{ "id": 2511084, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD McCLANAHAN, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. McClanahan", "decision_date": "1989-11-30", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201489\u20140425", "first_page": "276", "last_page": "282", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 276" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 1064", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3135959 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" }, { "page": "608" }, { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5494402 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 U.S. 798", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6191830 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/456/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 1032", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203160 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/1032-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 S. Ct. 494", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 979", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 601088, 600289, 601378, 600256, 599556, 599980, 602257, 600273, 599826, 600148, 602357, 602168, 602365, 599934, 599231 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0979-04", "/us/484/0979-11", "/us/484/0979-03", "/us/484/0979-09", "/us/484/0979-01", "/us/484/0979-08", "/us/484/0979-14", "/us/484/0979-07", "/us/484/0979-12", "/us/484/0979-05", "/us/484/0979-02", "/us/484/0979-13", "/us/484/0979-06", "/us/484/0979-15", "/us/484/0979-10" ] }, { "cite": "825 F.2d 152", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10544250 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/825/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 U.S. 583", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1519506 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/417/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 U.S. 42", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168334 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/399/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 U.S. 132", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6137701 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/267/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2615125 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564623 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 N.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126241 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0216-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 714, "char_count": 15810, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.8172472706271035e-08, "percentile": 0.3024865542354014 }, "sha256": "c98765c5d76391f7e0ad4750e2c9084824ded5086aa46e4ece4c481ec2c5b428", "simhash": "1:a0be7b869745a06a", "word_count": 2668 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:26:25.592248+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD McCLANAHAN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals the order of the trial court granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. The State alleges that the trial court incorrectly found that no probable cause existed to justify the search of defendant\u2019s automobile.\nWe disagree and affirm.\nOn September 2, 1988, defendant Donald McClanahan was arrested and charged with the offenses of possession and delivery of a controlled substance (Ill. Rev Stat., 1988 Supp., ch. 56\u00bd, pars. 1402(b), 1401(b)(2)) and unlawful use of a weapon (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 24\u20141(a)(4)). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging that the search of his automobile prior to his arrest was in violation of his fourth amendment rights. The court ruled that, although the officers had probable cause to stop defendant\u2019s automobile, they were without probable cause to search it. As a result, the court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the handgun found within the vehicle and the controlled substances found on the defendant. The controlled substances were found after defendant was placed under arrest because of the handgun found in the vehicle.\nTestifying for the State at the suppression hearing were Ralph Caldwell (Caldwell) and Richard Wiese (Wiese), the two Springfield police officers who were present at defendant\u2019s arrest. Caldwell testified that on September 2, 1988, at approximately 10 p.m., he was investigating an armed robbery that had occurred a few minutes earlier. After learning the description of the armed robbers from other officers investigating that armed robbery, Caldwell advised them that the description fit Michael Lipscomb (Lipscomb) and Rochelle Williams (Williams).\nFifteen minutes later, Caldwell went to Lipscomb\u2019s residence and knocked on his front door. No one answered. Caldwell then went into Lipscomb\u2019s backyard to speak to Wiese when a vehicle pulled into the front driveway. Caldwell observed at least two occupants in the vehicle, but could not identify who they were or even whether they were men or women. Caldwell testified that he saw the automobile back out of the driveway at a fast pace. He then ran to his police car, turned it around, and chased the vehicle.\nCaldwell testified that he had difficulty in catching up to defendant\u2019s car because defendant was traveling at a high rate of speed. He chased the vehicle for about 10 to 12 blocks because the car looked \u201cawful suspicious.\u201d Caldwell also testified that he pulled the car over because he thought that Lipscomb was in the car.\nAfter Caldwell stopped defendant\u2019s car, he radioed dispatch, approached the vehicle, and spoke with defendant, who remained in the driver\u2019s seat. Caldwell saw no one else in the car. He asked defendant for his driver\u2019s license and found the license to be valid. While defendant was giving Caldwell his license, Caldwell asked defendant where \u201cMike\u201d was. Caldwell testified that defendant said, \u201cMike who?\u201d Caldwell then stated that he told defendant that \u201cMike\u201d was Michael Lipscomb. Defendant then answered Caldwell and told him that Lipscomb had told him \u201cto get out of there,\u201d and that defendant had dropped him off.\nIt was at this point that Caldwell asked defendant to step to the rear of his car. As Caldwell was running checks on defendant, Wiese walked up to the driver\u2019s side of defendant\u2019s automobile, entered it, searched it, and found a gun. Defendant did not consent to a search of his car. Defendant was then placed under arrest, told to put his hands on the car and searched. Caldwell recovered $100 and cocaine from a pouch that defendant was holding. Defendant told Caldwell that the gun and cocaine were not his, that they were \u201cMike\u2019s.\u201d Caldwell did not have the results of the check until \u201ceverything was over.\u201d No warrants were out on defendant, and no tickets were issued for any violations.\nWiese corroborated much of Caldwell\u2019s testimony. Wiese testified that he also went to Lipscomb\u2019s house 10 to 15 minutes after being present at the scene of the armed robbery because Caldwell knew the description of the armed robber to match that of Lipscomb. Wiese further testified that while he was talking to Caldwell in the backyard, defendant\u2019s car pulled into Lipscomb\u2019s driveway and shined its headlights on the two officers. Wiese observed that the car immediately backed out of the driveway and drove away. He also noticed that the car seemed to pull out of the driveway faster than normal. Wiese followed Caldwell and indicated that he had difficulty in catching up to both defendant and Caldwell. Wiese stated that he was driving pretty quickly and only caught up to them after Caldwell had defendant\u2019s vehicle stopped.\nWiese went on to testify that defendant had gotten out of the driver\u2019s side of the car and was standing right by the door when Wiese walked up to the vehicle. Wiese testified that Caldwell told him that defendant had told him that Lipscomb was in the car with him. Then Wiese searched the driver\u2019s area of the car and found a gun under the front driver\u2019s seat. He said that he searched the car because Lipscomb matched the description of the armed robbery suspect and defendant stated that Lipscomb had been in the car with him. Wiese had no permission to search the vehicle nor a search warrant. After the gun was pulled out of the car, defendant was placed under arrest and searched. The rest of Wiese\u2019s testimony matched Caldwell\u2019s.\nThe defendant testified that he was driving his car when he picked up a black male at the corner of Martin Luther King Drive and Capitol Avenue. Defendant indicated that he did not know who the person was. In fact, defendant testified that he had never even heard of Michael Lipscomb.\nDefendant testified that the man got in his car and sat in the front passenger seat with a book-bag shoulder pouch in his possession. Defendant gave the man a ride to his house as the man pointed directions to it. As defendant drove into the man\u2019s driveway, his headlights shone on two uniformed officers in the backyard. The man told him to leave, so he did, and defendant drove 5 to 15 feet around the corner to let the man off. The man got out of the car and left the pouch and revolver in it.\nDefendant testified that he first saw the revolver when he let the man off and the man had put the revolver under the passenger seat. When stopped by the police officers, defendant did not tell them that someone had put a gun under the front seat.\nContrary to the police officers\u2019 testimony, defendant testified that there was nothing unusual about his driving when he left the driveway of Lipscomb\u2019s house. He also said that he did not speed. Defendant further testified that he was inside his car when the police stopped him and asked him for his driver\u2019s license. Defendant said that he sat still until Caldwell told him to get out of his car. Defendant then got out of his car and stood beside the driver\u2019s door.\nDefendant testified that the second police officer came soon after, and the first police officer told the second police officer to search defendant\u2019s car. He gave no consent to search the automobile nor was he told that he was under arrest. Defendant testified that after the second officer found the gun under the passenger seat, the first officer told defendant to put his hands against the car and searched defendant. The officers took the pouch found on defendant, unzipped it, and examined its contents. Defendant testified that the pouch had been left on defendant\u2019s seat, and when defendant was asked to get out of the car, defendant took the pouch with him.\nBased on the above facts, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. Even though the trial court found the police acted appropriately in stopping the vehicle, the court found no probable cause for the police to search it. The court concluded that there was no probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be contained in the vehicle after the police officers determined that neither Lipscomb nor Williams was in the car and that defendant was not suspected of being involved in the armed robbery. In addition, the court found that the weapon was not in plain view and that defendant was not subject to arrest before the vehicle was searched.\nFurther, the court found that defendant\u2019s vehicle was searched on a \u201chunch and a hope.\u201d No evidence was presented to show the vehicle was in any way involved in the crime.\nOn a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant has the burden of proof to make a prima facie showing that the evidence was obtained by an illegal search and seizure. (People v. Neal (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 216, 218, 486 N.E.2d 898, 899.) A reviewing court will not reverse the trial court\u2019s finding on a motion to suppress unless the finding is manifestly erroneous. People v. Galvin (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 153, 162, 535 N.E.2d 837, 841; People v. Binder (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 624, 627, 536 N.E.2d 218, 220.\nIn its brief, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. In support of its argument, the State maintains that the investigating officers had authority to conduct a search of defendant\u2019s vehicle under Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280, and subsequent cases. In the alternative, the State argues that the search for weapons was legal under the authority granted in Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868, and subsequent cases.\nThe State argues that under Carroll, probable cause for a search arises when circumstances known to the searching officer reasonably support the conclusion an automobile contains contraband. However, this probable cause determination must be based on objective facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, not merely on the subjective good faith of the officers. (Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280.) The State further argues that the officers\u2019 search of defendant\u2019s automobile is justified because the circumstances which constitute probable cause to search a particular automobile for particular articles are often unforeseeable and a car is readily moveable. (Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 U.S. 42, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 90 S. Ct. 1975.) Cardwell v. Lewis (1974), 417 U.S. 583, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325, 94 S. Ct. 2464, and United States v. Rivera (7th Cir. 1987), 825 F.2d 152, cert, denied sub nom. Robles v. United States (1987), 484 U.S. 979, 98 L. Ed. 2d 492, 108 S. Ct. 494, are also cited by the State for the same proposition. However, none of these cases diminishes the initial requirement of probable cause to justify the search of defendant\u2019s automobile.\nIn the alternative, the State argues that under Terry and Michigan v. Long (1983), 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469, the police were allowed to search defendant\u2019s car in the absence of probable cause based upon a reasonable belief that the defendant posed a danger to the investigating officers. Here, however, the police had no reason to suspect that defendant was armed and dangerous, nor did they testify to any such concern. In addition, defendant posed no danger to the officers since he was not in his car at the time his vehicle was searched.\nThe general rule, recently reiterated in Binder, is that police must obtain a search warrant prior to searching a motor vehicle unless the circumstances fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. (Binder, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 627, 536 N.E.2d at 220.) One such exception is if police have probable cause to believe the vehicle was used in or contains evidence of a crime. (United States v. Ross (1982), 456 U.S. 798, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 102 S. Ct. 2157; Binder, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 627, 536 N.E.2d at 220.) Given such a finding of probable cause, the permissible scope of a warrantless search may be as broad as that which a magistrate could have legitimately authorized by a search warrant. Binder, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 627, 536 N.E.2d at 220-21.\nAlthough People v. Lippert (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 171, 432 N.E.2d 605, reversing People v. Lippert (1980), 93 Ill. App. 3d 273, 415 N.E.2d 1064, involves an arrest rather than a search and seizure, the case sheds some light on the probable cause issue. In Lippert, a police officer observed an automobile containing two individuals matching descriptions given to him by the victims of an armed robbery shortly after the armed robbery. The appellate court found that the officer\u2019s pulling the vehicle over to the side of the road and having the driver and passenger step out was a justifiable Terry stop, but absent probable cause to believe that defendant and his passenger were the robbers, the Terry stop did not justify the officer\u2019s detaining a suspect and transporting him from the scene of the stop to another place for purposes of identification and further questioning.\nThe appellate court did not decide whether probable cause existed at the time the officer transported the defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, reversed the appellate court and decided the probable cause issue. In its analysis, the supreme court determined that probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. (Lippert, 89 Ill. 2d at 177, 432 N.E.2d at 607.) The court stated:\n\u201cProbable cause for arrest exists when facts and circumstances within the arresting officer\u2019s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested has committed the offense.\u201d (Lippert, 89 Ill. 2d at 178, 432 N.E.2d at 608.)\nThe court then stated that mere suspicion that the person arrested has committed the offense is an insufficient basis for arrest. Lippert, 89 Ill. 2d at 178, 432 N.E.2d at 608.\nConsistent with the Lippert analysis, we find that the facts of this case do not allow a finding of probable cause to search defendant\u2019s vehicle. The strongest factor connecting defendant\u2019s vehicle to the armed robbery is timing. The arrest of defendant occurred about 30 minutes after the armed robbery occurred. However, once the police stopped and questioned defendant and determined that defendant was not Lipscomb and that Lipscomb was not in defendant\u2019s car, no probable cause then existed to search defendant\u2019s car. At that point, the police had no basis to believe that defendant\u2019s car contained any fruits or instrumentalities of the armed robbery they were investigating. The record suggests that early on in their investigation the police jumped to the conclusion that Lipscomb had been a passenger in defendant\u2019s car and, in doing so, put \u201cMike\u2019s\u201d name in defendant\u2019s mouth. The testimony of the police officers shows that defendant never acknowledged that he knew who his passenger was.\nThus, we affirm the trial court\u2019s granting of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. The trial court\u2019s findings are not manifestly erroneous. The trial court carefully examined the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing. The State has not met its burden to overturn the trial court\u2019s decision on the motion to suppress evidence. The trial court\u2019s finding of no probable cause for the search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle and the suppression of the evidence seized as the fruits of that search are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, Ed., and KNECHT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Donald M. Cadagin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Timothy J. Londrigan, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Daniel D. Yuhas and Judith L. Libby, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD McCLANAHAN, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201489\u20140425\nOpinion filed November 30, 1989.\nDonald M. Cadagin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Timothy J. Londrigan, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Judith L. Libby, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0276-01", "first_page_order": 298, "last_page_order": 304 }