{
  "id": 2613168,
  "name": "JAMES KINDRED, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Appellees (International Harvester, Respondent)",
  "name_abbreviation": "Kindred v. Human Rights Commission",
  "decision_date": "1989-03-17",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201488\u20140320",
  "first_page": "766",
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:06:12.370658+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "JAMES KINDRED, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Appellees (International Harvester, Respondent)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Illinois Human Rights Commission (Commission) found that the respondent, International Harvester, had not terminated the petitioner\u2019s employment because of his age. The petitioner, James Kindred, appeals.\nThe record shows that on September 10, 1982, the respondent terminated the 52-year-old petitioner\u2019s employment after 30 years of service. The respondent had been suffering serious financial problems since 1980. The petitioner\u2019s termination was part of a massive workforce reduction which resulted in approximately 3,800 layoffs out of 4,350 total employees.\nDuring his employment with the respondent, the petitioner worked in the plant protection department. Starting as a plant guard, he eventually worked his way up to chief of the department. After suffering a heart attack, he voluntarily stepped down in 1978 from the chief's post and worked as a lieutenant until his termination.\nAt the time of the petitioner\u2019s termination, his department had one chief and three lieutenants. Chief James Dickey was 41 years old. Lieutenants Morris Chambers and Lynn Klarkowski were, respectively, 40 and 30 years old. As part of the work-force reduction, one lieutenant\u2019s position was eliminated.\nTom Hansen, the respondent\u2019s director of human resources, discussed the situation with Dickey and decided to discharge the petitioner. He further decided to move Ronald Bjork, the 43-year-old plant safety supervisor, to the plant protection department. Hansen testified that he retained Bjork because, among other reasons, he had more experience in plant safety than did the petitioner. He retained Chambers because he had greater growth potential, had an advanced degree, had excellent writing and verbal skills, had developed the respondent\u2019s fire fighting plan, and had had better evaluations than the petitioner. He stated that he kept Klarkowski because she was promotable, was equally qualified with the petitioner, and was a woman.\nThe petitioner argued before the Commission that Hansen\u2019s reasons were pretextual and hid age discrimination. In support of his position, the petitioner presented evidence that he was more experienced and more qualified than several of the retained personnel.\nThe administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the petitioner had proved a prima facie case of age discrimination and that the respondent had in turn articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the petitioner\u2019s discharge. The ALJ further found that the petitioner had failed to show direct evidence of age discrimination and had failed to show that the respondent\u2019s reasons were pretexts for age discrimination. The ALJ therefore recommended that the Commission dismiss the petitioner\u2019s complaint. The Commission subsequently dismissed the complaint with prejudice.\nOn appeal, the petitioner first argues that the Commission placed an improper burden of proof on him. The petitioner contends that instead of requiring him to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence, the Commission required him to prove that his credentials were so superior that the reasons articulated by his employer were unworthy of credence.\nIn an age discrimination suit, the employee may prove his case with either direct or circumstantial evidence. (McNeil v. Economics Laboratory, Inc. (7th Cir. 1986), 800 F.2d Ill.) In the indirect case, the employee must first prove a prima facie case of age discrimination. If the employer then articulates a lawful reason for the employee\u2019s dismissal, the employee has the burden of proving that the reason given by the employer is merely a pretext by showing that the discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or that the employer\u2019s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. LaMontagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc. (7th Cir. 1984), 750 F.2d 1405.\nWe find the petitioner\u2019s argument unpersuasive. The petitioner\u2019s prima facie case was based on the circumstantial evidence that his credentials were superior to the credentials of several of the retained personnel. The respondent then articulated apparently legitimate reasons for its determination that the retained personnel had better credentials. At that point, the petitioner did not have to merely prove that his credentials were in fact superior. He had to prove that their superiority was so obvious that the respondent\u2019s reasoning was unbelievable and must be construed as merely a pretext for age discrimination. Accordingly, the Commission correctly paraphrased the La Montagne burden of proof to fit the facts of the instant case.\nThe petitioner\u2019s second argument on appeal is that the ALJ erred in refusing to allow one of the respondent\u2019s guards to testify that Chambers had told him that Dickey had stated that the petitioner was too old for his job. He notes that this would have been direct evidence of age discrimination.\nWe agree with the petitioner that Dickey\u2019s alleged statement to Chambers was not hearsay, because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. (Lundberg v. Church Farm, Inc. (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 452, 502 N.E.2d 806.) However, we find that Chambers\u2019 alleged statement to the guard was hearsay. It was offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Dickey had made the alleged statement to Chambers. Further, Chambers\u2019 alleged statement was not admissible under the state-of-mind exception to the prohibition on hearsay statements (People v. Jones (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 896, 406 N.E.2d 112), because at most it could only have shown Chambers\u2019 state of mind. Dickey\u2019s state of mind, not Chambers\u2019, was the relevant issue.\nThe petitioner\u2019s third argument on appeal is that the ALJ erred in barring his testimony regarding Chambers\u2019 qualifications.\nIn limited instances, a lay witness may give his opinions or conclusions about facts in issue. (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Short (1970), 125 Ill. App. 2d 97, 260 N.E.2d 415.) In order for such testimony to be admissible, the court must find that the witness\u2019 testimony is based upon his personal observation and recollection of concrete facts. (Freeding-Skokie Roll-Off Service, Inc. v. Hamilton (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 217, 483 N.E.2d 524.) Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and may be disturbed on appeal only when they constitute an abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Weir (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 18, 458 N.E.2d 134.\nIn the instant case, the petitioner sought to give his opinion on Chambers\u2019 credentials. The record shows, however, that he had had very little opportunity to personally observe Chambers\u2019 work. Instead, the petitioner would have based his opinion on other parties\u2019 statements about Chambers and on conversations he and Chambers had when one was finishing his shift and the other was starting. Under these circumstances, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion in refusing to admit the evidence.\nThe judgment of the Human Rights Commission is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSCOTT and STOUDER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOMBACHER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Richard M. Batcher, of Bozeman, Neighbour, Patton & Noe, of Moline, for petitioner.",
      "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Diane Curry-Grap-sas, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Human Rights Commission.",
      "Oliver W. Loewy and Janet L. Jannusch, both of Keck, Mahin & Cate, of Peoria, for respondent International Harvester."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JAMES KINDRED, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Appellees (International Harvester, Respondent).\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201488\u20140320\nOpinion filed March 17, 1989.\nRichard M. Batcher, of Bozeman, Neighbour, Patton & Noe, of Moline, for petitioner.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Diane Curry-Grap-sas, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Human Rights Commission.\nOliver W. Loewy and Janet L. Jannusch, both of Keck, Mahin & Cate, of Peoria, for respondent International Harvester."
  },
  "file_name": "0766-01",
  "first_page_order": 788,
  "last_page_order": 791
}