{ "id": 2510654, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IVAN TODD THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Thomas", "decision_date": "1989-11-30", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201489\u20140076", "first_page": "187", "last_page": "197", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 187" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 924", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3637844 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0924-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489221 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 N.E.2d 432", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378433 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2654475 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070433 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 1090", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5307721 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/1090-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 S. Ct. 1043", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 1006", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 1072", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 600096, 602080, 601094, 599655, 601639, 599625, 600678, 601995, 601850, 599312, 602174, 600058, 601213, 600414, 601023 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/1072-11", "/us/484/1072-02", "/us/484/1072-09", "/us/484/1072-01", "/us/484/1072-12", "/us/484/1072-13", "/us/484/1072-15", "/us/484/1072-10", "/us/484/1072-08", "/us/484/1072-07", "/us/484/1072-06", "/us/484/1072-14", "/us/484/1072-05", "/us/484/1072-04", "/us/484/1072-03" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 1165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3542547 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 1339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 929", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5639791 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0929-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 955, "char_count": 24289, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.4357196114522507 }, "sha256": "f8223e2a16a8544a7aac51bd5b786490454060c125df11955a022226576729fa", "simhash": "1:e34af8eea258b57b", "word_count": 4105 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:26:25.592248+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IVAN TODD THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u20144(b)(1)) and acquitted of armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 18\u20142(a)). He appeals, contending (1) evidence of a statement which was purportedly related to plea bargaining was improperly admitted at his trial; (2) in closing argument, the prosecutor improperly defined the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury in such a manner as to lessen the State\u2019s burden of proof; and (3) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a deadly weapon was used in the battery of which he was convicted.\nAt defendant\u2019s trial, the victim, who is a haircutter by profession, stated that on the evening of December 19, 1987, he attended a Christmas party at the residence of Carol Wright. Several persons at the party were acquaintances whom the victim had met while a student at the Bloomington Academy of Beauty Culture. Defendant was among the guests at the party. The victim stated that during the course of the party, he saw defendant with a knife and that defendant talked about trading the knife for a hair-shaping razor blade, which is used for thinning hair. Defendant stated that he knew that Carol Wright possessed such a razor blade. During the party, the victim briefly saw the defendant in possession of a hair-shaping razor blade in the back bedroom of the Wright residence.\nThe victim further testified that he left the party at approximately 10:30 or 11 p.m. in the company of defendant and Paul Childs. The victim agreed to give defendant and Childs a ride to another party in the victim\u2019s car. The defendant sat in the front seat, and Childs sat in the middle of the backseat as the victim drove the car. There was no one at the scene of the party which defendant and Childs wanted to attend, and the victim therefore decided to return to the party at Wright\u2019s residence. En route, the victim \u201cstop[ped] by a girl\u2019s house\u201d at the request of defendant and Childs. When they arrived at that location, Childs left the car and was gone for a maximum of 10 to 15 minutes. After Childs left the car, the victim discovered that a bottle of vodka which had been in his car was missing. The victim frisked Childs upon his return, found the vodka in his possession, took it from him, and placed it by the driver\u2019s door of his car. When the victim took the bottle of vodka away from Childs, Childs claimed that it was his. The victim stated that he knew the vodka was his (the victim\u2019s) because it was still in a bag bearing the name of the store at which he had purchased it, and he knew that Childs did not have the vodka when he got into the car.\nThe victim stated that after recovering his bottle of vodka, he began to drive his car to the Wright residence. After driving a distance of one-half block, defendant pulled out \u201csomething like a knife,\u201d put it against the victim\u2019s throat and told the victim to take him and Childs to \u201cSunnyside.\u201d The defendant stated that if the victim did not cooperate, he would get hurt. The victim thereupon drove for a further distance, while the defendant continuously held the sharp object against his throat. The victim pulled the car over to a curb a couple of blocks from the Law and Justice Center. At that point, defendant turned off the ignition and grabbed the keys to the victim\u2019s car. The victim stated that at the same time, he grabbed the right hand of defendant, which was holding the knife, hit it against the steering wheel, and squeezed out of the car. The victim did not immediately know what happened to the object which the defendant was holding.\nAfter squeezing out of his car, the victim ran two blocks to the police station and reported the incident. He then returned to his car in the company of a police officer. They discovered that the glove compartment of the victim\u2019s car had been ransacked and that the bottle of vodka was missing.\nThe victim further testified that about a week after the incident involving the defendant, a friend of his discovered a \u201chair shaping blade\u201d under the seat of the victim\u2019s car. This was the same type of hair-shaping blade which he saw in defendant\u2019s possession during the party at the Wright residence. The victim further stated that the blade was not in his car prior to the evening of the party at the Wright residence and that when the victim\u2019s friend discovered the blade in the victim\u2019s car, it had a dried red substance on it which looked like blood.\nThe victim also testified that when he got to the police station, he noticed that his shirt had bloodstains on it and that there was blood on his neck. He further stated that after defendant placed the sharp object against his neck, he felt pain.\nOn cross-examination, the victim testified that he never saw defendant with the bottle of vodka. He further stated that he did not know what the object was which the defendant held to his neck. The victim further testified that while defendant held the object against his neck, defendant also had his other hand on the victim\u2019s neck. The victim acknowledged that the pain which he experienced at the time could have been caused by defendant\u2019s other hand, and that the cuts which he sustained could have been inflicted during the struggle just before he squeezed out of his car. The victim also acknowledged that he had had quite a bit to drink on the evening in question. The victim further testified on cross-examination that the defendant was not wearing gloves on the night of the party at the Wright residence.\nOn redirect examination, the victim stated that the injury to his neck consisted of both straight and jagged cuts, and that the straight cuts were \u201crazor fine.\u201d He further stated that a couple of weeks after the incident involving the defendant, he discovered that a coat which had been in his car on that evening was also missing.\nWhen asked on re-cross-examination if the cuts on his neck could have been caused by fingernails, the victim stated:\n\u201cI don\u2019t think so, I don\u2019t think so for the fact that they were longer. When you get scratched with a fingernail, it more or less scrapes instead of cuts. It was a clean cut. I don\u2019t think it was from fingernails.\u201d\nAlso testifying on behalf of the State was Vickie Walton. She stated that she saw defendant with a knife at the party at Carol Wright\u2019s residence on December 19 and 20, 1987. Walton testified that the knife had a dark handle and a long blade. She further testified that the bloodstained object found in the victim\u2019s car was a razor blade similar to the ones used in the razors at the beauty school which she attended. She also recalled a conversation at the party at Wright\u2019s residence in which defendant offered to trade Carol Wright a knife for a razor blade similar to the blade discovered in the victim\u2019s car. Walton further testified that she did not see cuts on the victim\u2019s neck while he was at the party at Wright\u2019s residence.\nOn cross-examination, Walton was impeached with a 1986 forgery conviction.\nDetective Jeff Sanders of the Bloomington police department stated that the victim gave him the blade which he recovered from his car. Sanders further testified that the substance on the object appeared to be dried blood.\nOn cross-examination, Sanders stated that no tests of the dried blood on the blade found in the victim\u2019s car were performed, and that he discovered no obviously apparent fingerprints on that object.\nFollowing Sanders\u2019 testimony, the court admitted into evidence the razor blade which the victim discovered in his car.\nDetective Mike Jordan of the Bloomington police department testified that when he observed the victim shortly after midnight on the morning of December 20, 1987, he noticed some fresh cuts to his neck area. The cuts appeared to have been made \u201cby a sharp instrument of some sort.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Jordan stated that he discovered no knife or razor blade when he searched the victim\u2019s car for evidence on the morning of December 20. He further stated that when he took the victim to the hospital on that morning, he required no stitches. Jordan also stated that the victim told him that he got cut during the struggle just before he escaped from his assailant.\nAt the conclusion of the State\u2019s case, the court admitted into evidence a transcript of a September 20, 1988, hearing on a motion of the defendant\u2019s court-appointed counsel for leave to withdraw. The prosecutor published to the jury a portion of the transcript in which the defendant stated: \u201cI know I am not guilty of nothing but aggravated battery ***.\u201d\nThe court denied a motion for a directed verdict as to both of the offenses with which defendant was charged. The defendant presented no evidence.\nFollowing a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced defendant to five years\u2019 imprisonment on the aggravated battery count of which he was found guilty.\nWe first consider defendant\u2019s contention that there is insufficient evidence to support his aggravated battery conviction, because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he utilized a deadly weapon in committing the aggravated battery of which he was convicted.\nIn determining whether the evidence is sufficient to establish a defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the pertinent inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have concluded that the evidence establishes the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 99 S. Ct. 2781; People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277.\nAs both parties point out, under the indictment filed in this cause, evidence that defendant used a deadly weapon was necessary in order for the battery which defendant committed to be enhanced to the more serious offense of aggravated battery. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u20144(b)(1).) Use of a deadly weapon during the commission of a battery may be established by circumstantial evidence if there is some physical manifestation of a weapon (People v. Parks (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 929, 365 N.E.2d 1339) or some other evidence from which the use of a weapon may be inferred. People v. Partee (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 231, 511 N.E.2d 1165, cert, denied (1988), 484 U.S. 1072, 98 L. Ed. 2d 1006, 108 S. Ct. 1043; People v. Goodwin (1975), 24 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 322 N.E.2d 569.\nIn the present case, there is ample circumstantial evidence to support a conclusion by a rational trier of fact that the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a deadly weapon in committing the battery of the victim. The victim testified that the defendant pulled out an object and placed it against his throat. In his testimony, the victim repeatedly referred to the object as a knife. The cuts on the victim\u2019s neck appear to have been caused by a long, sharp object. The discovery of a hair-shaping blade with dried blood on it in the victim\u2019s car approximately one week after the battery would not in itself be sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant used a deadly weapon in committing the battery. However, this was a factor which the jury properly could have considered together with the other evidence in concluding that defendant used a deadly weapon in committing the battery of which he was accused.\nWe next consider whether evidence of a plea-related statement was improperly admitted at defendant\u2019s trial. Admitted into evidence at defendant\u2019s trial was a transcript of a September 12, 1988, pretrial hearing on a motion by defendant\u2019s counsel for leave to withdraw. The prosecutor read a portion of this transcript to the jury. The part of the transcript which was read to the jury included the following response by defendant to the court\u2019s query as to whether he desired the appointment of other counsel:\n\u201cYes, like \u2014 because I really don\u2019t want to perform this myself. All I really want is somebody to work with me, you know, on my case, you know. That is all I want, you know? I feel as though Mr. Butler \u2014 evidently he didn\u2019t have the time or the patience to sit down and look at my case. It wasn\u2019t like I wanted to represent myself, because I am no lawyer, you know? I just wanted, you know, justice, you know? I mean I been up here for three pretrials and, you know, all this stuff ain\u2019t necessary, you know, especially when I know that I am not guilty of nothing but aggravated battery, you knowl\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nDefendant contends that when considered in the context of his previous statements to the court at other pretrial hearings, and a letter which he wrote to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, this statement was a part of a plea-related discussion and was thus improperly admitted into evidence in violation of Supreme Court Rule 402(f). 107 Ill. 2d R. 402(f).\nThe defendant observes that appearing in the common law record is a copy of a letter which he wrote to the McLean County State\u2019s Attorney in May 1988. In that letter, he offered to \u201ctake a Battery [sic] Class A, B, C,\u201d with a sentence of \u201c3yr. intens [sic] [intensive probation] and 4 mt. in here and some commt. savist. [sic] [community service] work,\u201d and further stated, \u201cI want to pay his [the victim\u2019s] Doctor Bill.\u201d The defendant asserts that when considered in the context of this statement and his other statements to the court at both prior and subsequent pretrial hearings, his September 12 admission was part of an ongoing attempt to engage the trial court in the plea negotiation process when he felt that his counsel was not participating. Defendant notes that the State referred to his September 12 statement in its opening statements, read it into evidence over defense objections, and referred to it extensively in closing argument. The defendant maintains that the admission of the purported plea-related statement which he made at the September 12, 1988, hearing denied him a fair trial.\nThe State asserts that at the September 12, 1988, hearing, defendant did not request that the trial judge \u201cmake a deal,\u201d did not convey to the trial judge any offer to plea bargain, did not address the assistant State\u2019s Attorney who was present, and did not testify as to what his expectations were. The State argues there was thus at that time no explicit manifestation of a subjective intent on the part of the defendant to plea bargain.\nThe State further asserts that a defendant\u2019s actions over a five-month period are not relevant in determining whether a statement on the part of a defendant was plea related. The State maintains that even if the September 12, 1988, statement is considered in the context of the defendant\u2019s statements before and after the September 12, 1988, hearing, defendant still did not manifest an expectation of negotiating a guilty plea. The State observes that defendant writing to the State\u2019s Attorney a letter setting forth the terms under which he would be willing to plead guilty, as well as his previously pleading guilty to a felony, demonstrates that he knew that the State\u2019s Attorney, and not the trial judge, was the person with whom to plea bargain. The State also argues that the defendant may have had other possible motives for making the admission here at issue, such as a desire to be released on a lower bond. Finally, the State asserts that even if defendant had a subjective expectation of negotiating a guilty plea on September 12, 1988, that expectation was unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.\nSupreme Court Rule 402(f) provides:\n\u201cPlea Discussions, Plea Agreements, Pleas of Guilty Inadmissible Under Certain Circumstances. If a plea discussion does not result in a plea of guilty, or if a plea of guilty is not accepted or is withdrawn, or if judgment on a plea of guilty is reversed on direct or collateral review, neither the plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea, or judgment shall be admissible against the defendant in any criminal proceeding.\u201d (107 Ill. 2d R. 402(f).)\nIn determining whether an admission by a defendant was plea related and is therefore inadmissible, a court must first inquire whether the accused demonstrated a subjective expectation to negotiate a plea. Second, the court must inquire whether this expectation was reasonable under the totality of the objective circumstances. Where a defendant manifests no explicit subjective expectations in making the statement at issue, the objective circumstances surrounding the statement take precedence in determining whether it was plea related. (People v. Friedman (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 341, 403 N.E.2d 229.) Before a statement may be characterized as plea related, \u201cit must contain the rudiments of the negotiation process, i.e., a willingness by defendant to enter a plea of guilty in return for concessions by the State.\u201d Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 353, 403 N.E.2d at 236.\nAssuming, without deciding, that the events which preceded and followed defendant\u2019s September 12, 1988, admission may properly be considered in determining whether that statement was plea related and is thus inadmissible, there is nothing in the record to support defendant\u2019s contention that this admission was plea related. Defendant provided no explicit indication of his subjective expectations in making this admission, and the objective circumstances do not support a conclusion that it was plea related. All of the defendant\u2019s other statements to the court on which defendant relies focus on either dissatisfaction with his counsel or requests for bond reduction. Likewise, in the September 12 statement, the defendant expressed a desire to obtain another attorney who would work more closely with him in the preparation of his case. Moreover, neither this statement, nor any of the defendant\u2019s other statements to the court, contain any indications of the terms on which the defendant was willing to plead guilty. In view of both his letter to the State\u2019s Attorney setting forth the terms on which he would plead guilty to battery and his prior plea of guilty to the offense of burglary, defendant certainly knew that the State\u2019s Attorney, and not the trial judge, was the proper person to approach in order to begin plea negotiations. Also, the trial judge at no time manifested a willingness to enter into plea negotiations with defendant.\nThis court\u2019s recent decision in People v. Connolly (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 429, 542 N.E.2d 517, does not support defendant\u2019s position that Rule 402(f) was violated in the present case. Connolly involved an inquiry by a suspect to a deputy sheriff as to whether \u201c \u2018deals\u2019 \u201d were made in the county. (Connolly, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 433, 542 N.E.2d at 520.) This court held that testimony concerning the suspect\u2019s inquiry was improperly admitted because the jury could have regarded the inquiry as an admission of guilt, despite the defendant\u2019s protestations of innocence.\nThe inquiry at issue in Connolly could have had no purpose other than to serve as an overture for the beginning of plea negotiations. Furthermore, the inquiry was directed to a law enforcement officer. In the present case, the admission occurred in a conversation with the trial judge concerning the defendant\u2019s desire for the appointment of other counsel. Also, unlike in the present case, the record in Connolly apparently contained no indications that the defendant was familiar with the plea negotiation process.\nIn sum, there are neither subjective nor objective indications that defendant\u2019s admission was a plea-related statement. Consequently, its introduction into evidence did not deny defendant a fair trial.\nDuring closing argument, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cAnother instruction that you need to talk about, need to think about, ladies and gentlemen, is the definition of the burden of proof. The State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. That is sort of textbook law. I think we all know about that. I submit to you folks that the operative word in that particular definition is the word \u2018reasonable.\u2019 We don\u2019t have to prove our case beyond any doubt or beyond a shadow of a doubt, just beyond a reasonable doubt. What that means, ladies and gentlemen, is that any doubt which you have which would defeat the State\u2019s theory I submit must be reasonable. It\u2019s got to fit together, it\u2019s got to make sense in light of all the other evidence in the case.\u201d\nDefendant contends that in making this statement, the prosecutor created a presumption in favor of the State, which the jurors\u2019 reasonable doubts had to defeat in order for defendant to be acquitted. The defendant also asserts that these comments may have improperly shifted the burden of proof from the State by requiring either the defense or the jurors' reasonable doubts to defeat the State\u2019s theory of the case.\nThe State asserts that any error in the prosecutor\u2019s comments regarding reasonable doubt was waived by the defendant\u2019s failure to object to these comments at trial or to specify them in his post-trial motion. The People further argue that these comments do not represent an attempt to define reasonable doubt but are merely an argument regarding the weight of the evidence. The State also contends that the prosecutorial comments at issue did not reduce the State\u2019s burden of proof, and that even if these comments were improper, they did not substantially prejudice the defendant. In support of the latter contention, the State relies on (1) the jury instructions and the portions of the arguments of counsel emphasizing the State\u2019s burden of proof and the defendant\u2019s presumption of innocence and (2) the presumption that the jurors followed the court\u2019s instructions.\nIt is well established that the concept of reasonable doubt needs no definition and that is improper for the court or counsel to attempt to define reasonable doubt to the jury. (People v. Weinstein (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 467, 220 N.E.2d 432; People v. Eddington (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 745, 473 N.E.2d 103.) The comments here at issue could have been construed by at least some jurors as implying that the State\u2019s evidence \u2014 or the State\u2019s theory of the case \u2014 enjoys a presumption of veracity, which the defendant must defeat or negate if he is to be acquitted. Because of the damaging effect which statements like this might have on such fundamental concepts of justice as the defendant\u2019s presumption of innocence and the prosecution\u2019s burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the charged offenses (see Weinstein, 35 Ill. 2d 467, 220 N.E.2d 432), we must consider whether these comments require reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction under the plain error exception to the waiver doctrine. 107 Ill. 2d R. 615; see People v. Ellis (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 924, 481 N.E.2d 320.\nWe conclude that although the prosecutorial remarks here at issue at least bordered on impropriety, they did not contribute to the jury\u2019s verdict to the extent that reversal of the defendant\u2019s conviction is required. The evidence in this case was largely undisputed. There was no evidence which contradicted the victim\u2019s testimony that a battery occurred or the victim\u2019s identification of the defendant as his attacker. Indeed, the only matter seriously disputed was whether the defendant used a deadly weapon in committing the battery. The evidence does not reasonably support a conclusion other than that a sharp metal object caused the cuts on the victim\u2019s neck. Because there was overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, we hold the prosecutor\u2019s comments concerning the concept of reasonable doubt and the State\u2019s burden of proof did not constitute plain error.\nThe defendant\u2019s aggravated battery conviction is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLUND and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Gloria A. Carroll, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Charles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IVAN TODD THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201489\u20140076\nOpinion filed November 30, 1989.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Gloria A. Carroll, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nCharles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0187-01", "first_page_order": 209, "last_page_order": 219 }