{ "id": 8499284, "name": "THOMAS NETZEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Netzel v. United Parcel Service, Inc.", "decision_date": "1989-03-29", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201485\u20141606", "first_page": "808", "last_page": "818", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 808" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "393 N.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3269802 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2983361 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 N.E.2d 1037", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3158933 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3131077 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 1242", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3316052 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 1145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 1078", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3227362 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/1078-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3370200 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429143 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 1285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3603966 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3175814 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3519110 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 792", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10002 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S. Ct. 3248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 L. Ed. 2d 779", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "483 U.S. 1032", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 28360, 28069, 28037, 28143 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/1032-02", "/us/483/1032-04", "/us/483/1032-01", "/us/483/1032-03" ] }, { "cite": "503 N.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179915 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6218054 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7185", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3615155 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0685-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 918, "char_count": 22019, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.88253377360407e-07, "percentile": 0.8436740906516171 }, "sha256": "da6aec8196e3cd3f2ece8a1d47d31aafc0203b57e5151bbf78805a53fed42243", "simhash": "1:abec611c7a8f7de4", "word_count": 3637 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:30:31.344826+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "McNAMARA and WHITE, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THOMAS NETZEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the oninion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Thomas Netzel, appeals from the trial court\u2019s grant of a new trial on both liability and damages in his suit for retaliatory discharge against defendant, United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS). At trial, a jury found in plaintiff\u2019s favor and awarded him $200,000 in compensatory damages.\nThis court\u2019s prior opinion (Netzel v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (1987), 165 Ill. App. 3d 685, 520 N.E.2d 665), finding that plaintiff\u2019s claim for retaliatory discharge had been preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. \u00a7185(a) (1976)), was reversed by the supreme court in a supervisory order based on, inter alia, Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988), 486 U.S. _, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410, 108 S. Ct. 1877, and Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp. (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 308, cert. denied (1987), 483 U.S. 1032, 97 L. Ed. 2d 779, 107 S. Ct. 3248.\nPlaintiff injured his knee while working as a package car driver for UPS on June 7, 1977. Plaintiff was off the job for extended periods in between which he unsuccessfully attempted to return to work. Plaintiff filed a claim under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) on July 12, 1978. On June 7, 1977, and three subsequent occasions on which he attempted to return to work, including August 7, 1979, the date of his discharge, plaintiff could not continue his route of package deliveries and pick-ups due to pain and swelling in his knee. On June 7, 1977, and the two occasions prior to his discharge when he could not continue working, a supervisor granted plaintiff permission to return to the UPS distribution center with undelivered packages or \u201cNDA\u2019s\u201d (no delivery attempted). Plaintiff maintained at trial that- he was also given permission to return to the distribution center on August 7, 1979. Defendant maintained that plaintiff was ordered to remain on his route until a supervisor went out to assist him in completing his route.\nAfter his discharge, plaintiff sued, alleging he was discharged in violation of section 4(h) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.4(h)) for filing a claim thereunder. After the jury verdict for plaintiff, UPS filed a post-trial motion. UPS requested either a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff\u2019s case in chief, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial or a remittitur.\nThe trial court denied UPS\u2019 motion for a judgment n.o.v. It did not rule on the motion for a directed verdict or remittitur. The trial court granted UPS a new trial on both liability and damages. The court found that there was no evidence linking plaintiff\u2019s discharge \u201cwith his having filed a [wjorkmen\u2019s [compensation [cjlaim more than one year prior to his discharge.\u201d The court also found that the damage award could not stand because of plaintiff\u2019s testimony that he could not perform the work required of a UPS driver after his injury and because the jury did not give him \u201ccredit for some of the benefits he received.\u201d By this last remark, the trial court was apparently referring to disability payments plaintiff received after his discharge.\nBefore addressing the merits of plaintiff\u2019s appeal, we must address UPS\u2019 claim that we should apply to his case the standards applied by Federal courts to employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a72000e et seq. (1976)). Therein, a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case which a defendant must rebut by adducing some evidence of lawful motivation for the challenged action. If the defendant does so, the plaintiff must then prove that the defendant\u2019s reason for the challenged action is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817.\nNo Illinois court has applied the standards under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to claims of retaliatory discharge brought under Illinois law. We therefore decline to do so here. We believe that such cases should be reviewed under a traditional tort analysis. The cases most like retaliatory discharge cases involve claims of breach of employment contracts by wrongful discharge. Therein, the employer must show that the plaintiff was guilty of conduct justifying his discharge. (Lukasik v. Riddell, Inc. (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 339, 346, 452 N.E.2d 55; Foster v. Springfield Clinic (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 459, 464, 410 N.E.2d 604.) Whether the plaintiff disobeyed reasonable orders and was thus terminated for good cause is a question for the trier of fact. (Lukasik, 116 Ill. App. 3d 339, 452 N.E.2d 55; Foster, 88 Ill. App. 3d 459, 410 N.E.2d 604.) These are proper considerations for a jury evaluating a claim of retaliatory discharge. However, a plaintiff must still convince the trier of fact only by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discharged for exercising his rights under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act.\nOn appeal, plaintiff first contends the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial because the jury\u2019s verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nA motion for new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. (Cadral Corp. v. Solomon, Cordwell, Buenz & Associates, Inc. (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 466, 497 N.E.2d 1285.) The standard to be applied in deciding a motion for new trial is whether the jury\u2019s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Mizowek v. De Franco (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 303, 356 N.E.2d 32.) A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the jury\u2019s findings are unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon the evidence. (Anderson v. Beers (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 619, 623, 393 N.E.2d 552.) In determining the propriety of a new trial, neither a trial nor reviewing court \u201cshould sit as a second jury to consider the nuances of the evidence or the demeanor and credibility of the -witnesses.\u201d Kitsch v. Goode (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 260, 271, 362 N.E.2d 446.\nApplying these principles here, we conclude that the jury drew reasonable inferences from the conflicting evidence before it. As such, the trial court erred in granting UPS a new trial.\nPreliminarily, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting UPS a new trial based on its finding that there was no evidence linking plaintiff\u2019s discharge to his filing a workmen\u2019s compensation claim more than a year before he was fired. Specifically, we believe the trial court erred in focusing on the filing of the claim as the action in retaliation against which plaintiff was discharged. Section 4(h) of the Act makes it illegal for employers to discharge an employee \u201cbecause of the exercise of his rights or remedies granted\u201d by the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.4(h).) The rights plaintiff asserts in his brief, viz., to stop working and to seek medical attention for his injuries, are not specifically enumerated in the Act. Plaintiff\u2019s right to receive benefits thereunder for as long as he was unable to work nonetheless deserves protection under the statute. As such, the passage of time from the date of filing a claim for adjustment under the Act to the date of discharge of an employee-claimant cannot be allowed to insulate an employer from liability for retaliatory discharge. Rather, where an employee can prove that the employer\u2019s motive was retaliation for the exercise of his rights under the Act, despite the passage of time, he is entitled to a recovery. For that reason, UPS\u2019 reliance on the passage of time as negating any retaliatory motive is similarly without merit.\nThe evidence adduced at trial satisfied plaintiff\u2019s burden. Under the circumstantial evidence adduced, it was within the bounds of reason for the jury to infer a retaliatory motive for plaintiff\u2019s discharge.\nPlaintiff testified that UPS summoned him to a safety meeting in April 1979. According to plaintiff, when Wayne Bigonin, the UPS distribution center manager who later fired him, saw him in a cast he told plaintiff that it was a bunch of \u201ccrap\u201d and \u201cbullshit\u201d and that he should have returned to work long before then.\nThe fact that the UPS officer who fired plaintiff had earlier accused him of feigning injury and malingering must have had a significant impact upon the jury. We disagree with UPS that it merely showed, at worst, that Bigonin\u2019s motive for discharging plaintiff was his belief that plaintiff was feigning injury, not retaliation for the exercise of his rights under the Act. This evidence could be reasonably interpreted as revealing Bigonin\u2019s displeasure with plaintiff\u2019s prolonged exercise of his statutory rights rather than an actual belief that plaintiff was feigning injury.\nPlaintiff also testified that he had been permitted to return to the distribution center with NDA\u2019s when he was first injured and on the two subsequent occasions when he had unsuccessfully attempted to return to work.\nThis testimony could have been reasonably interpreted by the jury as evidence either that plaintiff was given permission to return to the distribution center with NDA\u2019s on August 7, 1979, or that his return with such packages was not the real reason for his discharge, contrary to UPS\u2019 position at trial. We disagree with UPS that this testimony was subject only to the interpretation proffered by it. UPS asserts that the fact that plaintiff returned with NDA\u2019s on two occasions after he filed his workmen\u2019s compensation claim and the fact that Bigonin was the distribution center manager on one of those occasions negate a retaliatory motive for his discharge. UPS reasons that the difference between plaintiff\u2019s return to the distribution center on those two occasions and on August 7, 1979, was that Bigonin believed that the latter was contrary to a supervisor\u2019s instruction.\nThis testimony was susceptible to the interpretation proffered by either party. It tended to support each party\u2019s case only to the extent that the jury accepted their theory of the case. As it showed that plaintiff had twice been permitted to return with NDA\u2019s, it made more likely true that plaintiff was permitted to return with NDA\u2019s on August 7, 1979. As it showed that plaintiff sought and obtained permission to return with NDA\u2019s before doing so, it made more likely true that UPS discharged plaintiff for returning on August 7, 1979, without such permission. Either inference would have been reasonable, and we cannot say, assuming the jury drew the former inference, that its conclusion was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nUPS asserts that its articulation of a nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff\u2019s discharge negates a retaliatory motive therefor. The short answer to this argument is that the character of its reason for discharging plaintiff, whether innocent or culpable, was the ultimate fact question before the jury. By itself, the articulation of an innocent reason for plaintiff\u2019s discharge proves nothing.\nUPS also cites certain evidence as indicating Bigonin\u2019s reasonable belief that plaintiff had returned to the distribution center in violation of UPS rules and the express instruction of a supervisor, Steve Qualkenbush. Qualkenbush testified that, on August 7, 1979, he instructed plaintiff to stay on his route until he went out to meet plaintiff when plaintiff called to inform the center that he could not continue his route because of pain and swelling in his knee. Qualkenbush also testified that he told Bigonin what he had instructed plaintiff to do. Bigonin testified that Qualkenbush was changing into his driver\u2019s uniform when plaintiff returned to the center. Finally, Bruce DeFran-ceschi, plaintiff\u2019s immediate supervisor on August 7, 1979, testified that he was surprised to see that plaintiff had returned to the center on that date and that no one had told him that plaintiff was returning.\nUPS ignores that the value of this testimony to it depended upon the credibility of the witnesses, especially Bigonin and Qualkenbush, as determined solely by the jury. We cannot say that the jury\u2019s rejection of UPS\u2019 theory was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nDeFranceschi also testified that in order to terminate a UPS package car driver \u201cyou [had] to have a lot of write-ups\u201d on him, i.e., written reprimands for infractions such as returning with NDA\u2019s. UPS argues that this testimony was unreliable. It notes DeFrances-chi\u2019s testimony that he became a UPS supervisor shortly before August 7, 1979, that he resigned by mutual agreement in 1980 and that he had authority only to \u201cwrite-up,\u201d not discharge, employees. De-Franceschi also testified that he did not know of any driver who had been fired for returning with NDA\u2019s. UPS also discounts this testimony. It notes DeFranceschi\u2019s testimony that he did not know of any driver who returned with NDA\u2019s without permission, as plaintiff allegedly did. UPS also contrasts DeFranceschi\u2019s testimony with that of Bigonin, an 18-year UPS employee with seven years\u2019 experience as a distribution center manager, that insubordination is grounds for immediate dismissal. Finally, UPS cites plaintiff\u2019s failure to file a union grievance as evidence of his own belief that his discharge was not improper.\nOther than noting that Bigonin could not recall where he had read the rule regarding insubordination, we will not explore the factors which may have made these witnesses more or less credible in the eyes of the jury regarding UPS\u2019 discharge policies. It suffices to note that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony is uniquely the province of the jury. (Mizowek v. De Franco (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 303, 356 N.E.2d 32.) The jury might reasonably have given DeFranceschi\u2019s testimony more weight than Bigonin\u2019s. It might also have reasonably concluded that plaintiff\u2019s failure to file a union grievance did not reveal the absence of a retaliatory motive on UPS\u2019 part. Given the conflicting and circumstantial nature of the evidence in this case, we cannot say that, to the extent that it may have been based on such determinations, the jury\u2019s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nUPS asserts that certain elements in its case, or lacking in plaintiff's case, made the former much stronger than the latter. We disagree. Admittedly, evidence that other UPS employees had not been fired for returning with NDA\u2019s would have strengthened plaintiff\u2019s case. However, such evidence would have been but one more piece of circumstantial evidence for the jury\u2019s consideration. Its absence was not fatal to plaintiff\u2019s case. The same conclusion obtains as to the lack of proof that Bigonin or any other UPS officer had disparaged employees exercising their statutory rights. As to these and the remaining elements cited by defendant, which we see no need to discuss individually, it suffices to note that the weight and sufficiency of the evidence was for the jury to decide.\nIn the final analysis, this case is governed by the principle that a trial court abuses its discretion in granting a new trial only because it would have decided the case differently had it been the trier of fact or because it believes that the inferences which it has drawn are more reasonable than those drawn by the jury. (Duffek v. Vanderhei (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 401 N.E.2d 1145.) The jury\u2019s verdict as to UPS' liability for discharging plaintiff in retaliation for exercising his statutory rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As such, UPS was not entitled to a new trial on that issue.\nUPS also contends that certain errors by the trial court regarding the jury instructions also required a new trial on the liability issue. UPS raises as error the trial court\u2019s refusal to instruct the jury: (1) that plaintiff had to prove that he would not have been discharged \u201cbut for\u201d the exercise of his statutory rights; (2) not to consider whether UPS had a \u201csufficient reason\u201d for discharging plaintiff; (3) not to consider whether plaintiff\u2019s discharge was in conformance with the collective bargaining agreement between UPS and its employees\u2019 union; and (4) that the burden of proving plaintiff\u2019s claim remained with him at all times. UPS raises as further error, alone warranting a new trial, the jury instruction that Bigonin was the agent of UPS and, therefore, any act or omission of his was that of UPS. Specifically, UPS asserts that the instruction took away the jury\u2019s right to determine that Bigonin\u2019s discharge of plaintiff was a frolic for which it could not be vicariously liable. UPS asserts that the jury could have so concluded from the testimony of Les Dahlgren, a UPS safety representative, that it was against company policy to discharge employees for exercising their workmen\u2019s compensation rights.\nWe find no error with respect to the jury instructions and believe that those given properly charged the jury. UPS\u2019 proffered instructions were based on Federal case law which we have already concluded is inapplicable here. Moreover, given the lack of any allegation or evidence by UPS that Bigonin exceeded his general authority to discharge employees in discharging plaintiff, there was no error in the instruction regarding UPS\u2019 liability under agency principles for his conduct. (See Richard v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 825, 383 N.E.2d 1242.) In this regard, the mere fact that plaintiff\u2019s discharge was in violation of a UPS policy was insufficient to insulate it from liability. The authority relevant to the imputation of vicarious liability to UPS for Bigonin\u2019s conduct was the general authority to discharge employees, which UPS admits he had. It was not the authority to discharge employees for exercising their statutory rights, which no UPS supervisor could have under Illinois law, regardless of any UPS policy on that subject.\nUPS also asserts that it was entitled to a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff\u2019s case or a judgment n.o.v. Such relief may be granted only when all the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based thereon could ever stand. (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504.) Our determination that the jury verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability was not against the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily disposes of this argument.\nPlaintiff next contends that the trial court also abused its discretion in granting UPS a new trial on the issue of damages. He asserts that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence from which it could reasonably determine his damages from lost earnings and benefits.\nThe amount of damages awarded generally is within the discretion of the jury. (Hollis v. R. Latoria Construction, Inc. (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 401, 407, 485 N.E.2d 4.) Nevertheless, a reviewing court can order a new trial if the damages are manifestly inadequate, if proved elements of damages have been ignored, or if the award does not bear a reasonable relation to the plaintiff\u2019s loss. (Hollis, 108 Ill. 2d 401, 485 N.E.2d 4; Kern v. Uregas Service of West Frankfort, Inc. (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 182, 412 N.E.2d 1037.) Under the latter rule, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial on damages.\nThe damages instruction, submitted by plaintiff, instructed the jury to reasonably and fairly compensate him for the value of earnings and benefits lost if it found for plaintiff on the issue of liability.\nPlaintiff testified that he was unable to obtain employment after his discharge at as high a rate as UPS paid. He provided information regarding his earnings which the jury could utilize in calculating damages. In closing arguments, plaintiff\u2019s counsel requested $54,800 for lost wages and he suggested that a fair figure for the benefits lost such as medical, dental, pension, and overtime would be $45,000. He also requested $150,000 for \u201closs of job.\u201d\nThe jury\u2019s compensatory damages award in this case does not bear a reasonable relation to the loss suffered by plaintiff. (Hollis, 108 Ill. 2d 401, 485 N.E.2d 4; Kern, 90 Ill. App. 3d 182, 412 N.E.2d 1037.) Although there was testimony that plaintiff lost certain benefits due to his discharge, we cannot find sufficient evidence upon which the jury could reasonably and fairly compensate plaintiff for the value of those benefits. Moreover, the instruction did not allow the jury to award damages for the highly speculative element of \u201closs of job\u201d mentioned by plaintiff\u2019s counsel. The purpose of compensatory damages is to make the injured party whole, not to punish the defendant or bestow a windfall upon the plaintiff. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 353, 363, 392 N.E.2d 1.\nWe are unable to determine the basis of the jury\u2019s damages award in this case. The verdict does not reflect the evidence at trial and we cannot say, for example, whether the jury improperly included the \u201closs of job\u201d element in the award or misunderstood the instruction and included punitive damages in the award. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted a new trial on damages.\nFinally, as we affirm the grant of a new trial on the issue of damages, we need not address UPS\u2019 contention that it is entitled to a remittitur on the damage award.\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for a new trial in accordance herewith.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nMcNAMARA and WHITE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Marvin A. Brustin, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Keck, Mahin & Cate, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS NETZEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201485\u20141606\nOpinion filed March 29, 1989.\nMarvin A. Brustin, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nKeck, Mahin & Cate, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0808-01", "first_page_order": 830, "last_page_order": 840 }