{ "id": 2681841, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDREW JURIS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Juris", "decision_date": "1989-10-19", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201488\u20140751", "first_page": "934", "last_page": "936", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 934" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5643098 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3461311 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106404 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2990377 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3523993 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824" }, { "page": "824" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106963 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0138-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 290, "char_count": 4708, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.899991389258642e-08, "percentile": 0.36906765606797926 }, "sha256": "f70f8f37bfcffb40acaa775c1618d0aa5bf6615e122797ac2baa3e5f09743cfe", "simhash": "1:2cea56956b3f6df1", "word_count": 765 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:25:51.894502+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDREW JURIS, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Andrew Juris, was charged via information with criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(a)(1)) on January 7, 1988. The State amended the information on April 15, 1988, to apply an enhanced sentencing provision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(b)), which became effective January 1, 1988. This amended sentencing section allowed enhancement of the sentence for criminal sexual assault from a Class 1 felony to a Class X felony for \u201c[a] second or subsequent conviction for a violation of this Section or under any similar statute of this State or any other state for any offense involving criminal sexual assault that is substantially equivalent to or more serious than the sexual assault prohibited under this Section.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(b).) Defendant moved to dismiss the amended information, and the trial court, after a hearing, struck the enhancement language, along with the term \u201cClass X felony,\u201d from the information. The State appeals from this action.\nDefendant was convicted in 1979 of the Class 1 felony of attempted rape. The State sought to use this conviction as the basis for enhancing defendant\u2019s sentence upon conviction of the criminal-sexual-assault charge. On appeal, the State contends that the crimes of attempted rape and criminal sexual assault are \u201csubstantially equivalent,\u201d thus allowing use of the enhancement provision.\nThe State interprets section 12 \u2014 13 as allowing enhancement for any offense involving criminal sexual assault that has a penalty substantially equivalent to or more serious than that prescribed in section 12 \u2014 13. The State argues that since both the old offense of attempted rape and the new offense of criminal sexual assault are both Class 1 felonies (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 8 \u2014 4(c)(2), 11 \u2014 1(c); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(b)), the offenses are \u201csubstantially equivalent.\u201d We disagree with the State\u2019s interpretation, and we affirm the trial court.\nThe cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and meaning of the legislature.. (People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 138, 141.) The language used in the statute is the primary source of legislative intent. (People v. Sierra (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 822, 824.) Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the function of the court is to enforce the statute as enacted. (Harvey Firemen\u2019s Association v. City of Harvey (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 358, 363.) Any ambiguities in a penal statute, especially in the case of enhancement provisions, must be resolved in the defendant\u2019s favor. People v. McCarty (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 28, 34-35; Sierra, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 824.\nSection 12 \u2014 13(b) provides for enhancement for a second or subsequent conviction \u201cfor any offense involving criminal sexual assault that is substantially equivalent to or more serious than the sexual assault prohibited under this Section.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(b).) Thus, it is the elements of the offense, and not the penalty for the offense, which must be compared to the section 12 \u2014 13 criminal sexual assault.\nSuch a comparison clearly shows that the offense of attempted rape is not substantially equivalent to or more serious than the offense charged here. Criminal sexual assault requires an act of sexual penetration. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 13(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3); People v. Morgan (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 733, 738.) Attempted rape did not require penetration; the offender simply must have intended to accomplish intercourse by force against the victim\u2019s will and must have taken a substantial step toward accomplishing his purpose. (People v. Hanley (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 651, 659.) The absence of the element of penetration renders the offense of attempted rape inferior to criminal sexual assault. Attempted rape is an inchoate offense; by definition it is an incomplete effort to commit rape. The incomplete effort is not equivalent to the completed effort. The amended information was properly dismissed.\nFor these reasons, the circuit court of Boone County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nINGLIS and REINHARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roger T. Russell, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belvidere (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "G. Joseph Weller and Patrick M. Carmody, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDREW JURIS, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201488\u20140751\nOpinion filed October 19, 1989.\nRoger T. Russell, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belvidere (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nG. Joseph Weller and Patrick M. Carmody, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0934-01", "first_page_order": 956, "last_page_order": 958 }