{ "id": 2681257, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN ELVART, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Elvart", "decision_date": "1989-09-26", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201487\u20141554, 1\u201487\u20141795 cons.", "first_page": "524", "last_page": "534", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 524" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 N.E.2d 1049", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3631665 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5425878 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 N.E.2d 1186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3570398 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5442368 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054849 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "1194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 1103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5658884 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455040 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 N.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Ill. 2d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2702812 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/5/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 497", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185127 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 N.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3448383 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3579233 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "785 F.2d 682", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1565271 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/785/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 F.2d 186", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 530166 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/216/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 N.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2778408 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 F.2d 275", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2103239 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/391/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 873", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3513449 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0873-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 936", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3547704 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 815, "char_count": 19817, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8844662263940275e-07, "percentile": 0.7281252690793942 }, "sha256": "7cc5e3a2539eea18ace6a6e2513d50e76f806ca4ee32bf910faccc455c8fd1f3", "simhash": "1:821811b632c55493", "word_count": 3140 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:25:51.894502+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN ELVART, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DiVITO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant John Elvart was charged by indictment with two separate deliveries of less than 10 grams of cocaine. Following a bench trial, he was convicted and sentenced to four years\u2019 probation with the first six months in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections. He now appeals his conviction and sentence, raising as issues whether his trial counsel\u2019s assistance was ineffective; whether the prosecution was barred by either double jeopardy or collateral estoppel; whether the trial court improperly precluded testimony regarding an informant; and whether the trial court erroneously denied his motion for modification of his sentence. We affirm.\nOn March 27, 1985, defendant delivered one gram of cocaine to Special Agent Brian Kelly, an undercover Northeastern Metropolitan Enforcement Group police officer. This delivery occurred in the bedroom of defendant\u2019s apartment in the presence of a female informant who had introduced Kelly to defendant.\nOn April 5, 1985, Kelly purchased six-tenths of a gram of cocaine for $100 from defendant. This transaction also occurred in defendant\u2019s apartment and, according to defendant, the informant was also present. According to Kelly, the informant was not present during this transaction.\nOn April 16, 1985, Kelly purchased 2V2 grams of cocaine for $300 from defendant. Again, this transaction occurred in defendant\u2019s apartment. It is undisputed that the informant was not present during this transaction.\nOn May 13, 1985, Kelly, defendant, and Mark Allen, who had previously been introduced to Kelly as defendant\u2019s source, met in defendant\u2019s apartment to complete arrangements for the delivery of two ounces of cocaine for $3,500. After some conversation, Allen left defendant\u2019s apartment and returned with Daniel Interian. Kelly received a brown paper bag containing two clear plastic bags of cocaine. Defendant, Allen, and Interian were then arrested.\nIn connection with the May 13, 1985, transaction, defendant, Allen, and Interian were charged by indictment with calculated criminal drug conspiracy and delivery of more than 30 grams of cocaine. Defendant was tried separately before a jury and found not guilty. At that trial, defendant raised the defense of entrapment and the State introduced the April 5 and 16, 1985, transactions for the purpose of establishing defendant\u2019s predisposition to commit the May 13, 1985, delivery.\nDefendant was subsequently charged by indictment with two separate deliveries of less than 10 grams of cocaine in connection with the April 5 and 16, 1985, transactions. These charges are the subject of this appeal.\nDefendant was represented at trial and sentencing on the subject charges by a person admitted into practice in Illinois in 1970, but who, at the time of defendant\u2019s trial, had been removed from the Master Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 756(d) (107 Ill. 2d R. 756(d)), for failing to pay his registration fee for 1987. The same person represented defendant at sentencing and was suspended from practice six months later because of a \u201cmental infirmity, mental disorder, or addiction to drugs or intoxicants.\u201d\nAt trial, defendant admitted making the deliveries on April 5 and 16, 1985. As in the previous trial, he relied for his defense on the theory of entrapment. Defense counsel motioned to compel production of the informant, but that motion was denied. Without the benefit of a transcript from the former proceeding, defense counsel stipulated into the record the cross-examination of Kelly from the previous trial. He then cross-examined Kelly further regarding the entrapment defense. Kelly admitted that the informant was present during the March 27, 1985, transaction, but denied that the informant was present during either the April 5 or 16, 1985, transaction. Kelly was not permitted to reveal the identity of the informant or respond to questioning regarding his knowledge of the relationship between the informant and Allen, or whether the informant had arranged the April 5, 1985, transaction.\nDefendant was found guilty and sentenced to four years\u2019 probation with the first six months in custody. Defendant retained a different lawyer, who filed a post-trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel and a motion in the trial court seeking to eliminate the incarceration portion of defendant\u2019s sentence. Both motions were denied and defendant brought this appeal.\nI\nDefendant maintains first that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment and Article I of the Illinois Constitution, because his trial counsel was not a registered attorney in Illinois; was \u201claboring under a drug-or-alcohol-addiction induced mental impairment\u201d; failed to elicit testimony from him on direct examination regarding the defense of entrapment; failed to procure the testimony of the informant present during the May 27, 1985, transaction; and stipulated to seven-month-old former testimony although no transcript was yet available. We disagree.\nTo prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel\u2019s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246.) A defendant cannot merely conjecture or second-guess his counsel\u2019s trial strategy or tactics (People v. Rangel (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 730, 516 N.E.2d 936), or speculate that the outcome might have been different with a representation of higher caliber (People v. Schmidt (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 873, 522 N.E.2d 1317).\nWe do not believe the Strickland test is satisfied by a mere showing that defense counsel was removed from the Master Roll of Attorneys for failing to pay his registration fee. In Beto v. Barfield (5th Cir. 1968), 391 F.2d 275, for example, the court rejected the defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his lawyer\u2019s nonpayment of State bar fees. The court observed that under Texas law, an attorney who fails to pay State bar fees is nonetheless a valid practicing attorney and is reinstated upon payment of the fees. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 756(e) (107 Ill. 2d R. 756(e)), an attorney removed from the master roll for nonpayment of fees is likewise reinstated upon payment of the fees plus a prescribed penalty.\nWe do not find Beto distinguishable on the ground that in Illinois a person who fails to pay the registration fee is \u201cunauthorized [to] practice *** law\u201d (see 107 Ill. 2d R. 756(d)), whereas in Texas such a person is a \u201cvalid practicing attorney.\u201d Under Illinois Supreme Court Rules 756(d) and (e), a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law may be held in contempt of court and is subject to fines for late payment of fees. The rules do not suggest that the assistance of a person unauthorized to practice law because of nonpayment of fees and subsequent removal from the master roll is per se constitutionally ineffective.\nPeople v. Cox (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19, and Mays v. United States (10th Cir. 1954), 216 F.2d 186, relied on by defendant, are inapposite. In both of those cases, the defendants received ineffective assistance of counsel because they had been represented by persons never admitted to practice in any State or Federal court. In this case, by contrast, defendant was represented by a person who merely failed to pay his registration fee after having been licensed to practice law in Illinois for 17 years. Accordingly, as in Beto, we reject defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon his lawyer\u2019s nonpayment of State bar fees and subsequent removal from the Master Roll of Attorneys.\nWe also reject defendant\u2019s contention that the Strickland test is satisfied because of his lawyer\u2019s suspension from practice for a \u201cdrug-or-alcohol-addiction induced mental impairment.\u201d The record does not reflect any connection between that suspension, six months after defendant was sentenced, and defendant\u2019s representation in the instant case. In United States v. Mouzin (9th Cir. 1986), 785 F.2d 682, the court held that the disbarment for an unrelated matter of the defendant\u2019s lawyer during the defendant\u2019s trial did not, without more, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment. In this case, the suspension took place many months after defendant\u2019s trial and there is no indication in the record that the conduct giving rise to the suspension affected defense counsel\u2019s representation of defendant. As in Mouzin, the suspension did not by itself constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.\nFinally, with respect to defendant\u2019s entrapment defense, we do not find defense counsel\u2019s conduct constitutionally deficient. In some cases, defense counsel\u2019s failure to procure evidence regarding an entrapment defense will constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. (See People v. Solomon (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 432, 511 N.E.2d 875.) In this case, however, defense counsel preserved the defense; motioned to compel the production of the informant; and elicited testimony from defendant on direct examination regarding his relationship with the informant and her presence during one of the charged deliveries. Although defense counsel stipulated into the record the cross-examination of Kelly from the previous trial without the benefit of a transcript, defense counsel also questioned Kelly on cross-examination in the present case regarding the entrapment defense and, specifically, elicited testimony that the informant was present during the March 27, 1985, transaction. Moreover, defendant has not indicated to this court how his counsel\u2019s stipulation to Kelly\u2019s former testimony, in a case in which defendant had been acquitted, in any way prejudiced the outcome of the trial in this case.\nAccordingly, after considering the totality of defense counsel\u2019s conduct (see People v. Ayala (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 93, 491 N.E.2d 154), we conclude that defendant received competent representation.\nII\nDefendant maintains next that the prosecution stemming from the April 5 and 16, 1985, transactions was barred by either double jeopardy or collateral estoppel, because evidence of those transactions was admitted at the State\u2019s prior unsuccessful prosecution. We disagree.\nInitially, we note that defendant waived this issue by not raising it in his post-trial motion. (See People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) However, even if the issue had not been waived, defendant\u2019s argument fails.\nDouble jeopardy bars the prosecution of a defendant who has been tried and acquitted on the same charge. (Arizona v. Washington (1978), 434 U.S. 497, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717, 98 S. Ct. 824; U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a710; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 3 \u2014 4.) However, .if a defendant was formerly prosecuted for a different offense, a subsequent prosecution for an-offense known to the prosecution at the time of commencement of the former prosecution is not barred if each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required on the other prosecution. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 3 \u2014 4(b)(1).) In particular, in prosecutions for delivery of controlled substances, where the defendant could have been separately indicted for each sale, a conviction or acquittal on one sale does not bar a prosecution for another sale. See People v. Rivas (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 556, 562, 126 N.E.2d 638.\nIn this case, defendant had previously been indicted for calculated criminal drug conspiracy and delivery of more than 30 grams of cocaine in connection with the May 13, 1985, transaction. Defendant had not been charged with the April 5 and 16, 1985, deliveries, and proof of those deliveries was neither at issue nor required for the prosecution of the charged offenses. Contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, the conspiracy charge in the indictment related only to the events of May 13, 1985, and not to the April 5 and 16, 1985, transactions. Accordingly, we conclude that double jeopardy principles are not implicated in this case. People v. Gray (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 44, 370 N.E.2d 797, and People v. Shlensky (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 243, 454 N.E.2d 1103, relied on by defendant, are inapposite because both cases involved multiple prosecutions for the same acts, rather than distinct transactions occurring on separate dates.\nWe also conclude that the instant prosecution was not barred by collateral estoppel. That doctrine, a corollary of the fifth amendment double jeopardy prohibition, prohibits relitigation of an ultimate issue of fact fully litigated by the same parties. (Ashe v. Swenson (1970), 397 U.S. 436, 443, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469, 475, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194; People v. Ward (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 379, 382-83, 381 N.E.2d 256.) Here, defendant\u2019s argument fails because the April 5 and 16, 1985, transactions were not ultimate issues of fact in the former prosecution. Evidence of those transactions was admitted at the earlier trial for the limited purpose of rebutting defendant\u2019s entrapment defense by establishing his predisposition to commit the May 13, 1985, delivery. Proof of the April 5 and 16, 1985, deliveries was not required to sustain a conviction for the charged offenses. Conversely, defendant\u2019s acquittal is not inconsistent with a finding that he committed the April 5 and 16, 1985, deliveries. Again, defendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Shlensky, 118 Ill. App. 3d 243, 454 N.E.2d 1103, is misplaced because in that case a guilty finding on perjury charges in the second prosecution was inconsistent with the defendant\u2019s acquittal in the previous trial.\nIll\nDefendant asserts next that the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel disclosure of the informant and in precluding questioning at trial regarding the informant\u2019s role in the March 27, 1985, transaction. Defendant maintains that although he was not charged with the March 27, 1985, delivery, evidence of the informant\u2019s role in that transaction was crucial to his entrapment defense.\nInitially, we note that, like the double jeopardy and collateral estoppel issues, defendant waived this issue by not raising it in his post-trial motion. (See People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) However, even if the issue had not been waived, defendant\u2019s argument necessarily fails.\nThe identity of a government informant is privileged and need not be disclosed unless fundamental fairness so requires. (People v. Raess (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 384, 496 N.E.2d 1186; 107 Ill. 2d R. 412(j)(ii).) Disclosure is generally not required where the informant merely tipped the authorities regarding the criminal act. (People v. Chaney (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 216, 347 N.E.2d 285.) However, disclosure may be required if the informant participated in, witnessed, or assisted in setting up the criminal act. (People v. Chaney, 63 Ill. 2d 216, 347 N.E.2d 285.) The test is whether the defendant\u2019s need for the identity of the informant in preparing his defense outweighs the public\u2019s interest in protecting the informant\u2019s identity. People v. Thornton (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 316, 318, 465 N.E.2d 1049.\nIn this case, the record reflects that the informant was present during the March 27, 1985, transaction, but only introduced defendant to Kelly and asked defendant if he would sell drugs to Kelly. Defendant testified that the informant was also present during the April 5, 1985, transaction, but Kelly testified that the informant was not present at that time. It is undisputed that the informant was not present during the April 16, 1985, transaction. We note in addition that defendant knew the informant as Allen\u2019s former girl friend and so disclosure of her identity would not have greatly assisted defendant further in the preparation of his defense. Based on this record, we find that the trial court reasonably concluded that the informant did not participate in, witness, or assist in setting up the charged deliveries and properly precluded questioning regarding the informant\u2019s identity.\nFinally, we do not find any reversible error in the trial court\u2019s preclusion of testimony regarding the informant\u2019s role in the March 27, 1985, transaction. To establish the affirmative defense of entrapment, the evidence must show improper inducement on the part of the police and a lack of predisposition to commit the crime on the part of the defendant. (People v. Solomon (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 432, 436, 511 N.E.2d 875.) In this case, defendant argues that his entrapment defense was undermined by the trial court\u2019s improper preclusion of testimony regarding the uncharged March 27,1985, transaction.\nHowever, defendant himself testified that he had no recollection of the events of March 27, 1985. Moreover, the only instances where defendant was precluded from eliciting testimony regarding his entrapment defense occurred on cross-examination of Kelly during the State\u2019s case in chief. In particular, Kelly was not permitted to testify as to whether he was aware of the relationship between the informant and Allen, defendant\u2019s source, or whether the March 27, 1985, meeting had been arranged by the informant. However, Kelly was called to testify again as a rebuttal witness for the State during the defendant\u2019s case in chief. Kelly then testified on cross-examination that he did not recall talking to the informant between March 27, 1985, and April 5, 1985, and that he did not recall what brought him to defendant\u2019s apartment on April 5, 1985. Thus, even if Kelly had testified initially that he was aware of the relationship between the informant and Allen, and that the informant had arranged the March 27, 1985, meeting, the record would still be entirely devoid of any support for defendant\u2019s entrapment theory with respect to the April 5 and 16, 1985, transactions.\nIV\nFinally, defendant maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion for modification of his sentence. Defendant was sentenced to four years\u2019 probation, with the first six months in custody. Defendant moved to eliminate the incarceration portion of his sentence, but his motion was denied. Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly based its decision on disrespect for the appellate court and his release from custody following the appellate court\u2019s reduction of his bond.\nA trial court\u2019s sentencing decisions are entitled to great weight and deference and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882.) In this case, defendant\u2019s sentence was plainly within the statutory limits. In arguing for modification of the sentence, defense counsel expressed concern that the trial court\u2019s decision was motivated by improper considerations. In denying the motion, the trial court expressly indicated that its decision was based solely on whether the original sentence was appropriate. Given this record, we cannot conclude that the denial of defendant\u2019s motion was an abuse of discretion.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBILANDIC, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DiVITO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Julius Lucius Echeles and Frederick F. Cohn, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Theodore F. Burtzos, and LaCoulton Walls, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN ELVART, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNos. 1\u201487\u20141554, 1\u201487\u20141795 cons.\nOpinion filed September 26, 1989.\nJulius Lucius Echeles and Frederick F. Cohn, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Theodore F. Burtzos, and LaCoulton Walls, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0524-01", "first_page_order": 546, "last_page_order": 556 }