{ "id": 2639358, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY SARGENT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sargent", "decision_date": "1989-06-20", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201486\u20142640", "first_page": "1016", "last_page": "1029", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 1016" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3192926 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 N.E.2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "186" }, { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1334, "char_count": 30348, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.648245527248745e-07, "percentile": 0.6922787776430209 }, "sha256": "6558ae8d60ce99535686576406ea8a821f80f9feda948d271bf9d1311dd5232e", "simhash": "1:3b1c78d5ea970d95", "word_count": 4974 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:19:22.278456+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY SARGENT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of armed robbery and sentenced to 22 years in custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Defendant appeals and raises as issues whether: (1) the circuit court erred in denying his request for a continuance of the trial; (2) certain remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument denied him a fair trial; (3) he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing; and (4) his sentence should be modified.\nOn September 26, 1985, at about 3 a.m., Daisy Price and Ernest Walker were robbed by two men, one of whom carried a sawed-off shotgun. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with the armed robbery.\nAt trial the evidence revealed that Daisy Price and Ernest Walker left the New Ritz Hotel, located near Lake and Central in Chicago, between 2:15 and 3 a.m. on the morning of September 26, 1985. As they walked toward Walker\u2019s car, they noticed three men sitting in a small brown four-door station wagon. Walker unlocked the passenger door for Price and, as she entered the vehicle, a man rushed around from in front of the car. One man, later identified as defendant, and a second man holding a shotgun, later alleged to be Ricky Westbrook, began pushing Walker. The man with the shotgun placed it against Walker\u2019s head, walked him around the car, and made him lie on the ground. He searched Walker\u2019s pockets, taking his wallet containing $9.\nAs Price sat in the car with the door still open, defendant grabbed her arm and demanded \u201cWhere is your purse?\u201d When Price denied having a purse, which was actually located on the floor of the car, defendant leaned inside the vehicle to look for himself. The armed offender then entered the car from the driver\u2019s side and pointed the shotgun in Price\u2019s face. Defendant eventually found the purse, which contained an ID, checkbook, and $300 in cash, tucked the purse under his arm, and said, \u201cAll ladies wear chains.\u201d He was unable to pull off the chain Price wore around her neck, however, but did take her watch; he then demanded her ring. Defendant could not remove the ring from Price\u2019s finger and threatened to cut it off with his knife. Defendant subsequently shouted \u201cI\u2019ve got the purse,\u201d the other man responded \u201cLet\u2019s go\u201d and they ran off, dropping the shotgun in the parking lot. Walker chased after the two men, but they escaped from him by jumping a fence. Price immediately flagged down a passing police car, driven by Officer Joseph Eichinger, to report the robbery.\nPrice recalled that during the entire incident, she saw defendant\u2019s face clearly. The car\u2019s interior dome light was on, and the location was illuminated by streetlights. She also described being \u201ceyeball to eyeball\u201d with defendant during the robbery. Walker claimed he caught a quick glimpse of defendant at the outset of the encounter.\nLarry Daniels was the third man sitting in the car noticed earlier by Price and Walker. He testified that in the early hours of September 26, 1985, he was driving to a relative\u2019s house in his brown Hornet station wagon when he saw defendant and Ricky Westbrook on the street. The two men flagged down Daniels and asked for a ride to Lake and Central. He initially refused, but later agreed when offered $5.\nDaniels dropped off his family and proceeded to the requested intersection. Westbrook, and then defendant, told Daniels they were planning to rob somebody. Daniels drove to the New Ritz Hotel and pulled into the parking lot. They saw a lady and man walking to their car; Westbrook and defendant got out of Daniels\u2019 car and ran towards them. Although he was supposed to wait for the two men, Daniels became scared, not wanting to be involved. He drove off, but his car stalled on Central directly in front of the hotel. As Daniels restarted his vehicle, police sergeant Bill Sheldon, on routine patrol, drove up and asked if there was a problem. After a brief conversation, Daniels drove away down Central; 30 seconds to 1 minute later, the sergeant received a radio call informing him of the recent robbery.\nMeanwhile, as Price reported the robbery and described the car she saw earlier to Eichinger, she looked down the street and noticed Daniels\u2019 vehicle, which was slowly proceeding down Central. Eichinger pursued the vehicle, curbed it less than two blocks away, and arrested Daniels.\nDaniels immediately agreed to cooperate with police. He showed them an apartment building on the 4300 block of West Van Bur\u00e9n, where he thought the offenders might be staying, and later named Westbrook and defendant as the perpetrators. In cross-examination, however, Daniels admitted that he initially did not name defendant and told police a conflicting version of the robbery. At approximately 5:15 that same morning, he took two officers and two detectives back to the building on Van Bur\u00e9n. Daniels knocked on the door of the basement apartment and identified himself; defendant answered and opened the door asking \u201cWhere the fuck you been? You booked on us.\u201d The police entered the apartment and saw defendant and four other men inside, standing around a bar, attempting to stuff money into their pockets. Daniels then told police which men were Westbrook and defendant.\nThe five men eventually were taken to a police station, and around 7:15 a.m. that same morning, put into a lineup. Price, upon viewing that lineup, immediately identified defendant, saying she was \u201cabsolutely positive\u201d he was the man who robbed her. She did not identify Westbrook, however, who also was placed in the same lineup. Walker also identified defendant, but was tentative; he stated that he was not positive, but was \u201creasonably sure\u201d or \u201calmost sure\u201d of his identification of defendant. Walker also did not recognize Westbrook in the lineup at the station. Both Walker and Price identified defendant in court.\nDefendant\u2019s testimony differed from that of the foregoing State\u2019s witnesses in several details. He claimed that he met his girlfriend, Verdel Evans, at 4:30 p.m. the previous day, and they went to drink and gamble in the apartment at 4340 W. Van Bur\u00e9n. He stayed in that apartment from 5 to about 12:30 a.m. the following morning, when he left with Evans to purchase alcohol from a nearby store. He immediately returned to the apartment and continued to drink and gamble. He never left the apartment, never went anywhere with Westbrook, and never entered a car driven by Daniels. A man named Willie Stiffend answered the apartment door when Daniels knocked. The money confiscated from him by police was his, which he was using for gambling purposes. According to defendant, Verdel Evans left the apartment alone between 4 and 4:30 that morning, shortly before police arrived.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of two counts of armed robbery, judgment was entered on the verdict, and defendant was subsequently sentenced as previously noted, and fined $20 under the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 70, par. 510(b)). Defendant appeals, and asks this court to reverse his conviction, and alternatively requests that if the conviction is affirmed, the cause be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.\nI\nDefendant first contends that the circuit court erred in denying his request for a continuance in order to secure the presence of an alibi witness. Following defendant\u2019s trial testimony, defense counsel intended to call Verdel Evans to corroborate the alibi; since she was not present in the court at that point in the trial, counsel asked for a continuance. As of 2:30 that afternoon, when the defense desired to call her as a witness, Evans had not yet appeared. Defense counsel stated that: Evans had been in court the two previous days, but had a traffic matter to resolve in the Maywood court earlier that morning; defendant\u2019s uncle could not locate Evans; and Evans hadn\u2019t contacted him since the previous day. The court responded: \u201cWell, not knowing why she isn\u2019t here, the motion is denied.\u201d Counsel then replied, \u201cAt this point the defense would rest.\u201d Defendant submits this ruling denied him a fair trial.\nIn order to preserve an alleged error for review, both a trial objection and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are required. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, cert. denied (1988),_U.S.__, 102 L. Ed. 2d 263, 109 S. Ct. 274; People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 180, 196, 489 N.E.2d 845; People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 23, 31, 464 N.E.2d 223.) Defendant has waived this issue. His post-trial motion asserts 13 potential grounds for a new trial, but does not specify the court\u2019s denial of the continuance as one of them. The only grounds asserted that are possibly related to the alleged error are contained in number 3, \u201cThe defendant was denied due process of law,\u201d and number 7, \u201cThe defendant did not receive a fair and impartial trial.\u201d Without more specificity, these allegations are too general to have alerted the circuit court to any proposed error in its ruling regarding the continuance and \u201cstand in sharp contrast to the particularized nature\u201d of other grounds subsequently set forth in the written motion. (People v. Nunez (1974), 24 Ill. App. 3d 163, 169-70, 320 N.E.2d 462; see also People v. Witherspoon (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 12, 21, 337 N.E.2d 454.) Defendant\u2019s failure to specify this issue in his written motion for a new trial resulted in waiver.\nAssuming arguendo that defendant had properly preserved the issue, there was no error. The grant or denial of a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the circuit court, and its ruling will not be disturbed on review absent a clear abuse of.that discretion. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 281, 478 N.E.2d 267.) In reviewing the exercise of the court\u2019s discretion when a continuance is sought to secure the presence of a witness, this court must consider whether: (1) defendant has demonstrated a diligent effort to have the witness present; (2) the witness\u2019 testimony is material and might affect the outcome of the case; and (3) defendant has been prejudiced in his right to a fair trial. (People v. Timms (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 129, 135, 375 N.E.2d 1321.) In this case, it cannot be determined that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s request for a continuance; there is nothing in the record to establish what Verdel Evans\u2019 testimony would have been.\nA defendant seeking a continuance to secure the presence of a witness must make an offer of proof of that witness\u2019 proposed testimony. (People v. Boyce (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 549, 559, 366 N.E.2d 914, citing People v. Blackman (1966), 76 Ill. App. 2d 401, 222 N.E.2d 262 (abstract of opinion).) The purpose of such an offer is to inform the trial court, opposing counsel, and the reviewing court of the nature and substance of the testimony defendant would have introduced. (People v. Martin (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 480, 485, 428 N.E.2d 591.) Defendant correctly points out that an offer of proof is not necessary where there is a satisfactory indication to the court of the substance of the proposed testimony (People v. Moore (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 337, 344, 326 N.E.2d 420); however, the circuit court\u2019s general awareness that Evans would be offering alibi evidence is insufficient to eliminate the need for an offer of proof. As stated in People v. Brown (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1119, 433 N.E.2d 1081: \u201cIn making an offer of proof, counsel must explicitly state what excluded testimony would reveal and not merely allude as to what might be divulged by such testimony.\u201d In the case at bar, defense counsel simply indicated that Evans was an alibi witness, and never explicitly informed the court what her testimony would reveal. Instead, he rested his case when his motion for a continuance was denied. Under the circumstances, an offer of proof was necessary, and we therefore cannot consider this issue on review. People v. Martin, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 485.\nConsidering the first factor outlined in Timms, defendant\u2019s failure to explain adequately Evans\u2019 whereabouts that afternoon defeats any claim of diligence. As to the second and third factors, this court cannot determine whether the proposed testimony was material and would have affected the outcome of the case, or whether defendant was prejudiced in his right to a fair trial. The court has no way of knowing the materiality of testimony sought to be introduced without an offer of proof, even if it is told by counsel that the proposed evidence is in the nature of corroboration of an alibi. (See People v. Veal (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 938, 978, 374 N.E.2d 963.) Certainly, testimony corroborating defendant\u2019s alibi would be material; whether it would have affected the outcome under the facts of this case is dubious. If Evans\u2019 testimony only would have corroborated collateral aspects of defendant\u2019s testimony, a continuance would have been improper. (People v. Bryant (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 215, 221, 450 N.E.2d 744.) As noted in People v. Street (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 536, 541, 273 N.E.2d 172: \u201c[I]t is fruitless in the absence of the offer of proof to speculate upon the probable testimony of witnesses which the defense sought to place before the court ***.\u201d Defendant\u2019s suggestion that \u201clogic dictates\u201d Evans\u2019 testimony would corroborate defendant\u2019s alibi asks this court to engage in improper speculation. Finally, because we cannot speculate as to the nature and substance of Evans\u2019 testimony, defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulted as a result of the court\u2019s ruling. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant a continuance.\nDefendant also argues that the prejudice to defendant from this ruling was exacerbated when the prosecutor alluded to Evans\u2019 absence in cross-examination of defendant and again in closing argument. This contention is without merit. The cross-examination of defendant occurred before it was known that Evans was absent. The prosecutor did not refer to Evans\u2019 absence; rather, he methodically reviewed defendant\u2019s testimony, which included inquiry into his alibi involving Evans, not mentioning her absence. This was proper cross-examination. People v. Winston (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 673, 686-87, 435 N.E.2d 1327.\nLater, in closing argument the prosecutor commented: \u201cNow, what corroboration of the defendant\u2019s story have we heard?\u201d Defendant concedes that the comment was proper, but insists he was prejudiced in that it could not have been made if the court granted the continuance to allow Evans to testify. Again, since we do not know what Evans would have said in her testimony, we cannot determine whether she would have corroborated defendant\u2019s alibi. Further, the remarks cannot be construed to be a comment on defendant\u2019s failure to call Evans; the record reveals that four additional persons were mentioned by defendant who might have supported his testimony, but they were not called. The comment thus would have been proper even if Evans testified. Defendant was not prejudiced improperly by the prosecutor\u2019s reference to lack of corroboration, therefore.\nII\nDefendant next claims that certain remarks by the prosecutor in closing argument improperly denied him a fair trial. Specifically, he maintains that the prosecutor: (1) improperly placed the weight of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office behind the credibility of its witnesses; (2) improperly interjected his own personal opinion into the argument; (3) impermissibly enhanced the credibility of the police officers\u2019 testimony; and (4) incorrectly referred to evidence which had been excluded. Defendant concludes that even if each error alone does not warrant reversal, the cumulative impact of the statements materially prejudiced the jury.\nA review of the record in this case discloses that defendant has waived review of the prosecutor\u2019s comments in closing argument for two reasons: First, he failed to object to any of these remarks at trial. (People v. Neal, 111 Ill. 2d 180, 196; People v. Gacy (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 1, 88-89, 468 N.E.2d 1171.) Second, he failed to raise this issue in his written motion for a new trial. (People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186.) In his written motion, defendant asserts the following:\n\u201c9. The assistant state\u2019s attorney made prejudicial inflammatory and erroneous statements in closing argument designed to arouse the prejudices and passions of the jury thereby prejudicing the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial.\u201d\nThis allegation is too general to have alerted the court to any proposed error; failure to specify the alleged errors in a written motion for a new trial constitutes waiver of these issues. People v. Witherspoon, 33 Ill. App. 3d 12, 21.\nEven if the post-trial motion was sufficient, however, the failure to make timely objections at trial resulted in waiver, since both are necessary to preserve an issue for review. (People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186.) One of the purposes behind the waiver rule is directly implicated here. Appellate counsel obviously has diligently \u201ccomb[ed] the record for every semblance of error,\u201d and has raised them without regard for whether trial counsel considered them important or not. See People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d at 32.\nNor can this court consider the issue under the plain error doctrine as defendant urges (107 Ill. 2d R 615(a)), where, as here, the evidence is neither closely balanced nor of such gravity that defendant was denied a fair trial. (People v. Lucas (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 245, 250-51, 430 N.E.2d 1091; People v. Hudson (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 606, 610, 484 N.E.2d 1246; see also People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 502, 533, 456 N.E.2d 1369.) Price positively identified defendant in the lineup and in court as one of the offenders; Walker tentatively identified defendant in the lineup, and positively in court; Daniels, one of the men involved in the armed robbery, recounted the entire incident, identified defendant to police, and testified as to defendant\u2019s substantial role in the crime. These identifications of defendant were independent of each other. It cannot be said, therefore, that the jury\u2019s verdict resulted from the allegedly improper remarks. Even if improper, the comments do not constitute plain error.\nAssuming arguendo that defendant properly preserved the issue, each comment has been examined. Defendant\u2019s first argument is that the prosecutor improperly placed the weight of his office behind the credibility of the State\u2019s witnesses by stating he was putting his law license on the line. In defendant\u2019s closing argument, counsel urged that certain testimony given by State\u2019s witnesses did not \u201ccome from the head, it comes from rehearsal. Each one of the witnesses was rehearsed ***.\u201d In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that he and his colleague \u201cwouldn\u2019t put our law licenses on the line one day to rehearse anybody.\u201d Defendant contends this last comment was improper. The State\u2019s comment in rebuttal constituted a denial that the prosecutors would be parties to such improper conduct, a response clearly invited by the arguments of counsel and was not improper. People v. Griggs (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 224, 226, 366 N.E.2d 581. See also People v. Mays (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 145,156-57, 392 N.E.2d 106.\nThe cases relied on by defendant are inapposite. In People v. Bitakis (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 103, 289 N.E.2d 256, People v. Valdery (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 375, 381 N.E.2d 1217, and People v. Calderon (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 407 N.E.2d 840, the prosecution made similar comments, but the court found they were not invited by defendant\u2019s argument and therefore were prejudicial.\nThe second comment complained of, made by the prosecutor, referred to the lineup viewed by the witness Price. According to defendant, the prosecutor improperly interjected his personal opinion into the argument when he stated that the lineup was \u201cextremely good,\u201d claimed to have been an expression of the prosecutor\u2019s personal belief in the veracity of Price\u2019s lineup identification. It is reversible error for a prosecutor to offer his professional opinion or belief regarding the credibility of a witness. (People v. Calderon, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 1039.) In its context, however, the prosecutor\u2019s comment only referred to the nonsuggestiveness of the lineup, rather than Price\u2019s credibility, and did not constitute improper argument. See People v. Williams (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 736, 745, 484 N.E.2d 1191.\nThe third protested remark occurred when the prosecutor allegedly enhanced the credibility of the police officers\u2019 testimony. In argument addressed to the credibility of the various State witnesses, the prosecutor commented concerning the detectives having had 20 years\u2019 experience, who would not put their long careers on the line over defendant, which defendant concludes was improper. A police officer\u2019s testimony is to be evaluated in the same manner as that of any other witness; there is no presumption that a police officer is more credible than any other witness. (People v. Rogers (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 471, 476, 526 N.E.2d 655; People v. Ford (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 659, 662, 447 N.E.2d 564.) The cases are in conflict, however, whether it is proper argument to comment that police officers would not jeopardize their careers by testifying falsely against a defendant. (People v. Hunter (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 516, 548, 464 N.E.2d 659, comparing People v. Parker (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 679, 391 N.E.2d 89 (improper), with People v. Mayfield (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 669, 390 N.E.2d 1315 (proper).) Even if the comment was improper, any error was harmless, since, as noted above, the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was overwhelming and the complained-of remark could not have been a material factor in his conviction. (People v. Faysom (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 517, 525, 475 N.E.2d 945.) We note that the prosecutor made only one such comment and did not engage in repeated improper argument in this area. (See, e.g., People v. Rogers, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 476-77.) Additionally, the important testimony of the police officers was corroborated by other witnesses.\nThe fourth alleged improper comment is identified by defendant as a reference to evidence that was excluded by the court. Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly commented on why Ricky Westbrook, purportedly the man wielding the shotgun during the robbery, was not prosecuted. During the cross-examination of Officer Eichinger, defense counsel attempted to ask what happened to West-brook after he was arrested. The State objected, and a sidebar was held. The court eventually ruled that such inquiry by defense counsel was irrelevant to defendant\u2019s participation in the robbery. Later, in rebuttal argument, the prosecutor responded to what he considered unwarranted speculation by defense counsel that the lineup at police headquarters was suggestive. Our examination of the record reveals that defendant appears to have misinterpreted the State\u2019s mention of Westbrook. The comment was made in response to defense counsel\u2019s argument that the lineup was suggestive; indeed, defendant\u2019s brief admits that his counsel mentioned Westbrook with reference to the credibility of the witnesses\u2019 lineup identifications. In rebuttal, the prosecutor attempted to counter any inference that the police \u201cframed\u201d defendant. The fact that Westbrook was in the lineup, but not identified, only remotely relates to why he was not prosecuted in this case. Viewed in its entire context, the reference to Westbrook was not a comment upon evidence which had been excluded, but was a response to the inference that the police were setting up defendant through the use of a suggestive lineup.\nIn sum, pretermitting waiver, even if improper, the remarks could not have been a material factor in defendant\u2019s conviction given the compelling evidence of guilt, and the verdict would not have been different absent those comments. See People v. Faysom, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 525.\nIll\nDefendant next contends he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the circuit court did not consider a current presentence investigative report. He claims that because the court considered a report that was eight months old, the presentence investigation failed to reflect significant information (such as whether he sought rehabilitation or treatment for his drug problem); he concludes, therefore, that the report failed to meet the statutory standards. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 3\u20142.\nIn sentencing defendant on September 11, 1986, the court relied on a presentence report filed approximately seven months earlier, on February 10, 1986. At the sentencing hearing defense counsel advised the court that he reviewed the presentence investigation, waived the three-day period, and suggested that one entry was inaccurate, an indication that defendant was convicted of the possession charge, which he believed was \u201cnolled\u201d at trial. After the possession charge was corrected, the following colloquy took place:\n\u201cTHE COURT: All right. No changes, no corrections?\nMR. BRENNOCK (Defense counsel): No.\nMR. MORASK (Prosecutor): No, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Any testimony, the pre-sentence investigation will be made part of the record unless there is any objection.\nMR. BRENNOCK: No objection.\nMR. MORASK: We have no objection, Judge.\u201d (Emphasis added).\nThe hearing then proceeded, and defendant was subsequently sentenced.\nIt is the duty of the parties to bring to the attention of the sentencing authority any alleged deficiency or inaccuracy in a presentence investigative report. (People v. Meeks (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 524, 411 N.E.2d 9. See also People v. Laramore (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 783, 793, 516 N.E.2d 401; People v. Gornick (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 505, 515, 437 N.E.2d 892.) Here, as in Gornick, \u201c[a]ny purported deficiency in the presentence report with respect to its lack of current information was waived by defendant\u2019s failure to object.\u201d (107 Ill. App. 3d at 515; see also People v. Moore (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 266, 271, 450 N.E.2d 855.) Additionally, presentence reports prepared 10 months (People v. Gornick (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 505, 437 N.E.2d 892) and 14 months (People v. Stahlman (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 402, 431 N.E.2d 694) prior to sentencing were found acceptable, and any errors were waived by each defendant\u2019s failure to object to their alleged deficiencies.\nDefendant nevertheless argues that the statutory requirements for presentence reports are legislative, and not a personal right of defendant, and thus could not be waived. Defendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Harris (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 290, 473 N.E.2d 1291, People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 556, 413 N.E.2d 416, and People v. Lynch (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 121, 460 N.E.2d 817, in support of his argument, is misplaced. In Youngbey and Lynch, no report was filed; in Harris, no original presentence report was filed, and an \u201cupdated\u201d report, prepared for a sentencing hearing after revocation of probation, \u201cfell so far short of satisfying the statutory requirements as to render it totally inadequate.\u201d (Harris, 105 Ill. 2d at 301.) Here, unlike these cases, a full report was submitted and considered by the court.\nDefendant confuses a waiver of the preparation of a presentence report, which will not be permitted, with a waiver of any objections to deficiencies in a report based on its staleness. In the case before us, defense counsel made one correction, then explicitly approved of the presentence report; defendant cannot maintain on appeal that use of the report was error. People v. Moore, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 271.\nIV\nDefendant lastly contends, and the State concedes, that his sentence must be modified to reflect full credit against the $20 fine imposed under the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 70, par. 510(b).) Section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 110 \u2014 14) provides for a credit of $5 for each day of incarceration against any fine levied on conviction upon application of the defendant. Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that this monetary credit is available to defendants fined pursuant to the Violent Crimes Assistance Act who were convicted prior to the effective date of the amendment denying the credit. (People v. Hare (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 441, 519 N.E.2d 879.) Defendant, incarcerated almost one year between the day of his arrest and the date he was sentenced, is entitled to have his sentence modified to reflect a full credit against the $20 fine.\nFrom the foregoing analysis we are compelled to affirm defendant\u2019s conviction. His sentence will be modified to reflect full credit against the $20 fine imposed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nBILANDIC, P.J., and DiVITO, J., concur.\nDefendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Timms (59 Ill. App. 3d 129) is misplaced. In Timms, unlike the case at bar, defense counsel knew of the unexpected last-minute events which prevented an alibi witness from appearing; his car had broken down on the way to court. Here, defense counsel had no idea where Evans was, or if in fact she was delayed by last-minute events. More importantly, in Timms, the defendant submitted affidavits in his motion for a new trial establishing what the prospective alibi testimony would be; here, on the other hand, this court has no way to determine what Evans\u2019 testimony would have been. Defendant here filed no affidavits nor made an offer of proof establishing Evans\u2019 proposed alibi testimony.\nThe Act was subsequently amended, so that effective January 1, 1986, fines imposed under this section were explicitly exempt from the operation of the $5-per-day credit provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 510(b).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Debra R. Salinger, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Gael O\u2019Brien, and Andrew LeFevour, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY SARGENT, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201486\u20142640\nOpinion filed June 20, 1989.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Debra R. Salinger, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Gael O\u2019Brien, and Andrew LeFevour, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nThis case was assigned to the second division on April 10, 1989." }, "file_name": "1016-01", "first_page_order": 1038, "last_page_order": 1051 }