{ "id": 2615258, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOUIS HOLMES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Holmes", "decision_date": "1989-03-29", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201488\u20140054", "first_page": "870", "last_page": "875", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 870" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 1279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 1015", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5620518 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/1015-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5639770 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 1329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166824 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S. Ct. 298", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 898", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6437602 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0898-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3193825 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166824 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0386-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 621, "char_count": 12035, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.593988230871876e-08, "percentile": 0.4498825993330113 }, "sha256": "6f9ab310a4fae4dd0dbaa0fd8d8180080170ed0b2942c19e632a5405c6754ec6", "simhash": "1:b042b06f37489df1", "word_count": 1988 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:06:12.370658+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOUIS HOLMES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCOTT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, the defendant, Louis Holmes, was found guilty of misdemeanor unlawful possession of cannabis (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 5Q1k, par. 704(c)). The defendant was then sentenced to 12 months\u2019 probation and fined $300. He appeals.\nThe record reveals that on August 22, 1986, Galesburg police officer John Woolsey was dispatched to investigate an anonymous tip that cannabis was growing in the backyard of the defendant\u2019s residence. Upon arriving at the defendant\u2019s residence, Officer Woolsey knocked on the door. Tiffany Holmes, the defendant\u2019s 11-year-old daughter, answered and advised the officer that her parents were not home. Officer Woolsey explained his reason for being there and asked her if it would be all right to look around the yard and garage area. Tiffany replied that Officer Woolsey could go into the backyard.\nOfficer Woolsey then proceeded to enter the backyard of the defendant\u2019s next-door neighbor. From this vantage point in the neighbor\u2019s yard, Officer Woolsey observed what appeared to be cannabis plants growing in the defendant\u2019s backyard. Officer Woolsey observed a plant approximately four feet tall growing out of a crack in the cement directly in front of the defendant\u2019s garage. He also observed two pots that appeared to have cannabis growing in them. Officer Woolsey then radioed for assistance, and while waiting, moved his squad car around to the defendant\u2019s garage so that he could secure the evidence.\nAfter Officer Barney Price arrived, the two officers entered the defendant\u2019s property without a warrant and began pulling up cannabis plants. As the two officers were attempting to cut down the large four-foot plant growing through the crack in the cement, Officer Price happened to look through a window in the defendant\u2019s garage door and observed a Styrofoam cooler that had cannabis leaves laid out on top of it. The officers immediately entered the garage and seized the cannabis and cooler.\nThree days after the seizure of the cannabis, the defendant appeared at the police station for an interview. During the interview, the defendant acknowledged that he was aware of the two potted plants and the container of leaves in the garage, but he denied knowing it was cannabis. Subsequently, the defendant was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of cannabis. The defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the seized evidence was denied, and he was later tried before a jury.\nOne of the jurors selected was Irene Welsch, who lived four houses away from the defendant. During voir dire she admitted having heard neighborhood talk about the defendant, but failed to indicate that she had had contact with the defendant\u2019s wife. Welsch also remained silent when the court asked all of the veniremen whether there was \u201c[ajnything I haven\u2019t asked you about, any outside pressure or problems, anything that may be weighing on your mind that might make it difficult for you to decide this case today or give this case your full attention?\u201d\nLate on the last day of trial, the defendant became aware of a three-week-old dispute between his wife and juror Welsch. The dispute involved a verbal confrontation between the defendant\u2019s wife and Welsch. The defendant was unable to communicate the existence of this dispute to his counsel until after the jury had retired to begin deliberations.\nAfter deliberating, the jury returned a guilty verdict. As a result, the defendant filed a post-trial motion for a new trial, alleging that the failure of juror Welsch to disclose the altercation denied him his right to an impartial jury. The defendant also asserted that the trial court had erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress. The court subsequently denied the defendant\u2019s post-trial motion.\nOn appeal, the defendant argues that he should be granted a new trial because juror Welsch misled him into believing she was impartial. At the hearing on the defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial, the defendant\u2019s wife testified that she had had a number of verbal altercations with Welsch in the several weeks immediately preceding the jury selection. Mrs. Holmes testified that during the altercation Welsch accused the defendant\u2019s children and pets of trespassing on and littering Welsch\u2019s property. Mrs. Holmes further stated that she had not informed her husband of her relationship with Welsch prior to trial because she was not aware that Welsch was being considered as a juror.\nThe general rule in cases involving information not disclosed during voir dire is that a motion for a new trial will not be granted unless it is established that prejudice resulted; this determination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Porter (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 386, 489 N.E.2d 1329.) Mere suspicion of bias or partiality is not sufficient to disqualify a juror. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267.) However, where a juror affirmatively deceives or misleads the court by falsely testifying that she is unprejudiced or impartial, it is a general rule that upon discovery of the deceit after the verdict, a new trial will be ordered. People v. Oliver (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 665, 365 N.E.2d 618.\nApplying the above principles to the instant case, we find that the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Juror Welsch did not divulge the whole truth about her relationship with the defendant and his wife. At the hearing on his motion for a new trial, the defendant presented unrebutted evidence showing that Welsch had significant hidden reasons for being prejudiced against him. Further, it is clear that Welsch\u2019s silence effectively precluded the defendant\u2019s earlier discovery of her prejudices. We therefore find that the defendant met his burden of establishing that Welsch\u2019s relationship with him was of such a character that a presumption of prejudice arose. Since the State did not rebut this presumption, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant a new trial. See People v. Porter (1986), Ill 111. 2d 386, 489 N.E.2d 1329.\nThe defendant\u2019s second argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence. The defendant argues that no exceptions to the warrant requirement were present in this case. We .will address this contention since it is likely to be an issue on remand.\nWe agree with the trial court\u2019s finding denying the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. A minor child living at home is competent to give lawful consent to search; age alone is never an automatic barrier to capacity to consent. (People v. Swansey (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 379 N.E.2d 1279.) It is clear from the record that the defendant\u2019s 11-year-old daughter gave the police her consent to search the backyard. Further, the record shows that Tiffany was often left alone to babysit her younger brother, a fact which supports a finding that Tiffany had sufficient capacity to consent. We therefore conclude that Tiffany validly consented to the search and the trial court correctly denied the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Additionally, we note that the defendant\u2019s argument that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is rendered moot by our reversal of his conviction.\nWe do not deem it necessary to be repetitive by again setting forth the facts since it is evident that at the defendant\u2019s trial there was sufficient evidence presented to support a conviction. For the reasons stated, we do conclude that defendant is entitled to a new trial and, accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Knox County and remand this case for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nSTOUDER, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCOTT" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HEIPLE,\ndissenting:\nThe defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on juror Welsch\u2019s failure to disclose an ongoing dispute she had with the defendant\u2019s wife and children. The majority agrees with the defendant and has reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. I disagree with the reasoning and result reached.\nInitially, the majority should have determined that the defendant waived consideration of the alleged error by failing to bring it to the attention of the trial court during the proceedings at a time when the court could have easily investigated the matter and ascertained whether curative measures were needed. In his motion for a new trial, the defendant admitted that he became aware of juror Welsch\u2019s possible bias late on the final day of trial and that his counsel was aware of the situation after the case was submitted to the jury. Inexplicably, however, the defendant and his attorney sat idly by and raised the issue of juror Welsch\u2019s potential bias only after the jury returned a guilty verdict. Since the defendant failed to bring the matter to the court\u2019s attention before the jury, completed its deliberations, when he could and should have done so, he has waived the point for review. See Zukosky v. Grounds (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 355.\nWith regard to the merits of the appeal, I disagree with the majority\u2019s reasoning and result. The relevant legal rules are correctly stated by the majority. The first rule is that in cases such as this, involving information which is not disclosed by a juror during voir dire, a motion for a new trial will not be granted unless it is established that prejudice resulted. (People v. Porter (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 386, cert. denied (1986), 479 U.S. 898, 93 L. Ed. 2d 272, 107 S. Ct. 298.) Mere suspicion of bias or partiality is not sufficient to disqualify a juror. The second rule is that whether the motion for a new trial is granted is a matter resting within the trial court\u2019s sound discretion. (Porter, 111 Ill. 2d at 403.) The trial court\u2019s decision denying the motion for a new trial in the case before us does not represent an abuse of discretion; the defendant did not sustain his burden of proof on this issue.\nThe majority stated that the defendant presented evidence that the juror had \u201csignificant hidden reasons for being prejudiced\u201d against the defendant. (180 HI. App. 3d at 873.) The majority also determined that the juror\u2019s relationship with the defendant was of such a character that a presumption of prejudice arose. The record is void of support for either of these findings. In fact, the defendant concedes in his brief that \u201cthe dispute between Juror Welsch and the defendant\u2019s wife does not mean Welsch was not impartial.\u201d Thus, there is no presumption of prejudice here, and the majority has based its decision on the mere suspicion of bias or prejudice. As noted above and as the majority acknowledged, mere suspicion is not sufficient.\nFurthermore, during voir dire, juror Welsch indicated she felt she could be fair and impartial. The juror acknowledged that she had heard neighborhood talk about the case, but indicated it would not interfere with her ability to give the defendant a fair trial. Additionally, in response to a question from defense counsel, juror Welsch indicated that if the State failed to prove the defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, she would not hesitate to return a verdict of not guilty. Finally, the dispute was between the juror and the defendant\u2019s wife, not the defendant, whom the juror characterized only as an acquaintance.\nIn summary, the defendant failed to establish that his relationship with the juror was of such a character that a presumption of prejudice arose, and the defendant did not show that he was actually prejudiced. This court should have ruled that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, I dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE HEIPLE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Warren T. McNeill, of Monmouth, for appellant.", "Raymond Kimbell III, State\u2019s Attorney, of Galesburg (Judith Z. Kelly, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOUIS HOLMES, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201488\u20140054\nOpinion filed March 29, 1989.\nHEIPLE, J., dissenting.\nWarren T. McNeill, of Monmouth, for appellant.\nRaymond Kimbell III, State\u2019s Attorney, of Galesburg (Judith Z. Kelly, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0870-01", "first_page_order": 892, "last_page_order": 897 }