{ "id": 2620333, "name": "SAMPSON STEWART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUAN ALVAREZ, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Stewart v. Alvarez", "decision_date": "1989-04-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201487\u20141443", "first_page": "698", "last_page": "705", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "182 Ill. App. 3d 698" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5578749 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 N.E.2d 27", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3235166 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 1161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3032138 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 N.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5322431 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/92/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 894", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563841 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0894-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 N.E.2d 333", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 2d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903857 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/131/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179258 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0445-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 694, "char_count": 14185, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.0827996149582466 }, "sha256": "5b48e71a7397744d34b60a12d81c6dac76b37ff94c9e0cc4d7aece7a8ae6c21e", "simhash": "1:d3b7179f7bb72c84", "word_count": 2208 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:08:14.831486+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SAMPSON STEWART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUAN ALVAREZ, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Sampson Stewart, a Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) bus operator, filed an action against defendant, Juan Alvarez, for injuries sustained when plaintiff\u2019s CTA bus collided with defendant\u2019s automobile. Following a jury trial, judgment was awarded to defendant. Plaintiff appealed, and we now affirm.\nIt is undisputed that, at approximately noon on August 29, 1978, plaintiff\u2019s northbound CTA bus struck defendant\u2019s automobile at the intersection of Halsted and 39th Streets in Chicago. The accident occurred when defendant, traveling south on Halsted Street, attempted to complete a left turn, east, onto 39th Street, across the path of the CTA bus.\nAt trial, plaintiff testified that defendant caused the collision when he \u201cdarted out in front\u201d of the bus. The impact in turn caused a \u201cpin\u201d in the operator\u2019s seat to \u201cslip out.\u201d Plaintiff was injured when the seat collapsed. Plaintiff testified that the pin had never fallen out of the seat in the past, but he had heard of it happening to other drivers. He admitted that the pin could fall out from normal wear and tear and that the bus he drove that day was not new.\nDefendant testified that he proceeded into the intersection, stopped, and waited to turn left with his directional signals indicating that intent. The collision occurred when, as defendant began to make the turn, he stopped again for a pedestrian. Defendant admitted that while nothing prevented him from seeing the pedestrian, he could not identify her.\nPlaintiff denied seeing the pedestrian.\nOpinion\nWe consider, in turn, each of the points raised by plaintiff on appeal.\nPlaintiff first raises four issues regarding examination of the venire. Plaintiff initially contends the court improperly limited the questioning of two veniremen. In one instance, the court precluded plaintiff\u2019s counsel from asking a venireman whether he received insurance proceeds in conjunction with a traffic accident claim. In the other instance, the court admonished counsel against asking a venireman whether he would be willing to stay for the duration of the trial. Second, plaintiff contends defendant\u2019s counsel\u2019s remark during voir dire that the jury alone decided the fairness of a doctor\u2019s bill, if submitted as evidence, was improper as implying the jury was free to reject properly admitted exhibits. Third, plaintiff states the court improperly interjected remarks during plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s questioning of two veniremen. Specifically, after plaintiff\u2019s counsel asked whether the veniremen could give a \u201csubstantial award\u201d if the case was proved, the court cautioned that awards must be supported by evidence. Finally, plaintiff argues that it was improper to permit, as a juror, an individual who was a party to a child support matter pending in the circuit court.\nGenerally, Supreme Court Rule 234 permits trial courts broad discretion in conducting voir dire proceedings, and a verdict may be successfully challenged on appeal only where abuse of that discretion precludes an impartial jury. (107 Ill. 2d R. 234; Kingston v. Turner (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 445, 505 N.E.2d 320.) After considering each of the above contentions, we do not agree that any abuse of discretion occurred below.\nFirst, the court\u2019s preclusion of plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s irrelevant questions concerning insurance or willingness to sit through a lengthy trial was unquestionably within the trial court\u2019s discretion. Second, as to defendant\u2019s counsel\u2019s remark concerning the jury\u2019s consideration of the fairness of a hypothetical doctor\u2019s bill, the record discloses that the court immediately clarified counsel by telling the panel that if such a bill was paid and admitted as evidence, it would speak for itself. The record further reflects that the court\u2019s interjections related to evidentiary support for awards, rather than improper, were necessitated by plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s emphasis regarding the amount of potential award. Last, we need not consider the merits of the argument that one juror was involved in a pending matter as the record reveals that, knowing of that fact, no objection was raised by plaintiff\u2019s counsel. See Kingston, 115 Ill. 2d 445, 505 N.E.2d 320.\nPlaintiff\u2019s next contentions relate to plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s questioning of defendant as an adverse witness.\nSoon after questioning began, the court interrupted the examination to remind the jurors that they were permitted to take notes during testimony. Plaintiff argues that interruption was prejudicial.\nPlaintiff also contends the court committed error in ruling on two objections during defendant\u2019s testimony. Plaintiff first draws attention to questions regarding the elapsed time between defendant\u2019s stop for the pedestrian and the collision. The following testimony is relevant:\n\u201cQ. Would it be correct to say that it could have been probably less than a second between the time that you turned and stopped and the impact with the bus?\nA. I cannot answer that.\nQ. Okay. Have you ever given a contrary statement than that you could not answer that?\nA. No.\nQ. Let me refresh your recollection. Do you recall being in January 15 [sic] of this year in the office of the attorney who is hired to represent you, do you recall being at his office?\nA. Yes.\n* * *\nQ. And do you recall at that time being asked this question: \u2018And how much time went by between the second time you stopped and the time the bus that [sic] hit you?\u2019\n* * *\nQ. And do you recall the interpreter saying, \u2018Don\u2019t remember\u2019?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Then do you recall another question: \u2018Could it have been less than a second?\u2019 And the answer \u2018probably\u2019[?]\nA. Yes.\u201d\nThe court stated that the above did not constitute successful impeachment of defendant. Plaintiff contends that ruling was erroneous.\nPlaintiff further asserts the court committed prejudicial error in sustaining an objection to counsel\u2019s question as to whether defendant was familiar with law prohibiting left turps in front of oncoming traffic.\nWe find no merit to any of the above arguments. The record indicates no prejudicial effect from the court\u2019s comments regarding note taking by the jury. Further, we agree with the trial court that defendant\u2019s deposition and trial testimony were not inconsistent concerning the elapsed time between defendant\u2019s stop and the collision. In his deposition, defendant initially answered he could not remember how much time elapsed and answered \u201cprobably\u201d only in response to further speculation as to whether it \u201ccould\u201d have been less than a second. At trial, when asked again how much time elapsed, defendant repeated his same initial response that he was unable to give an answer. We consider defendant\u2019s testimony substantially consistent. Moreover, even if such constituted successful impeachment, that fact affords no reason to disturb the judgment below, as impeachment relates solely to witness credibility, a matter resolved exclusively by the jury. (See Perkins v. Culver (1971), 131 Ill. App. 2d 881, 269 N.E.2d 333.) Finally, the trial court properly sustained objection to the question implying an absolute prohibition on left turns in front of oncoming traffic as such left turns are obviously proper where they can be completed safely. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 902.\nPlaintiff next argues the trial court abused its discretion in permitting defendant\u2019s counsel to impeach plaintiff\u2019s testimony regarding two collateral matters: the number of passengers on the bus at the time of the collision and who drove plaintiff to the hospital after the accident.\nWe decline to consider the merits of that argument because, even if we determine that counsel\u2019s cross-examination included impeachment relating to collateral matters, after reviewing the record in its entirety, we cannot conclude that such questioning was harmful or provides a basis for reversal. See Hengels v. Gilski (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 894, 469 N.E.2d 708.\nPlaintiff also contends the trial court erred in permitting defendant\u2019s counsel to ask plaintiff whether the driver\u2019s seat pin could slip out because of wear and tear. Plaintiff argues that that question required scientific knowledge beyond the scope of plaintiff\u2019s knowledge as an occurrence witness.\nWe do not agree. After carefully reviewing plaintiff\u2019s testimony, we conclude that, rather than requiring special knowledge, the question required plaintiff only to relate his general observation of the pin mechanism from his perspective as an experienced bus operator. See Baggett v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co. (1968), 92 Ill. App. 2d 433, 236 N.E.2d 243.\nPlaintiff further complains that the trial court improperly permitted defendant\u2019s counsel on cross-examination to engage in argumentative questioning and improperly encouraged speculation.\nSpecifically, counsel questioned plaintiff as to releases plaintiff received from doctors allowing him to return to work. Plaintiff stated he was initially given a release from Dr. Rabin and, according to CIA policy, showed that release to a CTA physician. However, plaintiff did not then return to work. Plaintiff did return after he later obtained a second release from Dr. Wright, whom plaintiff had been referred to by a friend. When plaintiff was asked whether he returned to work based on the second release, plaintiff\u2019s counsel objected. Defendant\u2019s counsel explained to the court that he was attempting to ascertain why plaintiff elected to return to work after the second, rather than the first, release.\nAfter reviewing the above testimony, we do not agree that counsel\u2019s questioning was argumentative or otherwise improper. First, plaintiff admitted that he did not return to work after obtaining the initial release. Counsel\u2019s inquiry as to why plaintiff returned to work after obtaining a second release was a direct and limited inquiry, not a speculative question as to the thoughts of another individual nor, as the record shows, was the inquiry argumentative.\nPlaintiff also contends allowance of cross-examination by defense counsel regarding a collateral source of income was improper. However, we decline to address that issue here as we need not consider the propriety of testimony related to damages because we find reason to affirm the judgment below for defendant.\nPlaintiff argues the trial court improperly instructed the jury on impeachment by prior inconsistent statements by reading Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 3.01 (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 3.01 (2d ed. 1971)). The instruction given provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c[Credibility of the witness may be attacked by introducing evidence that on some former occasion the witness acted in a manner inconsistent with the testimony of the witness in this case on a matter material to the issues.\u201d\nPlaintiff argues that the instruction was improper because the inconsistencies related to plaintiff\u2019s statements, not conduct. Plaintiff also argues that the instruction was improper because the inconsistencies concerned collateral matters immaterial to the issues.\nThe record reflects, however, that the above instruction, as given, was tendered \u2022 by plaintiff and, therefore, we determine plaintiff thereby waived challenge to the giving of that instruction here.\nPlaintiff also raises two contentions related to defendant\u2019s counsel\u2019s closing argument. Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to preclude counsel\u2019s comments regarding whether the bus operator\u2019s seat collapsed, as testified to by plaintiff. Plaintiff also argues that certain of counsel\u2019s comments made in closing were prejudicial.\nThe character and scope of argument to the jury is left largely to the trial court, and every reasonable presumption must be indulged in that the court performed that duty in the proper exercise of discretion. (Mohler v. Blanchette (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 545, 435 N.E.2d 1161.) After carefully reviewing counsel\u2019s closing comments in the context of the above general proposition and plaintiff\u2019s contentions, we cannot conclude that any abuse of discretion occurred. First, plaintiff\u2019s motion to prohibit counsel\u2019s comments with reference to the collapse of the bus operator\u2019s seat was properly denied. It was plaintiff\u2019s position at trial that the collapse of the seat was the cause of plaintiff\u2019s injury. Comment on evidence pertaining to that issue was therefore proper. Further, denial of the motion at the outset of defendant\u2019s counsel\u2019s closing comments did not preclude later objection to improper comments related to that evidence if such were actually made by counsel. Moreover, with the exception of one comment, which counsel promptly withdrew, plaintiff failed at trial to object to any of counsel\u2019s closing comments now asserted as prejudicial. We conclude that the failure to object to the allegedly improper remarks constitutes waiver thereof, and, after reviewing counsel\u2019s comments, we cannot conclude those comments were so prejudicial as to deteriorate the judicial process or were of such character as to deprive plaintiff of a fair trial. See Terracina v. Castelli (1979), 80 Ill. App. 3d 475, 400 N.E.2d 27.\nLast, plaintiff argues that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Plaintiff\u2019s argument, however, is based solely on the same assertions of error we have above determined to be meritless. Even so, we do not agree that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. At best, only conflicting evidence was presented at trial. As such, no basis exists to disturb the verdict given that evaluation of the evidence is within the province of the jury\u2019s determination and because we conclude evidence existed to support the jury\u2019s conclusion. Bogatyrew v. Wachter (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 654, 390 N.E.2d 435.\nFor the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nMURRAY, P.J., and PINCHAM, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "James R. Vassilos & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Gerald J. Shine and James F. Flanagan, both of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SAMPSON STEWART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUAN ALVAREZ, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201487\u20141443\nOpinion filed April 21, 1989.\nJames R. Vassilos & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.\nGerald J. Shine and James F. Flanagan, both of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0698-01", "first_page_order": 720, "last_page_order": 727 }