{
  "id": 2679576,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEREK F. SHAW, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Shaw",
  "decision_date": "1989-09-27",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201488\u20140838",
  "first_page": "808",
  "last_page": "810",
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 274",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:25:51.894502+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEREK F. SHAW, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOMBACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn September of 1986, the defendant, Derek Shaw, was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. The offense and conviction took place in the State of Iowa. In August of 1988 the defendant was convicted of the Class A misdemeanor of driving while his driver\u2019s license was revoked in violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 303). The offense and conviction took place in the State of Illinois. In September of 1988 the defendant was again arrested in the State of Illinois for driving while his driver\u2019s license was revoked. Pursuant to statutory directive, the defendant was charged with a Class 4 felony, since the instant charge was his second violation following a revocation for driving under the influence of alcohol. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 303(d).\nThe pertinent paragraph of the Vehicle Code under which the defendant was charged provides:\n\u201cAny person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of this Section shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony if the original revocation or suspension was for a violation of Section 11 \u2014 401 or 11 \u2014 501 [driving while under the influence of alcohol] of this Code, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, or a violation of Section 9 \u2014 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, relating to the offense of reckless homicide.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 303(d).)\nThe defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge, contending that his Iowa conviction could not be used to enhance his offense to a Class 4 felony since the Iowa offense was not a violation of an Illinois law.\nThe trial court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, ruling that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The State brought the instant appeal seeking a review of the trial court\u2019s disposition.\nThe State contends that the Illinois driver\u2019s license compact (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 700) controls the issue presented in this appeal. The compact requires that the State\u2019s licensing authority report each conviction of a person from another State occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the licensee\u2019s home State. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 702.) The State argues that since the defendant was an Illinois resident and since the Illinois driver\u2019s license compact expresses the legislative intent to discipline resident drivers for conduct in another State, section 6 \u2014 303(d) should be interpreted as allowing the defendant\u2019s Iowa conviction for driving under the influence to be used to elevate the instant in-State charge of driving while license revoked to a Class 4 felony. This reasoning, however, is in direct contravention to this court\u2019s recent holding in People v. Weakley (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 274.\nThe defendant contends that this court\u2019s decision in People v. Weakley (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 274, 530 N.E.2d 1168, is precedential authority. We agree.\nIn Weakley, this court was confronted with the issue of whether section 6 \u2014 303(a) of the Code was a basis to charge an Iowa resident-defendant for driving in Illinois when his Iowa\u2019s driver\u2019s license was revoked by Iowa. Section 6 \u2014 303(a) provided as follows:\n\u201c(a) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such person\u2019s driver\u2019s license *** is revoked or suspended as provided by this Code or any other law, except as may be specifically allowed *** pursuant to this Code, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 303(a).)\nThis court found that since section 6 \u2014 303(a) was not specific in referring to foreign State revocations or suspensions and because the statute was penal in nature, the statute must be strictly construed against the State in favor of the defendant.\nLikewise, in the instant case, section 6 \u2014 303(d) did not specify that out-of-State convictions could be used for elevating an in-State conviction to a Class 4 felony. Indeed, section 6 \u2014 303(d) specifically refers to particular statutory sections of the Illinois Vehicle Code. Thus, section 6 \u2014 303(d) is more specific than the provision in Weakley, which merely states \u201cthis Code or any other law,\u201d and presents an even stronger argument for construing the statute against the State. If the legislature intended otherwise, the legislature, not the court, should change the statute.\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Hancock County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHEIPLE and STOUDER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOMBACHER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Samuel Naylor VI, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carthage (Vicki L. Seidl, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Capps, Ancelet & Stoverink, of Carthage (Albert V. Ancelet, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEREK F. SHAW, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201488\u20140838\nOpinion filed September 27, 1989.\nSamuel Naylor VI, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carthage (Vicki L. Seidl, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nCapps, Ancelet & Stoverink, of Carthage (Albert V. Ancelet, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0808-01",
  "first_page_order": 830,
  "last_page_order": 832
}