{ "id": 2608632, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Melvin Paproth, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Paproth", "decision_date": "1974-03-18", "docket_number": "No. 71-317", "first_page": "385", "last_page": "389", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 385" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "154 N.E. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2765380 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/15/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 N.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill.App.3d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2668663 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 N.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1580225 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/123/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 N.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2908254 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill.App.3d 754", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2671084 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0754-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 597, "char_count": 10575, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.484250069683933e-08, "percentile": 0.4456893046660249 }, "sha256": "6f55d27755b608e979466210a6d8f23f3452e91b0772793fdd724225091fbb46", "simhash": "1:2f66748da4e5a53b", "word_count": 1777 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:19:57.388760+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Melvin Paproth, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Melvin Paproth, was charged by indictment filed on March 31, 1971, in the circuit court of Montgomery County, Illinois, with the offense of burglary.\nAt the arraignment held on the morning of June 22, 1971, the defendant requested a recognizance bond. The court refused the request but stated that if the defendant were able to meet the bond that he would be allowed to leave the state to attend to a personal matter involving the legality of the defendant\u2019s marriage to a 15-year-old girl. The defendant expressed a desire to assist his wife in avoiding being placed in a det\u00e9ntion home by his proving the validity of a marriage that was alleged to have occurred in tire State of Missouri. The defendant asserted that he was without funds to meet the required bond. The matter with the defendant was concluded at approximately 10:45 A.M.\nAt 11:45 A.M., approximately 1 hour after the original arraignment had been concluded, court reconvened. The State\u2019s Attorney informed the court that he had received communication from defense counsel- stating that the defendant wished to change his plea. The State\u2019s Attorney stated to the court, \u201cMy understanding in communication with defense counsel as well as a recommendation of the Sheriff of Montgomery County is that Mr. Paproth wishes to plea [sic] guilty to the offense of burglary at the Pruitt residence and his attorney has asked us that the check charge be dismissed with leave to reinstate.\u201d\nThe court then inquired of the defendant if he desired to plead guilty and make application for probation. The defense counsel answered yes.\nThe court then explained that the defendant had a right to plead guilty and to request the matter be referred to the probation officer \u201cand in that event the Court would refer it to the Probation Officer of this court to make an investigation and there would be a hearing on that and it would be up to the Judge to grant you probation. In the event you were not granted probation you might be . sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than one year with a maximum of any number of years, do you understand?\u201d The defendant answered \u201cyes\u201d. The court then inquired if the defendant desired to plead guilty and the defendant responded, \u201c[Y]es, I want to plead guilty.\u201d The court then continued, \u201cVery well, it will be necessary that you reduce this to writing stating that you are guilty of this Pruitt burglary as charged and that you do waive your right to a trial by jury.\u201d\nThe State\u2019s Attorney next- informed the court that no promises or concessions had been made other than those which were part of the record and the defendant admitted subsequently that he did sign in open court the \u201cJURY WAIVER AND PLEA OF GUILTY\u201d.\nThe court then accepted the defendant\u2019s written jury waiver and plea of guilty and inquired of defendant if he understood that acceptance of such plea was the equivalent of having been found guilty by jury verdict. Again the defendant answered \u201cyes\u201d.\nThereupon the matter was referred to the probation officer. The probation report was filed on June 30, 1971, the date set for hearing. On October 4, 1971, the defendant appeared to offer testimony in support of his application for probation. During the hearing then held defendant testified, in explanation of his failure to appear June 30, that he was \u201cpreaching\u201d and working as a carpenter in South Dakota when he was arrested and waived extradition and brought back for this hearing; that he had intended to return for the June 30 hearing but was prevented from doing so because of an attack of stomach cramps in Kansas City. He also alluded to the personal matter of the legitimacy of his marriage. The court denied the defendant\u2019s application for probation and sentenced the defendant to a term of not less than 3 nor more than 7 years in the Illinois State penitentiary system. The State had recommended that the defendant be sentenced to a term of from 1 to 4 years.\nThe defendant has brought this appeal asserting that the trial court did not substantially comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402, specifically sections(a)(3), (a)(4) and (b).\nThe defendant asserts that the facts and circumstances of this case strongly suggest that the defendant was rushed or pressured into his decision to plead guilty, but concedes, however, that it cannot be positively established by the record. With that we agree. The record of the \u201coriginal\u201d or \u201cfirst\u201d arraignment includes the following dialogue which occurred earlier that morning.\n\u201cTHE COURT: Those are the various papers that are on file in this case. It\u2019s my duty once again to inform you that this Bill of Indictment returned by a Grand Jury of this County of March 31, 1971, charges you, Melvin Paproth, Jr., and Jess Arnold did commit the offense of burglary at the William Pruitt residence, Rural Route, Litchfield, Montgomery County, Illinois, in that you did in there knowingly enter the residence of said William Pruitt with intent to commit therein a theft and you did knowingly obtain unauthorized possession over a television, stereo, tape player, watch, knife and wedding ring, the property of Mr. and Mrs. Pruitt, being in the value of more than One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) with intent to permanently deprive the owners of use and benefit of that property.\nThis also constitutes the offense of burglary and in case you are found guilty you might be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than one year and with the maximum of any number of years. Here your rights are just the same as I told you in the other case. Would you like them repeated? Could we stipulate that the same rights that were explained in the Arraignment in Number 71-C-43 be incorporated in this Arraignment?\nMR. WHITE: Yes.\n. THE COURT: Now, you have a right to a trial by jury, you have a right to hire your own lawyer, however, the Court has appointed a lawyer for you and you have indicated that his services are satisfactory. You have a right to make the State prove this charge beyond a reasonable doubt convincing all 12 members of the Petit Jury panel that you are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. You have a right to confront the persons that accuse you of this crime in open court, you have a right to bring in witn\u00e9sses on your own behalf by subpoena or otherwise. You are presumed innocent of this charge until you are proven guilty and you have a right not to make any statement or plea which might incriminate you. You are entitled to a trial within 120 days from the time you were jailed for this offense. Now, I will ask you how do you plea, guilty or not guilty?\nMR. MELVIN PAPROTH: Not guilty.\u201d\nThe assertions that the defendant makes concerning the alleged pressures and persuasions are unsubstantiated by the record. The Supreme Court Rule requires substantial compliance and our reading of the record indicates that there has been substantial compliance. The cases cited by the defendant do not support his contention. Indeed, as stated in People v. Krouse, 7 Ill.App.3d 754, 757, 288 N.E.2d 543, at p. 547:\n\u201cSimilarly, the next contention of defendant regarding Rule 402, that he was not informed that he was waiving a right to trial and to confront witnesses against him cannot be refuted categorically. However, our Supreme Court in People v, Mendoza, 48 Ill.2d 371, 270 N.E.2d 30, stated that even though defendant, who had been informed that a guilty plea waives the right to a trial by jury, was not similarly admonished on the record, that he was simultaneously waiving additional constitutional rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to confront his accusers * * *.\u2019, the trial court\u2019s admonitions nonetheless constituted substantial compliance with Rule 402. The Supreme Court enlarged upon this issue:\n\u2018The free and voluntary character of defendant\u2019s plea, as disclosed in this record, is uncontradicted by factual allegations in the petition or by accompanying affidavit. The fact that defendant was not specifically admonished by the court, on the record, as to each and every consequence of this plea does not sufficiently demonstrate that he was, in fact, unaware of these consequences.\u2019 People v. Mendoza, 48 Ill.2d 371, 374.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s final contention under Rule 402, that the trial failed to determine that the plea was voluntary, is not supported by the record. The trial court asked the defendant, \u201cIn making this plea guilty have there been any promises made by anyone\u2014the state\u2019s attorney, * * *, you or the court concerning what the sentence might be?\u201d Defendant answered, \u201cNo.\u201d The court continued, \u201cThis is of your free will and accord?\u201d Defendant: \u201cYes.\u201d\nOn the strength of People v. Mendoza, 48 Ill.2d 371, we reach the conclusion that there was substantial compliance with Rule 402 and that the deficiencies noted are not sufficient to constitute reversible error.\nWe agree with the defendant\u2019s contentions that the mere signing of a printed form allegedly waiving the constitutional right to a jury trial is not sufficient to indicate that such an alleged waiver was performed not only understandingly but also expressly (People v. Rambo, 123 Ill. App.2d 299, 260 N.E.2d 119; People v. Cummings, 7 Ill.App.3d 306, 287 N.E.2d 291), and that the election to forego a jury .trial must expressly and understandably be made (People v. Surgeon, 15 Ill.2d 236, 154 N.E. 2d 253). We conclude that there has been substantial compliance with the rule.\nThe defendant next asserts that the sentence imposed is excessive. Defendant has a previous conviction for burglary, and had successfully completed a 2-year probation. Defendant\u2019s statements at the probation hearing likewise reflect on the possibility of an early rehabilitation. We note that since the court imposed the sentence the Unified Code of Corrections has become a part of the law and all cases on direct appeal are covered thereby. This law requires that the minimum sentence not exceed one-third of that of the maximum in this case. We therefore reduce the minimum sentence imposed upon the defendant to 2 years 4 months. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, sec. 1005\u20148\u20141.\nAs modified the judgment is affirmed.\nG. MORAN, P. J., and CREBS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert E. Farrell, Deputy Defender, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Kelly D. Long, State\u2019s Attorney, of Hillsboro, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Melvin Paproth, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 71-317;\nFifth District\nMarch 18, 1974.\nRehearing denied April 18, 1974.\nRobert E. Farrell, Deputy Defender, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nKelly D. Long, State\u2019s Attorney, of Hillsboro, for the People." }, "file_name": "0385-01", "first_page_order": 405, "last_page_order": 409 }