{
  "id": 2688797,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRAIG COOPER, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cooper",
  "decision_date": "1989-09-28",
  "docket_number": "No. 5-87-0800",
  "first_page": "971",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 149",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:36:06.130198+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRAIG COOPER, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE HOWERTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWe affirm defendant\u2019s conviction by jury for armed robbery.\nDefendant raises two issues. He claims first that the circuit court erroneously allowed the introduction of hearsay. He claims second that the circuit court erred in allowing substantive use of an out-of-court statement made by a witness under section 115 \u2014 10.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 115-10.1).\nA witness testified that defendant\u2019s coconspirator told him that he and defendant had \u201cstuck up\u201d the victim. Defendant is correct in categorizing this evidence as hearsay. However, the error is waived. Defendant did not object at the time the evidence was offered and did not address the error in his post-trial motion. People v. Volkmar (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 149, 538 N.E.2d 1255.\nDefendant\u2019s second claim was not waived. A prosecution witness\u2019 signed, out-of-court statement was used by the prosecution not only to impeach the witness but as substantive evidence of the assertions contained therein. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the use of that statement as substantive evidence, but contests the substantive use of only part of the statement. Defendant says it was error to allow substantive use of that part of the statement that read, \u201cCraig Cooper and Walter Eden told me they had just robbed Travis Vaughn.\u201d\nSection 115 \u2014 10.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides:\n\u201cIn all criminal cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if\n(a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing or trial, and\n(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and\n(c) the statement\n* * *\n(2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the witness had personal knowledge, and\n(A) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the witness ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 115-10.1.\nAt issue is the meaning of \u201cpersonal knowledge\u201d as used in subsection (c)(2). We hold that the personal knowledge required by the statute is not that which is acquired by being told something, even if an admission; rather, it means \u201cthe witness whose prior inconsistent statement is being offered into evidence must actually have seen the events which are the subject of that statement.\u201d See Steigmann, Prior Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence in Illinois, 72 Ill. B.J. 638, 640 (1984); see also Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment & as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review & Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence, 801(d)(1)(A), 613 & 607, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1565, 1584-85 (1977).\nIn the case at hand, the witness\u2019 statement that \u201cCraig Cooper and Walter Eden told me they had just robbed Travis Vaughn\u201d was based on knowledge he gained by being told that by a coconspirator, not from his perception of the robbery itself. Substantive use of that portion of the statement was error.\nWe reject, however, defendant\u2019s claim that the error requires reversal. The standard for determining whether error is harmless or reversible is whether it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Bascomb (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 392, 392 N.E.2d 1130.) Error may be harmless because the error itself is inconsequential or, if the error is of a more serious nature, it may be deemed harmless when balanced against the strength of the State\u2019s evidence. (People v. Glover-El (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 535, 430 N.E.2d 147.) Here, defendant gave a confession, the validity of which is not an issue in this appeal. Therefore, we hold that the error was harmless.\nDefendant\u2019s conviction is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWELCH, P.J., and CHAPMAN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE HOWERTON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel M. Kirwan and Dan W. Evers, both of State Appellate' Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.",
      "John Baricevic, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Ellen Eder Irish, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRAIG COOPER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 87\u20140800\nOpinion filed September 28, 1989.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Dan W. Evers, both of State Appellate' Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nJohn Baricevic, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Ellen Eder Irish, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0971-01",
  "first_page_order": 993,
  "last_page_order": 995
}