{ "id": 2628666, "name": "THOMAS DOYLE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE CITY OF CRYSTAL LAKE et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Doyle v. City of Crystal Lake", "decision_date": "1989-05-19", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201488\u20140701", "first_page": "405", "last_page": "411", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 405" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 1006", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2997207 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1008" }, { "page": "1008" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/1006-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3114045 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" }, { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3562015 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152590 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1590876 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/112/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5436041 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3506720 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3468448 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0518-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 622, "char_count": 12633, "ocr_confidence": 0.79, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0724831651205171e-07, "percentile": 0.5601013804279709 }, "sha256": "afd7718cdc6d67db3077f36c44a2bbc2fa0dc0898c492a45f91880f046c5be77", "simhash": "1:a7aec1bea6f88461", "word_count": 2055 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:47.196010+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THOMAS DOYLE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE CITY OF CRYSTAL LAKE et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs are residents and taxpayers of the City of Crystal Lake, Illinois. Plaintiffs sought administrative review of the decision of the City of Crystal Lake Zoning Board of Appeals (Zoning Board) finding that plaintiffs had not timely appealed a purportedly final determination of the Zoning Administrator (Administrator). The Administrator had found that the Crystal Lake Park District\u2019s proposed construction of a maintenance garage would be a permitted use within the city\u2019s zoning scheme for RE-1 residential areas. The Administrator\u2019s determination was in the form of an interoffice memorandum to the city manager dated July 21, 1987. The memorandum further advised that other normal procedures must also be followed in order to receive a development permit under the flood-plain ordinance. Plaintiffs filed their appeal to the Zoning Board on May 2, 1988, which was within 45 days of the issuance of the building permit for the garage (issued April 28, 1988); plaintiffs asserted that they had no prior notice of the actions of the Administrator. The Zoning Board concluded that the plaintiffs\u2019 appeal was not timely because it was brought more than 45 days after the Administrator\u2019s decision of July 21, 1987, as required by section 11 \u2014 13\u201412 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 24, par. 11 \u2014 13\u201412).\nPlaintiffs sought administrative review in the circuit court. On June 21, 1988, the circuit court found that the Administrator\u2019s memorandum of July 21, 1987, was not a final determination of the Administrator and therefore plaintiffs\u2019 appeal on May 2, 1988, was timely filed. The circuit court further ordered that its stay preventing construction should continue until the Zoning Board rendered a final decision pursuant to the procedures established by the City of Crystal Lake Zoning Ordinance. In effect, the circuit court remanded the case for further proceedings. Defendants timely appealed. Finding that the judgment of the circuit court is not final, we dismiss the appeal.\nDefendants raise essentially two contentions on appeal: (1) the trial court\u2019s determination that the plaintiffs\u2019 appeal to the Zoning Board was timely filed was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (2) the trial court erred in permitting certain testimony outside the scope of review afforded by section 3 \u2014 110 of the Administrative Review Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 110).\nInitially, we note that defendants have failed to include a jurisdictional statement in their brief in contravention of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(4)(ii) (122 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(4)(ii)). Additionally, the record appears to be incomplete, contrary to Rule 323(a) (107 Ill. 2d R. 323(a)). The trial court apparently scheduled a hearing on the merits of this case for June 21, 1988, and issued its decision and order on that date; however, defendants have provided no report of the proceedings for that date. The failure to follow those rules can result in the refusal of the court to consider the merits of the appeal or to dismiss the case. (McKanna v. Duo-Fast Corp. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 518, 524; Lindenmier v. City of Rockford (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 76, 79.) In addition, plaintiffs have not filed an appellees\u2019 brief. We thus limit our consideration of this appeal to the parameters established in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128.\nWe choose not to address the merits of defendants\u2019 appellate contentions except to the extent that they affect our jurisdiction of the case. We perceive the thrust of defendants\u2019 argument as questioning the jurisdiction of the Zoning Board to hear the appeal in the first instance; this in turn affects the validity of the circuit court\u2019s subsequent decision on that issue and, ultimately, our jurisdiction. We recognize that jurisdiction can be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally. (City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Comm\u2019n (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 108, 112.) The trial court found plaintiffs\u2019 appeal to be timely because the Administrator\u2019s memorandum was not a final determination We agree with the trial court that the Board could hear plaintiffs\u2019 appeal within 45 days of the issuance of the building permit. The memorandum in question reads in pertinent part:\n\u201cTO: Joseph Misurelli, City Manager\nFROM: Bill Ganek, Zoning Administrator\nDATE: July 21, 1987\nSUBJECT: Zoning Interpretation for Park District\nMaintenance Garage\nThis memo is in- response to a letter from Michael T. Caldwell, regarding the Crystal Lake Park District Maintenance Garage. As Zoning Administrator, I am responsible for the interpretation of the Zoning Ordinance. After review of the Crystal Lake Zoning Ordinance, I would agree with Mr. Caldwell\u2019s opinion for the following reasons:\n1. A park is a permitted use in a \u2018RE-1\u2019 Zoning District (See Table 2 \u2014 Uses Permitted in Zoning Districts).\n2. A maintenance garage including its associated activities would be classified as an accessory structure and accessory use to the use of the property as a park under Section 3 (definitions) of the Crystal Lake Zoning Ordinance and would be considered a permitted use.\nWhile it would appear that an addition to the maintenance garage would be permitted under the Zoning Ordinance, the normal review procedures must be followed by the Park District to receive a \u2018Development Permit\u2019 under the Flood Plain Ordinance. Once a topographic map is prepared for the property, Staff would be better informed to assess what impact, if any, the addition would have on the flood plain.\nShould you have any questions, please let me know.\nBG/shd\ncc: John Cowlin, City Attorney\nKen Smith, Building Director\u201d\nIt is clear that the memorandum was advisory and tentative in nature and that the Park District had further steps to take before it could be said that an aggrieved party should be required to intervene or appeal. Moreover, the memorandum does not appear to be of record and fails to give notice, constructive or otherwise, to any potentially aggrieved parties. Section 11 \u2014 13\u201412 of the Code states in pertinent part:\n\u201cAn appeal to the board of appeals may be taken by any person aggrieved or by any officer, department, board, or bureau of the municipality. The appeal shall be taken within 45 days of the action complained of by filing, with the officer from whom the appeal is taken and with the board of appeals a notice of appeal, specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom the appeal is taken shall forthwith transmit to the board all the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 24, par. 11 \u2014 13\u201412.\nWe fail to see how an internal action of the municipality in this case, unknown to any potentially interested parties, should trigger the running of the 45-day appeal period. It is clear that a person cannot be aggrieved until he has some actual or constructive knowledge of the action complained of or suffers some injury in fact. While we have found no Illinois case directly on point, Bull v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1969), 112 Ill. App. 2d 32, is instructive by analogy. There, a plaintiff was adversely affected by defendant applicant\u2019s use of an irregular procedure to secure a building permit. The zoning administrator initially denied defendant\u2019s application for a zoning variation, and defendant appealed to the zoning board of appeals. While the appeal was pending and without notice to either the board or to the plaintiff, defendant applied to the zoning administrator a second time, and the second request was allowed. Defendant then commenced construction of a building based on the approval of the second application. However, unaware of these developments, the zoning board affirmed the initial decision denying the zoning variation; defendant ignored that decision. Plaintiff noticed the permit issued pursuant to the second application when the permit was posted at the construction site and sued to enjoin construction. Plaintiff filed her complaint 40 days after the permit was posted at the building site.\nPlaintiff could have appealed but failed to appeal the second decision of the zoning board within the 30 days provided by the rules of the zoning board then in effect. Plaintiff instead chose to obtain relief under section 11 \u2014 13\u201415 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 24, par. 11 \u2014 13\u201415), whose provisions were intended to prevent zoning violations. The reviewing court found that plaintiff\u2019s complaint was filed within a reasonable time after learning of the violation. The reviewing court also found that plaintiff\u2019s choice of a remedy was appropriate under the circumstances and that she was an aggrieved party whose predicament was caused by defendant\u2019s use of an irregular procedure. Her predicament was aggravated by defendant\u2019s failure to notify plaintiff of the second application. The court found that plaintiff was not at fault; she could not object to a permit of which she had no knowledge and where there was no reason to examine the public records. Bull, 112 Ill. App. 2d at 38.\nSimilarly, in this case, plaintiffs could not object to the propriety of a zoning determination which was merely advisory, which was promulgated by interoffice memorandum within the municipal government, which was unknown to the complaining parties, and which required further steps before it would become an action that would aggrieve the plaintiffs. Here, the only \u201caction\u201d that could have aggrieved plaintiffs was the issuance of the permit authorizing construction. We conclude that the Zoning Board could have and should have heard plaintiffs\u2019 appeal filed on May 2, 1988, in view of the apparently irregular procedure used to secure the building permit.\nHaving determined that the Zoning Board had jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs\u2019 appeal, we next consider whether the trial court\u2019s order is final and appealable for the purposes of appellate review. We have a duty to inquire into our jurisdiction and to dismiss an appeal if jurisdiction is wanting. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 536, 539.\nThis court has stated that \u201ca circuit court order remanding a cause to the administrative agency for further hearings or proceedings has been held to be a non-appealable interlocutory order,\u201d and the general rule is that \u201cwhen an administrative decision is reversed, vacated, or remanded, the case stands as if no decision had ever been made.\u201d Jones v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 793, 801.\nWhen a reviewing court remands for further proceedings involving disputed questions of law or fact, the judgment of the reviewing court is not final. (Wilkey v. Illinois Racing Board (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 245, 249.) In such a case, upon remand of a cause to an agency for further proceedings, jurisdiction must necessarily remain with the circuit court until after disposition of those matters; only when the circuit court has examined the results of these additional proceedings will we recognize its subsequent order as being final and appealable. Mitrenga v. Martin (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 1006,1008.\nThe ultimate question is whether the order fully and finally disposed of the rights of the parties so that no material, controverted issue remains to be determined. (Wilkey, 96 Ill. 2d at 249.) In the present case, the trial court effectively remanded the case to the Zoning Board for a final decision on plaintiffs\u2019 appeal and ordered that the stay of construction continue until a final decision was issued. Because the court reversed and remanded the case for further action, we cannot assume that the Zoning Administrator\u2019s advice will prevail or that a valid building permit will issue. Thus, the rights of the parties are not finally adjudicated. Additionally, the circuit court must have an opportunity to review any action taken by the Zoning Board before appellate jurisdiction can be conferred on this court. Mitrenga, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 1008.\nAccordingly, we must dismiss the appeal.\nAppeal dismissed.\nREINHARD and NASH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "John L. Cowlin and Michael F. Kukla, both of Cowlin, Ungvarsky, Kukla & Curran, of Crystal Lake, and Henry E. Mueller of Ancel, Clink, Diamond, Murphy & Cope, P.C., of Chicago, for appellants.", "James F. Bishop, of Bishop, Callas & Wagner, of Crystal Lake, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS DOYLE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE CITY OF CRYSTAL LAKE et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201488\u20140701\nOpinion filed May 19, 1989.\nJohn L. Cowlin and Michael F. Kukla, both of Cowlin, Ungvarsky, Kukla & Curran, of Crystal Lake, and Henry E. Mueller of Ancel, Clink, Diamond, Murphy & Cope, P.C., of Chicago, for appellants.\nJames F. Bishop, of Bishop, Callas & Wagner, of Crystal Lake, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0405-01", "first_page_order": 427, "last_page_order": 433 }