{ "id": 2688347, "name": "THOMAS L. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIM EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Reynolds v. Edgar", "decision_date": "1989-08-31", "docket_number": "No. 4-89-0299", "first_page": "71", "last_page": "79", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 71" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3000517 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5428859 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 N.E.2d 929", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "933-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 1087", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3450216 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1094" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/1087-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 1085", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1088-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152711 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3615519 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 1008", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 814", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2431566 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0814-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 766, "char_count": 18072, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.953181076708474e-08, "percentile": 0.42153036721445925 }, "sha256": "06fc34d6e3d35b51d0da5e5cfb8a55a3d6c17398808e5337134c44ccfddaee56", "simhash": "1:3926a097fa176779", "word_count": 2933 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:36:06.130198+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THOMAS L. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIM EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant Secretary of State (Secretary) appeals from an order of the circuit court of Sangamon County which, upon administrative review, reversed an order of the Secretary denying plaintiff reinstatement of his driver\u2019s license or, in the alternative, a restricted driving permit.\nWe reverse.\nPlaintiff was convicted of 10 traffic offenses from July of 1977 to April of 1981. His driver\u2019s license was twice suspended, the first time for two months and the second time for one year. Both suspensions were as a result of his multiple speeding convictions. In April of 1981, plaintiff was convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug (DUI). Plaintiff was also convicted that same month of illegal transportation of alcohol. As a result of the DUI conviction, his license was revoked in May of 1981. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 6 \u2014 206(a), 11 \u2014 501.) In April of 1987, plaintiff was convicted of driving while his license was revoked (DWR).\nIn July of 1988, plaintiff petitioned the Secretary for reinstatement of his driver\u2019s license or, in the alternative, a restricted driving permit to commute to work. After a hearing in August of 1988, the Secretary adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the hearing officer and denied all relief requested by the plaintiff.\nPlaintiff sought administrative review before the circuit court, arguing that the Secretary\u2019s denial was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and constituted an abuse of discretion. The circuit court agreed and directed the Secretary to take all necessary steps to enable plaintiff to have his driving privileges restored.\nRecently, this court dealt with a similar case that also involved the Secretary. In Craig v. Edgar (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 270, 272, 519 N.E.2d 112, 114, we stated the following:\n\u201cThe findings and conclusions of an administrative agency on questions of fact are considered prima facie true and correct. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 110.) A court may not interfere with the discretionary authority vested in an administrative body unless that authority is exercised in an arbitrary manner or the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. A reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence. (Murdy v. Edgar (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 384, 469 N.E.2d 1085.) The Secretary\u2019s decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence when no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Secretary, could agree with the Secretary\u2019s decision. (Agans v. Edgar (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1094, 492 N.E.2d 929, 933-34.)\u201d\nIn his written findings and recommendations, the hearing officer set forth three separate \u201cconclusions of law\u201d which served as the bases for denying plaintiff\u2019s petition for reinstatement of his driving privileges. In his first two \u201cconclusions of law,\u201d the hearing officer essentially found that the evidence presented at the hearing established that the plaintiff was an \u201calcoholic/chemically dependent person\u201d who had failed to show that he had established an adequate support system in order to ensure continuous recovery from his \u201calcoholism/chemical dependency.\u201d Almost all of the evidence produced at the hearing dealt with the plaintiff\u2019s previous status as a drug and alcohol abuser who had successfully overcome his problem of abuse.\nAt the hearing, plaintiff testified that he had not had a drink since 1984, that he was regularly employed, and that he had ongoing support for his continued abstinence through involvement with his work, family, and hobbies. The hearing officer found the plaintiff to be sincere and credible and observed that his support system appeared to be working.\nUnderstandably, plaintiff attacks these findings on administrative review. Plaintiff argues that the first two \u201cconclusions of law\u201d are in conflict with the hearing officer\u2019s findings of fact and therefore contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. However, we need not resolve this issue because the third \u201cconclusion of law\u201d upon which the hearing officer\u2019s recommendation was based is clearly not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The third \u201cconclusion of law\u201d held that the plaintiff \u201cfailed to carry his burden of proving that he would be a safe and responsible driver and that he would not endanger the public safety and welfare.\u201d\nThe Illinois Supreme Court in Murdy v. Edgar (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 384, 391-92, 469 N.E.2d 1085, 1088-89, reviewed the law applicable to the question of whether a petitioner seeking reinstatement of his driving privileges \u201cwould not endanger the public safety and welfare,\u201d and stated the following:\n\u201cThe Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) grants the authority to the Secretary to reinstate driving privileges or to issue restricted driving permits. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 6\u2014 206, 6 \u2014 208.) A review of the Code makes it clear that, once driving privileges are revoked, the restoration of such privileges is not automatic. (People v. Turner (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 183, 186.) For example, before driving privileges are restored under section 6 \u2014 208, the Secretary must determine that \u2018to grant the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the highways will not endanger the public safety or welfare.\u2019 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 208(b)(2).) Similarly, the relevant inquiry before issuing a restricted driving permit is the danger to the public safety and welfare. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, par. 6 \u2014 206(c)(3).) (See also Foege v. Edgar (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 190, 193.)\u201d\nIn addition to the statutes cited by the supreme court, the Secretary has set forth administrative regulations which address the same question. Section 1001.420(d) of the Secretary\u2019s rules (92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71001.420(d) (Supp. Jan. 1, 1988)) provides that the Secretary, when deciding whether to issue restricted driving permits, shall consider (among other factors) the frequency, type, and severity of traffic violations, as well as efforts at rehabilitation or reform of past driving practices. Section 1001.420(e) (92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71001.420(e) (Supp. Jan. 1, 1988)) provides that the effect of the issuance of a restricted driving permit (RDP) upon public safety will be carefully considered before any RDP is granted. Section 1001.430 (92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71001.430 (Supp. Jan. 1, 1988)) directs that when the Secretary is considering the reinstatement of driving privileges after revocation, he shall consider (among other factors) whether the applicant has driven while his license was suspended or revoked, the applicant\u2019s total driving record (including, but not limited to, any reasons for driving violations), and whether the evidence shows that public welfare and safety will not be endangered by reinstatement of the applicant\u2019s driving privileges. Evidence before the Secretary in this case established that almost six years after plaintiff\u2019s license was revoked due to his DUI conviction and three years after he claims to have put into place a support system to help him avoid the misconduct of his youth, plaintiff was convicted of DWR (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6\u2014 303), a Class A misdemeanor.\nWhen the underlying revocation stems from a DUI conviction, DWR is treated by the legislature as one of the most serious driving offenses one can commit in the absence of bodily injury. A comparison of the sentencing provisions for DWR stemming from a DUI with those of DUI itself is illustrative of this point. A person convicted of DUI commits a Class A misdemeanor. A DUI conviction is elevated to a Class 4 felony if the driver is convicted a third or subsequent time. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 502(d).) A person convicted of DUI a second time within five years of a previous conviction must be sentenced to a minimum of 48 consecutive hours of imprisonment or assigned to a minimum of 10 days of community service as may be determined by the court. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501(c).\nThe penalties for DWR are more severe. DWR, which is normally a Class A misdemeanor, is elevated to a Class 4 felony upon a second or subsequent violation when, as here, the underlying revocation stems from a conviction for DUI, reckless homicide, or leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident involving personal injuries or death. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 303(d).) Furthermore, a person convicted of DWR stemming from these same underlying bases must serve upon the first conviction a minimum term of imprisonment of 7 consecutive days or 30 days of community service work. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 303(c).\nAt the hearing, the sole explanation offered by the plaintiff with regard to his DWR conviction was the following: \u201cWell uh, when I got, I got arrested it was in December of 86 and I was driving a, driving to the store to get some groceries because I couldn\u2019t get a hold of anybody to come and give me a ride and ***.\u201d\nBased upon this record, the hearing officer\u2019s third \u201cconclusion of law\u201d was that plaintiff had failed to carry his burden of proving that he would be a safe and responsible driver and that he would not endanger the public safety and welfare. In the plaintiff\u2019s complaint for administrative review, the only reference he makes to the third \u201cconclusion of law\u201d is the following: \u201cThis conclusion is clearly contrary to the plaintiff\u2019s testimony, as well as his witness, and the letters submitted and received into evidence.\u201d However, other than the statements of the plaintiff quoted above, neither plaintiff\u2019s testimony, the testimony of his witness, nor any of the letters submitted into evidence make any reference to or explanation of the 1987 DWR conviction.\nIn the circuit court\u2019s order on appeal before us, the court\u2019s only statement with regard to the third \u201cconclusion of law\u201d is that it \u201cis contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d No explanation is given as to why this is so.\nDespite the seriousness of the plaintiff\u2019s DWR conviction in 1987, plaintiff\u2019s brief makes no mention whatsoever of the DWR conviction in its attack on the Secretary\u2019s findings. Simply stated, the question before this court is whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Secretary, could agree with the Secretary\u2019s decision that the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proving that he would be a safe and responsible driver and that he would not endanger the public safety and welfare. On these facts, the answer is clearly in the affirmative, and the circuit court erred in holding otherwise.\nAs a last matter, this court needs to resolve whether we should reverse the circuit court\u2019s order outright or reverse and remand for further administrative hearings. Those hearings would provide the Secretary with the opportunity to determine whether the third \u201cconclusion of law\u201d is sufficient standing alone to warrant the denial of plaintiff\u2019s driving privileges. This issue arises because of plaintiff\u2019s argument that the Secretary\u2019s first and second \u201cconclusions of law\u201d were inconsistent with the Secretary\u2019s findings of fact. On this record, however, we do not believe remand is necessary. The third \u201cconclusion of law\u201d is entirely separate and severable from the first and second \u201cconclusions of law.\u201d Furthermore, although the Secretary found that plaintiff had failed to carry his burden of proving that he would be a safe and responsible driver and that he would not endanger the public safety and welfare, the Secretary already accepted the plaintiff\u2019s claims that he had overcome his alcohol and chemical dependency. In light of plaintiff\u2019s DWR conviction in 1987, we find no inconsistency in the Secretary\u2019s conclusions that plaintiff had overcome his drug and alcohol abuse and yet remained a potential danger to public safety and welfare if he were to have any of his driving privileges restored. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that even if the first and second \u201cconclusions of law\u201d were stricken, the Secretary\u2019s third \u201cconclusion of law\u201d and his ultimate action of denial would be any different if further proceedings occurred upon remand.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed; and the decision of the Secretary is affirmed and reinstated.\nReversed; and the Secretary of State\u2019s order affirmed and reinstated.\nLUND, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE GREEN,\nspecially concurring:\nThe majority places too much emphasis upon plaintiff\u2019s recent conviction of driving while his license was revoked (DWR). The purpose of the legislation under which plaintiff\u2019s driving privileges were revoked is not to punish persons who have been convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants or drugs (DUI). Nor is the purpose of the legislation to punish those guilty of DWR. Rather the purpose of the legislation is to protect the public from persons whose ability to drive is likely to be impaired. Punishment is the function of the sentences which the court has the responsibility to impose upon the conviction of the two offenses. I agree that the plaintiff\u2019s conduct in driving while his license was revoked is an indication of continued irresponsibility but I do not deem it sufficient, of itself, to justify continued denial of driving privileges eight years after plaintiff\u2019s DUI conviction. The conduct giving rise to the DWR conviction focuses only indirectly upon plaintiff\u2019s ability to drive safely.\nAccordingly, we must confront the other criterion applied by the hearing officer. The hearing officer found plaintiff \u201cis a chemically dependent person.\u201d That was established by (1) the evidence submitted by plaintiff of an updated alcohol drug assessment which described plaintiff as a person whose use was problematic with his dependency in remission; and (2) the evidence of plaintiffs record prior to his 1981 conviction. This determination was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. However, in view of the fact that the evidence conclusively showed that this dependency had been in remission since plaintiffs discharge from a treatment center in 1982, I do not deem this evidence sufficient, of itself, to justify denial of driving privileges.\nNo doubt our streets would be safer if no one convicted of DUI was ever permitted to drive again but, clearly, the General Assembly did not have that in mind when the legislation involved here was enacted. However, where, as here, such an offender is shown to have a latent substance dependency in remission, the danger from subsequent driving is substantial even when the remission has existed for a substantial time. Nevertheless, no case has been called to our attention where such a latent dependency in remission has, of itself, been held to be sufficient to justify indefinitely a return of a revoked driving privilege. Thus, considering the length of the time plaintiff has been able to refrain from ingestion of abusive substances, I do not deem his latent dependency to be a sufficient basis alone to justify denial of driving privileges. Even when this latent dependency is coupled with evidence of plaintiffs recent irresponsible driving while his license was revoked, I do not consider the evidence to support refusal to restore driving privileges.\nThe hearing officer also found plaintiff\u2019s support systems to be working but he had \u201cfailed to carry his burden of proving he had established an adequate support system in order to ensure continuous recovery from his *** dependency.\u201d This finding arose largely from testimony plaintiff had attended meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous for a while but had dropped out, stating he did not feel the need for help from such a group. He had not sought help from any other such group. The Secretary\u2019s regulations indicate a requirement that a person with continuing latent dependency attach himself or herself to some type of \u201congoing support/recovery program.\u201d (92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71001.440(b)(3) (Supp. Jan. 1, 1987).) The hearing officer also noted that plaintiff had supported his request for restoration of driving privileges with letters of persons attesting his abstinence but was critical of the fact that none of the letters spoke to the question of whether plaintiff would be able to abstain in the future.\nIn Lamborn v. Edgar (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 814, 533 N.E.2d 1008, a motorist whose driving privileges had been revoked because of a DUI conviction was also found to have a latent dependency which had been held in check for three years at the time he sought restoration of driving privileges. As has plaintiff here, that motorist had refused to continue in any organized program for support. The appellate court upheld the Secretary\u2019s refusal to reinstate the motorist\u2019s license. Here the period of plaintiff\u2019s successful battle against his dependency is approximately twice as long as that in Lamborn. I deem the time span of remission here to approach that in which denial of restoration of driving privileges is an abuse of discretion and more than a rational person could deem appropriate even when the person seeking restoration does not take part in a formal program of support. However, considering the fact plaintiff has recently committed the irresponsible act of driving while his license was revoked, I deem the evidence barely sufficient to support the denial of restoration of the license.\nAccordingly, I concur in the decision to reverse the judgment of the circuit court to affirm the Secretary.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE GREEN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Ann Plunkett-Sheldon, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jeffrey S. Geisler, of Geisler Law Offices, of Decatur, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS L. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIM EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 89\u20140299\nOpinion filed August 31, 1989.\nGREEN, J., specially concurring.\nNeil E Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Ann Plunkett-Sheldon, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nJeffrey S. Geisler, of Geisler Law Offices, of Decatur, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0071-01", "first_page_order": 93, "last_page_order": 101 }