{ "id": 2690584, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Robinson", "decision_date": "1989-09-22", "docket_number": "Nos. 3-88-0339, 3-88-0340 cons.", "first_page": "826", "last_page": "830", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 826" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "465 N.E.2d 162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 1074", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3427598 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/1074-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443843 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 917", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3108266 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0917-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3139219 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3128740 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3442757 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5554489 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 U.S. 625", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6206467 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/475/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 1094", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3188159 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/86/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3182454 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0621-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 469, "char_count": 8126, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.207966869300525e-08, "percentile": 0.3274026786889892 }, "sha256": "b99fca4b0aba4e304be0de0df3e227f5d8c41ac119d993975f8b94cc4bda3141", "simhash": "1:a3927e4c32db19d7", "word_count": 1281 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:36:06.130198+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury convicted the defendant, Michael Robinson, of one count of murder and one count of armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 60 years\u2019 imprisonment for the murder conviction and 20 years\u2019 imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction. This court affirmed his convictions on appeal. (People v. Robinson (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 621, 410 N.E.2d 121.) Subsequently, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court thereafter dismissed his petition. He appeals.\nThe sequence of events surrounding the defendant\u2019s commission of the above crimes was set forth in detail in People v. Gulliford (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 237, 407 N.E.2d 1094. Here, we will discuss only those facts pertinent to the issues presented by the defendant\u2019s appeal of the trial court\u2019s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.\nThe defendant\u2019s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing. He argues that his confession statement was taken in violation of his right to counsel as outlined in State v. Jackson (1986), 475 U.S. 625, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631, 106 S. Ct. 1404. In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that if police initiate interrogation after the defendant\u2019s assertion at arraignment of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant\u2019s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.\nThe record in the present case reveals that the defendant was arraigned on July 25, 1977, at which time the public defender\u2019s office was appointed to represent him. The record does not show whether the defendant requested a lawyer at arraignment. However, it does show that the defendant was given a piece of paper with the names and phone numbers of two assistant public defenders. In the defendant\u2019s previous appeal, we noted that he admitted that one of those assistant public defenders had represented him on a previous occasion, but that he nevertheless threw the piece of paper away and made no attempt to choose one of the public defenders before he voluntarily confessed to the crime on July 29, 1977, after being interrogated by police. Furthermore, prior to the commencement of the July 29 interrogation, the defendant did not request the presence of an attorney.\nWe find that even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in not suppressing the defendant\u2019s confession statement, any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt. In support of this finding, we note that there was an eyewitness to the crime. Further, the defendant\u2019s fingerprints were found on the bloody murder weapon discovered inside his car. Moreover, we note that in the first appeal of this case we held that \u201c[t]he record in the present case overwhelmingly establishes defendant\u2019s guilt, and we are convinced that his conviction would certainly have resulted even if his confession had not been admitted into evidence.\u201d (People v. Robinson (1980) , 87 Ill. App. 3d 621, 628, 410 N.E.2d 121, 126.) Accordingly, this finding was res judicata and could not be raised in a petition for post-conviction relief since it was decided on direct appeal adversely to the defendant. See People v. Edwards (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 128, 403 N.E.2d 771.\nThe defendant\u2019s second argument on appeal is that his appellate counsel was ineffective. He argues that his appellate counsel should have raised on direct appeal the issues contained in his petition for post-conviction relief.\nA defendant is not entitled as a matter of right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition alleging incompetence of counsel. (People v. Hanrahan (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 640, 478 N.E.2d 31.) Conclusional allegations regarding incompetency of counsel are not sufficient to require a post-conviction hearing. (People v. Howard (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 797, 419 N.E.2d 702.) Moreover, it is not incompetent for appellate counsel to fail to raise an issue on direct appeal which counsel believes is without merit, unless counsel\u2019s appraisal of the merits is patently erroneous. (People v. Crater (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 465 N.E.2d 162.) A petitioner who alleges ineffectiveness of counsel must show that but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201, 478 N.E.2d 392.\nApplying the above principles to the instant case, we find significant the fact that the defendant\u2019s allegations regarding the competency of his appellate counsel are mere conclusions. His post-conviction petition is devoid of affidavits or supporting memoranda. Furthermore, we note that even if the defendant\u2019s appellate counsel was incompetent, he makes no showing that the outcome of the proceedings was affected. We reiterate that the evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt was overwhelming. Accordingly, the trial court properly rejected the defendant\u2019s post-conviction claim that appellate counsel was ineffective.\nThe defendant\u2019s third argument on appeal is that he did not receive the effective assistance of trial counsel. He cites numerous instances in which he was allegedly denied the effective assistance of counsel. He contends that his trial counsel failed to interview certain witnesses and failed to impeach others. He further contends that his attorney failed to have him present during the instructions conference, failed to object to tainted identifications, failed to object to certain hearsay testimony, failed to demonstrate to the jury that a codefendant was awaiting trial, and failed to file certain additional pretrial and post-trial motions.\nInitially, we again note that conclusional allegations concerning the competency of counsel are not sufficient to require a post-conviction hearing. (People v. Howard (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 797, 419 N.E.2d 702.) When the defendant attacks the competency of his counsel for failing to call or contact witnesses, he must attach affidavits from those witnesses to his post-conviction petition and explain the significance of their testimony. (People v. Carmickle (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 917, 424 N.E.2d 78.) Errors in judgment or trial strategy do not establish that counsel was ineffective. (People v. Murphy (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 421, 381 N.E.2d 677.) Moreover, it is axiomatic that in order to establish that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must show not only that counsel\u2019s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, but also that counsel\u2019s shortcomings affected the outcome of the proceedings. (People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246.) Denial of an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is discretionary with the trial court, and its decision \"will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Hanrahan (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 640, 478 N.E.2d 31.\nIn the case at bar, we find that the defendant\u2019s allegations did not sustain his burden so as to require an evidentiary hearing. His allegations were either mere conclusions which were not supported by the record and affidavits, or were allegations regarding trial tactics. Further, we find that even if, arguendo, counsel did make errors, when the overwhelming evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt is considered, the defendant clearly failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that but for counsel\u2019s errors, the outcome of his trial would have been different.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWOMBACHER, P.J., and SCOTT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael Robinson, of Joliet, pro se, and Daniel M. Kirwan, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "John A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Rita Kennedy Mertel and John X. Breslin, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNos. 3 \u2014 88\u20140339, 3 \u2014 88\u20140340 cons.\nOpinion filed September 22, 1989.\nMichael Robinson, of Joliet, pro se, and Daniel M. Kirwan, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nJohn A. Barra, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Rita Kennedy Mertel and John X. Breslin, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0826-01", "first_page_order": 848, "last_page_order": 852 }