{
  "id": 2691034,
  "name": "Keith Carlson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald Hudson, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Carlson v. Hudson",
  "decision_date": "1974-05-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 73-149",
  "first_page": "576",
  "last_page": "579",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "34 Ill.App.2d 360",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:04.796688+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Keith Carlson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald Hudson, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is a negligence action brought by plaintiff, Keith Carlson, in the circuit court of Bureau County. After trial by jury judgment was entered on the verdict in favor of defendant, Donald Hudson.\nPlaintiff Carlson was injured in a fall from a tree while cutting a limb with a chain saw. Plaintiff was on a ladder supplied by defendant Hudson. The tree was located on land rented by defendant and the plaintiff was cutting the limb at the defendant\u2019s request Plaintiff\u2019s theory is that defendant breached a duty owed to plaintiff by not warning plaintiff that the ladder which defendant provided had the bottom rung wired, was split and cracked on one side and was nailed together. The circumstances here indicate a possible breach of duty but we cannot say as a matter of law the jury had to find the plaintiffs injury was the result of defendant\u2019s negligence. Implicit in plaintiffs own theory of the case are the questions of whether the defect in the ladder was patent or latent, whether in view of the condition any warning was required, and finally, whether it was the condition of the ladder which caused the plaintiff\u2019s injury.\nThe main issue on appeal concerns the admissibility of testimony by defendant\u2019s expert, a tree trimmer. Plaintiff\u2019s first argument is that the testimony was inadmissible because ft was based only on conjecture, and not on facts which were in evidence. Such argument is contrary to the record because it shows the defendant\u2019s expert\u2019s testimony was based on his examination of defendant\u2019s exhibits numbers one, two and three and that he identified from these exhibits an incomplete chain saw cut. It cannot therefore be said that defendant\u2019s expert\u2019s testimony was based solely on conjecture.\nPlaintiffs next argument is based on the proposition that an expert cannot testify as to an occurrence where there are credible eyewitnesses to that occurrence. As we noted earlier, it is plaintiff\u2019s theory that the cause of his injury was defendant\u2019s failure to warn him of the defective ladder even though in plaintiff\u2019s own testimony the relationship between the ladder and the fall is a matter of inference and not observation. The so-called occurrence witnesses arrived at the scene moments after the incident took place. The plaintiff himself did not see all that happened and his testimony, as well as that of his own expert, indicates that no one actually saw what happened.\nThe main issue on appeal derives from the proposition that an expert cannot testify as to matters of common knowledge. Plaintiff, relying on Ficht v. Niedert Motor Service, Inc., 34 Ill.App.2d 360, 181 N.E.2d 386, and Siltman v. Reeves, 131 Ill.App.2d 960, 269 N.E.2d 728, states the rule to be that experts are not permitted to express their conclusions in matters of common observation in which the lay mind is capable of forming a correct judgment. Defendant argues that the testimony here was not as to a matter of common knowledge and further argues that even if the subject matter here was a matter of such knowledge, they were matters which were difficult to comprehend and explain.\nWhile we recognize the rule that the testimony of an expert is inappropriate when it relates to matters of common knowledge, we are unable to say that the expert\u2019s testimony falls within that category in the context of this case. Even if such were the case, the trend of decisions is that an expert may testify as to matters of common knowledge where the expert\u2019s testimony would be helpful to the jury. In Stanley v. Board of Education, 9 Ill.App.3d 963, 293 N.E.2d 417, the court held: \u201cWe think, therefore, the better rule would give a trial judge a wide area of discretion in permitting expert testimony which would aid the triers of fact in their understanding of the issues even though they might have a general knowledge of the subject matter.\u201d In the Stanley case an 8-year-old boy had been injured while playing in a schoolyard. The issue concerned the question of the safety of tire playground. The trial court aHowed the testimony by a witness with training and experience in playground supervision and game safety. In Miller v. Pillshury Co., 33 Ill.2d 514, 211 N.E.2d 733, the court in affirming the judgment of the court below stated: \u201cWh\u00fce there has been a reluctance to permit expert testimony on many matters on the basis that it invades the province of the jury, confuses the issues and usurps the function of the jury, the trend is to permit expert testimony in matters which are complicated and outside the knowledge or understanding of the average person, and even as to matters of common knowledge and understanding where difficult of comprehension and explanation. The jury still may accept or reject such testimony.\u201d\nIn the case at bar the testimony of the expert may be considered helpful in determining what was the cause of plaintiffs injury. The subject matter, i.e., the procedure for cutting a limb from a tree, including the use of a ladder in such activity, is of such a nature that an expert\u2019s testimony could be helpful and appropriate in determining whether the cause of the plaintiffs injury was the defective ladder, as claimed by plaintiff, or another cause, as claimed by defendant.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the judgment of the circuit court of Bureau County and the judgment is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nSCOTT, P. J., and ALLOY, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Louis E. Olivero, of Peru, for appellant.",
      "Daniel Russell, of Johnson, Martin & Russell, of Princeton, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Keith Carlson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald Hudson, Defendant-Appellee.\n(No. 73-149;\nThird District\nMay 20, 1974.\nLouis E. Olivero, of Peru, for appellant.\nDaniel Russell, of Johnson, Martin & Russell, of Princeton, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0576-02",
  "first_page_order": 600,
  "last_page_order": 603
}