{ "id": 2606756, "name": "HERITAGE HOUSE OF GLAMOUR, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Heritage House of Glamour, Inc. v. Attorney General", "decision_date": "1989-02-07", "docket_number": "No. 88\u2014824", "first_page": "336", "last_page": "340", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 336" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "332 N.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 932", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2503275 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0932-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 1146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3108145 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 1012", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083629 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 N.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 2d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378427 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" }, { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/36/0460-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 463, "char_count": 8437, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.33228500966658675 }, "sha256": "184eac7a7b856e2bc0f1afc90e519ffdf89c6614ad19253429ffbcdd5bc18909", "simhash": "1:03ea8e0c6185f8dd", "word_count": 1323 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:22:52.001106+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HERITAGE HOUSE OF GLAMOUR, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCARIANO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from an administrative subpoena duces tecum issued by the defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant and dismissed plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether the subpoena duces tecum is overly broad; and (2) whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.\nOn September 30, 1987, defendant issued an administrative subpoena, pursuant to section 3 of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121V2, par. 263) to Lakeview Trust and Savings Bank (Lakeview) for its records concerning home improvement loans wherein Premier Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc., was the contractor, and any agreements between the bank and Premier regarding home improvement loans. In response, the bank informed defendant that it had no association with Premier but that it was in possession of loans purchased from plaintiff. (There is no explanation in the record as to why Lakeview responded to a subpoena for records on Premier with information on plaintiff.) Meanwhile, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment as well as a motion to quash the subpoena. After hearing the motion to quash, the trial court gave leave to defendant to file an administrative subpoena seeking the \u201crecords\u201d of plaintiff and plaintiff was given leave to file a motion to quash when that subpoena was issued.\nOn December 15, 1987, defendant issued an administrative subpoena duces tecum to Lakeview commanding production of the following:\n\u201cAll documents and papers concerning Home Improvement Loans purchased by Lake[v]iew Trust and Savings Bank from Heritage House of Glamour, Inc. from January 1, 1983 to present.\u201d\nOn December 30, 1987, the trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s amended motion to quash the subpoena and granted it leave to file an amended complaint. Pursuant to this order, plaintiff filed its amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting that the subpoena be declared null and void and that defendant be enjoined from enforcing the subpoena and from issuing any further subpoenas without leave of court. On February 2, 1988, this court denied plaintiff\u2019s application for leave to appeal the December 30 order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (107 Ill. 2d R. 308).\nOn March 1, 1988, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff\u2019s complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals from that order.\nOpinion\nPlaintiff argues that the subpoena is overly broad, as it fails to give a \u201creasonably informative description\u201d of the items sought. (People ex rel. Legislative Commission on Low Income Housing v. Keefe (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 460, 465, 223 N.E.2d 144.) It maintains that defendant should specify by name what records it wants.\nIn Keefe, the Illinois Attorney General issued a subpoena requesting \u201cvarious documents relating to described and undescribed properties which \u2018have public aid recipients\u2019 therein.\u201d (36 Ill. 2d at 465.) The court held that the subpoena was \u201cso lacking in specificity and so unreasonably broad as to violate constitutional standards,\u201d stating:\n\u201cThe phrase \u2018public aid recipient\u2019 is, of itself, susceptible of numerous interpretations. It might be, as suggested by the State, limited to aid supplied by the State of Illinois, but it could include Federally-sponsored assistance or that supplied by a governmental agency smaller than the State. The demand is not limited to those properties in which defendants know public aid recipients to be present, and it is not apparent whether properties having therein public aid recipients other than lessees are included. Nor is the demand restricted to properties located within this State, and it is entirely possible that among the properties owned, managed or controlled by defendants there may be some in other States.\u201d (36 111. 2d at 465-66.)\nPlaintiff contends that there is nothing in the subpoena which forms the subject matter of this action which limits the inquiry to home improvement loans to Illinois residents and that therefore the subpoena is unclear, vague and overbroad.\nDefendant responds that the purpose of its investigation is to uncover matters previously unknown to it which may or may not provide grounds for further action, and that since it cannot not know in advance what its investigation may produce, it can be required to provide only a \u201creasonably informative description\u201d of what is required. (Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, International (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 279, 298, 430 N.E.2d 1012.) Defendant further contends that its subpoena did provide such a description.\nIn Scott, the Association challenged sections 3 and 4 of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 121V2, pars. 263, 264), which authorize the Attorney General to investigate upon his belief that it is in the public interest to do so and to issue subpoenas, arguing that they violate the fourth amendment\u2019s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. In upholding both sections the court stated:\n\u201cIn testing the validity of an administrative subpoena, the appropriate considerations are: (1) the constitutionality of the statute, (2) whether the contemplated agency proceedings are included within the statutory authority, (3) the reasonableness of the demand, and (4) the relevance of the information sought. ***\nThe permissible scope of an administrative subpoena, and of any administrative demand for information or the production of documents, is measured by the relevance of the information sought to the problem under investigation.\u201d Scott, 88 111. 2d at 296-97.\nHere, the subject matter requested is limited to home improvement loans between two specific parties for a definite period of time and the information sought is reasonably related to the determination of whether plaintiff is engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The trial court properly held that the subpoena is not overbroad.\nPlaintiff also argues that the subpoena constitutes an impermissible constructive search. An administrative subpoena \u201cmay be so unreasonable in its demands, or so indefinite and general in its terms, as to go beyond the statutory purpose for which the inquiry was authorized and amount to a \u2018constructive search\u2019 \u201d (Scott, 88 111. 2d at 296); however, as discussed previously, the subpoena was not over-broad and therefore it does not amount to a constructive search.\nPlaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, arguing that there is a question of fact as to whether the officers of Lakeview understood what items were sought by the subpoena. It emphasizes that defendant\u2019s motion was unverified and unsupported by an affidavit. In granting defendant\u2019s summary judgment motion, the trial court stated that the issue of the validity of the subpoena had already been decided and there was nothing more to resolve in a trial.\nDefendant correctly argues that summary judgment is proper when the issue \u201cis determinable solely as a matter of law\u201d (Smith v. Rengel (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 204, 205, 442 N.E.2d 1146) and that no supporting affidavits are required. (Smith v. Ashley (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 932, 332 N.E.2d 32.) Here, the only issue to be decided was one of law: the validity of the subpoena. There was no factual issue to be resolved at trial, and therefore the trial judge properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant.\nWe note that defendant did not raise, either in the trial court or on appeal, the issue of plaintiff\u2019s standing to challenge a subpoena issued to the bank; therefore, there is no need to address this issue.\nFor the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHARTMAN and BILANDIC, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCARIANO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Cohen, Weisenburger & Challos, of Chicago (Martin J. Weisenburger, of counsel), for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Respicio F. Vazquez, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HERITAGE HOUSE OF GLAMOUR, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 88\u2014824\nOpinion filed February 7, 1989.\nCohen, Weisenburger & Challos, of Chicago (Martin J. Weisenburger, of counsel), for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Respicio F. Vazquez, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0336-01", "first_page_order": 358, "last_page_order": 362 }