{
  "id": 2694074,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Teichler, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Teichler",
  "decision_date": "1974-05-08",
  "docket_number": "No. 72-215",
  "first_page": "292",
  "last_page": "294",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 292"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "130 Ill.App.2d 581",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2824941
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    {
      "cite": "8 Ill.App.3d 944",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2761610
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/8/0944-01"
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    {
      "cite": "391 Ill. 565",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2512004
      ],
      "year": 1972,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "569"
        }
      ],
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      "case_paths": [
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  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:880acdadc35469f4",
    "word_count": 728
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:04.796688+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Teichler, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE L. L. RECHENMACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant waived counsel and indictment and pleaded guilty to a complaint charging forgery. The trial court sentenced him to 2 years\u2019 probation with the first 8 months to be served at the State Farm at Vandalia. The only point urged by defendant on appeal is that the complaint did not sufficiently identify the forged instrument as \u201can instrument apparently capable of defrauding another,\u201d thus depriving the court of jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea and to enter a judgment of conviction.\nThe complaint charged that on February 22, 1972, defendant committed the act of forgery \u201cin that Paul Teichler with intent to defraud, knowingly delivered two checks each dated February 22, 1972, payable to the order of cash for $29.00 with the name of Raymond Teichler as maker, knowing that said check [sic] to have been made such that it [sic] purported to have been made by authority of Raymond Teichler who did not give such authority; which is in violation of Chapter 38, Paragraph 17 \u2014 3(2) of the Illinois Revised Statutes.\u201d\nNo copies of the instrument or instruments were attached. It is obvious that the complaint does not state that the checks were drawn on a bank or set forth the name of such bank. One of the essential elements of the offense of forgery is that the accused made \u201cany document apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another * * *.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 17 \u2014 3(a)(1).) Defendant urges that the failure to set forth the name of a drawee bank renders the accusation insufficient because it could not be said that the instrument described in the complaint is \u201capparently capable of defrauding another\u201d.\nThe State argues that by labeling the instrument a \u201ccheck\u201d the complaint adequately alleged \u201ca three party negotiable instrument capable of defrauding another\u201d and that no more was necessary. However, it is apparent that the complaint identified only two parties to the instruments, i.e., the maker (Raymond Teichler) and the payee (cash). No third party (bank) is mentioned. The salient feature of a check would be the drawee bank and its name.\nIn People v. Nickols (1945), 391 Ill. 565, 569, the court defined a check as follows: \u201cA check is defined as a draft or an order upon a bank purporting to be drawn upon a deposit of funds, for the payment of a certain sum of money to a certain person named therein, or to his order or to bearer.\u201d In People v. Moats (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 944, the court held that an information charging forgery which described a check identifying the bank and maker, but making no reference to a payee or amount, did not identify an instrument capable of defrauding another and reversed the conviction even though the defendant pleaded guilty. In People v. Dzielski (1970), 130 Ill.App.2d 581, 584, which holds in a forgery case that as long as the indictment \u201cexplicitly identifies and describes the instrument\u201d it is not necessary to set it out exactly, we said:\n\u201cIn order to confer jurisdiction upon the court, an indictment must be sufficient to enable the defendant to prepare his defense, and to sustain a plea of judgment in bar to any further prosecution for the same offense. [Citations.] If the indictment is not sufficient to charge an offense, a judgment of conviction may not be upheld even though on a plea of guilty; and such defect may be raised for the first time on appeal. [Citations.]\u201d\nWe hold that the complaint did not sufficiently charge the offense of forgery and the judgment of conviction must, therefore, be reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nT. MORAN, P. J., and GUILD, J., concur.\nEven though defendant does not raise the point, we note that the complaint, after referring to two checks, does not make clear whether $29 represents the amount of each check or the aggregate sum of both, and that it then twice refers to \u201ccheck\u201d in the singular number.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE L. L. RECHENMACHER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ralph Ruebner, Deputy Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Loren Golden, State\u2019s Attorney, of Mt. Carroll (James W. Jerz, of Model District State\u2019s Attorneys Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Teichler, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 72-215;\nSecond District\nMay 8, 1974.\nRalph Ruebner, Deputy Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLoren Golden, State\u2019s Attorney, of Mt. Carroll (James W. Jerz, of Model District State\u2019s Attorneys Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0292-01",
  "first_page_order": 316,
  "last_page_order": 318
}