{ "id": 2621203, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEJUAN BROWN et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Brown", "decision_date": "1989-05-10", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201486\u20143509, 1\u201486\u20143510 cons.", "first_page": "1046", "last_page": "1055", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "182 Ill. App. 3d 1046" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "103 S. Ct. 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 L. Ed. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 869", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6379269, 6378216, 6378797, 6378031, 6377648, 6379440, 6379600, 6379091, 6378933, 6378518, 6378649, 6378364, 6377855 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/0869-11", "/us/459/0869-04", "/us/459/0869-08", "/us/459/0869-03", "/us/459/0869-01", "/us/459/0869-12", "/us/459/0869-13", "/us/459/0869-10", "/us/459/0869-09", "/us/459/0869-06", "/us/459/0869-07", "/us/459/0869-05", "/us/459/0869-02" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 1008", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5480637 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1012" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/1008-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 654", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3522406 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3647422 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3496168 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650607 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515129 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809407 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5514997 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 752, "char_count": 17775, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4961335456146237e-07, "percentile": 0.8090319165325854 }, "sha256": "8cd1b69908218dabd2fc595eacb5d3a6e2634a780062147e8d3a164330994c87", "simhash": "1:32fa30487ad30625", "word_count": 3031 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:08:14.831486+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEJUAN BROWN et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, DeJuan Brown (Brown) and David Lowe (Lowe), were indicted for murder and armed violence in the circuit court of Cook County in connection with the death of Richard Earners on December 22, 1985. Prior to trial, Brown filed a motion to suppress statements and Lowe filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress statements. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted both motions. The State appeals under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (107 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).\nChicago police officers John McHugh and James Ward arrested Brown, a 16-year-old at the time, between 11 a.m. and 12 on December 23, 1985, for an unrelated battery. The officers took him to the police station at the housing project where he lived. Shortly after his arrival there, Brown was transported to the Chicago Avenue station and delivered to the custody of a youth officer. The police at Chicago Avenue called Brown\u2019s grandmother, informed her of his arrest and requested that she send someone to pick him up. While Brown was at Chicago Avenue, two detectives came to him and told him, \u201cSnooky and Lowdown said you did this murder,\u201d apparently referring to the murder of Richard Earners. Brown told the officers he did not know what they were talking about. Eventually, Brown was transferred to Area 6 headquarters at Belmont and Western. He arrived there sometime between noon and 5 p.m.\nAt about 5 p.m., Officers McHugh and Ward interrogated Brown at Area 6 regarding Earners\u2019 murder. During this interrogation, according to the police, Brown implicated Lowe in Earners\u2019 murder. McHugh, Ward and Area 6 detective Dennis Gray interrogated Brown again approximately half an hour later. Brown was interrogated by an assistant State\u2019s Attorney between 8 and 8:30 p.m. Thereafter, Brown\u2019s mother, who had arrived at Area 6 sometime earlier, was allowed to see him. After speaking with his mother, Brown declined to give a written statement.\nThe main issues raised by Brown\u2019s motion to suppress and the evidence adduced thereon were: (1) whether he was advised of his Miranda rights, that he could be tried as an adult, or that he could have a parent, interested adult or youth officer present during questioning; (2) whether he asked to see his mother and, if so, whether the police told him he could not do so; (3) whether he was otherwise mentally or psychologically coerced or scared into giving a statement; and (4) whether his mother was misled as to his whereabouts on the afternoon of his arrest to prevent her from being present during his questioning.\nOn the morning of December 28, 1985, McHugh and Ward attempted to interview Lowe, also a 16-year-old at the time, regarding Earners\u2019 murder. They wanted to interview him because Brown had said that Lowe \u201cwas the individual with him who had knocked on the door,\u201d apparently, when Earners was shot. When they found that Lowe was not home, the officers informed his mother that he might be a witness to a murder or involved in it and that they wanted to speak to him. The officers interviewed Lowe at his apartment on the afternoon of December 28. Sometime after the interview, the officers searched an apartment at 1157 Cleveland for the gun used in Earners\u2019 murder. After recovering a revolver from the apartment, the officers met with Lowe and his uncle, James Wright, \u201con the street\u201d and Lowe identified the revolver as the weapon used in Earners\u2019 murder.\nMcHugh and Ward next saw Lowe and his uncle at about 7:30 p.m. that day. The officers had either called Lowe\u2019s uncle and asked him to bring Lowe to Chicago and Orleans or had made prior arrangements with Lowe to meet them there. At any rate, the officers asked Lowe to get out of Wright\u2019s car and told him that he \u201cwould have to\u201d go with them to Area 6 for questioning. The police, who had not received any new information since speaking with Lowe earlier in the day, wanted to question him because they did not know whether he was only a witness to Earners\u2019 murder or was actually involved in it. Wright told the officers he would be at Area 6 after picking up his girlfriend. Wright did not see Lowe again on December 28 although he did go to Area 6 and stayed there 60 to 90 minutes. Lowe gave an assistant State\u2019s Attorney an oral statement at about 10:15 p.m. He gave &\u25a0 written statement around 12. Later on the morning of December 29, the police called Lowe\u2019s mother and informed her he had been charged with murder.\nThe main issues raised by Lowe\u2019s motion to quash arrest and to suppress his statements and the evidence adduced thereon were: (1) whether he had been under arrest when he went to Area 6 with McHugh and Ward; (2) if he had, whether they had probable cause to arrest him at that time; (3) whether he was advised of his Miranda rights, that he could be tried as an adult or that he could have a parent, interested adult, or youth officer present during questioning; (4) whether he was beaten or otherwise mentally or psychologically coerced into making a statement; (5) whether he had asked to see his mother or his uncle during his interrogations and, if so, whether the police had told him he could not do so; and (6) whether James Wright had asked to see Lowe upon his arrival to Area 6 and, if he had, whether the police improperly prohibited him from doing so.\nTRIAL COURT\u2019S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS\nThe trial court\u2019s findings and conclusions in ruling upon both motions included the following.\nIt was undisputed that, after Brown arrived at Area 6 from Chicago Avenue at 1 p.m., he remained alone in an interview room for approximately four hours. Brown\u2019s mother called Area 6 at 5 p.m. and was told he was being questioned about a murder. Upon her arrival at the violent crimes office of Area 6, she was told Brown was still at Chicago Avenue. Chicago Avenue correctly told her Brown was at Area 6 when she inquired there. She returned to Area 6 a second time and was told to wait. The record was clear that Brown\u2019s mother \u201cwas literally put on a merry-go-round\u201d when she was attempting to locate him. \u201cAll of the time she was being shunted between [Chicago Avenue] and Area 6,\u201d Brown was being questioned. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Brown\u2019s statement had been involuntary.\nLowe had been arrested when he was placed in the police car at the gas station. When he was interviewed at his apartment, he had denied knowledge of or involvement in Earners\u2019 murder. The police ignored Lowe\u2019s mother\u2019s request to be called if they wanted to talk to him further. The officers made no effort to contact his mother or to notify a youth officer. The police made an elaborate effort \u201cto maneuver\u201d Lowe \u201cinto a street location *** to clean up their arrest and their subsequent actions of isolating him from adult members of his family until they had secured the admissions they sought.\u201d The police also flagrantly violated section 3 \u2014 2 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 703 \u2014 2), requiring an officer who takes a juvenile into custody to make a reasonable attempt to notify a parent, and police department regulations concerning the interrogation of juveniles. It was thus patently clear that they \u201cwent far beyond prescribed limits in their efforts to secure a statement\u201d from Lowe. From the totality of the circumstances, Lowe\u2019s arrest was illegal and all of his statements thereafter were involuntary.\nOpinion\nOn appeal, the State contends that Brown\u2019s statements were voluntary where: (1) he confessed after his mother and a youth officer had been notified; (2) he was at Area 6 for only an hour before he confessed; and (3) he was not threatened or coerced in any way into making a statement. In asserting that the trial court erred in granting Brox ,\u2019s motion, the State focuses on the allegedly erroneous finding that his mother was being \u201cshunted\u201d between Area 6 and Chicago Avenue.\nA reviewing court cannot disturb a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress a defendant\u2019s statement or confession unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence (People v. Davis (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 1, 20, 452 N.E.2d 525; People v. Wipfler (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 158, 172-73, 368 N.E.2d 870) or manifestly erroneous (People v. Winters (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 151, 158, 454 N.E.2d 299). Questions of credibility are to be resolved by the trial court. (Davis, 97 Ill. 2d 1, 452 N.E.2d 525; People v. Bagar (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 370, 373, 513 N.E.2d 628.) Moreover, the correctness of the trial court\u2019s ruling, not its rationale, is controlling. (People v. Dyer (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 326, 490 N.E.2d 237.) The key inquiry in determining the admissibility of a confession is whether it was made freely and voluntarily, without compulsion or inducement of any sort or whether the defendant\u2019s will was overcome when he confessed. (People v. McGhee (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 232, 507 N.E.2d 33.) Voluntariness is to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Travis (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 671, 462 N.E.2d 654.) Finally, receipt of an incriminating statement from a juvenile is a sensitive concern and the greatest care must be taken to ensure that it is voluntary. People v. McGhee (1987), 154 El. App. 3d 232, 507 N.E.2d 33.\nEven assuming the truth of the State\u2019s asserted grounds for a finding that Brown\u2019s statements were voluntary and that his mother was not \u201cshunted\u201d around to prevent her presence during his interrogations, we cannot reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling on Brown\u2019s motion. A reversal of the court\u2019s ruling would also have to be based on the conclusion, either explicit or implicit, that the manifest weight of the evidence revealed that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and knowingly and intelligently waived them. However, the manifest weight of the evidence does not reveal that to be the case.\nAt the suppression hearing on December 23, 1985, Brown consistently denied that he was ever advised of his rights, including his Miranda rights. The State\u2019s witnesses contended the opposite. However, this merely rendered the evidence on this issue in equilibrium. In this regard, the facts that more witnesses claimed that Brown had been advised of his rights than claimed he had not and that the State\u2019s witnesses were police officers and a former assistant State\u2019s Attorney were of no consequence. Obviously, such facts do not and cannot, alone, justify according more weight to the State\u2019s evidence than to a defendant\u2019s evidence.\nIn reaching our conclusion, we also rely on the undisputed fact that neither the police officers nor assistant State\u2019s Attorney who interrogated Brown obtained his signature on a rights waiver form. Surely, it must be apparent to law enforcement officers that a defendant\u2019s signature on such a form would be of great value in refuting a later claim that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights before making an inculpatory statement.\nBy the same token, the failure to obtain a defendant\u2019s signature on such a form carries great weight in support of that allegation. In this regard, we note that the State\u2019s witnesses did not assert that, although he agreed to waive his rights, Brown simply refused to sign a rights waiver form. Rather, they admitted that they did not even ask him to do so. While the former circumstance diminishes the importance of not obtaining a defendant\u2019s signature on such a form, the latter circumstance magnifies its importance. Where a defendant later alleges a statement was involuntary and the State alleges the contrary, the fact that the police did not even ask him to sign such a form justifies an inference that they did not ask because they had not advised him of his rights or because he had not, contrary to the State\u2019s assertion, agreed to waive his rights.\nIn view of Brown\u2019s denial that he had been advised of his Miranda rights and the fact that he did not sign a rights waiver form, the manifest weight of the evidence does not reveal that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. We must therefore affirm the grant of Brown\u2019s motion to suppress.\nThe evidence with regard to whether Brown had asked to see his mother was also conflicting. As such, we cannot say that the manifest weight of the evidence reveals that Brown had not asked to see her. Neither does the manifest weight of the evidence reveal that Brown\u2019s mother was allowed to see him as soon as it was reasonably practicable to do so. In relying upon this fact, we recognize that a juvenile does not have a per se right in Illinois to consult with a parent before questioning or to have the parent present during questioning. (In re S.D.S. (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1012, 431 N.E.2d 759, cert. denied (1982), 459 U.S. 869, 74 L. Ed. 2d 128, 103 S. Ct. 153.) However, where they indicate an interest by their presence, parents should be allowed to confer with their child before, and to be present during, any questioning. The presence or absence of the parent is a factor in evaluating the voluntariness of a statement or confession under the totality of the circumstances test. In re S.D.S., 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 431 N.E.2d 759.\nBrown\u2019s mother testified that she arrived at Area 6 late in the evening, around 7 o\u2019clock on December 23. It is a reasonable inference from the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses that they were not aware of her presence at Area 6 until they ended their interrogation of Brown at about 8:30 p.m. However, the fact that the assistant State\u2019s Attorney and police officers who were questioning Brown did not know of his mother\u2019s presence at Area 6 is insufficient to avoid the obligation to allow a parent to see his or her child where, as here, the parent has indicated an interest by her presence at the police station. Under such circumstances, the officers who know of the parent\u2019s presence have an affirmative duty to inform those actually questioning a juvenile of the parent\u2019s presence and request to see her child. And, in order to ensure the true voluntariness of a statement, those actually questioning the juvenile have an affirmative duty to stop the questioning and allow the parent to confer with her child. Where, as here, one or both of these duties is not fulfilled, that fact is properly considered in evaluating the voluntariness of a statement or confession.\nUnder the totality of the circumstances surrounding the custodial interrogations of Brown, we believe the trial court\u2019s grant of his motion to suppress was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe State next contends that the police had probable cause to arrest Lowe and that his statement was voluntary under all the facts and circumstances of his interrogation thereafter.\nEven assuming, as the State asserts, that Lowe\u2019s arrest was legal, i.e., accompanied by probable cause, and that we would therefore reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling on his motion to quash arrest, we cannot reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling on his motion to suppress unless we also find that the manifest weight of the evidence reveals that his statements were otherwise voluntary. However, as with Brown\u2019s statements, we do not find this to be the case.\nAt the suppression hearing, Lowe consistently denied having been advised of his Miranda rights after his arrest up to the time of his written statement. He also claimed that he asked about his uncle\u2019s whereabouts but received no answer from the police and that his request to call his mother was denied. Lowe further claimed that he was beaten and threatened into making a statement to the police and assistant State\u2019s Attorney and that the police directed his answers to the attorney\u2019s questions.\nThe State\u2019s witnesses contradicted Lowe\u2019s testimony in all of these respects. Moreover, Lowe\u2019s written statement reflected that he was not made any promises or threatened in exchange for the statement. Additionally, Lowe admitted being advised, at the time of his written statement, of his Miranda rights and that he could have his mother present during questioning. However, the effect of this latter fact is diminished by his testimony that he did not understand those rights and by the failure of the written statement to reflect that he was informed he could have his mother present during interrogation. In the final analysis, the contradictions in the evidence on these matters preclude a finding that the trial court\u2019s ruling on Lowe\u2019s motion to suppress was against the manifest weight of all the evidence.\nWe find that the failure of the police to allow Lowe\u2019s uncle to see him and to be present during his questioning, although he had indicated an interest by his presence at Area 6, also rendered Lowe\u2019s statements involuntary. In this regard, we believe that, while there is no per se right to speak to an adult in all cases, whether a juvenile has been afforded an opportunity to speak with an interested adult who is available to do so is of great importance in later determining the voluntariness of any statements by the juvenile.\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the order granting defendants\u2019 motions to suppress are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nRIZZI and WHITE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Linda Woloshin, and Pamela Hughes, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Paul D. Bellendir and Ronald P. Alwin, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellee DeJuan Brown.", "Richard T. Cozzola, of Cabrini Green Legal Aid Clinic, of Chicago, for appellee David Lowe." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEJUAN BROWN et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNos. 1\u201486\u20143509, 1\u201486\u20143510 cons.\nOpinion filed May 10, 1989.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Linda Woloshin, and Pamela Hughes, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Paul D. Bellendir and Ronald P. Alwin, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellee DeJuan Brown.\nRichard T. Cozzola, of Cabrini Green Legal Aid Clinic, of Chicago, for appellee David Lowe." }, "file_name": "1046-01", "first_page_order": 1068, "last_page_order": 1077 }