{
  "id": 8498456,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PAUL E. DUFF, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Duff",
  "decision_date": "1989-03-31",
  "docket_number": "No. 2\u201488\u20140811",
  "first_page": "324",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "McLAREN and DUNN, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PAUL E. DUFF, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nPlaintiff appeals an order of the circuit court of Du Page County granting a judicial driving permit (JDP) to defendant, Paul Duff. The Attorney General raises one issue on appeal: whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting a JDP to defendant, who was not a first offender within the meaning of section 6 \u2014 206.1(B) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6-206.1(B)).\nAlthough no appellee\u2019s brief has been filed in response, we will consider the appeal under the standards set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128.\nOn April 17, 1988, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11-501). Defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was summarily suspended, and the notice of suspension indicated that defendant was not a first offender under the definition set forth in section 11 \u2014 500 of the Vehicle Code. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 11-500, 11-501.1.\nOn May 25, 1988, defendant petitioned for a JDP to relieve undue hardship. Attached to the petition was an abstract of defendant\u2019s driving record from the Secretary of State\u2019s office. The abstract showed that two dispositions had taken place on January 11, 1984, regarding an arrest on December 12, 1983. The court granted the JDP to defendant for the purpose of driving within the scope of defendant\u2019s employment. The Secretary of State requested that the court review its decision to issue the JDP because defendant was a second offender for DUI. On July 12, 1988, after a hearing on the matter, the court issued a final order directing the Secretary of State to issue a JDP to defendant. The plaintiff then filed this appeal.\nOn appeal, plaintiff contends that the court should not have granted the JDP to defendant because he is not a first offender. When construing statutes, courts must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. (People v. O\u2019Donnell (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 517, 522.) The purpose of the summary suspension framework is protection of highway travelers. (Koss v. Slater (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 389, 395.) To interpret the statute, we must look to the language of the statute itself. (Niven v. Siqueira (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 357, 365.) Here, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.\nSection 6 \u2014 206.1(B) of the Vehicle Code provides that a driver who is impaired by alcohol is a threat to public safety and that, to provide a deterrent to driving while intoxicated and to remove impaired drivers from the roads, the State may summarily suspend a driver\u2019s license. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 206.1(B).) The section further provides:\n\u201c[W]henever a first offender is arrested for any offense as defined in Section 11 \u2014 501 ***:\n(a) Subsequent to a notification of a statutory summary suspension of driving privileges as provided in Section 11 \u2014 501.1, the first offender as defined in Section 11 \u2014 500 may petition the circuit court of venue for a Judicial Driving Permit ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6-206.1(B)(a).)\nA first offender is defined as:\n\u201c[A]ny person who has not had a previous conviction or court assigned supervision for violating Section 11 \u2014 501 *** within the last 5 years ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 500.\nThe plaintiff argues that defendant was not a first offender because he had a court supervision for DUI within the last five years'. Defendant was assigned supervision for DUI on January 11, 1984. The five-year time period did not expire until January 11, 1989, and the JDP was issued on May 25, 1988. Thus, if defendant had received supervision for DUI on January 11, 1984, defendant was not a first offender within the meaning of the statute.\nDefendant argued at the hearing that he qualified as a first offender because the DUI charge of December 12, 1983, was subsequently reduced to a charge of improper lane usage. This interpretation of the abstract is erroneous. The trial court's confusion over whether defendant\u2019s driving record included a supervision for a DUI offense is understandable because the State, in the trial court and on appeal, failed to explain adequately the coding system of the Secretary of State\u2019s abstract of defendant\u2019s driving record. In spite of this omission, we have deciphered the code.\nThe first column on the abstract is titled \u201cType Action.\u201d This column is a list of numbers, the meanings of which are listed on the back of the abstract. The fourth column from the left is entitled \u201cAuthority Section Doc. Ctrl. No. Test Res.\u201d This column refers to the section of the Vehicle Code under which the State has proceeded. The seventh column from the left is entitled \u201cAction Reference Information.\u201d This column also refers to a section of the Vehicle Code.\nThe two pertinent actions were the two orders on January 11, 1984. The first of these has a \u201c55\u201d in the \u201cType Action\u201d column. The 55 stands for \u201cDriver Remedial Program.\u201d This remedial program was imposed under \u201c6 117E\u201d in the \u201cAuthority Section\u201d column. Section 6 \u2014 117(e) of the Vehicle Code provides that \u201c[t]he Secretary of State shall also maintain appropriate records relative to a driver\u2019s referral to a driver remedial or rehabilitative program, as required by the Secretary of State or the courts.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 117(e).) In the \u201cAction Reference Information\u201d column is the code 11 \u2014 501. Section 11 \u2014 501 of the Vehicle Code is the DUI statute.\nThe abstract reveals that the conviction on January 11, 1984, was for improper lane usage under section 11 \u2014 709. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 709.) The driver remedial program, supervision, was for the DUI offense. Thus, defendant had a previous court-assigned supervision for DUI -within five years of his petition for a JDP. As such, defendant does not fall within the first offender category and is therefore ineligible to receive a JDP. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a JDP to defendant who was not a first offender as required by the statute.\nThe order of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed.\nReversed.\nMcLAREN and DUNN, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE UNVERZAGT"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Rosalyn B. Kaplan and Kimary Lee, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.",
      "No brief filed for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PAUL E. DUFF, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201488\u20140811\nOpinion filed March 31, 1989.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Rosalyn B. Kaplan and Kimary Lee, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.\nNo brief filed for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0324-01",
  "first_page_order": 346,
  "last_page_order": 348
}