{ "id": 2690185, "name": "TERRY CROSS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BRENDA A. MOEHRING, Defendant (Muriel Wolland, d/b/a Bacon Manor Farms, Defendant-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Cross v. Moehring", "decision_date": "1989-09-28", "docket_number": "No. 4-89-0240", "first_page": "830", "last_page": "833", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 830" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 1139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1142" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5660051 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 993", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3610924 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 1044", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1046" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5072497 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "879" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3174496 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 824", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3353955 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0824-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 417, "char_count": 6203, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.323993543495647e-08, "percentile": 0.5133278040534409 }, "sha256": "1b8d7645ddcb97124fc959f588b80960918ddba3f0b30c1e76f6cbb68bca57e8", "simhash": "1:a8cb7da42af4b459", "word_count": 999 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:36:06.130198+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "TERRY CROSS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BRENDA A. MOEHRING, Defendant (Muriel Wolland, d/b/a Bacon Manor Farms, Defendant-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, Terry Cross and Jenny Cross, appeal the trial court\u2019s dismissal of their case against defendant Muriel Wolland (Muriel) for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Muriel placed an advertising sign at an intersection that blocked the view of the cross-traffic. Plaintiff Terry Cross and the other defendant were involved in an automobile accident at that intersection. Plaintiffs allege that Muriel\u2019s placement of the sign constituted a breach of the duty of care Muriel owed to the plaintiffs.\nWe disagree and affirm.\nPlaintiff Terry Cross (Terry) was involved in an automobile accident with defendant Brenda Moehring (Brenda). The accident occurred at an intersection where Brenda had a stop sign facing her as she approached the intersection, and Terry did not. Brenda was traveling eastbound and Terry was traveling northbound when the accident occurred. Muriel\u2019s advertising sign was located on the southwest corner of this intersection. Plaintiffs do not allege in their complaint that the advertising sign obstructed Brenda's view of the stop sign; instead, they allege only that the advertising sign obstructed Brenda's view of the cross-traffic at that intersection.\nMuriel filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619), alleging plaintiffs\u2019 failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Muriel contended that she owed no duty to plaintiffs to erect her sign in a manner that would not obstruct cross-traffic.\nThe trial court granted Muriel\u2019s motion. At issue is whether plaintiffs stated a cause of action against Muriel for her having erected an advertising sign which, according to the complaint, blocked the view of cross-traffic at a controlled intersection where plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident. The standard of review is whether the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. S & F Corp. v. American Express Co. (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 824, 828, 377 N.E.2d 73, 77; Ording v. Springer (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 243, 246, 410 N.E.2d 428, 431.\nIn Esworthy v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 876, 879, 520 N.E.2d 1044, 1046, this court held that, \u201cThere is no duty owed in Illinois for trees obstructing visibility of motorists on an adjoining highway by either a municipal landowner or a private one at a controlled intersection and the visibility of the traffic controls has not been obstructed.\u201d (See also Pyne v. Witmer (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 254, 512 N.E.2d 993.) The issue presented by this appeal is whether a landowner is under a duty not to erect or to create an artificial condition, such as an advertising sign, at an intersection that obstructs an approaching motorist\u2019s view of cross-traffic. Plaintiffs argue that such a duty should be recognized under Illinois law, citing in support of their argument Lemings v. Collinsville School District No. 10 (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 363, 454 N.E.2d 1139, and Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7368 (1965)). Plaintiffs urge that we adopt the distinction provided by the Restatement between natural and artificial conditions that obstruct the vision of persons using a public way. While the Restatement (Second) of Torts is authority deserving of the highest respect, we decline to follow its recommendation concerning the issue before us. We also note the specially concurring opinion of Justice Jones in the Lemings case as being a basis for distinguishing that case from our present one. Justice Jones makes clear that the court in Lemings really did not decide the question of duty; instead, it viewed the issue before it as one concerning proximate cause. Lemings, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 368, 454 N.E.2d at 1142.\nAt oral argument, we asked counsel for the plaintiffs how our finding a duty under Illinois law for landowners not to erect or to create an artificial condition at an intersection that obstructs an approaching motorist\u2019s view of cross-traffic would affect urban landowners who have erected buildings at intersections right up to their lot lines, in some cases no more than a few feet from each intersecting street. Counsel was not able to assuage our concerns about the havoc such a finding might cause. We do not find persuasive counsel\u2019s suggestion that we not concern ourselves with this urban question since this case involves a rural intersection. We decline to do so for two reasons. First, we have difficulty discerning a principled basis for one rule governing rural intersections and another governing urban ones; and second, an urban versus rural distinction may not be all that helpful even if drawing such a distinction were appropriate. Whether a particular area is \u201curban\u201d or \u201crural\u201d is often in the eye of the beholder. Also, urban areas gradually become rural as one travels a highway from the center of town to the countryside. We think this distinction would likely cause great uncertainty.\nThe last problem with the \u201curban\u2019\u2019/\u201crural\u201d distinction is that it would provide no stability. Today\u2019s rural crossroads may be tomorrow\u2019s mini-mall.\nFollowing Esworthy, we hold that a landowner owes no duty not to erect or to create an artificial condition at an intersection that obstructs an approaching motorist\u2019s view of cross-traffic. The imposition of such a duty would likely have wide-ranging and possibly adverse consequences. We believe that a balancing of the policy considerations in favor of and against the imposition of such a duty is better left to the legislative branch of our government.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, P.J., and GREEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "'Donald K. Birner, of Pekin, for appellants.", "Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria (Karen L. Kendall, Frederick P. Velde, and Guy A. Studach, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TERRY CROSS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BRENDA A. MOEHRING, Defendant (Muriel Wolland, d/b/a Bacon Manor Farms, Defendant-Appellee).\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 89\u20140240\nOpinion filed September 28, 1989.\nRehearing denied October 30, 1989.\n'Donald K. Birner, of Pekin, for appellants.\nHeyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria (Karen L. Kendall, Frederick P. Velde, and Guy A. Studach, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0830-01", "first_page_order": 852, "last_page_order": 855 }