{
  "id": 2615660,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. MARJORIE BROWNING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORMAN MELTON, JR., Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Browning v. Melton",
  "decision_date": "1989-03-09",
  "docket_number": "No. 5-87-0700",
  "first_page": "519",
  "last_page": "522",
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:06:12.370658+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE ex rel. MARJORIE BROWNING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORMAN MELTON, JR., Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE HOWERTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe People of the State of Illinois sued defendant under section 10 \u2014 10 of the Illinois Public Aid Code (Public Aid Code) to recover the public aid money that had been paid to Robert Melton, defendant\u2019s minor son, for Robert\u2019s support. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 10\u2014 10.\nThe circuit court refused to apply the guidelines contained in section 505 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Dissolution Act) when the amount of the support was determined. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 505.) The circuit court found that the guidelines did not apply to proceedings brought under the Public Aid Code.\nThe People appeal that ruling.\nWe, therefore, are presented with the question of whether the guidelines for determining support contained in the Dissolution Act must be followed when a court determines support in cases brought under the Public Aid Code.\nWe hold they do.\nThe Public Aid Code provides that an action may be brought to recover aid granted during the period support was not provided and to obtain future support.\nIn determining the amount of support, the Public Aid Code provides, \u201c[t]he court shall determine the amount of child support by using the guidelines and standards set forth in subsection (a) of Section 505 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 10 \u2014 10.\nAlthough there is no case on point, we have benefit of reasoning provided by the supreme court of Illinois in People ex rel. Sheppard v. Money (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 265, 529 N.E.2d 542. The supreme court decided Sheppard after the circuit court entered its order in this case.\nSheppard was brought under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2501 et seq.).\nThe Parentage Act provided that the guidelines contained in the Dissolution Act \u201cshall\u201d apply to determinations of support in cases brought under the Parentage Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2514(a).) Sheppard held that use of the guidelines for determining support contained in the Dissolution Act was mandatory in cases brought for support under the Parentage Act. 124 Ill. 2d at 286, 529 N.E.2d at 552.\nSheppard was statutory construction.\nThe word \u201cshall\u201d usually indicates a mandatory obligation unless the statute indicates otherwise. People v. Gerke (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 85, 525 N.E.2d 68.\nWe believe that the same reasoning should apply to cases brought under the Public Aid Code.\nThe Parentage Act says the support guidelines contained in the Dissolution Act \u201cshall\u201d be used to determine support in cases brought under the Parentage Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2514(a).\nThe Public Aid Code says the support guidelines contained in the Dissolution Act \u201cshall\u201d be used to determine support cases brought under the Public Aid Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 10-10.\nThe wording is identical, the statutes parallel.\nFurthermore, both have a common purpose. Both announce a firm policy that parents are to support their children. Both provide a method to enforce that policy. Since there is a common purpose, there is no reason to stray from the supreme court\u2019s rationale in Sheppard.\nThe guidelines for determining support contained in the Dissolution Act apply to cases for support brought under the Public Aid Code.\nAlthough these guidelines apply, a court need not follow these guidelines in all cases. In appropriate cases, the trial court may enter an order for support in an amount less than that prescribed in the Dissolution Act. However, in that instance, the court must enter express findings upon which the deviation rests. 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 505.\nIn this case, the circuit court found that even if the guidelines applied, the defendant\u2019s financial circumstances required the entry of an order for support in an amount less than the guidelines, because \u201cthe circumstances of the defendant are broader in scope than just the needs of Robert Melton in that demands are placed upon defendant from other jurisdictions for other children and for debts other than the standard debts of his personal household, and the child support guidelines shall not control in determining the amount of support.\u201d\nWe do not believe that these are the types of express findings contemplated by the Dissolution Act.\nThis case, therefore, is reversed and remanded for rehearing.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nHARRISON and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE HOWERTON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Karen Konieczny, Special Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "No brief filed for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. MARJORIE BROWNING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORMAN MELTON, JR., Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5-87-0700\nOpinion filed March 9, 1989.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Karen Konieczny, Special Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nNo brief filed for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0519-01",
  "first_page_order": 541,
  "last_page_order": 544
}