{ "id": 2677614, "name": "JUDITH A. EALY, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Kerasotes Theatre, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Ealy v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1989-09-28", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201488\u20140584WC", "first_page": "76", "last_page": "80", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 76" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "276 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2911448 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 1031", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473429 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 1146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1149" }, { "page": "1150" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982800 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" }, { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0081-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 434, "char_count": 6811, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.699805336962679e-08, "percentile": 0.4070855096185144 }, "sha256": "1bae015f62a21fb72205e946cf0fcdebe44b089a3057f446bdc68506f99ad9ea", "simhash": "1:204f6dc12e302e07", "word_count": 1119 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:25:51.894502+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JUDITH A. EALY, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Kerasotes Theatre, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAn arbitrator found that an injury sustained by the petitioner, Judith A. Ealy, had not arisen out of and in the course of her employment. The Industrial Commission (Commission) affirmed the arbitrator\u2019s decision, and the circuit court confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision. The petitioner appeals.\nAt the hearing before the arbitrator, the petitioner testified that on January 2, 1984, she was working as a relief manager for the respondent, Kerasotes Theatre. Her duties included supervising concession and box office personnel. The respondent owned two theaters in Mattoon, the Time and the Cinemas, which were located across the street from each other. On that night she was working at the Time, although her duties sometimes required her to work at the Cinemas. Her shift began at 3:30 p.m. and was to end at 10 p.m.\nThe petitioner further testified that the respondent had a rule requiring that an employee working more than six hours must take a break. The time of the break was at the employee\u2019s discretion, and the employee was not paid for time spent while on break. The respondent did not allow employees to eat in the theater\u2019s foyer, nor did the respondent provide a break room.\nThe petitioner testified that she decided to take her break around 7:30 p.m. After she signed out, her husband, who was also an employee of Kerasotes Theatre, and petitioner\u2019s supervisor accompanied her to a Burger King restaurant one block west of the theater. While at the restaurant they discussed business matters. Around 8:30 p.m., they decided to go back to the theater. The petitioner intended to go to the Cinemas to pick up some box office reports and then return to the Time. The route she took from the Burger King was the same whether she intended to go to either theater.\nShe stated that as they walked down the alley leading from the Burger King she slipped and fell on some ice. Although her left arm and hip were hurt, she continued on to the Cinemas, where she picked up the box office reports. She then returned to the Time. Later in the evening, she went to the hospital and was told that she had broken her arm.\nRobert Cope, the petitioner\u2019s supervisor, testified that employees were allowed to eat on the premises during breaks, but not in front of the customers. He also stated that the route the petitioner took from the Burger King to the location of her accident would be the same whether she intended to go to the Time or the Cinemas.\nThe petitioner argues on appeal that the Commission erred in finding that her accident had not arisen out of and in the course of her employment. She contends that since her trip back from the restaurant served a business purpose, the Commission should have found that she was entitled to compensation.\nAlthough petitioner has framed the issue otherwise, the question before this court is whether the Commission\u2019s finding of noncompensability is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, workers shall only be compensated for injuries arising out of and in the course of their employment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 138.2; Lynch Special Services v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 81, 389 N.E.2d 1146.) Generally, off-premises injuries incurred while going to and coming from an unpaid dinner break are not compensable. (International Art Studios v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 457, 415 N.E.2d 1031.) An exception to this rule is when the trip is occasioned by the demands of the employment. (Torbeck v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 515, 276 N.E.2d 344.) It is clear to us that the \u201cdual-purpose trip\u201d analysis (see 1 A. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law \u00a718.12 (1985)) as suggested by petitioner in this case does not apply. Rather, the guiding principle in determining whether petitioner\u2019s dinner break injury is compensable is \u201cwhether \u2018the employer, in all the circumstances, including duration, shortness of the off-premises distance, and limitations on off-premises activity during the intervals can be deemed to have retained authority over the employee ***.\u2019 \u201d Lynch, 76 Ill. 2d at 90, 389 N.E.2d at 1149, quoting 1 A. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a715.54 (1978).\nIn Lynch, a case factually similar to this, our supreme court denied compensation. There the claimant slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk, as here, and broke his arm returning from a restaurant where he had purchased his breakfast. The court analyzed the issue by considering both the general \u201cgoing and coming\u201d rule of noncompensability and Professor Larson\u2019s discussion of the personal comfort doctrine and the \u201ccoffee break\u201d cases. The court observed that the cause of injury \u2014 i.e., falling on the icy sidewalk \u2014 was not a risk peculiar to claimant\u2019s employment, thereby defeating the \u201carising out of\u201d requirement of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. The court concluded, \u201cIn our judgment claimant\u2019s injury cannot be said to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment to any greater extent than can that of the ordinary fall on the ice suffered by an employee who voluntarily elects to go outside his place of employment to purchase or eat his food.\u201d (Lynch, 76 Ill. 2d at 92, 389 N.E.2d at 1150.) Accordingly, the court reversed the circuit court\u2019s award of compensation.\nApplying the principles enunciated in Lynch to this case, we find that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of the petitioner\u2019s employment. The petitioner went to the restaurant of her own volition, and the trip was not occasioned by the demands of her employment. Moreover, it appears that she would have undertaken her trip regardless of whether she planned to go to the Cinemas Theatre. Despite the fact that petitioner was joined by other employees and discussed \u201cshop\u201d during her break, the evidence does not demonstrate that petitioner\u2019s trip either benefited or accommodated her employer. Consequently, it cannot be said that respondent retained authority over her during the break; and the Commission did not err in finding that petitioner\u2019s injury from a fall on the ice was not occasioned by a risk peculiar to or incidental to her employment. We therefore affirm the Commission\u2019s finding that the petitioner was not entitled to compensation.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Coles County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcNAMARA, WOODWARD, McCULLOUGH, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Scheele, Cornelius & Associates, Ltd., of LaGrange, for appellant.", "Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Urbana (Edward M. Wagner and John D. Flodstrom, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JUDITH A. EALY, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Kerasotes Theatre, Appellee).\nFourth District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 4\u201488\u20140584WC\nOpinion filed September 28, 1989.\nScheele, Cornelius & Associates, Ltd., of LaGrange, for appellant.\nHeyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Urbana (Edward M. Wagner and John D. Flodstrom, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0076-01", "first_page_order": 98, "last_page_order": 102 }