{ "id": 2657847, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMMY ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Robinson", "decision_date": "1989-06-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201487\u20140713", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "15", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 1138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3012628 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1143" }, { "page": "1144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/1138-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 1168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3347861 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 968", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "971" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3289917 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 N.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481665 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 1163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 1015", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465040 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/1015-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3505509 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-44" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 N.E.2d 621", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 891", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604708 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896-909" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0891-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3505706 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374-94" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 816", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3514449 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821-44" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0816-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 N.E.2d 943", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3551011 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541-81" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/169/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498218 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070395 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 N.E.2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 993", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3030849 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0993-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3492006 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3644548 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5442928 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" }, { "page": "61-62" }, { "page": "63" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "64-65" }, { "page": "63-65" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 1138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3012628 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1143-44" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/1138-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1122, "char_count": 34610, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.3653697570785015 }, "sha256": "b5c39058b94fbe785ecac8bca0edf66d18edba821251d972a801ce81649903e1", "simhash": "1:1b36654e25238f42", "word_count": 5683 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:50.889546+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMMY ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE MURRAY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Sammy (also known as Sammie) Robinson appeals his conviction for the crime of communicating with a witness, for which he received a four-year extended prison sentence. The following facts are pertinent to this appeal.\nIn December 1985, defendant was arrested and charged with the aggravated sexual assault of a 14-year-old girl. He was free on bond pending trial in May 1986 when the rape victim and her mother, Mildred Stephen, were approached by Lemual Taylor. Taylor told the mother that \u201cSammie sent me to [offer] you a thousand dollars for [your daughter] not to come to court,\u201d after which Taylor gave Stephen a piece of paper with a telephone number on it, telling her to call Sammie. That number was later shown by competent evidence to be the number assigned to defendant\u2019s car telephone.\nStephen returned to her apartment and dialed the number. The person answering the call identified himself as Sammie and proceeded to offer Stephen $1,000 if her daughter would not go to court. After Stephen stated to Sammie that he now offers her $1,000 after burning down her mother\u2019s house, almost killing her parents, defendant raised his offer to $3,000. Meanwhile, a police officer arrived, having been summoned by a call from a family member, and picked up a telephone extension at Stephen\u2019s direction and after she had informed him that Robinson was on the phone. The officer testified that he listened to the conversation for about 30 seconds and heard defendant say that he would give Stephen $1,000 to drop the sexual assault charges pending against him.\nPrior to trial on the communicating with a witness charge, the court overruled defendant\u2019s motion to preclude mention of the sexual assault charge and any mention of arson. During the jury trial, defense counsel made various hearsay objections, which the court overruled when the State asserted that it would later prove the existence of a conspiracy. After the jury found defendant guilty of communicating with a witness, defendant filed this appeal, asserting that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of irrelevant other crimes evidence, hearsay statements should have been excluded because the State failed to prove the existence of a conspiracy, and the State\u2019s evidence did not prove the acts charged in the indictment.\nThere is no need to address the first two issues raised on appeal since we must reverse defendant\u2019s conviction because the State failed to prove an essential element of the crime charged.\nThe offense with which defendant was charged and convicted\u2014 communicating with a witness, a Class 4 felony \u2014 occurs when \u201c[a] person who, with intent to deter any party or witness from testifying freely, fully and truthfully to any matter pending in any court ***, forcibly detains such party or witness, or communicates, directly or indirectly, to such party or witness any knowingly false information or a threat of injury or damage to the property or person of such party or witness, *** or offers or delivers money or another thing of value to such party or witness or to a relative of such party or witness.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 32 \u2014 4(b).\nThere is no evidence in this record that defendant offered money to Stephen to deter her or her daughter from testifying freely, fully and truthfully. Section 32 \u2014 4(b) appears to be directed to the prevention of paying a witness to testify other than truthfully and of her own will. The offense defendant should have been charged with is compounding a crime: \u201cA person compounds a crime when he receives or offers to another any consideration for a promise not to prosecute or aid in the prosection of an offender.\" (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 32 \u2014 1(a).) Compounding a crime is a petty offense.\nDefendant\u2019s offer of money for the Stephens not to appear in court is in return for their nonaid in the prosecution of the sexual assault charge. Nonappearance is a refusal to aid in a prosecution rather than a refusal to testify other than freely, fully and truthfully. Furthermore, the police officer testified that defendant asked Stephen not to prosecute the case. Although the State argues that an offer of money not to appear in court can be equated to an offer of money not to testify freely, fully and truthfully, there is no supporting authority for this equation. If the Stephens had accepted defendant\u2019s offer, the State could still have proceeded with the prosecution, subpoenaing them as witnesses whereupon they could then testify freely, fully and truthfully.\nThe opinion in People v. Scribner (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 1138, is illuminative of the confusion between sections 32 \u2014 1 and 32 \u2014 4 of the Criminal Code of 1961. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 32 \u2014 1, 32\u2014 4.) In Scribner, the defendant was charged with communicating with a witness after offering the complainant money to request that criminal charges be dropped against defendant\u2019s nephews. The Scribner court found that the evidence did not show any payment to the complainant to not testify or to testify other than freely, fully and truthfully, and that defendant was instead guilty of the petty offense of compounding a crime. In so doing, the court noted that the power to dismiss criminal charges rests with the prosecuting officer. Scribner, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 1143.\nWe agree with the reasoning of the Scribner court that our legislature probably did not intend section 32 \u2014 4 to be a duplicate of section 32 \u2014 1, thus making the latter superflous, and further, that criminal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of an accused and nothing is to be taken by intendment or implication against a defendant beyond the literal and obvious meaning of the statute. Scribner, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 1144.\nAccordingly, we conclude that the State did not prove that defendant offered Stephen money to not testify freely, fully and truthfully, but rather offered her money not to aid in the prosecution of the sexual assault charge against him. We must therefore reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and resultant sentence.\nIt is to be noted that during oral argument before this court, it was revealed by the attorneys that the aggravated sexual assault charge against defendant was nol-prossed by the State and that he is now on parole from his sentence in the present case.\nReversed.\nLORENZ, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE MURRAY" }, { "text": "JUSTICE PINCHAM,\ndissenting:\nI dissent. I do not agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that:\n\u201c[T]he State failed to prove an essential element of the crime charged.\nThere is no evidence in this record that defendant offered money to Stephen to deter her or her daughter from testifying freely, fully and truthfully. ***\n*** j-ip]he State did not prove that defendant offered Stephen money to not testify freely, fully and truthfully, but rather offered her money not to aid in the prosecution of the sexual assault charge against him.\u201d 186 Ill. App. 3d at 3, 4.\nThe defendant was charged with the offense of communicating with a witness (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 32 \u2014 4(b)), which provides in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cA person who, with intent to deter any party or witness from testifying freely, fully and truthfully to any matter pending in any court *** offers or delivers money or another thing of value to such party or witness *** commits a Class 4 felony.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe indictment alleged in pertinent part:\n\u201cSammie Robinson committed the offense of communicating with a witness in that he with intent to deter Mildred Stephen and her daughter Sarah Stephen from testifying freely, fully and truthfully in a manner pending in the criminal division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, entitled People of the State of Illinois versus Sammie Robinson offered said Mildred Stephen a sum of United States Currency in violation of Chapter 38, Section 32 \u2014 4(b) of the Illinois Revised Statutes ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe cause was tried by a jury. The State\u2019s uncontradicted trial evidence established the following.\nIn December of 1985, the defendant Sammie Robinson was arrested for and charged with the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault (rape) of Sarah Stephen, a 14-year-old minor. The defendant was at liberty on bond on the charge, which was set for trial for June 10,1986.\nEighteen days before the June 10, 1986, trial date, on May 23, 1986, at about the noon hour, Mrs. Mildred Stephen, the mother of Sarah Stephen, and other family members were moving into a second-floor apartment on West 101st street in Chicago. Lemuel Taylor approached Sarah and stated to her, \u201cSammie sent me to talk to you.\u201d Mrs. Stephen told Lemuel Taylor that neither she nor her daughter wished to speak to Sammie and Taylor left. The police were called and a police report was made of Taylor\u2019s visit and conversation with Mrs. Stephen.\nLater that afternoon Lemuel Taylor returned outside the Stephen apartment. Taylor stated to Tina Clark, Mrs. Stephen\u2019s niece and Sarah\u2019s cousin, that he had to speak to Sarah\u2019s mother \u201cbecause Sammie got some money and wants to give it to her not to come to court.\u201d Taylor further stated that if he did not speak to Sarah\u2019s mother, Sammie would not pay him for delivering the message. Mrs. Stephen was upstairs in the apartment and Tina Clark asked Tracy, a family friend, to go and tell Mrs. Stephen that Lemuel Taylor was back. Tracy related Taylor\u2019s and Sammie Robinson\u2019s messages to Mrs. Stephen, who told Tracy to call the police. Tracy did so, while Mrs. Stephen went downstairs onto the porch where she saw Taylor.\nMrs. Stephen told Taylor that she was Sarah\u2019s mother and asked him if he wanted to talk to her. Taylor answered that he did. Taylor had something in his hand and said, \u201cSammie sent me to give you a thousand dollars for Sherry not to come to court. *** [H]ere\u2019s a number for you to call him, he is on 104th and Wentworth in his car. Taylor handed Mrs. Stephen a piece of paper with telephone number 802-0464 written on it.\nThe unrebutted testimony of Charles Moran, the general auditor of Ameritech Mobile Communication, Chicago police detective Gallagher, Joliet police officer Christine Lang and a certified vehicle registration established that telephone number 802-0464 was a car phone purchased from Ameritech by defendant Sammie Robinson, whose address was listed at 5659 S. Shields, that a Cadillac with that license number had been observed parked at that address, that there was a telephone inside the Cadillac, and that six incoming calls to that telephone number were received on May 23, 1986, between 4:45 p.m. and 5:31 p.m.\nWhen Mrs. Stephen received the paper with telephone number 802-0464 on it from Lemuel Taylor, she went upstairs to her apartment and dialed that telephone number. She related that the following conversation occurred:\n\u201cMRS. STEPHEN: Hello, could I speak to Sammie?\nSAMMIE: This is Sammie.\nMRS. STEPHEN: This is Sarah\u2019s mother, you wanted to talk to me?\nSAMMIE: Yeah, I want to give you a thousand dollars for Sarah not to come to court.\nMRS. STEPHEN: You offer me money after you burn my mother\u2019s house down and almost killed them?\nSAMMIE: Well, I can give you three thousand dollars, whatever I guess to help.\u201d\nMrs. Stephen testified that Sammie further stated that he was not worried about Sarah\u2019s case, but he did not want Sarah to come to court and help hurt the case they already had in court.\nOfficer Walsh entered Mrs. Stephen\u2019s apartment while she was talking on the phone to Sammie and Mrs. Stephen stated to Officer Walsh, \u201cRobinson is on the phone, pick it up.\u201d Officer Walsh listened on a phone extension and heard a male voice say to Mrs. Stephen that he would give her $1,000 to drop the charges against him and that he would beat the case.\nWhen Mrs. Stephen ended her telephone conversation with Sammie, she went outside, where she observed the police arrest Lemuel Taylor.\nThe defendant did not call any witnesses or present any evidence.\nThe jury found the defendant guilty of the offense of communicating with a witness, as charged. The foregoing evidence is abundantly adequate to sustain that guilty finding. The evidence is more than sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with the intent to deter Mrs. Stephen and her daughter Sarah from testifying freely, fully and truthfully to a matter pending in court, offered Mrs. Stephen a sum of money. Understandably, the defendant neglected to use the express language of the statute or indictment. Of course he did not expressly state to Mrs. Stephen that he offered her the money with intent to deter her and her daughter from testifying freely, fully and truthfully to a matter pending in court. Nevertheless, the foregoing evidence of Robinson\u2019s offer of $1,000 to Mrs. Stephen for her and Sarah not to come to court was sufficient and competent evidence from which the jury was authorized to and could justifiably conclude and find beyond a reasonable doubt that Robinson offered Mrs. Stephen the money with the intent to deter her and Sarah from appearing in court and that by not appearing in court, they would and could not testify freely, fully or truthfully, or at all.\nRobinson\u2019s offer also may have been an offer by Robinson \u201cfor their nonaid in the prosecution of the sexual assault charge\u201d and for them \u201cnot to aid in the prosecution of the sexual assault charge against him,\u201d as the majority concludes, but that does not preclude this offer from also being with the intent to deter the Stephens from testifying freely, fully and truthfully in court, as charged and as the jury so found by their guilty verdict. 186 Ill. App. 3d at 3, 4.\nThe majority\u2019s conclusion, that \u201c[i]f the Stephens had accepted defendant\u2019s offer, the State could still have proceeded with the prosecution, subpoenaing them as witnesses whereupon they could then testify freely, fully and truthfully,\u201d is immaterial, irrelevant and inconsequential. 186 Ill. App. 3d at 4.\nAdditionally, the majority\u2019s reliance on People v. Scribner (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 1138, 440 N.E.2d 160, is ill-founded. Scribner is not analogous to the instant case. In Scribner, criminal charges were pending against Kevin Crottly and Jeffrey Crottly stemming from a fight between them and John Zini. Scribner, the Crottlys\u2019 uncle offered to pay Zini $500 to go to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office and request that the charges against the Crottlys be dropped. At the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, Zini signed an affidavit stating that he was dropping the charges against the Crottlys and that he was not being threatened, coerced, or paid to do so. Zini signed another affidavit which stated that he was being offered $500 by Scribner to drop the charges against the Crottlys but he intended to prosecute them despite the payment. Scribner had given Zini $100 before Zini entered the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office and gave Zini an additional $150 when Zini left. The $250 balance was to be paid upon Jeffrey Crottly being released from custody. On these facts the jury found Scribner guilty of offering and delivering money to Zini with intent to deter from testifying freely, fully and truthfully in the Crottly prosecution.\nScribner urged on appeal for reversal that the evidence failed to prove the commission of the offense with which he was charged, i.e., that he offered or delivered money to a witness with intent to deter the witness from testifying freely, fully and truthfully to any matter pending in court. Scribner contended that the evidence established his intent to cause Zini to ask the State\u2019s Attorney to drop the charges. The Scribner court concluded:\n\u201cOur review of the evidence reveals that, without doubt, defendant\u2019s offer to pay Mr. Zini was made contingent upon Mr. Zini\u2019s agreement to ask the State\u2019s Attorney to drop charges against his nephews. There is no evidence of any specific request by defendant that Mr. Zini refuse to testify or testify other than freely, fully and truthfully. Rather, Mr. Zini admitted on several occasions at trial that defendant never made such a request. Nowhere in the [tape-]recorded conversations between Mr. Zini and defendant does such a request appear. *** The most the complaining witness can do is request that the State\u2019s Attorney not proceed with the prosecution. As former assistant State\u2019s Attorney Rand Hale admitted in testifying for the State, the State\u2019s Attorney was empowered to disregard Mr. Zini\u2019s request not to prosecute and to subpoena Mr. Zini to testify, though doing so would cause the State\u2019s Attorney additional difficulty.\nBased on the evidence adduced at trial, we conclude that defendant\u2019s acts evinced an intent to cause Mr. Zini not to aid in prosecution of defendant\u2019s nephews. Although such evidence establishes guilt of the petty offense of compounding a crime (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 32 \u2014 1), this is not an offense defendant was charged with committing and presumably was not prepared to defend. Mr. Zini could have fulfilled his part of the bargain with defendant, as revealed by both the testimony of Mr. Zini and by the tapes, by asking the State\u2019s Attorney to drop the charges; yet he still could have testified fully and truthfully at trial. ***\n*** [W]e conclude that the State\u2019s evidence, if it were accepted as true, was not sufficient to establish that defendant committed the offense charged.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 108 Ill. App. 3d at 1143-44.\nFirst, in Scribner, unlike in the case at bar, and as the Scribner court pointed out, the testimony of Zini affirmatively established, without contradiction, that the defendant Scribner never requested Zini to refuse to testify or not to testify freely, fully and truthfully.\nSecond, in Scribner, again unlike in the instant case, Scribner offered to pay Zini upon Zini\u2019s agreement to ask the State\u2019s Attorney to drop the charges against his nephews, the Crottlys, whereas, in the instant case the defendant Robinson offered the Stephens money not to come to court. Although Officer Walsh testified that the offer he overheard when listening on the telephone extension was that the man would give Mrs. Stephen $1,000 to drop the charges and that he would beat the case, Mrs. Stephen testified, however, that the defendant offered her the money for Sarah not to come to court. The jury was authorized to accept her testimony, which was not necessarily contradictory or inconsistent with Officer Walsh\u2019s testimonial version of the telephone conversation offer.\nThird, in the instant case, as in Scribner, \u201cthere is no evidence of any specific request by defendant\u201d that Mrs. Stephen or her daughter Sarah not testify freely, fully and truthfully. In the instant case, however, unlike in Scribner, the evidence does not affirmatively establish, as the evidence established in Scribner, that the defendant did not request Mrs. Stephen and Sarah to testify freely, fully and truthfully.\nFourth, concededly, the defendant in the case at bar did not expressly couch his request to Mrs. Stephen in the precise and exact words of the statute. Rarely, if ever, is even the most sophisticated criminal so articulate. Nevertheless, the jury could validly conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the language that the defendant did employ in his request and offer of money to Mrs. Stephen, and that the defendant by such language and offer intended to deter Mrs. Stephen and her daughter from testifying freely, fully and truthfully in the case in which he was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault upon the minor daughter. Scribner is not analogous with, applicable to, or controlling in the case at bar.\nThe instant case is more closely analogous to People v. Powell (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 50. In Powell, Juanita Guevara was charged with aggravated battery arising out of a stabbing of Arvilda Torres. Officer Martinez, the investigating officer in the case, was offered $250 by Guevara\u2019s attorney, Paul Powell, if he could get the stabbing victim, Arvilda Torres to \u201cdrop the charges.\u201d After meetings and numerous conversations between Officer Martinez and attorney Powell on how to manipulate the dismissal of the battery charges, Officer Martinez appeared in court, and when Guevara\u2019s case was called, Officer Martinez falsely represented to the judge that Torres did not \u25a0wish to prosecute the case, and the aggravated battery charge against Guevara was stricken on leave to reinstate. Officer Martinez and attorney Powell left the courtroom and entered attorney Powell\u2019s car parked outside the court building. Powell drove off. As they approached the corner, Powell threw $250 on the floor at Officer Martinez\u2019 feet. Officer Martinez picked the money up and handed attorney Powell a grand jury subpoena which commanded Powell\u2019s appearance before the grand jury concerning the just completed Guevara bribery. Officer Martinez got out of Powell\u2019s car. In the ensuing conversation, which gave rise to the solicitation charge against Powell, Powell repeatedly asked Officer Martinez for a \u201cpass\u201d and told Martinez that the officer was \u201cblowing my whole license.\u201d Powell urged the officer to hide the money and tell the State\u2019s Attorney that he, Powell, \u201cstiffed him\u201d (failed to pay) and that he, Powell, would \u201cdrop anything you want any place.\u201d Powell was convicted of the Guevara bribery offense and also of the Officer Martinez solicitation offense. The appellate court reversed the bribery conviction on the grounds that the bribery had not been proven as it was charged in the indictment and that the acts Powell sought Officer Martinez to perform were not related to the performance of Officer Martinez\u2019 official duties. The appellate court also reversed Powell\u2019s solicitation conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Powell\u2019s solicitation was with the requisite intent to obstruct the apprehension or prosecution of a specific person.\nThe supreme court granted the People leave to appeal in Powell. The supreme court pointed out that the bribery statute that Powell allegedly violated provided:\n\u201cA person commits bribery when:\n(a) With intent to influence the performance of any act related to the employment or function of any public officer, public employee or juror, he promises or tenders to that person any property or personal advantage which he is not authorized by law to accept ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 33 \u2014 1.)\nThe supreme court thereafter pointed out that the bribery indictment against Powell alleged:\n\u201c[W]ith the intent to influence the performance of acts related to the employment and function of a public employee, Jose Martinez, he [Powell] promised and tendered to that person property which Jose Martinez is not authorized by law to accept, to wit: Paul Powell did promise and tender a quantity of United States currency to Chicago Police Officer Jose Martinez, to influence Martinez in the securing of witnesses, and investigation and prosecution of a criminal case entitled People v. Juanita Guevara in the Circuit Court of Cook County.\u201d (Powell, 72 Ill. 2d at 6.)\nIn reversing the appellate court and in affirming Powell\u2019s bribery conviction, the supreme court stated, in language most analogously applicable to the facts in the instant case:\n\u201cThe appellate court found that Powell never actually told Officer Martinez not to bring a witness to court, and that, even if he did, the bringing of witnesses to the courtroom was not related to the official duties of the officer. Officer Martinez testified, however, that his function and role as a police officer was to \u2018investigate crime, secure witnesses, bring enough evidence to court,\u2019 and that inquiries as to the availability of witnesses were part of his \u2018official duties.\u2019 But such testimony is not essential. It is common knowledge of which we take judicial notice that a principal duty of a policeman or any other law enforcement officer is the enforcement of the law. That payments made to an investigating officer in a criminal case to induce him to persuade key prosecuting witnesses not to appear or to withdraw a complaint are not intended to influence the performance of the officer\u2019s duties in investigating, identifying and securing witnesses in criminal cases is an argument we believe does not merit further discussion. *** It seems to us clear that an important part of any investigating officer\u2019s official duties is the location and procuring of witnesses for the prosecution or for the defendant so that the result of a crime will be a fair trial and punishment for the proper person.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 72 Ill. 2d at 61-62.\nRegarding Powell\u2019s conviction of solicitation to obstruct justice, the supreme court stated that, \u201cThe crime of solicitation is committed when a person, with intent that an offense be committed, commands, encourages or requests another to commit that offense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 8 \u2014 1(a).) Obstructing justice occurs when one, with intent to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person, knowingly commits one of certain enumerated acts, including concealing physical evidence or furnishing false information. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 31 \u2014 4(a).)\u201d (Powell, 72 Ill. 2d at 63.) The solicitation count against Powell alleged:\n\u201cPaul Powell committed the offense of solicitation in that with intent that the offense of obstructing justice be committed encouraged and requested Chicago Police Officer Jose Martinez to commit that offense, to wit: knowingly encouraged and requested Jose Martinez to conceal $250.00 in United States currency, said currency being physical evidence that the offense of bribery was committed by Paul Powell on or about October 18,1973.\nIn violation of Chapter 38, Section 8 \u2014 1, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1973.\u201d (Powell, 72 Ill. 2d at 64.)\nPowell argued, and the appellate court agreed, that the solicitation count was invalid because it did not allege which person\u2019s apprehension Powell sought to prevent and thus failed to inform him of the nature of the offense and prevented him from preparing his defense. The supreme court held that this contention was also without merit, and:\n\u201cIn our judgment this indictment did in fact allege the name of the particular persons \u2014 namely, Paul Powell \u2014 whose apprehension Officer Martinez would intend to prevent if he had concealed the evidence as defendant had requested. An indictment which charges an offense in the language of the statute is sufficient when the statute itself apprises the defendant with reasonable certainty of the precise offense with which he or she is charged ***. This indictment is first couched in the language of the solicitation statute, then goes on to specify the key elements of the crime solicited; a common sense reading of it makes difficult a belief that Powell could not properly prepare his defense because the indictment was not sufficiently specific. In any event, \u2018[t]he office of a bill of particulars is to provide more specificity of detail to supplement a sufficient indictment so as to enable an accused better to understand the nature of the charge against him or better to prepare his defense.\u2019 [Citation.] No bill of particulars was requested.\u201d 72 Ill. 2d at 64-65.\nThe appellate court in Powell also concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove the solicitation to obstruct justice offense. The supreme court likewise held this conclusion to be without merit, stating, again, in language most analogously applicable to the instant case:\n\u201c[T]he conversation which occurred after Officer Martinez gave Powell the grand jury subpoena, clearly establishes that Powell solicited the obstruction of justice. Telling the assistant State\u2019s Attorney that Powell \u2018stiffed\u2019 Officer Martinez, or did not pay him the bribe money, obviously involves concealing the $250. In addition, Powell directly encouraged the officer to hide the currency, which was later introduced against Powell * * *\nThe trial judge *** found the evidence sufficient, and we find nothing in this record justifying a contrary conclusion.\u201d 72 Ill. 2d at 63-65.\nIn the instant case the jury found the evidence sufficient and there is nothing in this record which justifies a contrary conclusion.\nThe defendant Robinson finally argues in the case at bar that the \u201cadmission of irrelevant other crimes\u2019 evidence\u201d and the admission of Lemuel Taylor\u2019s conversations with Tina Clark and Mrs. Stephen denied him a fair trial. I disagree.\nEvidence of a defendant\u2019s commission of other crimes for which the defendant is not on trial ordinarily is inadmissible. (People v. Grabbe (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 678, 499 N.E.2d 499; People v. Davis (1984), 130 Ill. App. 3d 41, 473 N.E.2d 387; People v. Barbour (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 993, 436 N.E.2d 667; People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 129.) I have repeatedly expressed my views of the law\u2019s prohibition against the admission of evidence of the defendant\u2019s commission of other crimes for which the defendant is not on trial in People v. McCarthy (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 208, 214 (Pincham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); People v. Howard (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 536, 541-81, 523 N.E.2d 943 (Pincham, J., dissenting); People v. Hayes (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 816, 821-44, 522 N.E.2d 1279 (Pincham, J., dissenting); People v. Porter (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 365, 374-94, 509 N.E.2d 662 (Pincham, J., dissenting); People v. Harris (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 891, 896-909, 498 N.E.2d 621 (Pincham, J., dissenting); and People v. Wachal (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 331, 340-44, 509 N.E.2d 648 (Pincham, J., specially concurring). I do not here retreat from those views. In the instant case evidence of the defendant\u2019s commission of other crimes for which the defendant was not on trial simply was not offered or admitted. In the instant case, the evidence presented to the jury was only that the defendant was charged with the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault upon Sarah Stephen. The jury was not presented one speck of evidence of the defendant\u2019s commission of that offense. The charge of aggravated criminal sexual assault upon Sarah Stephen by the defendant was an integral ingredient of the offense of communicating with a witness with which the defendant was charged and on trial. Evidence that the defendant was so charged was therefore clearly admissible. The learned trial judge, in properly overruling the defendant\u2019s in limine motion to exclude such evidence, aptly and correctly stated:\n\u201c[T]he charge of communicating with a witness is intricately involved with what the pending charge was. I can\u2019t see any way of properly trying the case without knowing that. However, any evidence concerning the case other than the facts of what the charge was would be irrelevant. While it is relevant that communication concerning aggravated criminal sexual assault, I believe to go into the actual facts of that case would be inappropriate. The motion in limine however will be denied.\u201d\nLikewise, Mrs. Stephen\u2019s statement to the defendant over the telephone that \u201cyou offer me money after you burn my mother\u2019s house down and almost killed them,\u201d and the defendant\u2019s response, \u201cWell, I can give you three thousand dollars, whatever I guess to help,\u201d were an integral part of the defendant\u2019s commission of the offense of communicating with the witness with intent to deter her and her daughter from testifying freely, fully and truthfully. The statements immediately followed and were components of the defendant\u2019s offer to Mrs. Stephen to give her a thousand dollars \u201cfor Sarah not to come to court,\u201d which offer the defendant thereby raised to $3,000. Moreover, Mrs. Stephen\u2019s statement was not evidence of the defendant\u2019s commission of the arson. It was no more than an accusation by Mrs. Stephen to the defendant that he committed the arson of her mother\u2019s home. For these foregoing reasons, this statement of Mrs. Stephen was also admissible.\nThe defendant\u2019s contention that Tina Clark and Mrs. Stephen\u2019s testimony of Lemuel Taylor\u2019s statements that Sammie sent him to give Mrs. Stephen $1,000 for Sarah not to come to court, that Sammie would not pay Taylor if he did not deliver the message, that Sammie was on 104th and Wentworth in his car and about Sammie\u2019s telephone number were inadmissible because no conspiracy between Taylor and defendant Robinson was shown is without merit.\nWhen a conspiracy has been shown, admissions by a coconspirator in the course of the conspiracy are admissible against the conspirators. (People v. Masters (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 508 N.E.2d 1163, citing People v. Goodman (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 278, 408 N.E.2d 215.) The prosecution is required to establish a prima facie case by independent evidence that two or more persons were engaged in a common plan or agreement to accomplish a criminal goal or criminal end. (People v. Olmos (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 287, 395 N.E.2d 968.) The existence of the agreement need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be inferred from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the acts and declarations of the accused. 77 Ill. App. 3d at 291, 395 N.E.2d at 971, citing People v. Veltese (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 279, 282, 377 N.E.2d 1168.\nThe independent, undisputed evidence in the instant case established that Lemuel Taylor went to Mrs. Stephen\u2019s apartment twice. During Taylor\u2019s second visit he gave Mrs. Stephen a piece of paper. On the piece of paper was written defendant\u2019s telephone number. Mrs. Stephen called the phone number given to her by Taylor and spoke with defendant. During the phone conversation, defendant offered her $1,000 and later $3,000 in exchange for her daughter Sarah not to go to court. It is abundantly clear by Taylor\u2019s actions and defendant\u2019s words that they had entered into an agreement. There was overwhelming unrebutted direct and circumstantial evidence which established an agreement between Taylor and the defendant to accomplish a criminal act.\nThe defendant\u2019s trial was without reversible error. Accordingly, I would affirm his conviction. I therefore dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE PINCHAM," } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Vicki Rogers, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Renee Goldfarb, and Richard G. Cenar, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMMY ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201487\u20140713\nOpinion filed June 30, 1989.\nPINCHAM, J., dissenting.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Vicki Rogers, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Renee Goldfarb, and Richard G. Cenar, Jr., Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 23, "last_page_order": 37 }