{
  "id": 2640224,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. LEAMON JORDAN, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. LEAMON JORDAN, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jordan",
  "decision_date": "1989-06-16",
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    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. LEAMON JORDAN, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. \u2014 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. LEAMON JORDAN, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nBoth the State and Leamon Jordan appeal from the judgment of the circuit court of Will County, which, after a hearing on Jordan\u2019s post-conviction petition, reduced his sentence of imprisonment. Jordan was convicted of murder and kidnapping and was given extended sentences of 60 years\u2019 imprisonment and 14 years\u2019 imprisonment for the respective crimes. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence (People v. Jordan (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 16, 448 N.E.2d 237), and the supreme court of Illinois affirmed the judgment convicting Jordan, but reduced the concurrent kidnapping sentence from 14 to 7 years\u2019 imprisonment (People v. Jordan (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 192, 469 N.E.2d 569). Jordan filed this post-conviction petition some three years later, seeking relief from the alleged ineffective assistance of his defense counsel.\nJordan\u2019s petition relates and the circuit court found that Jordan\u2019s defense counsel was ineffective in two respects: first, in failing to encourage Jordan to accept the State\u2019s offer of a recommended sentence of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment in exchange for his testimony against the alleged codefendants in the murder for which he was convicted and, second, in having Jordan testify, repudiating line for line his prior confession to involvement in the crimes, after the defense counsel lost two motions to exclude Jordan\u2019s confession. The circuit court, having further found that Jordan, at the post-conviction hearing, admitted his involvement in the murder and that Jordan was \u201cruined\u201d as a State\u2019s witness, concluded that the most appropriate form of relief was to reduce Jordan\u2019s 60 years\u2019 imprisonment sentence to a sentence of 35 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nIn this appeal, the State argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that Jordan\u2019s defense counsel was ineffective. Jordan contrarily argues that the circuit court was correct in its conclusion but asserts that the court erred in failing to grant greater relief. Jordan argues alternatively that the circuit court\u2019s judgment reducing his sentence to 35 years\u2019 imprisonment should be affirmed.\nIn arguing their respective positions, both parties cite to the standard relating to ineffective assistance of counsel set by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052. To support a relievable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for the fact that defense \u201ccounsel\u2019s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.\u201d 466 U.S. at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693,104 S. Ct. at 2064.\nIn this case there is no argument that the outcome of the trial would have been different had Jordan\u2019s defense counsel assisted differently. In fact, as the circuit court noted, Jordan, at the hearing on his post-conviction petition, admitted again his involvement in the kidnapping and murder. Thus, because there was no prejudice to Jordan with respect to the finding of guilt, there is no merit to the assertion that Jordan\u2019s counsel rendered ineffective assistance by having Jordan testify. There remains, therefore, only the question of whether Jordan\u2019s counsel\u2019s advice to reject the State\u2019s offer of a sentence of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.\nIn this regard, Jordan relies substantially on Turner v. Tennessee (M.D. Tenn. 1987), 664 F. Supp. 1113, aff\u2019d (6th Cir. 1988), 858 F.2d 1201. In Turner the defendant, relying on the advice of counsel, rejected the State\u2019s offer of a sentence of two years\u2019 imprisonment if he would plead guilty to one of the three counts charged against him. The defendant was subsequently convicted of all the counts, including kidnapping and murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment. After losing his State court appeals, Turner sought Federal habeas corpus relief, asserting primarily that he suffered a violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel when he relied to his detriment on his counsel\u2019s advice to reject the State\u2019s offer.\nIn support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Turner introduced evidence that his attorney \u201chad an inflated estimate of his own abilities, an unrealistic estimate of the probabilities of outcome at trial, and a casual attitude toward trial preparation.\u201d (664 F. Supp. at 1115 n.6.) There was also evidence that Turner\u2019s attorney \u201cused cocaine and consorted with prostitutes during the weekend that preceded trial.\u201d (664 F. Supp. at 1115 n.6.) Turner\u2019s counsel\u2019s advice to reject the State\u2019s offer was particularly unreasonable considering that at least two eyewitnesses \u2014 a codefendant and a victim \u2014 were available to testify against Turner. (664 F. Supp. at 1114.) In fact, cocounsel to the defendant, who had advised all along that Turner accept the State\u2019s offer, testified that he thought the decision to go to trial was \u201cludicrous.\u201d (664 F. Supp. at 1121.) Moreover, an attorney for one of Turner\u2019s codefendants, who had advised his client to accept the same offer .which had been made to Turner, informed Turner\u2019s attorneys that Turner would \u201cbe crazy not to take\u201d the two-year offer. (664 F. Supp. at 1121.) The district court, giving deference to these facts as found by the State court, concluded that Turner\u2019s counsel rendered ineffective assistance and granted relief.\nWhile the Turner case provides some authority for Jordan\u2019s position that ineffective assistance of counsel in deciding to reject an offer may result in the need to reinstate the offer, we note that unlike the substantiated assertions in Turner there is little, if any, evidence in this case, other than Jordan\u2019s own self-serving assertions, to support Jordan\u2019s argument that his counsel rendered unreasonable advice. Jordan\u2019s counsel, for instance, did not, as did the counsel in Turner, have to defend against eyewitness testimony of both a victim and a codefendant. Additionally, there is no evidence that Jordan\u2019s counsel was unreasonable in his estimation that Jordan would most likely receive a sentence not in excess of 30 years\u2019 imprisonment if convicted. Jordan\u2019s counsel\u2019s basis for such an estimation was most likely founded on the fact that while Jordan was present at the time of the crimes, he did not, according to his subsequently refuted confession, commit the murder. (See People v. Jordan (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 16, 448 N.E.2d 237.) Moreover, Jordan\u2019s counsel did not, like the counsel in Turner, appear to suffer from an exaggerated view of his abilities. On the contrary, the circuit court considered that Jordan\u2019s defense counsel, particularly in handling pretrial motions to exclude evidence, acted as an \u201cextremely gifted and competent attorney.\u201d Thus, the Turner case has a factual basis which is absent from the case at bar, and there is otherwise no basis in the record for the circuit court to have concluded that Jordan\u2019s counsel rendered ineffective assistance in advising Jordan to reject the State\u2019s offer. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in concluding that Jordan received ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly reverse its judgment.\nReversed.\nHEIPLE and SCOTT, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE STOUDER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Edward F. Masters and Edward Burmilla, State\u2019s Attorneys, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Robert Agostinelli and Peter A. Carusona, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for Leamon Jordan."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. LEAMON JORDAN, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. \u2014 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. LEAMON JORDAN, Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.\nThird District\nNos. 3\u201488\u20140505, 3\u201488\u20140518 cons.\nOpinion filed June 16, 1989.\n\u2014Rehearing denied July 14, 1989.\nEdward F. Masters and Edward Burmilla, State\u2019s Attorneys, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert Agostinelli and Peter A. Carusona, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for Leamon Jordan."
  },
  "file_name": "1090-01",
  "first_page_order": 1112,
  "last_page_order": 1115
}