{ "id": 2621838, "name": "KENNETH W. ZIEKERT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID COX, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Ziekert v. Cox", "decision_date": "1989-05-03", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201488\u20142313", "first_page": "926", "last_page": "936", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "182 Ill. App. 3d 926" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5305258 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 N.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3123016 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 1244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 1012", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6514432, 6514368, 6513698, 6513895, 6513997, 6514126, 6513808, 6514225, 6514514, 6513623, 6514297 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/1012-10", "/us/479/1012-09", "/us/479/1012-02", "/us/479/1012-04", "/us/479/1012-05", "/us/479/1012-06", "/us/479/1012-03", "/us/479/1012-07", "/us/479/1012-11", "/us/479/1012-01", "/us/479/1012-08" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173556 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3123286 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "928-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0915-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.E.2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360279 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 2d 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2566107 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/79/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3575904 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 974", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3612215 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3202058 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 1134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3460103 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5580886 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3513992 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188627 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1035, "char_count": 22002, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2274631024461358e-07, "percentile": 0.6048873891875549 }, "sha256": "7c90c7f06e68ce3c7ba9ba02677057b162cd31f26e4aee39992194e8bf713b0a", "simhash": "1:a3bf38d4fce7ed65", "word_count": 3611 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:08:14.831486+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KENNETH W. ZIEKERT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID COX, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Kenneth Ziekert, sued defendant, David Cox, for personal injuries sustained when defendant\u2019s automobile rear-ended plaintiff\u2019s automobile on the Kennedy expressway. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court granted plaintiff directed verdicts finding that he had not been contributorily negligent and that defendant had been negligent, as a matter of law. Thereafter, the jury awarded plaintiff $96,500 in damages. Defendant appeals.\nAt trial, plaintiff testified that he left his office in downtown Chicago at approximately 5:30 p.m. on December 2, 1977, a weekday, and drove to the Kennedy expressway, which he normally travelled on his way home. When plaintiff exited the westbound express lanes, traffic came to a stop at the intersection of the Kennedy and Edens expressways. Plaintiff \u201ccame to a stop because of traffic stopping up ahead.\u201d Plaintiff described his stop as \u201cgradual\u201d and \u201ccomplete.\u201d After stopping his vehicle, plaintiff reached to turn the volume on his radio down. While so doing, plaintiff\u2019s vehicle was struck from behind. Plaintiff was \u201cviolently thrown backwards\u201d in his seat, felt as if he \u201cwas going backward over the *** front seat\u201d and \u201cwas immediately disoriented\u201d for about a minute or two. After the collision, defendant told plaintiff that he had been \u201clooking over his shoulder to learn if traffic was clear so he could pass\u201d plaintiff\u2019s stopped vehicle.\nPlaintiff\u2019s expert witness, Dr. John Shea, a neurosurgeon, testified through an evidence deposition. Dr. Shea reviewed the records of plaintiff\u2019s treatment for health problems he experienced after the accident. Those records consisted of plaintiff\u2019s treatment at the emergency room of Sherman Hospital in Elgin, Illinois, and records of Drs. Lea, Mansfield and Campbell, the latter of the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. He also reviewed the records of plaintiff\u2019s examination by Dr. William Grimm, a neuropsychologist to whom Dr. Shea referred plaintiff, and the records of plaintiff\u2019s ophthalmological examination. Dr. Shea stated that these are the types of records normally relied upon by experts in the field. Dr. Shea also examined plaintiff in October 1987. Dr. Shea testified extensively regarding, inter alia, the causes and symptoms of traumatic brain injury in general and pseudotumor cerebri in particular, as well as the methods of diagnosis of the latter. After reviewing the plaintiff\u2019s medical records, Dr. Shea stated his opinion, based on a reasonable degree of medical and neurological certainty, that plaintiff had a pseudotumor cerebri which was caused by a traumatic occlusion or blockage of the right sinus. Finally, Dr. Shea testified that after examining plaintiff and reviewing the report of Dr. Grimm, it was his opinion that plaintiff\u2019s pseudotumor cerebri was proximately caused by the accident with defendant.\nOver defendant\u2019s objection based on plaintiff\u2019s failure to disclose his identity until the day before the trial started, the trial court allowed Dr. Grimm to testify for plaintiff. Dr. Grimm conducted a mental status examination of plaintiff to determine his orientation and performed a series of tests on plaintiff to determine whether he had any cognitive difficulties. As a result of his examination and tests, Dr. Grimm determined that plaintiff exhibited mild difficulties in concentration and spatial perception. He also concluded that plaintiff was experiencing an enhanced sense of stress and anxiety since his accident. At the end of his examination, Dr. Grimm recommended to plaintiff \u201clearning a new set of skills\u201d to help him deal with daily stresses more effectively.\nDefendant testified that the accident with plaintiff occurred on the Kennedy expressway beyond both the merger of the express and local lanes and the separation of the Kennedy and Edens expressways. It occurred at about 8 p.m. when it was dark and the traffic was heavy but was the \u201cusual rush hour traffic.\u201d At that time, defendant \u201cwent to change lanes.\u201d In so doing, he turned on his turn signal, looked into his rearview mirror and turned his head over his right shoulder to check his blind spot. By the time he looked forward again, defendant saw two brakelights on, realized that traffic was stopped ahead of him, and collided into the rear of plaintiff\u2019s car.\nFor defendant, Dr. James Mansfield, a neurosurgeon who treated plaintiff in 1981 and the first to diagnose plaintiff\u2019s condition as a pseudotumor cerebri, testified that the collision did not cause plaintiff\u2019s condition. Defendant\u2019s expert, Dr. Marshall Matz, also a neurosurgeon, agreed with Dr. Campbell\u2019s conclusion that the cause of plaintiff\u2019s sinus occlusion, which, in turn, caused the pseudotumor, was unknown. However, Dr. Matz did state that the collision with defendant did not cause plaintiff to develop the sinus occlusion.\nOpinion\nOn appeal, defendant first contends the trial court erred in denying him a judgment n.o.v. because plaintiff failed to prove that defendant proximately caused his injuries. Defendant asserts that Dr. Shea\u2019s testimony that plaintiff\u2019s pseudotumor cerebri was caused by the collision was outweighed by that of Drs. Mansfield and Matz.\nA judgment n.o.v. is proper only where all the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the nonmovant, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on the evidence could ever stand. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, 299 N.E.2d 504.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, Dr. Shea\u2019s testimony was sufficient to sustain the verdict for plaintiff. An expert opinion, held to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, provides an adequate basis for a jury finding that causation was proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Witherell v. Weimer (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 321, 337, 515 N.E.2d 68; Swaw v. Klompien (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 705, 714, 522 N.E.2d 1267.\nIn this regard, the weight to be given Dr. Shea\u2019s testimony was not lessened by his statement that the most common cause of sinus occlusion was a mastoid infection. The fact that plaintiff did not have a mastoid infection supported, rather than negated, the conclusion that the collision with defendant was the cause of plaintiff\u2019s condition. Dr. Shea also testified that 90% to 95% of all pseudotumors cerebri were nontraumatic spontaneous events, that most cases of pseudotumor had nothing to do with sinus occlusion and that plaintiff had gone the longest he had seen between a traumatic event and onset of pseudotumor cerebri. These concessions by Dr. Shea did not require the jury to discount his testimony that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, plaintiff\u2019s condition was caused by the collision with defendant. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the jury. Fuery v. Rego Co. (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 739, 745, 390 N.E.2d 97.\nIn this same vein, the conflict between Dr. Shea and Drs. Mansfield and Matz as to the ultimate cause of plaintiff\u2019s condition did not require the jury to give more weight to the testimony of the latter. A disagreement among medical authorities as to cause and effect does not preclude a verdict for the plaintiff. (Witherell, 118 Ill. 2d 321, 515 N.E.2d 68.) In other words, the jury was free to believe Dr. Shea\u2019s testimony over that of defendant\u2019s witnesses. (See Trower v. Jones (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 705, 721, 500 N.E.2d 1134, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 211, 520 N.E.2d 297.) After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the evidence in this case satisfies the Pedrick standard.\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in denying him a new trial based on several alleged errors.\nDefendant first asserts that the trial court erred in failing to ex-elude Dr. Grimm as an expert witness under Supreme Court Rule 220 (107 Ill. 2d R. 220). Plaintiff defends the trial court\u2019s decision on the grounds, inter alia, that his trial counsel did not know that he had been examined by Dr. Grimm until the week before the trial started and that she immediately turned over his report to defense counsel.\nRule 220 requires the pretrial disclosure of expert witnesses, i.e., persons who, because of education, training or experience, possess knowledge of a specialized nature beyond that of the average person on a material factual matter and who are retained to render an opinion at trial. (107 Ill. 2d R. 220.) Contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, there is nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiff retained Dr. Grimm to testify as an expert witness at trial. Moreover, he did not, as an expert typically does, render any opinions regarding any matters in issue. For that reason, defendant\u2019s reliance on Phelps v. O\u2019Malley (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 214, 511 N.E.2d 974, holding that the testimony of an undisputed expert witness should have been barred due to the plaintiff\u2019s violation of Rule 220, is misplaced.\nMoreover, we need not determine that Dr. Grimm was excluded from the disclosure requirements of Rule 220 by virtue of being a treating physician in order to find that there was no violation of that rule. Rule 220 applies only to expert witnesses. The pretrial disclosure of all other witnesses, whether treating physicians or not, is governed by Supreme Court Rule 219. (107 Ill. 2d R. 219.) That rule vests a court with discretion to determine both whether to impose sanctions for a party\u2019s noncompliance with discovery rules and orders and, if it determines to do so, the appropriate sanction therefor. Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co. (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 524, 531, 504 N.E.2d 772.\nHowever, defendant also contends that the trial court erred in failing to exclude Dr. Grimm\u2019s testimony under Supreme Court Rule 219. Defendant notes that plaintiff did not disclose Grimm\u2019s report to Dr. Shea in his answer to defendant\u2019s discovery request for all data on plaintiff\u2019s condition although plaintiff had seen Grimm and Grimm\u2019s report was dated prior to that answer.\nWe find no abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion under Rule 219 in its allowing Dr. Grimm to testify without imposing any sanction upon plaintiff. There is nothing in the record to refute plaintiff\u2019s trial counsel\u2019s contentions that she was unaware that plaintiff had seen Dr. Grimm and that he had made a report to Dr. Shea until the week before trial and that she immediately disclosed the report to defense counsel. Moreover, the trial court offered defense counsel the opportunity to depose Dr. Grimm before he testified for the express purpose of determining whether there would be anything in his testimony which would be a \u201cdisqualifying factor,\u201d but defense counsel declined.\nIn Frozen Food Express v. Modern Truck Lines, Inc. (1967), 79 Ill. App. 2d 84, 223 N.E.2d 275, the defendants contended the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of one of plaintiff\u2019s witnesses. Plaintiff disclosed the witness to defendant the Saturday preceding the first day of trial. In rejecting the contention, the court stated:\n\u201cThe defendants knew on the Saturday preceding trial, that Herod might be called as a witness. Admittedly, little could be done on that day, or on Easter Sunday, in the way of interrogation of Herod, or any investigation of his connection with the case. The record shows that defendants announced \u201cReady for trial\u201d on Monday morning. They made no request for continuance, and did not advise the court of what had transpired. Had the court been informed that defendants desired to take Herod\u2019s discovery deposition, and would then require some additional time to investigate the matters about which he was deposed, a refusal to continue the case for a reasonable time for these purposes would have presented for review, an entirely different question, than is presently before us. *** A party, in these circumstances, should ascertain the nature of the testimony which the witness will give, and may not, safely, answer ready for trial, and gamble on the trial court\u2019s excluding the witness.\u201d Frozen Food Express, 79 Ill. App. 2d at 92.\nWe believe that defendant here, like the defendants in Frozen Food Express, could not merely decline an opportunity to depose Dr. Grimm, gamble that the court would exclude his testimony and, when that gamble failed, appeal on the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion. In this regard, we find the Phelps court\u2019s disapproval of the procedure of adjourning the trial, while an undisclosed expert was deposed, not to be a consideration here.\nDempski v. Dempski (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 69, 187 N.E.2d 734, and Jensen v. Chicago & Western Indiana R.R. Co. (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 915, 419 N.E.2d 578, cited by defendant, do not require a contrary conclusion. In Dempski, the defendants offered the testimony of three witnesses at trial not previously disclosed to the plaintiff. The court stated that the determination whether there was a wrongful or inexcusable noncompliance with discovery was, in the first instance, the trial court\u2019s responsibility and that, from the record before it, it did not appear that it had abused its discretion. (Dempski, 27 Ill. 2d at 77.) In Jensen, the court noted that surprise to the opponent, whether the omission was intentional or inadvertent, the nature of the witness\u2019 testimony, timeliness of an objection, the opponent\u2019s opportunity to depose the witness before trial and prejudice to the opponent by virtue of the testimony were factors in determining whether an appropriate sanction had been invoked for failure to disclose a witness. Similarly to Dempski, however, the Jensen court merely concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of six defense witnesses not previously disclosed to the plaintiff. Jensen, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 928-29.\nThis case is in keeping with Dempski and Jensen. That is, we cannot say, in view of defendant\u2019s failure to seek some relief other than exclusion of his testimony, that the trial court abused its discretion in not imposing any sanction upon plaintiff for violating Rule 219 by failing to disclose Dr. Grimm prior to trial.\nDefendant also asserts that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff finding defendant negligent as a matter of law. Defendant notes that a rear-end collision does not automatically give rise to an inference that the driver of the trailing car was negligent as a matter of law. Burgdorff v. IBM, Inc. (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 158, 392 N.E.2d 183.\nThe rule articulated in Burgdorff did not preclude the trial court from concluding that the evidence before the jury, when viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, so overwhelmingly revealed his negligence as a matter of law that no contrary verdict could ever stand and, therefore, directing a verdict for plaintiff on that issue. Pedrick, 37 Ill. 2d 494, 299 N.E.2d 504.\nA driver, such as defendant, has a duty to maintain a sufficient distance from the vehicle in front in order to stop or slow down (Hickox v. Erwin (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 585, 428 N.E.2d 520), to maintain a safe lookout for traffic ahead (Hickox, 101 Ill. App. 3d 585, 428 N.E.2d 520; Joseph v. Schwartz (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 749, 422 N.E.2d 35; Snedden v. Lavenka (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 979, 416 N.E.2d 1097) in order to avoid colliding with it (Droese v. Fleming (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 781, 417 N.E.2d 855), and to take into account the prospect of having to suddenly stop (Droese, 93 Ill. App. 3d 781, 417 N.E.2d 855; Snedden, 92 Ill. App. 3d 979, 416 N.E.2d 1097) or slow his vehicle (Gullberg v. Blue (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 389, 406 N.E.2d 927). Thus, while a trial court cannot hold a driver, such as defendant, negligent as a matter of law by virtue of a rear-end collision alone, nothing prohibits it from taking the issue of his negligence away from the jury where the evidence overwhelmingly reveals his breach of the foregoing duties. See, e.g., Korpalski v. Lyman (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 563, 449 N.E.2d 211.\nWe agree with the trial court that there was no evidence that plaintiff had been contributorily negligent. More importantly, we agree with the trial court that the evidence was such that no other conclusion could stand other than that defendant breached the duties of a following driver and was, therefore, negligent as a matter of law. \u201cUnlike the situation in Burgdorff, there was no evidence presented tending to show that defendant was in a helpless or an unavoidable situation.\u201d (Korpalski, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 566.) As otherwise stated, \u201c[t]he evidence fails to disclose any intervening parties, events or factors which would support a finding that *** defendant was not the proximate cause of the collision.\u201d (Gullberg v. Blue (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 389, 392, 406 N.E.2d 927.) As such, the court did not err in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of defendant\u2019s negligence.\nDefendant next asserts the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Shea to read into evidence the medical reports on which he based his opinions at his deposition. In support, defendant cites the rule that it is impermissible for an expert to read from medical records prepared by other physicians who do not authenticate the records at trial because, under such circumstances, the records constitute hearsay.\nPreliminarily, we note that the cases cited by defendant do not involve an expert\u2019s reading into evidence the contents of medical records and, therefore, do not stand for the rule upon which defendant relies. More importantly, it is well settled that, not only may experts consider medical records commonly relied upon by members of the medical profession in forming their opinions, but that they may testify as to the contents of those records as well. (People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485, cert. denied (1986), 479 U.S. 1012, 93 L. Ed. 2d 713, 107 S. Ct. 658; Lovelace v. Four Lakes Development Co. (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 378, 523 N.E.2d 1335; In re Scruggs (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 260, 502 N.E.2d 1108; Mayer v. Baisier (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 150, 497 N.E.2d 827; Henry v. Brenner (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 609, 486 N.E.2d 934.) This rule recognizes that the records from which an expert reads are admitted, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein, but for the limited purpose of explaining the expert\u2019s testimony. (People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485; Lovelace v. Four Lakes Development Co. (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 378, 523 N.E.2d 1335.) The only limitations on the testimony allowed under this rule are that the expert must reasonably rely on the records and that its probative value must outweigh any prejudicial impact or tendency to create confusion. (Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485; Lovelace, 170 Ill. App. 3d 378, 523 N.E.2d 1335.) As defendant does not contend that these limitations were violated here, the trial court did not err in allowing Dr. Shea to read from the medical records of plaintiff\u2019s treating physicians.\nDefendant next contends that he is also entitled to a new trial because the jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, plaintiff having failed to prove that any negligence on defendant\u2019s part proximately caused his injuries. The standard to obtain a new trial is less demanding than that to obtain a judgment n.o.v. Nonetheless, our prior rejection of defendant\u2019s argument that plaintiff failed to prove proximate cause, in connection with defendant\u2019s request for a judgment n.o.v., also defeats defendant\u2019s right to a new trial on that ground.\nDefendant lastly contends that he is entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages or a remittitur because the plaintiff\u2019s evidence does not support the jury award of $96,500. In so arguing, defendant focuses on the limited medical expenses which plaintiff incurred. He also focuses on the fact that before 1981, plaintiff complained only of neck and back pain and only thereafter complained of other health problems.\nThe trial court instructed the jury that, in deciding the amount of the award to plaintiff, it was to consider the nature and extent of his injury, including: (1) the resulting disability; (2) the resulting pain and suffering; and (3) the reasonable expense of necessary medical care, treatment and services received.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s implication in focusing upon plaintiff\u2019s medical expenses, the amount of compensation for plaintiff\u2019s disability and pain and suffering was not necessarily related to the amount of medical expenses incurred and plaintiff\u2019s medical bills were not conclusive as to the size of the jury\u2019s award. Ludgin v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1986), 145 El. App. 3d 703, 710, 495 N.E.2d 1287; Henry v. St. John\u2019s Hospital (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 725, 735, 512 N.E.2d 1244.\nIn view of plaintiff\u2019s evidence regarding the effects of pseudotumor cerebri and the indeterminate length of time which those effects could last and the elements of damages the jury was allowed to consider, an award of $96,500 is not so large that it indicates passion or prejudice on the part of the jury (Jones v. Karraker (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 487, 492, 457 N.E.2d 23) or falls outside the limits of fair and reasonable compensation or shocks the judicial conscience (LeMaster v. Chicago Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co. (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1030, 343 N.E.2d 65). As such, defendant is entitled to neither a new trial on damages alone nor a remittitur.\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in its entirety.\nAffirmed.\nWHITE and CERDA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "McKenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Farrug, of Chicago (James P. DeNardo and Christine L. Olson, of counsel), for appellant.", "Lane & Munday, of Chicago (Kathleen Reynolds and John J. Munday, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KENNETH W. ZIEKERT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID COX, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20142313\nOpinion filed May 3, 1989.\nMcKenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Farrug, of Chicago (James P. DeNardo and Christine L. Olson, of counsel), for appellant.\nLane & Munday, of Chicago (Kathleen Reynolds and John J. Munday, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0926-01", "first_page_order": 948, "last_page_order": 958 }