{ "id": 8499237, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD JOCELYN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jocelyn", "decision_date": "1989-04-20", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201488\u20140638", "first_page": "774", "last_page": "778", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 774" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3261100 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 N.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3529624 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 847", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3386864 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "855" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0847-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 460, "char_count": 8498, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.147758866476958e-07, "percentile": 0.5806274805982897 }, "sha256": "87824f607e3313f772d2a217cb44d4d00feff598341b8c0d88db14da860517f0", "simhash": "1:fad2450f3355f717", "word_count": 1392 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:30:31.344826+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "McCULLOUGH, P.J., and KNECHT, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD JOCELYN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nOn July 11, 1988, following a bench trial in the circuit court of Champaign County, defendant Ronald E. Jocelyn was convicted of the offense of escape in violation of section 3 \u2014 6\u20144 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1003 \u2014 6\u20144). He was subsequently sentenced to a term of two years\u2019 imprisonment, with the sentence to be served' consecutive to the sentence he was then serving.\nOn appeal, defendant maintains (1) his waiver of jury trial was not knowingly and intelligently made; (2) he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing; and (3) the double jeopardy clause requires the two-year sentence of imprisonment be vacated and the conviction reversed without remand. We affirm.\nPrior to accepting defendant\u2019s waiver of a jury trial, the court advised defendant of the nature of the charge against him, the possible sentences he could receive, and his right to a jury trial. In admonishing defendant of the possible sentences he could receive, the court stated (1) the offense of escape was a Class 3 felony; (2) he could receive a sentence of not less than two years and not more than five years and would be required to serve a period of mandatory supervised release; and (3) any sentence imposed would be consecutive to the remainder of the sentence he was serving at the time the escape offense occurred. The court then asked if probation or conditional discharge were available. Defense counsel indicated probation was a possible sentence, and the court admonished defendant of the details of a probation or conditional discharge sentence.\nFollowing these admonishments, defendant said he was prepared to enter into a written stipulation as to what the State\u2019s evidence would be if witnesses were called to testify. The written stipulation indicated in part that defendant was a person committed to the Illinois Department of Corrections, was involved in a work release program, and, on April 3, 1988, did not return to the correctional center after leaving work until several hours after he should have returned.\nAt the sentencing hearing, Max Pridemore, a correctional officer, testified that he had seen defendant on August 22, 1988, at the Champaign County Correctional Center when defendant said he was going to \u201ckick Mr. Wennmaker\u2019s ass when [he got] out of [there].\u201d Wennmaker was employed at the work release center. The State then requested the maximum term of imprisonment. Defense counsel pointed out that defendant did return to the center of his own accord, albeit six to seven hours late, and then requested that defendant be placed on probation for a period of 30 months.\nAt sentencing, in discussing the availability of probation, the court cited section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(g) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code), which provides:\n\u201cA sentence under Section 3 \u2014 6\u20144 for escape or attempted escape shall be served consecutive to the terms under which the offender is held by the Department of Corrections.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20144(g).)\nThe court further found that the Code does not allow the court to impose consecutive sentences of probation. Section 5 \u2014 6\u20142 of the Code provides:\n\u201cMultiple terms of probation imposed at the same time shall run concurrently.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u2014 2(b).)\nThe court then indicated \u201cthe logic underlying that provision would certainly seem to apply here.\u201d The court thus apparently concluded, based on these two sections, that since any sentence imposed for escape must be consecutive to the original term of imprisonment, and since terms of probation could not run consecutively, a sentence of probation was not available for a conviction of escape.\nDefendant first argues his waiver of a jury trial was not voluntarily or intelligently made, since, at the time he waived his right to a jury trial the court informed him he was eligible for probation, but at sentencing, the court indicated a belief that defendant was not eligible. Defendant maintains, therefore, that he should receive a new trial.\nDefendant cites no case where a jury waiver was held invalid because of improper admonitions regarding the availability of probation as a sentencing option. However, we need not determine whether such improper admonitions would vitiate the admonitions, because the court was correct in its initial determination that probation was available.\nWe note the legislature has not expressly provided for this particular situation. However, section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(b) of the Code enumerates the available options for sentencing, including a period of probation, a term of periodic imprisonment, a term of conditional discharge, and a term of imprisonment, \u201calone or in combination\u201d for felonies such as those here. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143(b).) Section 5 \u2014 6\u20143(e) also provides the court with the option of combining a sentence of periodic imprisonment with a sentence of probation or conditional discharge. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20143(e).\nWe also note that the fifth district has interpreted section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 of the Code and has concluded that it applies only to multiple terms of probation imposed at the same time. (People v. Gischer (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 847, 366 N.E.2d 521.) However, that court determined that terms of probation \u201cnot imposed at the same time and not for the same offense may run consecutively.\u201d Gischer, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 855, 366 N.E.2d at 527.\nThus, we conclude that section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(b) of the Code, together with sections 5 \u2014 8\u20144(g) and 5 \u2014 6\u20142(b), allow a sentence of probation as an available option following a conviction of escape and that the sentence of probation must run consecutive to the underlying term of imprisonment a defendant is currently serving. Since the legislature has specifically provided for an increased penalty following a conviction for escape, this determination does not depart from the conclusion of the second district that, absent express legislative authorization, a sentence of probation to be served consecutive to a sentence of imprisonment for a separate offense was not a sentence authorized under the Code, because it improperly enhanced the penalties. (People v. Mack (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 788, 794, 479 N.E.2d 445, 449.) The period of probation would commence when the period of mandatory supervised release was complete. Defendant was correctly informed, at the time he waived his right to a jury trial, that probation was among the sentences available to him.\nMoreover, defendant is not, as he next argues, entitled to a new sentencing hearing. Although the court expressed the mistaken belief that probation was not a sentencing option available under the Code, the court also noted at the sentencing hearing that even if probation were an available option, the court would not give it. The court determined defendant\u2019s conduct, in threatening Wennmaker, was \u201ctoo blatant *** too outrageous and too intolerable\u201d and showed defendant did not seriously regard the rules governing his incarceration and did not respect the officers supervising his incarceration. The court then gave the minimum sentence of imprisonment. Any error in the court\u2019s determination that probation was not an option available to him was clearly harmless.\nFinally, the defendant argues the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibited a criminal conviction for escape after defendant was subjected to internal prison disciplinary proceedings in which his 360 days of accumulated good time were revoked.\nThis issue was raised and rejected by the third district in People v. Lewis (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 361, 386 N.E.2d 910. That court relied on a number of Federal cases which held that administrative discipline of a prisoner does not prohibit criminal prosecution for the same event.\nDefendant urges this court to reject Lewis. We decline the invitation to do so.\nAccordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, P.J., and KNECHT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Jane Raley, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Rebecca L. White, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD JOCELYN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201488\u20140638\nOpinion filed April 20, 1989.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Jane Raley, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Rebecca L. White, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0774-01", "first_page_order": 796, "last_page_order": 800 }