{ "id": 2615445, "name": "In re C.L. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. C.L. et al., Minors, Respondents-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "People v. C.L.", "decision_date": "1989-02-22", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201487\u20140245, 1\u201487\u20140247 cons.", "first_page": "173", "last_page": "184", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 173" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2906977 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/131/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 894", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489336 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0894-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 N.E.2d 1280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3493557 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3224422 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 N.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2791427 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/32/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 N.E.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 1041", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3126283 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1048" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/1041-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 731", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5677909 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S. Ct. 1145", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 L. Ed. 2d 412", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 936", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11654786, 11655011, 11654712, 11654861, 11654830, 11655055, 11655088, 11654936, 11654906, 11655129, 11654970, 11654749 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0936-03", "/us/420/0936-09", "/us/420/0936-01", "/us/420/0936-05", "/us/420/0936-04", "/us/420/0936-10", "/us/420/0936-11", "/us/420/0936-07", "/us/420/0936-06", "/us/420/0936-12", "/us/420/0936-08", "/us/420/0936-02" ] }, { "cite": "315 N.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5377752 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" }, { "page": "213-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3309244 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 1098", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 769", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639292 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S. Ct. 1658", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 L. Ed. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 972", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11767201, 11766531, 11766566, 11766759, 11767023, 11767089, 11766834, 11766972, 11767158, 11766684, 11766623 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/0972-11", "/us/402/0972-01", "/us/402/0972-02", "/us/402/0972-05", "/us/402/0972-08", "/us/402/0972-09", "/us/402/0972-06", "/us/402/0972-07", "/us/402/0972-10", "/us/402/0972-04", "/us/402/0972-03" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899528 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 N.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5379092 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 1202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2970851 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0574-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 967, "char_count": 23427, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.621251124853151e-07, "percentile": 0.6872730803996681 }, "sha256": "0687186bb7ee1e0195b6c526e0bce2990e88ba20ddc1080ebae391b456bc5ee8", "simhash": "1:9ab15dfd212d40d4", "word_count": 3892 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:06:12.370658+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re C.L. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Ap-pellee, v. C.L. et al., Minors, Respondents-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondents, C.L. and A.R., were charged with two counts each of aggravated assault in petitions for adjudication of wardship brought by the State. The trial court adjudicated respondents to be delinquent. The court credited C.L. for 30 days spent in custody and placed him on probation for one year. The court committed A.R. to the juvenile detention center for 25 days and also placed him on probation for one year. Respondents appeal.\nThe petitions in this case were based on respondents\u2019 alleged commission of the offense of aggravated assault against Earlean Collier and George Henderson. On October 22, 1986, at approximately 9 p.m., Earlean Collier and her husband, George Henderson, were at home with their children when they heard noise in front of their home. When Earlean and George went out to their front porch to investigate, they found one of their daughters having an argument with Tracy Smith, who lived next door. Earlean and George also saw A.R. at the scene. A.R. was wearing a black jogging suit with yellow stripes down the sides. George heard A.R. say that if George\u2019s daughter was going to fight Tracy, A.R. \u201c \u2018was going to get into it.\u2019 \u201d George then grabbed A.R. by the arm and told him he wanted to talk. George led A.R. down the street and was talking to him when A.R.\u2019s girlfriend approached them. A.R. told her to get C.L. \u201c \u2018and tell him to bring that thing.\u2019 \u201d While George and A.R. were talking, C.L., who was dressed like A.R., came up to them and asked A.R., \u201c \u2018What\u2019s happening, man?\u2019 \u201d When George told C.L. to give them \u201csome space,\u201d C.L. left and walked over to Earlean\u2019s and George\u2019s porch.\nWhen C.L. walked over to the porch, he told Earlean that she \u201c \u2018better tell [George] to get away from [A.R.] because [A.R.] will pop him.\u2019 \u201d Earlean testified that \u201cpop\u201d was street slang for \u201cshooting.\u201d George returned to the porch as C.L. was leaving. While Earlean and George were on the porch, A.R. walked up, stood in front of the porch and said, \u201c \u2018Don\u2019t nobody put his hands on me. You\u2019re going to pay for that.\u2019 \u201d George then started walking off the porch to talk to A.R. \u201cman-to-man.\u201d At that point, C.L. grabbed A.R. and said, \u201c \u2018Man you don\u2019t got to take that shit.\u201d\nEarlean testified that George then walked back up the stairs and said, \u201cHe\u2019s really got a gun.\u201d Earlean said, \u201c \u2018What?\u2019 \u201d and turned around to look at A.R. George then pushed her inside the house. Ear-lean testified that when she turned around \u201c[h]e had the gun in his hand and [waved] it.\u201d Earlean stated that after George pushed her inside, \u201cwe went upstairs to call the police.\u201d Earlean also testified that black and yellow are the colors of the Vice Lords street gang. Ear-lean identified the respondents while they sat in a police car later that night.\nGeorge\u2019s testimony, some of which is included above, was substantially the same as Earlean\u2019s. He additionally testified that after he pushed Earlean inside the house, C.L. asked A.R., \u201c \u2018Man do you want to pop?\u2019 \u201d and A.R. yelled, \u201c \u2018[S]ay, let\u2019s pop,\u2019 \u201d which George knew meant \u201cshoot.\u201d George testified that when he heard that, he felt frightened because he didn\u2019t know \u201cif he was going to shoot me or *** my -wife.\u201d George further testified that, after he heard those words, he went upstairs and called the police. After the police arrived, they and George toured the area looking for the two boys. George identified the respondents after the police picked them up.\nOpinion\nWe first address the State\u2019s argument that respondents have waived every issue they now raise due to their failure to file a post-trial motion. The State relies on Supreme Court Rule 660(a), providing that appeals from final judgments in delinquent minor proceedings are \u201cgoverned by the rules applicable to criminal cases.\u201d (107 Ill. 2d R. 660(a).) Based on that rule, the State argues that the requirement of a post-trial motion contained in section 116 \u2014 1(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 116\u2014 1(b)) applied to the proceedings in this case. We disagree.\nIn contrast to the State, we construe the term \u201crules\u201d as used in Rule 660(a) to mean simply the \u201csupreme court rules\u201d applicable to criminal appeals, not rules codified in the Code of Criminal Procedure or general rules of criminal trial practice. Section 5 \u2014 18 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 805 \u2014 18), cited by the State at oral argument in support of its waiver argument, merely provides that, inter alia, the rules of evidence in criminal proceedings are applicable to delinquency hearings. Moreover, In re Driver (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 574, 360 N.E.2d 1202, has already rejected the State\u2019s argument. The court stated:\n\u201cDriver is attacking a bench finding of wardship based on the evidence. And such an attack is analogous to a criminal defendant\u2019s appellate attack on the sufficiency of evidence to convict in a criminal bench trial. It has been held that the failure to file any post-trial motion in a criminal bench trial does not waive on appeal issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, errors in admission of prejudicial hearsay, and failure to grant a motion to suppress. [Citations.] This is not a case where the alleged error was not brought to the trial court\u2019s attention. In the instant case, no written motion was necessary to preserve the issue for review.\u201d Driver, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 575-76.\nRespondents first contend that the trial court erred in allowing Earlean to testify that the colors yellow and black, the colors of jogging outfits worn by respondents on October 16, 1986, were the colors of the Vice Lords street gang. Respondents argue that seeing someone in a black and yellow jogging suit would not signify to a reasonable person that the wearer was in a street gang or place such a person in apprehension of receiving a battery from the person wearing the suit.\nThe State asserts that respondents misconstrue the term \u201creasonable\u201d as used in section 12 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 1). The State contends, citing People v. Alexander (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 443, 350 N.E.2d 144, that \u201creasonable\u201d as used in section 12 \u2014 1 refers to a subjective, not objective, standard, i.e., whether the particular victim involved reasonably apprehended receiving a battery under the circumstances of the case.\nWe cannot agree with the State that the standard employed in the statutory definition of assault is subjective. The element of reasonable apprehension is the traditional element of assault borrowed from the law of torts. (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 1, Committee Comments, at 406 (Smith-Hurd 1979).) It is therefore an objective standard: \u201cthe apprehension must be one which would normally be aroused in the mind of a reasonable person.\u201d (W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a710, at 44 (5th ed. 1984).) Unlike the State\u2019s standard, an objective standard bars consideration of the idiosyncratic characteristics of a particular victim such as extreme timidity or frightfulness. (W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a710, at 44 (5th ed. 1984).) However, we do not believe, as respondents imply, that it bars consideration of facts known to the victim of the assault about the alleged assailant in determining whether the apprehension of a battery was reasonable.\nRather, such knowledge may be taken into consideration as part of the circumstances of the case, which are always relevant to determining reasonableness. Earlean\u2019s knowledge that black and yellow are the colors of a street gang was therefore relevant and admissible to show whether a reasonable person with that knowledge would have apprehended a battery from another who was wearing those colors, acting belligerently toward the person and a loved one and carrying a gun.\nEven assuming that it was error for the trial court to admit this evidence, we disagree with respondents that it was reversible error. In view of Earlean\u2019s and George\u2019s testimony, discussed more fully below, that C.L. was carrying a gun and George\u2019s testimony that A.R. and C.L. discussed shooting, we do not believe that a trial free of this evidence would have produced a different result. It was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIn this regard, we disagree with respondents that the court compounded its error by barring evidence to rebut the inference of gang membership arising from Earlean\u2019s testimony. Respondents sought to introduce, through the testimony of Chicago police officer Ralph Gomez, the fact that the colors of Orr High School, near which this incident occurred, are black and gold. We agree with the State that Earlean\u2019s testimony was not introduced for the purpose of proving, or raising an improper inference of, gang membership. (See People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840, cert. denied (1971), 402 U.S. 972, 29 L. Ed. 2d 136, 91 S. Ct. 1658.) Therefore, the trial court need not have allowed respondents to rebut that inference. Moreover, absent an allegation that Earlean knew that the colors of Orr High School are black and gold, that fact was irrelevant to the reasonableness of her apprehension of receiving a battery by respondents.\nNor did the trial court compound its error by barring evidence that a \u201cCrazy C\u201d tattoo on C.L.\u2019s arm was not gang-related. Absent evidence that Earlean was aware of the tattoo, any evidence as to its meaning was irrelevant to the reasonableness of her apprehension of a battery. Moreover, police officer Gomez, through whom respondents also sought to adduce this evidence, answered \u201cno\u201d when asked whether he knew what a \u201cCrazy C\u201d signified. There was thus no foundation for any testimony by him as to the meaning of the tattoo.\nRespondents next contend that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Gomez\u2019 hearsay testimony that George Henderson told him that he and E arlean had a verbal altercation with two boys who had a gun and that A.R. was one of the boys.\nOfficer Gomez\u2019 testimony that Henderson identified A.R. as one of the boys was properly admitted under section 115 \u2014 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 12.) As required thereunder: (1) the out-of-court declarant, George Henderson, testified at respondents\u2019 trial and was subject to cross-examination and (2) the hearsay statement was one of identification of A.R. made after perceiving him. The hearsay statement was thus admissible as substantive and corroborative evidence. (People v. Davis (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 769, 771, 484 N.E.2d 1098.) People v. Johnson (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 836, 386 N.E.2d 642, cited by respondents, holds only that a hearsay statement of identification is inadmissible where, unlike here, the out-of-court declarant does not testify at trial and is thus not subject to cross-examination.\nMoreover, Officer Gomez\u2019 testimony that George Henderson told him that he and Earlean had an altercation with two boys who had a gun was not incompetent hearsay. In People v. Houston (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 209, 213, 315 N.E.2d 192, cert. denied (1975), 420 U.S. 936, 43 L. Ed. 2d 412, 95 S. Ct. 1145, a police officer testified that he had a conversation with the victim of an intimidation \u201c \u2018relative to two youths approaching *** and threatening her\u2019 \u201d and that, as a result of that conversation, he arrested the defendants. What the court stated in rejecting a hearsay challenge to that testimony is dispositive here:\n\u201cFor two reasons, we do not agree that what the officer related *** was hearsay. Primarily, the officer was testifying *** only to the fact of what he had been told by [the victim] and not to the substantive truth of her assertion that [the defendants] actually intimidated her, and thereafter, only to what he did as a result of the conversation. He was explaining how he had come to arrest appellants for the instant offense. [Citation.] Moreover, it is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination of the out-of-court declarant, whose assertion is being offered as substantive truth, that is the essential reason why the assertion must be rejected. [Citation.] Here, the out-of-court declarant *** testified in court and was thoroughly cross-examined by defense counsel. The rule against hearsay is not applicable to the facts of this case.\u201d Houston, 21 Ill. App. 3d at 213-14.\nRespondents next contend the trial court deprived them of their right to effective cross-examination (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV) by prohibiting them from asking Earlean whether she was drinking on October 22, 1986.\nWhen a defendant alleges the denial of the right of confrontation, the issue is whether the finder of fact was made aware of adequate factors to determine the witness\u2019 credibility, not whether any particular limitation has been placed on the defendant\u2019s ability to cross-examine the witness or whether the finder of fact has knowledge of any specific fact. (People v. Newman (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 43, 46, 462 N.E.2d 731; People v. Hines (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1048, 419 N.E.2d 420.) A review of the record convinces us that, except for the prohibition complained of, the trial court afforded respondents sufficient opportunity to bring such matters to its attention as the trier of fact and thus did not violate their right to effective cross-examination.\nRespondents note that evidence of intoxication or drinking around the time of an offense is admissible to attack a witness\u2019 perception and memory of the events to which she is testifying. They further note that such evidence is not collateral and may be introduced either in cross-examination or the defendant\u2019s case in chief. People v. DiMaso (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 338, 426 N.E.2d 972, the only case which respondents cite, and People v. Morris (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 406, 197 N.E.2d 433, the case underlying it, deal with situations where the principal issue is the identification of the accused. (Morris, 30 Ill. 2d at 409; DiMaso, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 342.) Here, however, identification was not the principal issue. Respondents never asserted at trial that they were the victims of mistaken identity. Morris and DiMaso do not require a finding of reversible error in the trial court\u2019s prohibition of further questioning of Earlean regarding her drinking on October 22, 1986.\nMoreover, respondents were not so prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s action that a new trial is required. Before the trial court prohibited further questioning of Earlean concerning her drinking, she thrice responded to individual queries, albeit over the State\u2019s sustained objections, that she did not even drink. Respondents also ignore that defense counsel was subsequently allowed to ask Earlean whether she had a beer in her hand when she first came out to the porch. Earlean denied this allegation. Finally, respondents were allowed to impeach Earlean\u2019s denials without objection when Tracy Smith testified that Earlean had a beer in her hand when she appeared on the front porch.\nTracy\u2019s testimony was the only evidence in the record that Ear-lean was drinking. Contrary to respondent\u2019s assertion at oral argument, no defense witness testified that Earlean was or appeared intoxicated. Earlean specifically denied that she had been drinking. Additionally, James Riddle, also a defense witness, testified that Ear-lean did not have anything in her hand when she appeared on the front porch. There is thus a paucity of evidence in the record that Earlean had been drinking on October 22, 1986. Given that fact and defense counsel\u2019s failure to make an offer of proof to support his questioning of Earlean about drinking, respondents cannot complain that they were denied effective cross-examination. Cf. People v. McCommon (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 853, 865, 399 N.E.2d 224 (no error in prohibiting cross-examination of State\u2019s witness regarding drug use where there was no record evidence that he was using drugs at any relevant time and defense counsel did not make an offer of proof to support his inquiry).\nRespondents next contend that they were not proved guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondents first assert that there was no evidence that Earlean apprehended receiving a battery from them and that the limited evidence of George\u2019s apprehension was controverted by his act of staying out on the porch while respondents talked about shooting, which was inconsistent with an apprehension of a battery.\nWe cannot agree. The existence of reasonable apprehension of a battery is a question for the trier of fact. Its determination will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (People v. Holverson (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 459, 460, 336 N.E.2d 88.) It is not necessary that a victim expressly testify that he was in apprehension of receiving a battery to sustain a conviction. Rather, the fact finder may infer reasonable apprehension of a battery from the facts of the case (People v. Chrisopulos (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 581, 402 N.E.2d 912), including the conduct of the defendant and the victim (see People v. Alexander (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 443, 447-48, 350 N.E.2d 144). We believe that the conduct of respondents and the alleged victims was sufficient for the trial court to infer the latter\u2019s reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery. We believe this notwithstanding Earlean\u2019s failure to expressly testify to such effect and George\u2019s allegedly inconsistent conduct.\nRespondents also assert that inconsistencies in Earlean\u2019s and George\u2019s testimony, coupled with the defense evidence that neither respondent had a gun, raised a reasonable doubt of guilt. Specifically, they assert that Earlean testified that George saw the gun first and told her that A.R. had a gun. They also note Earlean\u2019s testimony that George then pushed her inside and went in right behind her. In contrast, they assert, George testified that Earlean saw the gun first in C.L.\u2019s right hand and alerted him to that fact. They also note that George claimed he pushed Earlean inside but remained on the porch while A.R. and C.L. discussed whether they should shoot.\nPreliminarily, we find unavailing respondent\u2019s reliance on the discrepancy, if any, between the testimony of Earlean and George as to which respondent held the gun. The State never contended at trial that respondents had more than one gun between them. Obviously, therefore, the State was relying on accomplice liability as to one respondent. Which respondent held the gun was thus irrelevant to the State\u2019s case as long as it proved that one of them held it and that the other aided and abetted his conduct. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 5-1, 5-2.\nMoreover, respondents\u2019 contention that Earlean testified that she saw A.R. with the gun is without merit. Earlean testified on direct examination that, when he walked up to the porch after descending a second time to talk to A.R., George said, \u201cHe\u2019s really got a gun.\u201d She testified that she then turned around to look at A.R. before George pushed her inside. Thereafter, neither she nor the prosecutor named the boy who had the gun. Rather, they simply referred to \u201che,\u201d e.g., \u201che\u2019s got a gun,\u201d \u201c[h]e had the gun,\u201d \u201che held the gun.\u201d The fact that Earlean had turned around to look at A.R. does not compel the conclusion that A.R. was the \u201che\u201d to whom Earlean and the prosecutor referred as holding the gun. Finally, respondents ignore Earlean\u2019s testimony on cross-examination. Defense counsel asked Earlean whether C.L. had not dragged A.R. away after C.L. had told A.R. that he did not have to take \u201cthat shit.\u201d Earlean responded, \u201cWhen he said that, he had a gun in his hand. He was talking to [A.R.].\u201d Defense counsel later asked Earlean, \u201cYou never saw [C.L.] shoot the gun?\u201d and Earlean responded, \u201cI saw him with a gun.\u201d These references, unlike those in Earlean\u2019s direct testimony, were clearly to C.L., not A.R. Thus, Earlean, like George, testified that C.L. held the gun.\nWe also find no discrepancy between Earlean\u2019s and George\u2019s testimony regarding who saw the gun first. It is a reasonable inference from Earlean\u2019s testimony that George saw the gun first. However, George neither testified nor implied that Earlean saw the gun first. George testified that, after C.L. told A.R. he didn\u2019t have to take or listen to \u201cthat shit,\u201d C.L. approached him with an automatic pistol in his right hand. Only after so testifying did George state that Earlean told him \u201cthat boy has a gun.\u201d George\u2019s testimony thus corroborated Earlean\u2019s with respect to who saw the gun first. At most, it was inconsistent with hers as to who first told the other that one of the boys had a gun. That inconsistency is wholly inadequate to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt.\nEarlean also testified that, after George told her that \u201che\u201d had a gun and pushed her inside, \u201cwe went upstairs to call the police.\u201d George, on the other hand, testified on direct examination that he went upstairs and called the police after he heard respondents discuss whether they should shoot. Similarly, on cross-examination, George testified that after he pushed Earlean inside, he remained on the porch while respondents discussed shooting and then went inside to call the police.\nClearly, there was a discrepancy between George and Earlean as to when George went inside the house. However, it does not create a reasonable doubt of respondents\u2019 guilt. The discrepancy had no effect on the evidence regarding the elements of aggravated assault as to each victim. Specifically, it was unrelated to the issue and evidence of respondents\u2019 possession of a deadly weapon at the time of the incident. The State\u2019s evidence clearly proved that Earlean and George both saw C.L. with a gun. Moreover, respondents\u2019 conduct prior to the point in time at which Earlean and George saw C.L. carrying a gun and the fact that they saw C.L. doing so were sufficient grounds for the trial court to infer that both Earlean and George reasonably apprehended a battery from respondents. As such, whether George went inside right behind Earlean or stayed out on the porch and heard respondents discuss shooting is irrelevant.\nIn sum, the inconsistencies between Earlean\u2019s and George\u2019s testimony, either alone or together with the defense evidence, do not render the State\u2019s evidence in toto so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory that they cast a reasonable doubt upon respondent\u2019s guilt. (See, e.g., People v. Holiday (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d 753, 474 N.E.2d 1280.) Regarding the defense evidence that neither respondent had a gun but that C.L. was holding a silver belt buckle, it is axiomatic that a court of review will not substitute its judgment for the trier of fact where the evidence is merely conflicting. People v. Daniels (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 894, 473 N.E.2d 517; People v. Porterfield (1971), 131 Ill. App. 2d 167, 268 N.E.2d 537.\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in its entirety.\nAffirmed.\nMcNAMARA and RIZZI, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re C.L. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Ap-pellee, v. C.L. et al., Minors, Respondents-Appellants.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNos. 1\u201487\u20140245, 1\u201487\u20140247 cons.\nOpinion filed February 22, 1989.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago, for appellants.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, for the People." }, "file_name": "0173-01", "first_page_order": 195, "last_page_order": 206 }