{
  "id": 2677352,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. PATRICIA A. KAZIK, Defendant-Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kazik",
  "decision_date": "1989-10-18",
  "docket_number": "No. 2\u201489\u20140237",
  "first_page": "930",
  "last_page": "933",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:25:51.894502+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. PATRICIA A. KAZIK, Defendant-Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, the Secretary of State (Secretary), appeals an order of the circuit court of Lake County, granting a judicial driving permit (JDP) to defendant, Patricia A. Kazik. The Secretary raises one issue on appeal: whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a JDP to defendant, who was not a statutory first offender within the meaning of section 11 \u2014 500 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 500).\nAlthough defendant has not filed an appellee\u2019s brief in response, we consider the Secretary\u2019s appeal under the standards set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128.\nOn March 27, 1983, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501). Defendant\u2019s driving privileges were suspended August 17, 1983, pursuant to section 6\u2014 206(a)(17) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95^2, par. 6\u2014 206(a)(17)), which authorizes the suspension of driving privileges for a motorist\u2019s refusal to submit to a chemical test as required by the implied-consent provision of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1). Defendant\u2019s suspension was effective through February 17, 1984.\nDefendant was arrested for DUI a second time on October 29, 1988. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary served defendant with a notice of statutory summary suspension of her driving privileges for a period of 12 months commencing December 14, 1988. The Secretary\u2019s notice stated that defendant was not a first offender.\nOn January 5, 1989, defendant filed a petition for a JDP in which she declared that she was a first offender as defined in section 11\u2014 500 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 500). The trial court granted defendant\u2019s petition and ordered the issuance of a JDP to defendant for the purpose of driving to and from her place of employment. The Secretary requested the court to reassess its decision to issue the JDP because he believed defendant was ineligible to obtain such a permit as her record indicated she was not a first offender. On February 3, 1989, the court issued a final order directing the Secretary of State to issue a JDP to defendant. The Secretary\u2019s timely appeal ensued.\nAt the outset, we must address this court\u2019s jurisdiction to consider the Secretary\u2019s appeal. On May 25, 1989, the Secretary filed a motion to stay proceedings in this matter pending disposition by the Illinois Supreme Court of People v. Pine, which addressed the issue of the Secretary\u2019s standing to appeal an order of the trial court directing him to issue a JDP pursuant to section 6 \u2014 206.1 of the Code. This court denied the Secretary\u2019s motion on June 2, 1989, and he filed his brief in accordance with our order. The supreme court has resolved the standing question in the Secretary\u2019s favor in its recently issued decision in People v. Pine (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 88. We thus consider the merits of the appeal.\nOn appeal, the Secretary contends that the trial court should not have granted a JDP to defendant because she is not a statutory first offender. Section 6 \u2014 206.1(B)(a) authorizes the trial court to grant a first offender\u2019s petition for a JDP. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 206.1(R)(a).) This section relies upon the definition of \u201cfirst offender\u201d as provided in section 11 \u2014 500 of the Code, which states:\n\u201cFor the purposes of interpreting Sections 6 \u2014 206.1 and 6\u2014 208.1 of this Code, \u2018first offender\u2019 shall mean *** any person who has not had a driver\u2019s license suspension for Section 11\u2014 501.1 after January 1, 1982, or a previous statutory summary suspension as provided in this Code, except in cases where the driver submitted to chemical testing resulting in an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more and was subsequently found not guilty of violating Section 11 \u2014 501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 500.\nIn its initial order issuing a JDP to defendant, the trial court found that defendant was a first offender \u201cin that her conviction for a prior DUI was in July 1983 and the arrest on this matter was October 29, 1988 a period greater than five (5) years.\u201d The Secretary contends, and we agree, that the statute does not impose a five-year limitation on driver\u2019s license suspensions for the purpose of determining whether a DUI defendant is a first offender. Thus, the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant was a first offender and its order to issue a JDP to defendant were erroneous.\nWe believe that the trial court\u2019s error springs, at least in part, from a faulty interpretation of the abstract of defendant\u2019s driving record as prepared by the Secretary of State. The trial court\u2019s confusion in this regard is understandable because the Secretary has failed to provide an adequate explanation of the coding system to be used in deciphering this abstract. We have noted difficulties of the same type in a recent decision, People v. Duff (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 324, 326. There, as in the instant matter, painstaking review of the abstract of defendant\u2019s driving record reveals that defendant is not a statutory first offender.\nAlthough the first column of the abstract, entitled \u201cType Action,\u201d characterizes defendant\u2019s 1983 suspension as a \u201cdiscretionary suspension,\u201d the fourth column, which refers to the section of the Vehicle Code under which the State proceeded, indicates that this suspension was pursuant to section 6 \u2014 206(a)(17) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 206(a)(17)), which authorizes the Secretary to suspend or revoke a motorist\u2019s driving privileges for refusal to consent to a chemical test pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1. It is quite evident that defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license suspension on August 17, 1983, is \u201ca driver\u2019s license suspension for Section 11 \u2014 501.1 after January 1, 1982,\u201d as stated in section 11 \u2014 500. Defendant is not a statutory first offender and is therefore ineligible to receive a JDP. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by granting a JDP to defendant.\nIn closing, we urge the Secretary of State to attempt to explain more carefully the coding system used in the abstracts of motorists\u2019 driving records to avoid future confusion and the concomitant waste of judicial resources in similar cases.\nThe order of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed.\nReversed.\nREINHARD and DUNN, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE UNVERZAGT"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Kimary Lee, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "No brief filed for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. PATRICIA A. KAZIK, Defendant-Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201489\u20140237\nOpinion filed October 18, 1989.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Kimary Lee, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nNo brief filed for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0930-01",
  "first_page_order": 952,
  "last_page_order": 955
}