{ "id": 2639126, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LYNN L. SEDREL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sedrel", "decision_date": "1989-04-05", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201488\u20140536", "first_page": "1078", "last_page": "1082", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 1078" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3123184 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Or. App. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 2131414 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/7/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 U.S. 610", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6169223 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/365/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 U.S. 582", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 377179 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/328/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 573", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777746 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" }, { "page": "651" }, { "page": "1380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0573-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 506, "char_count": 8096, "ocr_confidence": 0.79, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.690054300454042e-07, "percentile": 0.6990706794102668 }, "sha256": "83747c26e2961078cb89a07f67b6a41ba19cafd01b1e337c2b07c1b895ba85f9", "simhash": "1:fc8a3c3b22c6ae58", "word_count": 1309 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:19:22.278456+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LYNN L. SEDREL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant was convicted of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. She appeals the denial of her motion to quash a search warrant and suppress evidence seized from the execution of said warrant, and her resulting conviction and sentence.\nOn October 27, 1987, the defendant, Lynn Sedrel, leased an apartment from Mr. James Haggerty on a month-to-month basis. She paid one month\u2019s rent and security deposit to Mr. James Haggerty (hereinafter Haggerty) on October 27, 1987. The lease permitted Haggerty to enter defendant\u2019s apartment at reasonable times to repair or inspect the premises. Defendant\u2019s lease contained a provision for a late charge to be assessed when rent was paid more than five days late. Throughout the existence of defendant\u2019s lease, Haggerty went to her apartment on several occasions, but found no one home on each occasion.\nAs of November 30, 1987, the Monday following Thanksgiving, Haggerty did not receive defendant\u2019s rent check for the next month. Haggerty received no notification from defendant the she intended to move and terminate her lease, nor did he give notice to defendant regarding the late payment of her rent or any other matter. After finding that no one answered at defendant\u2019s apartment, Haggerty asked two other tenants to accompany him into her apartment to determine if she still resided therein. Upon entering, Haggerty observed a scale resembling the type used to measure drugs. One of the other tenants noticed plastic bags containing a white soapy substance located within an open safe in a closet of defendant\u2019s apartment. Haggerty was not familiar with the appearance of cocaine, so he notified the police based only on his suspicion.\nHaggerty related what he observed to the police when they arrived at the apartment. The police did not have a search warrant and indicated they believed they had insufficient information at that point to obtain one. Haggerty consented to their entry into and search of defendant\u2019s apartment. They removed a portion of the white substance, field-tested it, and determined it to be cocaine. Then they secured her apartment and obtained a search warrant.\nThe trial court found that Haggerty had a valid reason to enter defendant\u2019s apartment, entered after the termination of her lease, was not acting as an agent for the police, and therefore denied her motion to quash and suppress.\nAt trial, the same evidence was introduced regarding the events leading up to the search. In addition, defendant in her testimony claimed only to be a bookkeeper for Steven Spears, who was in charge of the cocaine operation and had possession of all the keys to the apartment. She stated she had no knowledge regarding the source of the cocaine or who Spears\u2019 customers were.\nThe State\u2019s expert analyzed approximately two ounces of cocaine. She weighed numerous other bags containing a white substance, which totalled about 26 ounces.\nThe trial court found defendant guilty, denied her post-trial motion, and sentenced defendant to a 7\u00bd-year term of imprisonment. The court also fined defendant $33,800, the street value of the cocaine in the analyzed and unanalyzed bags.\nThe defendant claims the search of her apartment was unlawful because it was based upon invalid consent of her landlord. We agree.\nBoth the United States and Illinois Constitutions protect individuals from unlawful searches and seizures. (U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a76.) The physical entry into one\u2019s home by the police is the chief evil against which the fourth amendment is directed. (Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371.) Warrantless searches of residences are per se unreasonable unless justified by a specific exception to the warrantless search rule. (Payton, 445 U.S. at 586, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 651, 100 S. Ct. at 1380.) The only possible exception that could exist in this matter is that Haggerty consented to the search; however, searches must usually be consented to by the person affected. Davis v. United States (1946), 328 U.S. 582, 90 L. Ed. 1453, 66 S. Ct. 1256.\nGenerally, a landlord cannot, during the pendency of a lease, validly consent to a search of the leased premises. (Chapman v. United States (1961), 365 U.S. 610, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828, 81 S. Ct. 776.) Haggerty could not effectively consent to the search by the police of defendant\u2019s apartment. Haggerty\u2019s right to occupancy was not equivalent or greater than defendant\u2019s. The fact that he had authority under the lease to periodically enter her apartment only to inspect or repair the premises at reasonable times did not permit him to disregard the defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights by consenting to the initial search of defendant\u2019s apartment, thereby subjecting her to an unreasonable search and seizure.\nThe initial search by the police pursuant to Haggerty\u2019s invalid consent violated defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights. Without the initial intrusion by the police following Haggerty\u2019s consent, the police would not have had any knowledge whether the white substance was cocaine. If they could have obtained a search warrant prior to entering defendant\u2019s apartment, the case might have been closer. The police, however, admitted they did not have a sufficient basis from Haggerty\u2019s statement to obtain a search warrant until they field-tested the substance and determined it was cocaine.\nThe trial judge found the lease expired or was terminated on November 30, 1987. We disagree. The defendant\u2019s rent was only three days overdue, the five-day grace period did not even commence, and late charges could not have been assessed until two days subsequent thereto. That is insufficient time to lead one to believe the premises had been abandoned. Due to the holiday season, it is possible the defendant overlooked her rent obligation or was out of the vicinity. The landlord could not have considered defendant\u2019s lease terminated and sued to recover possession until after providing written notice demanding payment to defendant. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 9\u2014 209.\nA similar result was reached in Oregon. The Oregon Appeals Court in State v. Taggert (1971), 7 Or. App. 479, 491 P.2d 1187, held the landlord could not consent to a search of a tenant\u2019s apartment even when the rental payment was over 30 days overdue. The proper inquiry justifying a search was whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a leased premises.\nThe search and seizure of defendant\u2019s apartment was unreasonable. The landlord could not effectively have consented to the search of defendant\u2019s apartment, and there were no other applicable exceptions to the warrantless search rule. The trial judge\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was contrary to the weight of authority and was erroneous.\nThe defendant contends the fine assessed was excessive. We agree. The trial court imposed a fine based upon the weight of all the substance confiscated from her possession. The police seized a total of approximately 26 ounces of a white substance believed to be cocaine; however, they only positively identified two ounces of cocaine. In order to impose a fine commensurate to the value of the cocaine seized, it is imperative that the substance seized be conclusively established as cocaine. See People v. Games (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 130, 418 N.E.2d 520.\nBased on the foregoing, the circuit court of Peoria County is reversed as to defendant\u2019s conviction and this matter is remanded for a new trial and further proceedings consistent with this decision.\nReversed and remanded.\nSTOUDER and SCOTT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOMBACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "John A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Judith Z. Kelly, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LYNN L. SEDREL, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201488\u20140536\nOpinion filed April 5, 1989.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied July 12, 1989.\nStephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJohn A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Judith Z. Kelly, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1078-01", "first_page_order": 1100, "last_page_order": 1104 }