{
  "id": 2606783,
  "name": "In re ESTATE OF MARY GRUSKE, Deceased (I.H. Mississippi Valley Credit Union, Petitioner, v. Lynda Ryberg, Ex'r of the Estate of Mary Gruske, Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant (Debbie Beauchamp et al., Petitioners-Appellants and Cross-Appellees))",
  "name_abbreviation": "I.H. Mississippi Valley Credit Union v. Ryberg",
  "decision_date": "1989-02-16",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201488\u20140295",
  "first_page": "675",
  "last_page": "679",
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      "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 675"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 24",
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 502,
    "char_count": 8903,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.76,
    "pagerank": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:22:52.001106+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re ESTATE OF MARY GRUSKE, Deceased (I.H. Mississippi Valley Credit Union, Petitioner, v. Lynda Ryberg, Ex\u2019r of the Estate of Mary Gruske, Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant (Debbie Beauchamp et al., Petitioners-Appellants and Cross-Appellees))."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe trial court found that the estate of Mary Gruske, deceased (the estate), had not overcome the presumption that Mary had possessed the required donative intent when she established a joint credit union account with the claimants, Debbie Beauchamp, Ronnie L. Ziemer and Loretta Caron. The court further found that Mary had later effectively terminated the joint account. The claimants appeal.The estate cross-appeals.\nThe record shows that on November 18, 1982, Mary executed a will. In the will, she left her nephew, William Ryberg, 40% of the residue of her estate. She named William\u2019s wife, Lynda, executor of the will and left her 20%. The remainder of the estate went to other relatives, including 20% to Mary\u2019s sister, Clara Ziemer.\nIn March of 1983, Mary suffered a stroke and spent her remaining four years of life in a nursing home. In the fall of 1983, Mary told Clara that she wished to make Clara\u2019s grandchildren, the instant claimants, joint tenants in her savings account at I.H. Mississippi Valley Credit Union (the credit union). She subsequently signed a credit union form naming Clara and the claimants joint tenants. The form provided in relevant part:\n\u201cThe _ Credit Union is hereby authorized to recognize any of the signatures subscribed hereto in the payment of funds or the transaction of any business for this account.\n* * *\nThe right or authority of the credit union under this agreement shall not be changed or terminated by said owners, or any of them except by written notice to said credit union which shall not affect transactions theretofore made.\u201d\nMary died on January 17, 1987, at age 85. Only then did Clara leam that the credit union had a December 12, 1984, letter signed by Mary, which stated in relevant part: \u201cPlease change the name on my account from Mary Gruske and Clara Ziemer to just Mary Gruske alone.\u201d\nLynda Ryberg, as executor of the estate, subsequently withdrew the $60,741.07 in the credit union account, which consisted of $35,574.91 in a regular share account and $25,166.16 in a certificate account. In response, the claimants filed a $60.741.07 claim against the estate, contending that the money belonged to them as the surviving joint tenants. The claimants subsequently stipulated that they had no claim to the certificate account. Though they attempted to withdraw this stipulation in a post-trial motion, the trial court denied their request.\nAt the hearing on the matter, the trial court allowed Lynda and William Ryberg to testify about Mary\u2019s termination of the joint tenancy. Lynda testified, and William generally reiterated, that on December 12, 1984, Mary was reviewing her financial records with Lynda and William. At one point, Mary stated that Clara\u2019s name was on the credit union account merely as the next of kin. When Lynda told her that Clara was a joint tenant in the account, Mary said that it was her money alone, that a mistake had been made, and that she did not want anyone else\u2019s name on the account. William and Mary then composed the above-quoted letter, which William typed and Mary read and signed.\nLynda also testified that after her stroke, Mary sometimes was confused about financial matters. However, when Lynda would explain the transactions to her, Mary seemed to understand.\nThe trial court found that the estate had not rebutted by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that Mary had the required donative intent when she created the joint account. It further found, however, that Mary had effectively terminated the rights of the other joint tenants with her December 12,1984, letter.\nOn appeal, the claimants first argue that the court erred in finding that Mary terminated their rights to the funds in the joint account. They contend that the joint-share agreement did not authorize one tenant to unilaterally terminate the rights of the other tenants.\nIt is well established in Illinois that an agreement creating a joint account governs the rights of the parties thereto. (Paskas v. Illini Federal Savings & Loan Association (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 24, 440 N.E.2d 194.) An instrument creating a joint account under the statutes presumably speaks the whole truth, and one seeking to go behind the terms of the agreement has the burden of establishing that its effect was not intended. 109 Ill. App. 3d 24, 440 N.E.2d 194.\nThe last paragraph of the instant joint-share agreement stated that the authority of the credit union could not be terminated \u201cby said owners, or any of them\u201d except by written notice. Accordingly, it expressly provided for termination of the credit union\u2019s authority over the money by any one of the tenants. Since by law the agreement also governed the rights of the tenants among themselves, and since the claimants failed to establish that the plain meaning of the agreement did not express the parties\u2019 true intentions, the trial court properly ruled that Mary could unilaterally terminate the joint account.\nThe claimants next argue that the trial court\u2019s determination that Mary competently and knowingly terminated the joint-share account was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe burden of proving mental incompetence is on the party seeking to set aside a transaction. (Eslick v. Montgomery (1972), 3 Ill. App. 3d 447, 278 N.E.2d 412.) Persons of mature age are presumed to be mentally competent; their incompetence cannot be inferred merely from old age, physical illness or defective memory. (3 Ill. App. 3d 447, 278 N.E.2d 412.) Impairment of the mind incident to old age and disease will not invalidate a transaction so long as the person in question was able to comprehend the nature of the transaction and to protect her interests. 3 Ill. App. 3d 447, 278 N.E.2d 412.\nIn the instant case, the evidence tending to establish that Mary was incompetent included her age, her stroke, her confusion over certain matters, and her failure to include the names of the claimants in her letter requesting the removal of the joint tenants. As noted in Eslick, age and illness are not sufficient by themselves to establish incompetence. Additionally, Lynda Ryberg explained that Mary was confused not in a general sense, but only about specific financial matters. Lynda noted that when she explained the financial transactions to her, Mary appeared to understand. Mary\u2019s failure to name the claimants in her December 12, 1984, letter is not especially probative of mental incompetence, since their names never appeared on any of the credit union statements due to a lack of space. Further, Lynda\u2019s and William\u2019s testimony concerning Mary\u2019s state of mind on December 12, 1984, tended to show that she was competent and understood the nature and effect of her actions. Based on the record as a whole, we find that the trial court\u2019s determination that Mary was competent when she terminated the joint tenancy agreement was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe claimant\u2019s third argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in allowing Lynda and William to testify regarding Mary\u2019s execution of the December 12, 1984, letter. Specifically, they contend that the Dead Man\u2019s Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 8 \u2014 201) prohibits testimony from parties who have a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation.\nIn Bank of Viola v. Staley (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 531, 475 N.E.2d 1110, this court addressed a similar issue and held that even where one has an interest in an estate, one may testify on behalf of the estate. Here, the claimants brought suit against the estate, seeking to reduce its assets. Though Lynda was a legatee under the will, she defended the suit as executor. She and William testified on behalf of the estate, with the objective of protecting the estate\u2019s assets. Accordingly, their testimony was not barred by the Dead Man\u2019s Act.\nOur decision renders moot the claimant\u2019s argument regarding the trial court\u2019s denial of their post-trial motion to withdraw their stipulated release of any claim to the certificate account. Likewise, the estate\u2019s cross-appeal of the court\u2019s finding that it had not rebutted the presumption of donative intent, and the claimant\u2019s motion to dismiss the cross-appeal, are rendered moot.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHEIPLE and BARRY, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE WOMBACHER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Samuel S. McHard and Stephen T. Fieweger, both of Katz, McAndrews, Durkee, Balch & Lefstein, P.C., of Rock Island (Stuart R. Lefstein, of counsel), for appellants.",
      "Robert G. Scott, of Rock Island, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re ESTATE OF MARY GRUSKE, Deceased (I.H. Mississippi Valley Credit Union, Petitioner, v. Lynda Ryberg, Ex\u2019r of the Estate of Mary Gruske, Respondent-Appellee and Cross-Appellant (Debbie Beauchamp et al., Petitioners-Appellants and Cross-Appellees)).\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201488\u20140295\nOpinion filed February 16, 1989.\nSamuel S. McHard and Stephen T. Fieweger, both of Katz, McAndrews, Durkee, Balch & Lefstein, P.C., of Rock Island (Stuart R. Lefstein, of counsel), for appellants.\nRobert G. Scott, of Rock Island, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0675-01",
  "first_page_order": 697,
  "last_page_order": 701
}