rights and privileges other than the guarantee against self-incrimination may be involved in a grand jury appearance. Volumes have been written concerning the complex nature of grand jury proceedings. (See, e.g., S. Beale & W. Bryson, Grand Jury Law & Practice (Callaghan 1986); Grand Jury Project, Inc., of the National Lawyers Guild, Representation of Witnesses Before Federal Grand Juries (1985 through 1988).) It strikes me that even the most intelligent and sophisticated adult layman could not intelligently comprehend the intricate nuances of grand jury litigation without legal assistance. Just recently, our supreme court touched upon the complexity of yet another possible privilege heretofore potentially available to grand jury witnesses. See In re October 1985 Grand Jury Number 746 (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 466.\nI use the word \u201cdeliberately\u201d here advisedly. Surely no one would suggest that in 1985 experienced police detectives and/or Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Ellison were unaware of their obligations to advise persons under Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602. That duty and obligation placed by the Supreme Court upon law enforcement authorities is so well recognized that it would be totally unreasonable to conclude that the failure to comply with it could be other than purposeful.\nI note that recently one of our sister courts has specifically ruled that it was error for the trial court to rely upon former testimony, even when given on the defendant\u2019s own motion to suppress. See People v. Brown (1989), 177 Ill. App. 3d 671, 673, 532 N.E.2d 547.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE PINCHAM," } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert A. Egan, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth T. McCurry, Kim A. Novi, and Robert McNamara, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES GREEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 86\u20141019\nOpinion filed November 14, 1988.\nRehearing denied March 10, 1989.\nPINCHAM, J., dissenting.\nRobert A. Egan, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth T. McCurry, Kim A. Novi, and Robert McNamara, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel) for the People." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 23, "last_page_order": 120 }