{
  "id": 2699368,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Respondent-Appellee, v. Larry Jackson, Petitioner-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jackson",
  "decision_date": "1974-05-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 73-179",
  "first_page": "404",
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:04.796688+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Respondent-Appellee, v. Larry Jackson, Petitioner-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE CARTER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant was indicted in 1967 in St. Clair County for murder. Pursuant to plea negotiations the defendant pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and on July 8, 1968, was sentenced to a term of not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years in the penitentiary. On December 29, 1972, the defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition, which was amended in February, 1973, by court-appointed counsel.\nThe evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction petition was held in April, 1973, but the post-conviction petition was denied. It is from this denial that the defendant appeals. The only issue presented by the appellant in his brief for review is whether the trial judge in the post-conviction hearing improperly relied upon information outside the record which was prejudicial to the defendant\u2019s cause for relief.\nThe original lawyer appointed to represent defendant became ill and one of his associates was appointed to carry on. There is some suggestion that the original lawyer had promised defendant that he would get probation if he would plead guilty; however, this was not raised in the appeal.\nIn the amended petition before the court at the evidentiary hearing the defendant raised the issue that he was not advised of his right to appeal and his right to a transcript. However, an examination of appellant\u2019s brief suggests that he has abandoned those points. The brief concentrates on the conduct of defendant\u2019s lawyer and his quality of representation at the hearings before and after the plea of guilty.\nIn a post-conviction hearing the real issue is whether the petition when liberally construed in favor of the petitioner and taken as true, makes a showing of imprisonment in violation of the Federal or State constitutions. If a post-conviction petition shows a denial of any substantial constitutional rights, a hearing must be held on the petition. The right of appeal in a criminal case and the denial of a transcript are not per se constitutional questions.\nBoth from the insufficiency of the petition itself and the subsequent testimony elicited at the hearing, it seems that the suggestion of the guilty plea by both attorneys was entirely justified under the circumstances and did not amount to coercing the defendant into pleading guilty. People v. Williams, 44 Ill.2d 334.\nThe other allegation in the amended petition was that the attorney who represented defendant when he pled guilty had promised the defendant that he would receive probation on such a plea. This was refuted by the court-appointed attorney in his direct examination at the hearing. There were no affidavits attached to the defendant\u2019s petition concerning this allegation or any other allegations and no reason given why they were not attached.\nDuring the hearing held in April, 1973, counsel for defendant at the close orally moved to amend the petition by inserting a paragraph indicating that \u201cthe quality of representation that the defendant received was not in accordance with that prescribed by the Federal and State Constitutions\u201d. The court granted the amendment.\nThe defendant has failed to cite in his brief any authority that the behavior of his attorney amounted to actual incompetence. At any rate, the evidence of incompetence adduced at the hearing fell far short of substantiating the allegation that was attached to the petition by counsel. The defendant\u2019s attorney on cross-examination of court-appointed counsel attempted to prove the incompetency. In People v. Dudley (1970), 46 Ill.2d 305, 308, the supreme court held:\n\u201cIn order for a defendant to establish incompetent representation by appointed counsel, he must demonstrate \u2018actual incompetence of counsel, as reflected by the manner of carrying out his duties as a trial attorney\u2019; and it must further appear that substantial prejudice results therefrom, without which the outcome would probably have been different.\u201d\nNowhere in the record is there any evidence to substantiate the charge asserted by defendant\u2019s attorney at the evidentiary hearing.\nWe now come to the point raised by defendant in his brief, whether the trial judge\u2019s reliance upon information outside the record is prejudicial. Assuming the judge relied on evidence not in the record to find defendant\u2019s attorney competent, that evidence did not unduly prejudice Jackson because he never made a case at the evidentiary hearing that the attorney was, in fact, incompetent and that that incompetence directly resulted in Jackson\u2019s conviction. The record contains testimony by the defendant\u2019s attorney that he was licensed to practice law in Illinois and Missouri and \u201cthat he successfully defended felons in Federal Court and in the State of Missouri\u201d.\nThe credibility of the testimony is a matter for the trial judge to determine and unless something appears to show that the determination by the trial judge was manifestly erroneous, the trial judge, who had an opportunity to see and to hear each witness, should be upheld. (People v. Alden, 15 Ill.2d 498; People v. Davies, 10 Ill.2d 11.) Only two witnesses testified, the defendant and his court-appointed attorney. Their testimony, plus the failure of any affidavits to be attached to the petition, was more than ample grounds for the trial judge to dismiss the petition.\nThe defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition brought no showing of any violations of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights; therefore, the judgment of the Circuit Court of St. Clair County dismissing the defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nG. MORAN, P. J., and CREBS, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE CARTER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert E. Farrell, Deputy Defender, of Mt. Vernon (Robert E. Davison, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Robert H. Rice, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Philip G. Feder, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Respondent-Appellee, v. Larry Jackson, Petitioner-Appellant.\n(No. 73-179;\nFifth District\nMay 20, 1974.\nRobert E. Farrell, Deputy Defender, of Mt. Vernon (Robert E. Davison, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of counsel), for appellant.\nRobert H. Rice, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Philip G. Feder, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0404-01",
  "first_page_order": 428,
  "last_page_order": 431
}