{ "id": 2649092, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICKEY MYERS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Myers", "decision_date": "1989-06-21", "docket_number": "No 4-88-0568", "first_page": "118", "last_page": "121", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "185 Ill. App. 3d 118" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "459 F.2d 431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 724359 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/459/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 F.2d 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1283002 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/625/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 F.2d 366", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 742735 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/455/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 972", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5537588 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "974" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0972-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 1382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1386" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 787", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3372311 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 337", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054264 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" }, { "page": "361" }, { "page": "1063" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0337-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 491, "char_count": 7546, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.339701094470699e-08, "percentile": 0.2728717002419832 }, "sha256": "d4e805a48fabd60356a5a252ade9e6ba6adbbbe46c1732dc75f059baaeb4589a", "simhash": "1:9cee555fee857544", "word_count": 1278 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:46.579667+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICKEY MYERS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial in the circuit court of Livingston County, the defendant, Mickey Myers, was found guilty of aggravated battery in that he knowingly or intentionally caused bodily harm to a correctional institution employee. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 4(b)(6).) He was sentenced to a term of eight years in the Department of Corrections consecutive to his current sentence.\nThe defendant appeals his conviction on the sole ground he was denied a fair trial due to the shackling of his key witness. We affirm.\nOn October 14, 1987, Terry Williams, a counselor at Pontiac Correctional Center, was scalded with water while walking past a row of cells in a segregation unit. Williams received first and second degree burns on areas of his head, face, and neck.\nAt trial Williams testified he knew the liquid came from the defendant\u2019s cell because it is directly in front of a guard tower and because as he walks down the cell row he glances at each cell and the number above it. Williams also testified that just before getting hit with the substance he saw the defendant standing in the middle of his cell holding a bowl-container.\nOther evidence from the prosecution at trial consisted of (1) objects found in the defendant\u2019s cell: a bowl still wet to the touch, a pair of gloves, and an extension cord with the end stripped exposing bare wires, generally referred to as a \u201cstinger\u201d used to heat liquid; (2) corroboration of the testimony of Williams and a corrections officer (Officer Munson), in that the floor around the defendant\u2019s cell was wet after the incident; and (3) testimony by Munson the defendant \u201cadmitted having done it.\u201d\nThe defense presented one witness, James Allen, another inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center. The circuit court ordered Allen shackled by one hand to a waist-type device he was wearing. Before Allen was allowed to testify, the defense objected to his being shackled. The court allowed the shackles, holding, \u201cI think everyone knows that he is incarcerated in the Department of Corrections, and I just can\u2019t imagine any possible prejudice.\u201d Allen was brought into and taken out of the courtroom out of the presence of the jury.\nAllen testified he was housed in the cell next to the defendant at the time of the incident. Allen stated the defendant could not have thrown the liquid as the incident occurred three or four cells down the gallery and he and the defendant were talking at the time Williams was scalded. On cross-examination, Allen testified his adult convictions consisted of robbery, kidnapping, rape, and murder.\nJust prior to the sentencing hearing, the court found the defendant was not prejudiced by the shackling of Allen and denied the defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. Addressing the defendant\u2019s arguments at this time, the court held:\n\u201cI am not aware of any way the jury was informed or would have known he was shackled. I don\u2019t think the jury was aware of the fact that he was shackled unless he would have shown them that. Because I think the shackling there is underneath the table in such a way the jury would not see it.\u201d\nOn appeal, the defendant argues the shackling affected the credibility of the testimony of his key witness thus denying him a fair trial. In response, the State argues the shackling did not affect the credibility of the witness\u2019 testimony.\nBefore the issue of shackling as it might affect credibility can arise, there must be evidence the jury knew the witness was shackled. Here, the record contains no indication the jury was aware the witness was shackled. The trial court described the restraint as a waist-type device with one hand attached to the witness stand underneath a table, and stated it did not think the jury was aware of the shackles.\nThe defendant does not argue the shackles were visible, only the trial court erred in shackling Allen. It is reasonable to infer the defendant\u2019s failure to comment on the visibility of the shackles suggests they were not openly visible. For these reasons we are unable to determine if any member of the jury saw the shackles. Absent such a showing, there is no issue to consider. Further, even if the shackles were visible to one or more members of the jury, there is no showing of prejudice.\nIllinois courts have been consistent with the issue of shackling, following the principle laid down in Illinois v. Allen (1970), 397 U.S. 337, 348, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 361, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1063, which holds a trial judge has wide discretion in maintaining the security of his or her courtroom. \u201c[A] State witness, like a defendant, may be shackled for proper reasons when he appears in court.\u201d People v. Sullivan (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 787, 792, 362 N.E.2d 1382, 1386.\nIn People v. Robinson (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 972, 416 N.E.2d 793, inmate witnesses for the defendant were ordered shackled before a jury. The court in Robinson held \u201c[t]he fact that they were shackled was merely another indication of that residency *** [and] could not have detracted from the fairness of the trial.\u201d (Robinson, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 974, 416 N.E.2d at 796.) Where inmate witnesses were seen as being escape risks, Federal courts have allowed shackling in front of juries. United States v. Roustio (7th Cir. 1972), 455 F.2d 366; United States v. Garcia (7th Cir. 1980), 625 F.2d 162.\nIn a case very similar to this one, the Seventh Circuit ruled \u201cthe shackling of witnesses is an unfortunate and undesirable practice which should be employed only in cases of extreme need.\u201d (United States v. Esquer (7th Cir. 1972), 459 F.2d 431, 433.) However, the Esquer court found the shackling of the witness not to be reversible error. \u201cIn such a situation, without some showing of actual prejudice, the conviction must be allowed to stand.\u201d Esquer, 459 F.2d at 433.\nThe circuit court in Livingston County gave no indication as to why Allen was ordered shackled other than he was an inmate. The court also did not state for the record whether it felt Allen posed any type of threat to the peace and dignity of the courtroom. While it would be preferable for the court to give reasons for shackling, there was no error here for two reasons. First, there is no showing the jury was aware of the shackling. Second, the defendant has made no showing of actual prejudice.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Livingston County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSPITZ, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" }, { "text": "JUSTICE LUND,\nspecially concurring:\nDefendant was an inmate of the Pontiac Correctional Center and was charged with scalding a correctional officer. Defendant\u2019s witness was a fellow inmate, serving time, by his admission, for robbery, kidnapping, rape, and murder. The jury, the court staff, the attorneys, and the judge are entitled to protection. It would be a foolish trial judge who would order the shackles removed. Of course, an alternative might be to fill the courtroom with SWAT team members. When trying cases of this type, I find no necessity for a judicial statement justifying the restraints.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE LUND," } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Gary R. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Donald D. Bernardi, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Timothy J. Londrigan, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICKEY MYERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo 4-88-0568\nOpinion filed June 21, 1989.\nLUND, J., specially concurring.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Gary R. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nDonald D. Bernardi, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Timothy J. Londrigan, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0118-01", "first_page_order": 144, "last_page_order": 147 }