{ "id": 2669614, "name": "ESTATE OF VIRGINIA L. RIHA, A Disabled Person by and through Mary A. Riha, Guardian of the Estate and Person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRIST HOSPITAL et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Estate of Riha v. Christ Hospital", "decision_date": "1989-08-14", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201486\u20143474, 1\u201486\u20143475 cons.", "first_page": "752", "last_page": "756", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "187 Ill. App. 3d 752" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "176 N.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5226232 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/31/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780-81" }, { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3576360 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" }, { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3461755 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 2d 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2583195, 2583510 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/73/0072-02", "/ill-app-2d/73/0072-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 505, "char_count": 9496, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.1698346083958427e-07, "percentile": 0.9121755747149737 }, "sha256": "c564129f67ae3121fedeff999933ecfaaf50631fbc7f3eefb3550f1ab3362f77", "simhash": "1:5a7d5ad7d696d41a", "word_count": 1492 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:20:22.173562+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ESTATE OF VIRGINIA L. RIHA, A Disabled Person by and through Mary A. Riha, Guardian of the Estate and Person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRIST HOSPITAL et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal arises from the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of two complaints filed by Mary Riha (plaintiff), guardian of the estate and person of Virginia Riha, alleging medical malpractice against Christ Hospital and Dr. Melvin Wichter and products liability against Ayerst Laboratories (defendants). The circuit court found the actions were barred by the statute of limitations. The applicable statutory provisions are the tolling provision in section 13 \u2014 211 of the Civil Practice Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 211) and the refiling provision in section 13 \u2014 217 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 217). Section 13 \u2014 211 tolls the limitation period for actions specified in sections 13 \u2014 201 through 13 \u2014 212 for persons \u201cunder legal disability\u201d \u201cat the time the cause of action accrued\u201d until two years after the disability is removed. Section 13 \u2014 217 limits the refiling period after an action is voluntarily dismissed to \u201cwithin one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 217).\nOn August 20, 1981, Virginia Riha filed a complaint in her individual capacity in the circuit court alleging medical malpractice against Christ Hospital and 36 physicians and alleging product liability against Ayerst. She moved to voluntarily dismiss all defendants except Dr. J. Meiszner, M.D., on July 6, 1982.\nOn May 22, 1985, the probate court entered an order finding Virginia Riha to be a \u201cdisabled person\u201d and appointing plaintiff guardian of her estate and person. On August 13, 1985, plaintiff, as guardian of the estate and person of Virginia Riha, a disabled person, filed an amended complaint retaining Dr. J. Meiszner as a defendant and renaming as defendants Christ Hospital, Ayerst, and Wichter.\nChrist Hospital and Ayerst moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the basis that it was time barred. Before their motions were heard, plaintiff filed another lawsuit on behalf of Virginia Riha on June 9, 1986, naming as defendants Christ Hospital, Donald Walker, R.N., Wichter and Ayerst. Christ Hospital and Ayerst also moved to dismiss that case because of the pendency of another lawsuit involving the same issues and parties. The circuit court sustained Christ Hospital\u2019s and Ayerst\u2019s motions to dismiss on August 13, 1986, as well as Wichter\u2019s motion to dismiss on November 12,1986.\nOn appeal, plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in holding her actions were time barred by section 13 \u2014 217\u2019s refiling provisions, arguing that she timely filed the action \u201cwithin the remaining period of limitation\u201d under that provision. To sustain her position, plaintiff asserts that the limitations period for filing her original action was tolled by section 13 \u2014 211 of the Act since Virginia Riha was legally disabled at the time the cause of action accrued and her disability had not been removed at the time she refiled the action.\nIt is clear from the record that Virginia Riha was not legally adjudicated an incompetent at the time her cause of action accrued. Nonetheless, our research has revealed, and defendants have conceded in oral argument, that a formal legal adjudication of disability is not required to show that a person was \u201cunder a legal disability\u201d pursuant to section 13 \u2014 211.\nIn an amendment effective July 1, 1982, the legislature changed the language of the tolling provision in issue here from persons who are \u201cincompetent\u201d to persons \u201cunder legal disability.\u201d (Pub. Act. 92\u2014 280, eff. July 1, 1982 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 22).) Under case law involving the previous statute, claimants were not required to show a formal adjudication of incompetency to satisfy the statutory language, but could present medical evidence to establish their incompetency. See Peach v. Peach (1966), 73 Ill. App. 2d 72, 218 N.E.2d 504.\nOur research discloses only two appellate court cases involving an interpretation of this statutory amendment or a similar statutory amendment. In the first case, relied on by plaintiff, Mazikoske v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 166, 500 N.E.2d 622, the disputed issue was whether the appointment of a guardian six months after the cause of action accrued removed the legal disability under section 13 \u2014 211. After answering in the negative, the court further found section 13 \u2014 211's provisions were satisfied by evidence of a legal adjudication six months after the accident and testimony from a licensed clinical psychologist, who examined the claimant 10 years after the accident, that the accident rendered the victim incompetent to manage his estate and person and such condition was permanent.\nThe appellate court in the second case, Passmore v. Walther Memorial Hospital (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 554, 504 N.E.2d 778, explicitly rejected the argument that the claimant had to be legally adjudicated disabled under identical language and statutory amendment under section 13 \u2014 212, the tolling provision for bringing actions for injuries or death against physicians and hospitals. The appellate court reversed the circuit court\u2019s finding that \u201cunder legal disability\u201d meant a legally adjudicated disability. The court stated the policy reasons for its finding:\n\u201cThe public policy which underlies the tolling provision set forth in section 13 \u2014 212 and its predecessor has been clearly stated by this and other courts on numerous occasions. This section, and its predecessor, was designed to ensure that \u2018statutes of limitations [were] generally tolled during a plaintiff\u2019s infancy, mental incompetency, or imprisonment. (Emphasis added.) [Citation.] The tolling provision was intended to protect the rights of those who were not \u2018legally competent to bring actions directly\u2019 since the courts recognized that the enforcement of their rights should not be \u2018left to the whim or mercy of some self-constituted next friend.\u2019 [Citation.]\nIf defendants\u2019 interpretation of this statute is accepted and the \u2018self-constituted next friend\u2019 fails to seek an \u2018adjudication\u2019 of \u2018legal disability\u2019 within the two-year period specified by section 13 \u2014 212, the provisions of the tolling statute will have been rendered meaningless and the protection afforded to the otherwise incompetent person destroyed.\u201d (Passmore, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 558, 504 N.E.2d at 780-81.)\nThus, plaintiff need not establish that Virginia Riha was legally adjudicated disabled at the time her cause of action accrued, as the intent of the legislature in enacting section 13 \u2014 211\u2019s tolling provision is to protect the rights of incompetent persons, whether or not they are adjudicated as such.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint here sufficiently alleged facts that Virginia Riha was \u201cunder legal disability\u201d at the time her cause of action accrued. Virginia Riha\u2019s 1981 amended complaint and plaintiff\u2019s 1986 refiled complaint alleged that as of the date Virginia Riha was hospitalized, she suffered from schizophrenia and mental disorders and that defendants\u2019 negligence aggravated her condition and caused her to be \u201cgreatly disordered *** in mind.\u201d The Passmore court similarly found the complaint to sufficiently allege facts that the claimant was \u201cunder legal disability\u201d to invoke section 13 \u2014 212\u2019s tolling provision where the complaint alleged that from the date of the acts of malpractice the claimant was entirely without understanding or capacity to make or communicate decisions regarding his person and totally unable to manage his estate or financial affairs. Passmore, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 557, 504 N.E.2d at 780.\nAt plaintiff\u2019s motion for a rehearing in the circuit court, plaintiff brought to the circuit court\u2019s attention medical and psychiatric reports and hospital records to establish her incompetence at the time the cause of action accrued. The record indicates, however, that the circuit court did not consider this evidence because it apparently was under the erroneous belief that a formal legal adjudication was required to establish that Virginia Riha was under a legal disability at the time her cause of action accrued. Because this determination is properly one for the trier of fact, it is necessary that we remand this matter to the circuit court. While a person is presumed to be sane and competent until his status is otherwise determined (In re Estate of Oelerich (1961), 31 Ill. App. 2d 457, 176 N.E.2d 549), on remand, the plaintiff is to be afforded an evidentiary hearing so that she may attempt to overcome that presumption.\nReversed and remanded.\nMANNING, P.J., and O\u2019CONNOR, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Alan C. Hoffman, of Chicago (John Munday, of counsel), for appellant.", "Cassiday, Schade & Gloor, of Chicago (Michael J. Gallagher, Rudolf G. Schade, Jr., Lisa A. Masucci, and Judith A. Schieber, of counsel), for appellee Christ Hospital.", "John Cadwalader Menk & Associates, of Chicago (John Cadwalader Menk and Brian Perry Bruce, of counsel), for appellee Ayerst Laboratories, Inc.", "Johnson, Cusack & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago (Thomas H. Fegan and Margaret A. Unger, of counsel), for appellee Melvin Wichter." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ESTATE OF VIRGINIA L. RIHA, A Disabled Person by and through Mary A. Riha, Guardian of the Estate and Person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRIST HOSPITAL et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNos. 1\u201486\u20143474, 1\u201486\u20143475 cons.\nOpinion filed August 14, 1989.\nRehearing denied September 20, 1989.\nModified opinion filed September 29, 1989.\nAlan C. Hoffman, of Chicago (John Munday, of counsel), for appellant.\nCassiday, Schade & Gloor, of Chicago (Michael J. Gallagher, Rudolf G. Schade, Jr., Lisa A. Masucci, and Judith A. Schieber, of counsel), for appellee Christ Hospital.\nJohn Cadwalader Menk & Associates, of Chicago (John Cadwalader Menk and Brian Perry Bruce, of counsel), for appellee Ayerst Laboratories, Inc.\nJohnson, Cusack & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago (Thomas H. Fegan and Margaret A. Unger, of counsel), for appellee Melvin Wichter." }, "file_name": "0752-01", "first_page_order": 778, "last_page_order": 782 }