{ "id": 2691454, "name": "RAYMOND A. KOLANOWSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS VALLEY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Kolanowski v. Illinois Valley Community Hospital", "decision_date": "1989-09-22", "docket_number": "No. 3-88-0586", "first_page": "821", "last_page": "825", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 821" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3610539 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ark. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1753689 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/275/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 S.W.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10145099 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/426/0882-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 So. 2d 1031", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7569440, 7569489, 7569558 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/523/1031-01", "/so2d/523/1031-02", "/so2d/523/1031-03" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.Y.S.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 A.D.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 5552904, 5564355, 5554468, 5569599 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/78/0813-03", "/ad2d/78/0813-01", "/ad2d/78/0813-04", "/ad2d/78/0813-02" ] }, { "cite": "491 N.E.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3450689 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650196 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 958", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3544369 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3504625 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0649-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 582, "char_count": 10863, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7455447622667144e-07, "percentile": 0.7077144265939829 }, "sha256": "2a8f761974e10c7c35af97f4b4427e51cda8652de65be8d2d917fc7ba54ad500", "simhash": "1:9de084fc47fe1dc5", "word_count": 1722 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:36:06.130198+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RAYMOND A. KOLANOWSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS VALLEY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Raymond A. Kolanowski, brought suit against the defendant, Illinois Valley Community Hospital, for injuries he allegedly sustained when he fell from a bed while he was in the defendant\u2019s respite care program. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the plaintiff had failed to file an affidavit and medical report as required by section 2 \u2014 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 622). The trial court agreed and dismissed the suit, allowing the plaintiff 90 days to file new pleadings. The plaintiff failed to file new pleadings, and the trial court subsequently dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that section 2 \u2014 622 of the Code does not apply to the defendant\u2019s respite care program.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s complaint stated in count I that when he entered the defendant\u2019s custodial shelter care unit, the defendant knew that he was paralyzed on the left side of his body, rendering him weak, confused, helpless, and susceptible to falling from a hospital bed. It further alleged that on August 2, 1986, the defendant had left him unattended, allowing him to fall out of bed and injure himself. The plaintiff contended that the defendant was negligent in failing to properly supervise him, in failing to fix his bed so that he could not fall out of it or, at least, so that he would not be hurt by a fall, and in allowing him to get out of bed. Count II alleged that the defendant had breached its contract with the plaintiff wherein it agreed to provide him with quality care, 24-hour supervision, and skilled nursing services.\nThe record contains a copy of a brochure published by the defendant, stating that \u201cRespite Care is an interval of rest or relief for families or primary care-givers of Medicare-aged recipients who need to arrange 24-hour care and supervision for a loved one living with them when they must be away from the home because of short-term business/vacation plans, personal/family commitments, or sheer exhaustion.\u201d The contract between the plaintiff and the defendant indicates that the defendant had agreed to provide respite care at the highest level offered, \u201cskilled.\u201d Services it agreed to perform included \u201c[mjedication administration based upon level of care and physicians\u2019 orders,\u201d \u201c[professional supervision, observation, and treatment at the aforementioned level of care,\u201d and \u201c[sjkilled nursing services at the aforementioned level of care.\u201d The defendant also agreed to provide, as needed, prescribed medication, treatment modalities, physicians\u2019 visits, and medical supplies and equipment.\nSection 2 \u2014 622 of the Code provides in relevant part:\n\u201cHealing art malpractice, (a) In any action, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, in which the plaintiff seeks damages for injuries or death by reason of medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice, the plaintiffs attorney or the plaintiff, if the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, shall file an affidavit, attached to the original and all copies of the complaint, declaring one of the following:\n1. That *** [a] reviewing health professional has determined in a written report, after a review of the medical record and other relevant material involved in the particular action that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of such action; and that the affiant has concluded on the basis of the reviewing health professional\u2019s review and consultation that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for filing of such action. *** A copy of the written report, clearly identifying the plaintiff and the reasons for the reviewing health professional\u2019s determination that a reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action exists, must be attached to the affidavit ***.\n2. That the *** consultation required by paragraph 1 *** could not be obtained before the expiration of the statute of limitations. If an affidavit is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the certificate and written report required by paragraph 1 shall be filed within 90 days after the filing of the complaint. ***\n* * *\n(g) The failure to file a certificate required by this Section shall be grounds for dismissal under Section 2 \u2014 619.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 622.\nSection 2 \u2014 1704 of the Code provides:\n\u201cMedical Malpractice Action. As used in this Part, \u2018medical malpractice action\u2019 means any action, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, in which the plaintiff seeks damages for injuries or death by reason of medical, hospital, or other healing art malpractice. The term \u2018healing art\u2019 shall not include care and treatment by spiritual means through prayer in accord with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1704.\nThe term \u201chealing art malpractice\u201d is broad in scope. (Lyon v. Hasbro Industries, Inc. (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 649, 509 N.E.2d 702.) However, not every injury sustained by a patient in a hospital results from \u201chealing art malpractice.\u201d To determine whether a complaint sounds in ordinary negligence or healing art malpractice, courts look to the evidence that will be necessary to establish the defendant\u2019s standard of care. Edelin v. Westlake Community Hospital (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 857, 510 N.E.2d 958.\n\u201cGenerally, in a medical malpractice case, plaintiff must offer expert ' testimony to establish the standard of care unless defendant\u2019s conduct is so grossly negligent or the treatment so common that a lay person could readily understand it.\u201d (Edelin, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 862, 510 N.E.2d at 961.) If, however, the standard may be established on the basis of defendant\u2019s administrative policies or other evidence short of medical expert testimony, plaintiff will be permitted to proceed with his suit on a theory of ordinary negligence. For instance, an action based on a slip and fall injury allegedly resulting from defendant hospital\u2019s negligent failure to remove or warn of water on the floor constituted an ordinary premises liability claim rather than medical malpractice claim. The standard of care in such a case is that owed by a reasonable owner or occupier of the premises to a business-invitee. (Mooney v. Graham Hospital Association (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 376, 513 N.E.2d 633.) By contrast, it has been frequently held in this State and others that the standard of care where an injury allegedly results from a hospital\u2019s failure to provide adequate restraints, including bed rails, can be established only upon expert medical testimony. Consequently, these cases are treated as medical malpractice actions subject to statutory restrictions for healing art malpractice. (See, e.g., Taylor v. City of Beardstown (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 584, 491 N.E.2d 803; Lenny v. Loehmann (1980), 78 A.D.2d 813, 433 N.Y.S.2d 135; Bell v. West Harrison County District (Miss. 1988), 523 So. 2d 1031; Howe v. Citizens Memorial Hospital (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), 426 S.W.2d 882; Sexton v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. (1982), 275 Ark. 361, 631 S.W.2d 270.) Under this State\u2019s healing art malpractice act, failure to file the necessary affidavit and report is cause for dismissal with prejudice. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 622(g).\nThe instant plaintiff contends that since no medical treatment was being rendered to him, he did not need to comply with section 2 \u2014 622\u2019s requirements. We disagree. In advancing his argument, plaintiff relies primarily upon Owens v. Manor Health Care Corp. (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 684, 512 N.E.2d 820. In Owens, plaintiff complained that defendant nursing home was negligent in failing to provide adequate restraints to protect him from falling out of his wheelchair. In determining whether plaintiff\u2019s complaint was fatally defective for failure to comply with section 2 \u2014 622\u2019s requirement that a written report of a health professional be attached to the complaint, the court reviewed the nature of care being provided to plaintiff in the nursing home and the direct cause of his injury. First, the court noted that plaintiff was in the home for custodial shelter care, and not for the purpose of being restored to a normal physical or mental state. .And second, plaintiff\u2019s fall did not result from any medical condition or treatment, but merely because he had tried to get out of his wheelchair. Under the circumstances, even though plaintiff had alleged that his personal physician had ordered a wheelchair restraint, the defendant\u2019s alleged negligence did not require the assessment of any healthcare professional, and expert medical testimony was not required at trial because defendant\u2019s standard of care under the circumstances was not elevated to that of a \u201chealing art\u201d professional. The court accordingly ruled that plaintiff\u2019s complaint sounded in ordinary negligence and could proceed to trial as such. 159 Ill. App. 3d at 689, 512 N.E.2d at 824.\nUnlike Owens, in the case before us plaintiff was evaluated as requiring the highest level of care during his stay in the defendant\u2019s respite care program. His agreement with the defendant stated that the defendant would provide proper supervision and any needed medication, treatment, and physicians\u2019 examinations. The plaintiff\u2019s pleadings alleged that the defendant had failed to provide adequate supervision and restraints in light of his condition of partial paralysis. Plaintiff\u2019s fall, it appears, was directly related to his medical condition. As indicated above, it has been previously determined in this State that the need for bed rails in light of a patient\u2019s medical condition is not a matter of common knowledge, but requires medical knowledge, skill, and training. Taylor v. City of Beardstown (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 584, 491 N.E.2d 803.\nUnder the circumstances of this case, we find that the proper levels of supervision and restraint were determined by the plaintiff\u2019s medical condition and therefore involved medical judgments. Accordingly, an expert\u2019s opinion regarding the defendant hospital\u2019s standard of care would have been required at trial. We hold, therefore, that the gravamen of plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges healing art malpractice and required strict compliance with section 2 \u2014 622 of the Code. Since plaintiff failed to provide the necessary affidavit and report, the trial court correctly dismissed the cause of action.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHEIPLE and STOUDER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Louis E. Olivero & Associates, of Peru, for appellant.", "Douglas A. Gift, of Herbolsheimer, Lannon, Henson, Duncan & Reagan, of La Salle, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RAYMOND A. KOLANOWSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS VALLEY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 88\u20140586\nOpinion filed September 22, 1989.\nLouis E. Olivero & Associates, of Peru, for appellant.\nDouglas A. Gift, of Herbolsheimer, Lannon, Henson, Duncan & Reagan, of La Salle, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0821-01", "first_page_order": 843, "last_page_order": 847 }