{
  "id": 2611720,
  "name": "In re William Darcy-(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. William Darcy, Respondent-Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Darcy",
  "decision_date": "1974-04-10",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re William Darcy\u2014(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. William Darcy, Respondent-Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Darcy, was convicted and adjudicated a delinquent for violating section 11\u20143 of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, sec. 11\u20143), to-wit:\n\u201cAny person of the age of 14 years and upwards who, by force or threat of force, compels any other person to perform or submit to any act of deviate sexual conduct commits deviate sexual assault.\u201d\nIn the instant case, the State charges that on June 24, 1972, the defendant, by threat of force, compelled Anthony Quinlan to submit to a deviate sexual act.\nThe sole issue presented for review is whether the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged victim submitted to such an act because of the threat of force from the defendant.\nIn People v. Bruno (1969), 110 Ill.App.2d 219, 231, 249 N.E.2d 252, this court noted that the Committee Comments to section 11\u20143 state: \u201cThe phrase used in section 11\u20143 is intended to state generally the equivalent of the force requirement in rape.\u201d The court decided that, since the evidence of force was insufficient to convict under section 11\u20141 (rape), the evidence would not sustain a conviction under section 11\u20143 (deviate sexual assault).\nThe Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Taylor (1971), 48 Ill.2d 91, 98, 268 N.E.2d 865, 868, reiterated the force requirements for conviction under the rape statute:\n\u201cAs summarized in People v. Faulisi, 25 Ill.2d 457, we have held that reviewing courts are especially charged with the duty of carefully examining the evidence in rape cases, and it is the duty of the reviewing court not only to consider the evidence carefully but to reverse the judgment if the evidence is not sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt and to create an abiding conviction that he is guilty of the crime charged. We stated further that the degree of force exerted by the defendant and the amount of resistance on the part of the complaining witness are matters that depend upon the facts of the particular case; that resistance is not necessary under circumstances where resistance would be futile and would endanger the life of the female as where the assailant is armed with a deadly weapon, and that proof of physical force is unnecessary if the prosecuting witness was paralyzed by fear or overcome by superior strength of her attacker; that it is, however, fundamental that in order to prove the charge of forcible rape there must be evidence to show that the act was committed by force and against the will of the female, and if she has the use of her faculties and physical powers, the evidence must show such resistance as will demonstrate that the act was against her will.\u201d\nIllinois courts have consistently applied these force requirements in reviewing rape convictions. People v. Qualls (1961), 21 Ill.2d 252, 171 N.E.2d 612; People v. Elder (1962), 25 Ill.2d 612, 186 N.E.2d 27; People v. DeFrates (1965), 33 Ill.2d 190, 210 N.E.2d 467; People v. Flowers (1968), 98 Ill.App.2d 289, 240 N.E.2d 761; People v. Bruno (1969), 110 Ill.App.2d 219, 249 N.E.2d 252.\nThe sole evidence of physical contact and threats by the defendant towards the prosecuting witness was Quinlans testimony that, in front of the St. Thomas of Canterbury Church on a Saturday afternoon, in the presence of a lot of people, \"He [Darcy] took me and pushed me around some; he hit me and told me if I don\u2019t do it [go to a homosexual\u2019s house], he would beat me up; he struck me in the chest and on the arm.\u201d\nQuinlan then walked 2\u00bd blocks from the corner of Ken more and Lawrence to Sheridan, south on Sheridan to Lakeside, and then east to 820 West Lakeside, the residence of Chuck Mavacheck. Quinlan\u2019s entire route was heavily trafficked with both pedestrians and cars, but he neither cried out for help nor attempted to escape.\nThe State relied upon the alleged threats and physical exertion to demonstrate that Quinlan was paralyzed with fear of Darcy. This threat and shove, they argue, account for Quinlan\u2019s failure to yell for help to the many passersby during the 2\u00bd-block walk from the church to 820 West Lakeside. In People v. Faulisi (1962), 25 Ill.2d 457,185 N.E.2d 211, the Supreme Court held that the victim\u2019s failure to cry for help when an occupied apartment was downstairs dictated reversal.\nWhere the victim willingly walked with the defendant 7 blocks and then, after being threatened by the defendant with a knife, rode an additional 23 blocks to his apartment and failed to cry out for help or attempt to escape, such action was said to negate the use of force by the defendant and to imply consent. People v. Qualls (1961), 21 Ill.2d 252, 171 N.E.2d 612. See also People v. Adams (1969), 115 Ill.App.2d 360, 253 N.E.2d 23.\nQuinlan admitted on re-direct examination that he was not paralyzed by fear but went to Chuck Mavacheck\u2019s voluntarily. Concerning his failure to cry for help to the many passersby, Quinlan responded: \u201cI didn\u2019t see no reason to.\u201d When asked, \u201cHad you agreed to go with him to this apartment on 820 West Lakeside?\u201d, Quinlan responded \u201cYes.\u201d He agreed, by his own words, to get money from the homosexual by submitting to a deviate act. Moreover, the evidence showed that he had visited the apartment before and knew the occupant.\nThe State established two previous incidents and two subsequent contacts by the complaining witness with homosexuals and voluntary submission to deviate sexual acts. The first occurrence, in early June, 1972, was a visit to Robert Olsen\u2019s apartment for the purpose of getting money by submitting to a deviate act. Quinlan admitted that he went alone and without physical coercion. During the second week in June, 1972, at the alleged direction of Bill Darcy, Quinlan went to an Orval Frank\u2019s apartment for the same purpose. Again Quinlan went alone and without physical coercion, and after receiving $5, he allegedly turned it over to Bill Darcy. These facts suggest that Quinlan frequented the homosexuals of his own volition and needed no coercion from Bill Darcy to do so.\nQuinlan testified to two incidents after June 24, 1972. During the first week of July, at the alleged instance of Bill Darcy, Quinlan alone visited two homosexuals. In return for his \u201csubmission\u201d to a deviate act, Quinlan received $5 which he gave to Bill Darcy. The final occurrence happened during the third week in July, just before Quinlan left home and joined a carnival. Quinlan went back to Robert Olsen\u2019s apartment, again alone, and again submitted to a deviate sexual act and received $5.\nThese incidents, in our opinion, show that the complaining witness was not compelled by force or threat of force to submit to deviate sexual conduct. Under the circumstance of the instant case and for the reasons hereinabove stated, we conclude that defendant was not proved guilty of a deviate sexual assault.\nThe judgment of the circuit is reversed.\nReversed.\nBURMAN and DIERINGER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE JOHNSON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Douglas I. Milan and Paul E. Flaherty, both of Chicago (Gann, McIntosh, Flaherty & Parker, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis and John M. Cutrone, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re William Darcy\u2014(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. William Darcy, Respondent-Appellant).\n(No. 59170;\nFirst District (4th Division)\nApril 10, 1974.\nDouglas I. Milan and Paul E. Flaherty, both of Chicago (Gann, McIntosh, Flaherty & Parker, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis and John M. Cutrone, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "1068-01",
  "first_page_order": 1088,
  "last_page_order": 1091
}