{ "id": 2640945, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY BRAGGS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Braggs", "decision_date": "1989-02-10", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201486\u20140823", "first_page": "756", "last_page": "761", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 756" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 813", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3500909 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 1088", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1095" }, { "page": "1095" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535418 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" }, { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0609-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 607, "char_count": 11049, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.859737600198212e-08, "percentile": 0.5344050946599589 }, "sha256": "a5be607741c9ea0102f3dfa67cb27d90615f7b53ca857407a5bfc21c893d42c3", "simhash": "1:ba933e5e138d0743", "word_count": 1773 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:19:22.278456+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY BRAGGS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal follows defendant\u2019s convictions, after a jury trial, on counts of aggravated sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, and unlawful restraint for which defendant received a sentence of 12 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nWe reverse and remand for a new trial.\nWe summarize below the pertinent testimony adduced at trial.\nComplainant Linda Jones testified that on June 11, 1985, at approximately 12:15 p.m., she and her friend Ray accepted an automobile ride from defendant, who offered to drive Ray to class at Olive-Harvey College in Chicago. Vance Jackson was also a passenger in defendant\u2019s car. Jones stated that before reaching the college, defendant stopped at a liquor store to purchase gin and beer. Jones admitted drinking \u201ca cup of beer.\u201d After taking Ray to the college, defendant drove to Jones\u2019 aunt\u2019s house at 95th and Jeffrey Streets to visit Jones\u2019 sister, whom defendant also knew. Jones stated that after visiting with Jones\u2019 sister and aunt for some time, Jones accompanied defendant to a liquor store where defendant bought more beer. Jones, defendant, and Jackson drank the beer.\nAt approximately 6:30 or 7 p.m., Jones, defendant, and Jackson left and went to look for Jones\u2019 other sister at 811 West 68th Street. However, they first proceeded to Jones\u2019 apartment so that Jones could change her pants, which were wet from rain. On the way, they saw defendant\u2019s mother, with whom Jones was acquainted, and talked with her for a few minutes. They proceeded on to Jones\u2019 apartment, where Jones changed her pants.\nJones testified that on the way to 811 West 68th Street, defendant took Jackson home. Jones stated that they arrived at the address, she left the car and approached the house, but found that her sister was not present. Jones stated she began walking home. On the way, she again encountered defendant as he was coming out of a liquor store. Jones accepted defendant\u2019s offer of a ride home.\nJones testified that she let defendant into her apartment and went to the bathroom. She stated that when she came out of the bathroom defendant grabbed her from behind, physically picked her up and threw her down on her bed, straddled her, and began to choke her while forcibly removing her clothing. Jones testified that defendant slapped her and, when she began to scream, told her, \u201cShut up, bitch.\u201d Jones stated that defendant pulled his pants down to his thighs, put his penis inside her vagina and stayed on top of her for about 30 minutes, ejaculating three times. Defendant removed his penis from her vagina, pulled Jones\u2019 head, by the hair, toward his penis, and forced defendant to orally copulate him. Jones stated that she got up, told defendant she wanted to use the bathroom, got her robe, and attempted to escape through the front door of the apartment. Jones opened the door and called for help, but defendant pulled her back into the apartment.\nDarrell Williams, a neighbor of Jones, testified that he heard Jones yell for help, went to Jones\u2019 apartment, and knocked on the door. When the door opened, he was able to pull Jones out. The police soon arrived and arrested defendant.\nRicco Burts, who lived in the apartment next to Jones, also testified that he was home with his girlfriend and heard Jones crying and pleading with defendant. Burts stated that he instructed his girlfriend to notify police and went to investigate. When he went into the hall, he saw Darrell Williams helping Jones out of her apartment.\nDr. Jerry Noble testified that he examined Jones at St. Bernard's Hospital. Noble stated that Jones had bruises on her right eyelid, the tip of her nose, and on the left side of her neck. Jones also had dried blood on the tip of her nose and had suffered a scratch on her right breast as well as cuts to the fingers of her right hand. Noble performed a vaginal examination and found signs of bruising. Beyond the physical examination, Noble testified that Jones appeared agitated, hysterical, and depressed.\nVance Jackson testified on behalf of defendant. Jackson stated that after defendant picked up Jones and her friend in the early afternoon of June 11, 1985, defendant, acting on Jones\u2019 request, drove them to a building at 6531 South Lowe Street where she bought some marijuana. Jackson stated they next stopped at a liquor store where they purchased two 40-ounce bottles of beer which they drank on the way to Olive-Harvey College. After taking Jones\u2019 friend to the college, the three proceeded to Jones\u2019 grandmother\u2019s house. There they drank beer and smoked marijuana. At some point, the three returned to the liquor store to purchase a six-pack of beer. Eventually, they left the house and went to Jones\u2019 apartment, where she changed her pants. On the way, they had stopped to buy another six-pack of beer. Jackson stated that, during the drive, he had asked Jones for sex but she declined, saying she was menstruating. After leaving Jones\u2019 apartment, they stopped at 59th and Princeton Streets to pick up defendant\u2019s mother. Defendant then drove to another liquor store. Jackson testified Jones bought another 40-ounce bottle of beer. Defendant drove his mother home and then drove around the block while they finished drinking the beer. Jackson stated defendant took him home.\nDuring cross-examination, the following exchange took place:\n\u201cQ. [Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Let me ask you this, Mr. Jackson. Were you present when the defendant\u2019s mother offered the victim $500 to drop the charges?\n[Defendant\u2019s Counsel]: Objection, Judge.\nTHE COURT: Objection sustained.\n[Defendant\u2019s Counsel]: Move for a mistrial.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nQ. [Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Were you present at any time when the defendant\u2019s mother talked to Linda Jones?\nA. [Jackson]: I don\u2019t know anything about it.\n[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Judge, I don\u2019t have any other questions.\n[Defendant\u2019s Counsel]: We have no questions. The defense rests.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of Jackson\u2019s testimony, a short recess was taken during which time defendant\u2019s counsel again moved for mistrial based on the inquiry concerning a bribe. That motion was denied. Defendant\u2019s counsel then requested leave of court to \u201creopen\u201d the question of a mistrial based on the improper conduct of the assistant State\u2019s Attorney, arguing that the jury would not be able to disregard the question to the prejudice of defendant. The trial judge also denied that request, stating that he believed the question had no effect on the jury. Defendant was eventually convicted.\nOpinion\nOn appeal, defendant raises 10 separate issues as bases for reversal. However, we need here address only defendant\u2019s contention that it was error for the State to insinuate to the jury that defendant\u2019s mother had tried to bribe the complainant to forgo prosecution of defendant, because we conclude that reason is sufficient to require retrial.\nIllinois courts have long recognized the error present when the State, on cross-examination, asks a defense witness questions, presuming facts not in evidence, as a precursor to impeachment of that witness, in the absence of rebuttal evidence to substantiate the inquiry. (People v. Rivera (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 609, 619, 495 N.E.2d 1088, 1095.) The danger inherent in such situations being that the jury will ignore any denial, presume the accuracy of the questions\u2019 insinuation or innuendo, and substitute that presumption for proof. (Rivera, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 619, 495 N.E.2d at 1095.) For reasons which follow, we believe such a situation was present below and inevitably contributed to defendant\u2019s conviction.\nThe State contends any error resulting from the State\u2019s question was harmless because there was no response to the question as defendant\u2019s objection was immediately sustained and, therefore, evidence rebutting the insinuation was unnecessary since there was nothing to rebut. The State also argues that the question does not form a basis for reversal because the insinuation was ambiguous, thus not prejudicial, and, further, that the question\u2019s purpose was only to establish Jackson\u2019s bias. Lastly, the State maintains that overwhelming evidence of guilt minimized any prejudicial effect of the question.\nWe do not find merit in any of the above contentions. First, the State\u2019s assertion that Jackson made no response to the question is simply an inaccurate representation of the record. As set out above, in response to the assistant State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s second question related to the purported conversation between defendant\u2019s mother and complainant, Jackson replied, \u201cI don\u2019t know anything about it.\u201d No immediately sustained objection followed that question. Jackson\u2019s denial cannot be ignored. The State\u2019s failure to present evidence thereafter to rebut the denial created the type of insinuation Illinois courts have long sought to guard against.\nFurther, we are not persuaded that the resulting insinuation was ambiguous or that the question merely pertained to Jackson\u2019s bias. A careful reading of the formulation of the initial question put to Jackson specifically implies, as fact, that defendant\u2019s mother offered complainant the $500 bribe; the actual inquiry being only whether or not Jackson was present at that time. The second formulation of the question, while not specific to the purported bribe, similarly inquires of Jackson only whether he was present during any time when defendant\u2019s mother talked to complainant. We conclude the effect of these questions was to establish, by insinuation, that a conversation concerning the bribe had in fact taken place, notwithstanding the State\u2019s claim that the question\u2019s intended purpose was to elicit Jackson\u2019s bias. We view that questioning as highly improper in the absence of rebuttal evidence to support the resulting insinuation. And, because of the nature of the questioning, we are not persuaded that the insinuation can be considered harmless.\nHowever, we otherwise conclude, without making any finding as to defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence, that the evidence at trial was sufficient for the trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt such that the risk of subjecting defendant to double jeopardy in a new trial is removed. (See People v. Littlejohn (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 813, 828, 494 N.E.2d 677, 687.) We therefore reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and remand the cause to the circuit court for retrial.\nReversed and remanded.\nPINCHAM and MURRAY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Linda J. Deeley, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., and Lynda A. Peters, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, and Jean T. McGuire Quinn, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY BRAGGS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201486\u20140823\nOpinion filed December 30, 1988.\n\u2014 Modified opinion filed February 10, 1989.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied July 25, 1989.\nRandolph Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Linda J. Deeley, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., and Lynda A. Peters, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, and Jean T. McGuire Quinn, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0756-01", "first_page_order": 778, "last_page_order": 783 }